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ABSTRACT	
This	 thesis	 provides	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 how	 the	 power	 of	 the	 United	
States	Federal	Reserve,	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	European	Central	Bank	has	
changed	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 reorientation	 of	 central	 banking	 towards	
financial	 stability	 since	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis.	 Drawing	 on	 a	wide	 range	 of	
primary	and	secondary	sources,	including	more	than	30	interviews	with	central	
bankers	 and	 other	 public	 officials,	 the	 thesis	 demonstrates	 that	 to	 different	
extents,	 each	 of	 these	 organisations	 has	 exhibited	 a	 more	 authoritative	
relationship	with	its	key	interlocutors	in	recent	years.	The	thesis	attributes	this	
variegated	 transformation	 to	 the	 policy	 entrepreneurship	 of	
transgovernmentally	 networked	 central	 bankers,	 who	 acted	 in	 concert	 with	
sympathetic	 executive	 politicians	 to	 operationalise	 new	 ‘macroprudential’	
policy	 frameworks	 after	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Central	 bankers’	 collective	 policy	
entrepreneurship	 was	 guided	 by	 shared	 normative	 beliefs	 about	 their	
appropriate	 role	 in	 respect	 of	 financial	 stability,	 but	 their	 embrace	 of	
macroprudential	 ideas	 was	 far	 from	 uniform.	 Central	 bankers	 in	 each	
jurisdiction	 pursued	 subtly	 different	 policy	 objectives	 within	 idiosyncratic	
political,	cultural	and	 institutional	 terrains,	 leading	to	distinctive	 local	varieties	
of	reform.	The	thesis	argues	that	central	banks’	heightened	authority	since	the	
financial	 crisis	has	been	underpinned	by	an	 increase	 in	 their	 structural	power,	
which	owed	to	the	heightened	reliance	of	politicians	and	financial	market	actors	
on	central	banks’	unique	ability	to	create	new	base	money.	It	also	demonstrates	
how	transformations	in	central	banks’	authority	and	structural	power	feed	into	
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their	 overall	 capacity	 to	 achieve	 their	 financial	 stability	 objectives.	 The	 thesis	
argues	that	in	the	post-crisis	regulatory	framework,	central	banks	are	at	risk	of	
underdelivering	 on	 their	 mandates.	 A	 bias	 towards	 inaction	 in	 the	 face	 of	
uncertainty	and	insufficient	willingness	to	break	with	pre-crisis	economic	tropes	
threaten	to	undermine	central	banks’	efforts	to	maintain	financial	stability	over	
the	medium	term.	
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1 INTRODUCTION	
1.1 THE	END	OF	AN	ERA	IN	CENTRAL	BANKING	
The	global	financial	crisis	that	began	in	2007	heralded	the	end	of	an	era	for	the	
major	central	banks	of	the	advanced	industrial	world.	For	almost	two	decades,	
starting	 in	 the	 late	1980s,	most	advanced	economy	central	banks	had	focused	
increasingly	 narrowly	 on	 one	 objective:	 ensuring	 a	 low	 and	 steady	 rate	 of	
inflation.	While	central	banks	have	always	taken	a	close	interest	in	the	activities	
of	 banks	 and	 other	 financial	 institutions,	 by	 the	 late	 2000s,	 the	 objective	 of	
financial	 stability	 had,	 for	 some	 central	 banks,	 become	 secondary	 to	 that	 of	
price	stability.	In	many	advanced	industrial	countries,	the	job	of	monitoring	and	
controlling	risk-taking	by	commercial	banks	–	a	central	component	in	any	effort	
to	guard	against	financial	crises	–	was	assigned	to	organisations	other	than	the	
central	bank.		
The	period	since	the	onset	of	 the	crisis	has	been	one	of	 intense	 innovation	
for	the	central	banks	of	most	advanced	economies.	Having	cut	nominal	interest	
rates	 almost	 to	 zero	 by	 early	 2009,	 central	 banks	 have	 experimented	 with	 a	
range	 of	 unconventional	 monetary	 policies	 to	 help	 boost	 their	 stagnating	
economies.	 They	 have	 pumped	 vast	 quantities	 of	 new	 money	 into	 their	
respective	financial	systems,	buying	up	large	volumes	of	government	securities	
and	other	 financial	 assets	 in	 the	process.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 they	have	placed	
new	 emphasis	 on	 the	 objective	 of	 financial	 stability.	 Central	 banks	 have	
toughened	 regulatory	 requirements	 for	 financial	 firms,	 aiming	 to	make	 those	
institutions	more	 resilient	both	 individually	and	collectively.	Much	work	 is	on-
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going	to	limit	the	complex	interconnectedness	of	banks	and	‘non-bank’	financial	
entities,	which	was	a	major	factor	in	the	financial	contagion	that	spread	rapidly	
around	the	world	from	the	summer	of	2007.	Some	advanced	economy	central	
banks	 have	 taken	 measures	 to	 limit	 cyclical	 fluctuations	 in	 credit	 and	 asset	
prices,	resurrecting	forms	of	financial	regulation	that	were	common	in	the	three	
decades	after	the	Second	World	War,	but	which	had	fallen	out	of	favour	in	the	
era	of	market	triumphalism	that	began	in	the	1980s.	
A	 core	 claim	of	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 the	major	 central	 banks	of	 the	advanced	
industrial	 economies	 have	 become	 more	 powerful	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 this	
‘financial	stability	turn’	in	central	banking.	Drawing	on	a	wide	range	of	primary	
and	secondary	sources,	including	interviews	with	key	central	bankers	and	public	
officials,	the	thesis	supports	this	claim	by	comparing	the	changing	power	of	the	
US	Federal	Reserve,	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	and	the	Bank	of	England.1	
In	order	 to	make	this	comparison,	 the	 thesis	proposes	a	 threefold	 typology	of	
central	 bank	 power.	 This	 typology	 encompasses	 central	 banks’	authority	 over	
other	 actors	 in	 society,	 including	 their	 ability	 to	 win	 policy	 debates	 both	 in	
public	 and	 behind	 closed	 doors;	 their	 structural	 power,	 which	 denotes	 the	
extent	 to	 which	 they	 are	 able	 to	 shape	 the	 contexts	 in	 which	 other	 actors	
perceive	and	frame	their	preferences;	and	their	capacity,	which	refers	to	their	
ability	to	achieve	their	statutory	and	self-defined	objectives	whether	in	respect	
of	financial	markets	or	monetary	policy.		
One	 of	 the	 core	 resources	 contributing	 to	 a	 central	 bank’s	authority	 is	 the	
formal	 legal	 authority	 it	 exercises	 as	 an	 agent	 of	 the	 state.	 All	 three	 of	 the	
central	banks	considered	in	this	thesis	have	been	delegated	new	legal	authority	
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since	2008.	In	addition	to	their	traditional	monetary	policy	functions,	each	now	
operates	 in	 an	 expanded	 policy	 space	 that	 includes	 ‘macroprudential’	 policy,	
which	focuses	on	mitigating	risks	to	financial	stability	arising	at	the	level	of	the	
financial	system	as	a	whole,	and	‘microprudential’	policy,	which	focuses	on	risks	
to	 the	 safety	 and	 soundness	 of	 individual	 financial	 institutions.	 However,	 the	
expansion	of	 these	central	banks’	authority	has	been	 far	 from	uniform.	 In	 the	
United	Kingdom,	the	Bank	of	England	has	a	broad	legal	mandate	to	implement	
both	macroprudential	and	microprudential	policy,	 in	addition	 to	 its	 traditional	
monetary	policy	competencies.	 In	 the	United	States,	 the	Federal	Reserve	now	
has	strong	regulatory	and	supervisory	authority	in	respect	of	large,	‘systemically	
important’,	 financial	 institutions,	 but	 macroprudential	 oversight	 has	 been	
assigned	to	a	multi-agency	Financial	Stability	Oversight	Council	(FSOC),	which	is	
chaired	by	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury.	 In	the	European	Union	(EU),	the	ECB	
has	new	microprudential	supervisory	competencies	for	banks	in	the	euro	area,	
but	 it	 shares	 these	 competencies	with	 the	 supervisory	 authorities	 of	member	
states.	 It	 also	 plays	 a	 leading	 role	 in	 macroprudential	 policy,	 albeit	 as	 one	
organisation	 in	a	complex	multi-level	 framework	 involving	differentiated	 levels	
of	 centralisation	 depending	 on	 which	 countries	 and	 categories	 of	 financial	
activity	are	involved	(see	McPhilemy	2016).		
Beyond	 their	 legal	mandates,	many	 factors	 affect	 central	 banks’	 authority.	
Inter-agency	 relations	 differ	 from	one	 country	 to	 the	 next	 and	 do	 not	 always	
reflect	what	 is	mandated	by	statute.	Central	banks	encounter	varying	 levels	of	
political	resistance	to	their	operations,	most	notably	from	financial	 institutions	
that	stand	to	lose	from	policies	oriented	towards	greater	financial	stability,	but	
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also	 from	 wider	 societal	 constituencies,	 which	 may	 oppose	 measures	 that	
restrict	access	 to	credit	and	potentially	 lower	economic	growth.	 In	 the	United	
States,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 and	 the	 multi-agency	 FSOC	 have	 faced	 fierce	
resistance	 from	 certain	 non-bank	 financial	 institutions,	 which	 have	 been	
supported	 by	 Republican	 politicians	 in	 Congress.	 By	 contrast,	most	 legislative	
politicians	 in	 the	 European	 Parliament	 have	 regarded	 the	 ECB’s	 actions	 to	
prevent	systemic	risks	as	excessively	timid.		
Central	 banks	 perform	unique	 functions	 in	 their	 respective	 economies	 that	
give	 them	 an	 ability	 to	 shape	 the	 contexts	within	which	 other	 societal	 actors	
operate.	 By	 manipulating	 interest	 rates,	 central	 banks	 alter	 the	 financial	
conditions	 facing	 fiscal	 policymakers,	 market	 participants,	 firms	 and	
households.	Likewise,	in	determining	prudential	policies,	central	banks	alter	the	
costs	and	rewards	associated	with	particular	categories	of	financial	activity.	To	
the	extent	that	central	banks	can	manipulate	the	conditions	within	which	other	
actors	 perceive	 and	 define	 their	 preferences,	 they	 may	 be	 said	 to	 exercise	
structural	 power.	 Central	 banks’	 structural	 power	 derives	 from	 the	 economic	
functions	 they	perform,	 including,	most	notably,	 their	unique	ability	 to	 create	
new	money	 at	 will	 (or	 ‘by	 fiat’).	 Yet	 central	 banks’	 structural	 power	 is	 by	 no	
means	constant.	At	any	given	moment,	structural	power	may	be	mediated	by	a	
variety	of	factors	including	the	degree	to	which	other	actors	rely	on	the	central	
bank	 for	 their	 immediate	political	 or	 economic	 survival,	 the	 substitutability	of	
new	 channels	 of	 credit	 intermediation	 for	 existing	 ones	 and	 the	 ideological	
preferences	of	central	bankers	themselves.		
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Central	banks’	structural	power	underpins	their	ability	to	win	policy	debates	
and	 take	 actions	 in	 line	 with	 their	 own	 preferences.	 However,	 even	 were	 a	
central	 bank	 to	 be	 in	 a	 structurally	 advantageous	 position	 vis-à-vis	 its	 key	
interlocutors,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	it	would	have	the	capacity	to	succeed	
in	meeting	 its	statutory	or	self-defined	objectives.	The	great	failures	of	central	
banking	of	the	past,	such	as	the	calamitous	effort	to	restore	the	gold	standard	
as	 the	 international	 exchange	 rate	 regime	 after	 the	 First	 World	 War	 (see	
Ahamed	 2009),	 were	 rooted	 not	 in	 an	 inability	 of	 central	 bankers	 to	 impose	
their	 will	 over	 politicians	 or	 financial	 market	 participants.	 Rather,	 they	 arose	
from	the	ideational	proclivities	of	central	bankers	and	their	deficient	theories	of	
how	 the	 world	 confronting	 them	 actually	 operates.	 Central	 banks’	 ability	 to	
attain	 their	 objectives	 –	 their	 capacity	 –	 depends	 on	 the	 policy	 choices	 they	
make,	which	in	turn	are	governed	in	large	part	by	the	theories	and	assumptions	
they	 use	 in	 defining	 policy	 problems	 and	 devising	 solutions	 to	 them.	 On	 a	
practical	level,	successful	goal	attainment	also	depends	on	the	extent	to	which	
central	 banks’	 policies	 are	 coordinated	 with	 other	 relevant	 agencies.	 Fiscal	
policymakers,	other	financial	regulatory	authorities	and	the	authorities	of	other	
jurisdictions	 all	 make	 policies	 that	 directly	 impinge	 on	 the	 financial	 market	
activities	that	central	banks	endeavour	to	control.		
Understanding	the	transformation	that	has	taken	place	in	the	major	central	
banks	 of	 the	 advanced	 industrial	 economies	 since	 the	 financial	 crisis	 requires	
attention	 to	 the	 technical	 detail	 of	 monetary	 and	 financial	 stability	 policies.	
However,	 the	 changing	 role	 of	 these	 central	 banks	 is	 a	matter	 of	 more	 than	
mere	technical	concern.	The	public	image	of	advanced	economy	central	banks	is	
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that	 they	 are	 beyond	 politics.	 They	 are	 regarded	 as	 apolitical	 technocratic	
organisations	fulfilling	highly	complex	and	strictly	circumscribed	tasks	delegated	
to	them	by	democratically	elected	politicians.	This	is	an	appearance	that	central	
banks	themselves	take	great	care	to	perpetuate.	Yet	the	decisions	they	take	are	
inescapably	political.	Setting	interest	rates,	manipulating	the	supply	of	credit	to	
the	 real	 economy,	 defining	 prudential	 regulations	 and	 carrying	 out	 financial	
supervision	 all	 have	 important	 distributional	 consequences.	 They	 influence	
prospective	 homeowners’	 access	 to	mortgages,	 the	 price	 at	which	 businesses	
can	borrow	and	the	rewards	that	savers	can	expect	to	make	for	a	given	level	of	
risk.	 Likewise,	 by	 buying	 or	 selling	 government	 debt,	 central	 banks	 directly	
influence	 the	 cost	 of	 borrowing	 for	 governments,	 constraining	 or	 enabling	
governments’	 ability	 to	 borrow	 and	 spend	 and,	 in	 turn,	 the	 macroeconomic	
strategies	 they	 can	 pursue.	 Central	 banks’	 actions	 are	 of	 direct	 material	
consequence	to	society	at	large.	Yet	neither	the	economic	rationales	informing	
their	 decisions,	 nor	 the	 governance	 processes	 they	 employ	 in	 reaching	 them,	
are	well	 understood	 outside	 a	 small	 elite	 of	 central	 bankers,	 financial	market	
players,	 academic	 economists	 and	 financial	 journalists.	 As	 a	 contribution	 to	
addressing	this	‘information	asymmetry’,	this	thesis	aims	to	pull	away	the	cloak	
of	technocracy	that	obscures	the	changing	power	of	advanced	economy	central	
banks	after	the	global	financial	crisis.		
1.2 HOW	HAS	CENTRAL	BANK	POWER	CHANGED?			
Since	 2008,	 the	 central	 banks	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis	 have	 developed	 new	
objectives	and	policies,	they	have	adopted	new	governance	structures	and	they	
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have	had	new	formal	authority	conferred	upon	them.	Most,	if	not	all,	of	these	
transformations	 have	 been	 bound	 by	 a	 common	 theme:	 namely,	 the	 need	 to	
strengthen	 the	 ability	 to	 identify,	 monitor	 and	 mitigate	 risks	 to	 financial	
stability.	That	central	banks	have	a	role	to	play	in	maintaining	financial	stability	
is	 hardly	 a	 novelty.	 Since	 the	 19th	 century,	 central	 banks	 have	 generally	 been	
regarded	 as	 the	 de	 facto	 guarantors	 of	 systemic	 stability	 in	 their	 respective	
jurisdictions.	However,	the	nature	of	their	engagement	with	financial	markets,	
and	 the	 nomenclature	 used	 to	 describe	 their	 policies	 and	 objectives,	 has	
changed	over	time.	To	facilitate	comparisons	across	the	three	cases	considered	
in	this	thesis,	three	elements	of	central	banks’	activities	in	the	financial	stability	
domain	 will	 be	 examined	 systematically.	 These	 areas	 are	 crisis	 management,	
microprudential	policy	and	macroprudential	policy.		
Historically,	 the	 role	 of	 central	 banks	 in	 crisis	management	 arose	 from	 the	
banking	facilities	they	provided	to	commercial	banks.	In	the	19th	century,	most	
central	 banks	 came	 to	 exercise	 a	 monopoly	 over	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 base	
money,	comprising	banknotes	in	circulation	and	commercial	banks’	reserves	at	
the	central	bank.	This	ability	 to	create	money	 ‘out	of	 thin	air’	enabled	central	
banks	 to	 act	 as	 lender	 of	 last	 resort	 (LOLR)	 to	 commercial	 banks	 that	 found	
themselves	unable	to	borrow	elsewhere.	In	turn,	the	ability	to	act	as	the	LOLR	
meant	 that	central	banks	have	 traditionally	been	 looked	upon	as	guardians	of	
systemic	stability	in	their	respective	banking	systems.	Central	banks	became	the	
organisations	to	which	teetering	banks	would	turn	when	they	had	nowhere	else	
to	go.	They	also	became	the	organisations	to	be	held	responsible	in	the	event	of	
financial	scandals	and	banking	panics.	
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The	 role	 of	 central	 banks	 in	microprudential	 policy	 developed	 out	 of	 their	
LOLR	functionality	and	their	responsibilities	for	maintaining	monetary	stability.	
Central	banks	generally	maintain	close	relationships	with	commercial	banks.	For	
much	of	the	history	of	central	banking,	such	relationships	were	largely	informal,	
with	 little	 in	 the	way	of	codified	 rules	and	 few	resources	devoted	explicitly	or	
exclusively	to	ensuring	that	individual	banks	ran	their	businesses	prudently.	This	
situation	began	to	change	with	the	growth	and	 internationalisation	of	banking	
and	 financial	 markets	 from	 the	 1970s	 onwards.	 In	 the	 advanced	 industrial	
economies,	 prudential	 regulation	 and	 supervision	 became	 increasingly	 formal	
and	legalistic.	Later,	prudential	regulation	and	supervision	also	came	to	be	seen	
as	 largely	 separate	 from	 monetary	 policy	 with	 many	 countries	 choosing	 to	
establish	 independent	 financial	 supervisory	 authorities,	 separate	 from	 their	
central	 banks.	 Since	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 this	 trend	 has	 been	 largely	 reversed,	
with	more	central	banks	playing	a	direct	and	active	role	in	the	microprudential	
supervision	of	individual	firms.				
Although	 there	 is	 no	 settled	 definition	 of	 macroprudential	 policy,	 many	
commentators	would	agree	that	this	area	of	financial	stability	policy	focuses	on	
identifying	 and	 mitigating	 ‘systemic	 risks’	 to	 financial	 stability,	 rather	 than	
‘idiosyncratic	 risks’	 associated	 with	 individual	 financial	 institutions	 (Crockett	
2000).	 In	 Western	 Europe	 and	 North	 America,	 the	 explicit	 attempt	 to	
operationalize	 macroprudential	 policy	 frameworks	 began	 only	 after	 2008,	
following	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 US	 investment	 bank	 Lehman	 Brothers	 and	 the	
dramatic	worsening	of	the	global	financial	crisis	precipitated	by	that	event.2	Yet	
systemic	 instability	 is	 by	 no	 means	 a	 novel	 concern	 for	 public	 authorities	 in	
	 22	
these	 countries.	Measures	 that	would	 today	be	described	 as	macroprudential	
were	in	fact	common	during	much	of	the	20th	century	in	the	United	States	(Elliot	
et	 al.	 2013),	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (Watson	 and	 Herzberg	 2014)	 and	 much	 of	
continental	Europe	(Perez	1998).		
In	 focusing	 on	 crisis	 management,	 microprudential	 policy	 and	
macroprudential	policy,	the	thesis	does	not	deny	the	significant	transformations	
that	have	taken	place	 in	respect	of	central	banks’	monetary	policy	operations.	
Financial	stability	policy	and	monetary	policy	are	deeply	intertwined,	whether	in	
their	 objectives,	 their	 practice,	 or	 their	 consequences.	 Since	 the	 onset	 of	 the	
financial	 crisis,	 the	 central	 banks	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis	 have	 employed	 an	
array	of	unconventional	monetary	policies	to	encourage	the	supply	of	credit	to	
the	real	economy,	or	sub-sectors	thereof.	Such	policies	are	both	instruments	of	
macroeconomic	 demand	 management,	 and	 tools	 for	 managing	 the	 financial	
crisis.	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 aim	 to	 address	 risks	 arising	 from	 the	 pro-
cyclicality	 of	 credit	 conditions,	 their	 objectives	 may	 also	 be	 regarded	 as	
macroprudential	 in	 nature.	 Discussed	 further	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 the	
effectiveness	of	monetary	policy	is	a	crucial	determinant	of	the	effectiveness	of	
financial	 stability	policies	and	vice	versa.	Accordingly,	while	 transformations	 in	
central	banks’	monetary	policy	functions	are	not	the	primary	focus	of	this	study,	
they	 are	 considered	 throughout	 the	 thesis,	 as	 appropriate,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	
they	intersect	with	changes	in	the	financial	stability	arena.		
Evaluating	how	the	power	of	the	major	advanced	economy	central	banks	has	
changed	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 their	 heightened	 focus	 on	 financial	 stability	
requires	 more	 than	 mapping	 the	 new	 statutory	 rights	 and	 responsibilities	 of	
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individual	central	banks,	or	documenting	their	actions	during	the	financial	crisis.	
It	 involves	evaluating	 their	 relationships	with	other	actors	 in	society,	 including	
their	 ability	 to	 shape	 financial	 and	 macroeconomic	 policy	 debates,	 whether	
publicly	 or	 behind	 closed	 doors.	 In	 turn,	 such	 an	 assessment	 requires	 an	
appreciation	 of	 the	 structural	 interdependencies	 between	 central	 banks	 and	
their	 key	 interlocutors	 in	 governments	 and	 in	 financial	 markets.	 Such	
interdependencies	alter	the	bargaining	position	of	these	actors	in	their	relations	
with	 one	 another.	 Beyond	 these	 ‘relational’	 aspects	 of	 central	 banks’	 power,	
there	 is	also	the	question	of	how	‘empowered’	central	banks	have	become.	 In	
other	words,	it	is	important	to	interrogate	whether	the	changes	witnessed	have	
actually	 increased	 the	 capacity	 of	 central	 banks	 to	 achieve	 their	 high-level	
statutory	 objectives	 and	 the	 lower-level	 objectives	 they	 set	 for	 themselves.	
Assessing	the	capacity	of	central	banks	entails	a	focus	on	the	effectiveness	–	or	
‘fitness	for	purpose’	–	of	the	policies	they	are	choosing	to	develop	within	their	
broadened	 mandates,	 the	 strategies	 they	 employ	 for	 implementing	 those	
policies	and	the	extent	to	which	their	actions	are	supported	or	undermined	by	
the	actions	of	other	economic	policymaking	bodies.	
The	multi-dimensional	understanding	of	central	bank	power	employed	in	this	
thesis	reflects	a	recognition	that	far	from	acting	as	passive	technocratic	‘agents’	
fulfilling	mandates	 conferred	 upon	 them	 by	 their	 political	 ‘principals’,	 central	
banks	 are	 inescapably	 political	 organisations	 (cf.	 Burnham	 2001;	 Watson,	 M.	
2002;	 Marcussen	 2006;	 Dyson	 2009;	 Adolph	 2013;	 Fernandez-Albertos	 2015	
among	others).	The	business	of	central	banking	is	inherently	political	because	it	
involves	 decisions	 that	 affect	 the	 relative	 prosperity	 of	 different	 actors	 and	
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societal	 groups.	 Moreover,	 central	 banks	 may	 be	 considered	 political	 agents	
because	their	words	and	deeds	have	a	strong	bearing	on	their	own	relationships	
vis-à-vis	 elected	 executive	 authorities,	 legislative	 politicians,	 private	 financial	
interests	 and	 the	 wider	 public.	 A	 central	 bank’s	 power	 may	 be	 direct	 and	
compulsory,	 as	 when	 it	 uses	 legal	 authority	 to	 compel	 other	 actors	 to	 do	
something	 they	 would	 not	 otherwise	 do.	 It	 may	 also	 be	 indirect	 and	
collaborative,	 as	when	 it	 shapes	 the	 context	 in	which	other	 actors	operate	or	
when	 it	defines	 concepts	and	meanings	 in	 financial	 sector	 regulation.	 Yet	 it	 is	
important	 to	 recognise	 that	 central	 bank	 power	 may	 also	 be	 inclusive	 and	
empowering.	 By	 working	 collaboratively	 with	 other	 societal	 actors,	 central	
banks	may	enable	societies	as	a	whole	to	realise	superior	and	more	sustainable	
macroeconomic	performance.	
1.3 MECHANISMS	OF	CHANGE	IN	CENTRAL	BANKING	
This	thesis	aims	not	only	to	describe	the	change	that	has	taken	place	in	central	
banking	in	recent	years,	but	also	to	identify	the	mechanisms	through	which	that	
change	 has	 been	 effected.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 looks	 beyond	 the	 individual	
organisations	 in	 question,	 towards	 the	 transgovernmental	 networks	 of	
monetary	 authorities,	 associated	 international	 organisations	 and	 economic	
advisors	within	which	central	banks	are	embedded.	Central	bankers	are	highly	
networked.	In	a	tradition	that	dates	to	the	1930s,	the	central	bank	governors	of	
major	economies	have	gathered	every	 two	months	 for	 informal	 and	 secretive	
meetings	 at	 the	 Bank	 for	 International	 Settlements	 (BIS)	 in	 Basel,	 Switzerland	
(Irwin	 2013).	 Discussions	 and	 coordinated	 policy	 initiatives	 also	 take	 place	
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within	 transgovernmental	 governance	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 G7	 and	 G20,	
where	central	bank	governors	meet	regularly	alongside	finance	ministers	(Baker	
2006).	 Many	 new	 regulatory	 standards,	 codes	 and	 best	 practices	 are	 agreed	
within	 specialist	 transnational	 standard-setting	 bodies	 such	 as	 the	 Basel	
Committee	 on	 Banking	 Supervision	 (BCBS)	 and	 the	more	 recently	 established	
Financial	 Stability	 Board	 (FSB),	 both	 of	 which	 are	 governed	 by	 committees	
composed	 mainly	 of	 central	 bankers.	 In	 addition,	 central	 banks	 engage	 with	
international	 organisations,	 chief	 amongst	 them	 the	 International	 Monetary	
Fund	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Clift	 and	 Tomlinson	 2012;	 Moschella	 2012),	 which	
provide	advice	and	commentary	on	regulatory	and	institutional	changes	as	they	
are	 enacted,	 legitimising	 and	 sometimes	 challenging	 the	 courses	 of	 reform	
chosen	in	different	settings.	
The	major	 transformations	 in	 central	 banking	 since	 their	 emergence	 in	 the	
19th	century	have	been	rooted	in	the	changing	economic	ideas	and	intellectual	
fashions	 of	 actors	 within	 these	 networks	 (cf.	 Capie	 et	 al.	 1994:	 80).	
Transgovernmental	 networks	 of	 central	 bankers,	 and	 of	 closely	 associated	
technocratic	 officials	 of	 national	 and	 international	 organisations,	 have	
advocated	and	implemented	reforms	based	on	shared	normative	beliefs	about	
their	appropriate	roles	and	shared	causal	beliefs	about	the	nature	of	the	policy	
problems	they	confront.	To	this	extent,	such	networks	conform	to	the	image	of	
‘epistemic	communities’	(cf.	Verdun	1999;	King	2005;	Dyson	2009;	Mackintosh	
2014).	 According	 to	 Haas	 (1992:	 3)	 epistemic	 communities	 are	 networks	 of	
experts	 in	 a	 given	 policy	 domain	with	 a	 common	 policy	 endeavour.	 They	 are	
bound	 by	 shared	 normative	 convictions	 about	 the	 value	 of	 their	 role	 in	 the	
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domain	of	 expertise,	 shared	 causal	beliefs	 about	 the	 central	 problems	of	 that	
domain	 and	 shared	 intersubjective	 criteria	 for	 weighing	 and	 validating	 policy	
relevant	knowledge.		
One	 example	 of	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 central	 banking	 epistemic	 community	 to	
produce	 change	 in	 the	 roles	 and	modes	 of	 governance	 of	 central	 banks	 took	
place	 in	 the	1990s	and	2000s	with	 the	emergence	and	spread	of	central	bank	
independence	 (henceforth	 CBI)	 as	 a	 legal	 form	 (cf.	 King	 2005).	 During	 this	
period,	more	than	100	countries	around	the	world	adopted	some	form	of	legal	
CBI	 (Marcussen	 2005).	 This	 international	 convergence	 (which	 was	 sometimes	
superficial)	 reflected	 a	 pervasive	 consensus	 within	 the	 central	 banking	
community	 and	 wider	 technocratic	 and	 international	 business	 networks	 that	
independent	 central	 banks	 are	 superior	 in	 keeping	 inflation	 in	 check	 (Kydland	
and	 Prescott	 1977;	 Rogoff	 1985;	 Alesina	 and	 Summers	 1993).	 To	 be	 sure,	
international	 convergence	 upon	 CBI	 was	 partly	 driven	 by	 international	
organisations,	such	as	the	IMF	and	the	World	Bank,	which	serve	to	promote	and	
diffuse	 international	 standards	 through	 conditional	 lending	 programmes,	
technical	 assistance	 and	 policy	 training	 (Broome	 and	 Seabrooke	 2016).	
However,	much	convergence	–	particularly	in	Europe	–	owed	to	the	intellectual	
leadership	and	policy	advocacy	of	international	networks	of	central	bankers	and	
associated	technocrats	(Verdun	1999).		
The	recent	shift	in	central	banking	towards	heightened	emphasis	on	financial	
stability	 reflects	 the	policy	 entrepreneurship3	of	 the	 central	 banking	epistemic	
community.	 As	 Baker	 (2013a)	 has	 highlighted,	 in	 late	 2008	 and	 early	 2009,	 a	
widespread	 consensus	 emerged	 within	 the	 international	 central	 banking	
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community	 over	 the	 need	 for	 macroprudential	 policies	 and	 organisational	
frameworks	to	identify,	manage	and	mitigate	systemic	risks	to	financial	stability.	
In	 each	 of	 the	 jurisdictions	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis,	 initial	 legislative	 reforms	
were	 enacted,	 based	 partly	 on	 the	 recommendations	 of	 high-level	 expert	
groups	 that	were	composed	of	 transnationally	networked	central	bankers	and	
financial	 supervisory	 officials	 (see	 Seabrooke	 and	 Tsingou	 2014).	 Though	 far	
from	identical,	high-level	expert	studies	published	in	2009	in	each	of	the	three	
jurisdictions	considered	 in	 this	 thesis	–	 the	De	Larosière	Report	 in	 the	EU,	 the	
Turner	 Review	 in	 the	United	 Kingdom	and	 the	 Treasury’s	New	Foundation	 for	
Financial	Regulatory	Reform	in	the	United	States	–	each	reflected	the	emerging	
orthodoxy	 that	 macroprudential	 policies	 were	 needed	 to	 supplement	
microprudential	supervision	and	monetary	policy.	
The	 international	 consensus	 on	 the	 need	 for	 new	macroprudential	 policies	
belies	marked	 differences	 in	 the	 functions,	 policy	 styles	 and	 overall	 power	 of	
central	banks	within	 their	 respective	domestic	 jurisdictions.	Differences	 in	 the	
power	 of	 central	 banks	 arise	 because	 ideas	 about	 monetary	 and	 financial	
stability	policies	play	out	in	idiosyncratic	national	(or	regional)	institutional	and	
structural	 environments.	 Local	 idiosyncrasies	 include	 the	 structure	 of	 national	
financial	systems	–	or	‘varieties	of	financial	capitalism’	(see	Hardie	and	Howarth	
et	al.	2013)	–	 that	affect	which	actors	 stand	 to	 lose,	and	which	 stand	 to	gain,	
from	 convergence	 on	 new	 prescriptive	 ideas	 and	 principles	 agreed	 at	 the	
international	 level.	 Local	 idiosyncrasies	 also	 include	 the	 existing	 structure	 of	
national	regulatory	systems.	In	the	United	States,	bureaucratic	agencies	outside	
the	 central	 bank,	 sometimes	 supported	 by	 powerful	 financial	 sector	 lobby	
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groups,	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 determining	 the	 trajectory	 of	 change	 in	
financial	 reform.	 In	 the	 EU,	 an	 increasingly	 complex,	 geographically	 and	
sectorally	 differentiated,	 regulatory	 space	 constrains	 the	 options	 for	 future	
reform	(McPhilemy	2014).		
As	set	out	in	the	next	chapter,	the	thesis	employs	an	agent-centred	historical	
institutionalist	analytical	framework	(Bell	2011)	to	explain	the	transformation	in	
central	bank	power	 since	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Such	a	 framework	offers	 insights	
into	the	interaction	between	the	ideas,	standards	and	policy	prescriptions	that	
transnational	 epistemic	 communities	 promulgate	 and	 the	 local	 institutional	
terrains	 in	which	new	policies	and	 ideas	are	enacted.	Historical	 institutionalist	
approaches	 generally	 start	 from	 the	 premise	 that	 processes	 of	 institutional	
change	 are	 deeply	 constrained	 by	 existing	 institutional	 and	 structural	
environments	 (Pierson	 2000,	 2004).	 To	 understand	 how	 ‘history’	 has	 shaped	
central	banks’	capacities	in	the	area	of	financial	stability	policy,	the	thesis	draws	
attention	 to	 the	 differential	 reception	 and	 implementation	 of	 new	 ideas	 in	
different	 jurisdictions.	 Yet	 the	 framework	 employed	 here	 moves	 beyond	 the	
deterministic	conceptualisations	of	‘path	dependence’	that	are	characteristic	of	
some	 historical	 institutionalist	 literature	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Krasner	 1984;	
Pierson	 2000,	 2004).	 It	 sees	 policy	 entrepreneurs	 as	 capable	 of	 carving	 out	
discretionary	 spaces	 within	 the	 constraints	 imposed	 by	 the	 institutional	 and	
structural	 environments	 they	 inhabit.	 In	 exercising	 this	 discretion,	 they	 can	
shape	 and	 reshape	 their	 institutional	 environments	 through	 time.	 Policy	
entrepreneurs	 exist	 in	 a	 dynamic	 interaction	 with	 the	 structural,	 institutional	
and	political	terrains	they	find	themselves	in.	This	approach	suggests	that	in	the	
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context	 of	 highly	 interconnected	 administrative	 and	 financial	 systems,	 policy	
change	 will	 always	 combine	 elements	 of	 international	 convergence	 and	
enduring	national	distinctiveness.		
1.4 LIMITATIONS	OF	THE	EXISTING	LITERATURE:	THE	‘EMPIRICAL	GAP’	
At	the	time	of	writing,	neither	economics	nor	political	science	has	fully	reflected	
upon	 the	 nature,	 mechanisms	 or	 implications	 of	 the	 transformation	 that	 has	
taken	 place	 in	 the	 role	 of	 central	 banks	 after	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Many	
economists	 have	debated	 the	 ‘optimal’	 organisational	 framework	 for	 financial	
regulation	and	supervision,	 including	the	role	that	central	banks	should	play	in	
financial	stability	policy	(Goodhart,	C.	and	Schoenmaker	1992;	1995;	Goodhart,	
C.	2002;	Haubrich	1996;	Peek	et	al.	1999;	Abrams	and	Taylor	2000;	Masciandaro	
et	al.	2008,	2010;	Klomp	and	de	Haan	2009;	Dincer	and	Eichengreen	2012).	As	
set	 out	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 this	 debate	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 shadow	 of	 a	
widespread	 consensus	 over	 the	 supposed	 desirability	 of	 CBI	 as	 a	 means	 of	
achieving	low	inflation.	In	line	with	the	consensus	view	on	CBI,	economists	have	
tended	 to	 argue	 that	 politicians	 should	 delegate	 responsibility	 for	 banking	
supervision	 to	 politically	 independent	 technocrats	 (De	 Haan	 et	 al.	 2009).	
However,	 theoretical	and	empirical	research	on	the	pros	and	cons	of	different	
organisational	 arrangements	 for	 financial	 supervision	 produced	 mixed	
conclusions,	 leading	 to	 a	 frequently	 voiced	 conventional	wisdom	 that	 there	 is	
no	universally	applicable	‘best	practice’	model.	In	particular,	there	has	been	no	
consensus	 amongst	 economists	 as	 to	whether	 prudential	 banking	 supervision	
should	be	assigned	to	a	central	bank	or	an	independent	supervisory	agency.	
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The	economic	literature	on	organisational	arrangements	for	financial	stability	
policy	has	tended	to	fall	into	one	of	three	broad	categories.	Some	have	engaged	
in	 abstract	 theorisation	 over	 the	 potential	 benefits	 and	 drawbacks	 of	
integration	 or	 separation	 of	 monetary	 policy	 from	 bank	 supervisory	 policy	
(Abrams	and	Taylor	2000;	Goodhart,	C.	2002;	Masciandaro	2009;	Blinder	2010).	
Others	 have	 provided	 empirical	 analyses	 of	 institutional	 variations	 and	
economic	 outcomes	 across	 countries	 employing	 different	 supervisory	 models	
(Masciandaro	 et	 al.	 2008,	 2010;	 Klomp	 and	 de	 Haan	 2009;	 Dincer	 and	
Eichengreen	 2012).	 More	 recently,	 a	 third	 group	 of	 economists	 have	
endeavoured	 to	 elaborate	 organising	 frameworks	 that	 might	 guide	 central	
banks	 or	 other	 public	 authorities	 in	 their	 renewed	 focus	 on	 financial	 stability	
(Goodhart,	C.	and	Tsomocos	2010;	Schoenmaker	2013;	Adrian	et	al.	2013).		
Such	 contributions	 are	 of	 limited	 benefit	 in	 terms	 of	 explaining	 how	 the	
power	 of	 central	 banks	 has	 changed	 after	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 While	 some	
authors	 have	 provided	 historical	 overviews	 of	 central	 banks’	 supervisory	
functions	 (Goodhart,	 C.	 and	 Schoenmaker	 1995;	 Goodhart,	 C.	 and	 Tsomocos	
2010;	 Toniolo	 and	 White	 2015),	 absent	 from	 this	 literature	 is	 an	 in-depth	
comparison	 of	 new	 national	 approaches	 to	 the	 management	 of	 financial	
stability	 or	 how	 those	 approaches	 compare	 to	 the	 pre-crisis	 status	 quo.	 Nor	
does	 the	 economic	 literature	 reveal	much	 about	 the	processes	 by	which	new	
approaches	 to	 financial	 stability	 have	 emerged,	 why	 outcomes	 have	 differed	
from	one	jurisdiction	to	the	next	and	the	consequences	of	such	differences	for	
the	 ability	 of	 central	 banks	 to	 induce	 deference	 on	 the	 part	 of	 others	 or	 to	
achieve	their	ultimate	objectives.		
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The	 ‘large-n’,	 cross-sectional	 nature	 of	 the	 empirical	 contributions	 to	 the	
economic	 literature	 similarly	 obscure	 as	 much	 as	 they	 reveal.	 Thus,	
Masciandaro	et	al.	 (2008,	2010)	 inform	us	 that	banking	supervision	 is	 likely	 to	
be	more	politically	independent	in	countries	where	the	central	bank	is	also	the	
banking	supervisor,	and	that	independent	supervisory	authorities	tend	to	have	
better	developed	accountability	arrangements	 than	banking	supervisors	based	
in	a	central	bank.	Focusing	on	de	jure	governance	arrangements,	such	accounts	
reveal	 little	about	 the	de	 facto	 relationships	 formed	between	central	bankers,	
financial	 supervisors,	 politicians	 and	 the	 regulated	 industry	 in	 individual	
countries.	 Taken	 as	 a	 whole,	 the	 economic	 literature	 provides	 limited	 insight	
into	the	domestic	and	international	forces	that	have	shaped	institutional	change	
in	 this	 policy	 field	 over	 the	 last	 two	 decades.	 Nor	 does	 it	 enable	 adequate	
comprehension	 of	 the	 distributional	 consequences	 of	 different	 models	 of	
financial	supervision	in	different	countries.		
The	 political	 science	 literature	 on	 central	 banks’	 capacities	 in	 respect	 of	
financial	 stability	 policy	 is	 also	 limited.	 Like	 their	 colleagues	 in	 economics,	
political	scientists	interested	in	central	banks	have	tended	to	focus	on	the	issue	
of	CBI.	Of	particular	interest	have	been	the	mechanisms	and	political	rationales	
underlying	the	emergence	and	spread	of	CBI	(Burnham	1999,	2001;	McNamara	
2002;	King	2005;	Marcussen	2005);	 the	means	by	which	central	banks	 sustain	
their	 independence	(Goodman	1991);	concerns	over	democratic	accountability	
(Elgie	 1998,	 2002);	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 independence	 to	 instantiate	
destabilising	 pathologies	 within	 national	 and	 international	 economic	
governance	(Simmons	1996;	Maxfield	1998;	Watson,	M.	2002).		
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More	 recent	 political	 science	 scholarship	 has	 shifted	 focus	 from	CBI	 to	 the	
wider	 issue	 of	 central	 bank	 governance.	 From	 a	 constructivist	 perspective,	 R.	
Hall	 (2008)	 argued	 that	 trends	 towards	 increasingly	 independent,	 transparent	
and	knowledge-based	modes	of	central	banking	represent	efforts	on	the	part	of	
central	 bankers	 to	 shape	 inter-subjective	 expectations	 of	 market	 actors	 in	
regards	to	the	future	stance	of	monetary	policy	and,	by	extension,	the	level	of	
future	prices.	Quaglia	(2008a)	and	Dyson	and	Marcussen	et	al.	(2009)	focus	on	
the	 consequences	 of	 Economic	 and	 Monetary	 Union	 for	 central	 bank	
governance	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU).	While	 these	 accounts	 provide	much	
needed	 comparative	perspective	on	 central	 banking	 –	 including	differences	 in	
historical	 trajectories,	 policy	 capacities	 and	 central	 bankers’	 external	 relations	
with	 firms	 and	 politicians	 –	 both	 suffer	 from	 the	 obvious	 limitation	 that	 they	
were	 produced	 before	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	 transformations	 in	
central	bank	governance	that	have	taken	place	since	then.	Beyond	this,	both	of	
these	 accounts	 take	 a	 general	 approach	 to	 the	 study	 of	 central	 banks,	
examining	their	governance	arrangements	and	policy	capacities	across	 the	 full	
range	 of	 their	 activities.	Without	 losing	 sight	 of	 the	multiple	 interconnections	
between	 central	 banks’	 different	 functions,	 this	 thesis	 differs	 from	 these	
accounts	by	concentrating	in	particular	on	the	consequences	for	central	banks’	
power	of	their	enhanced	emphasis	on	financial	stability	since	the	financial	crisis.	
Lavelle	(2013)	provides	a	more	recent	comparative	account,	focusing	on	the	
evolving	 roles	 of	 ECB	 and	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 in	 financial	 regulation	 and	
supervision.	 This	 account	 usefully	 discusses	 the	 pressures	 leading	 to	
organisational	 reforms	 in	either	 jurisdiction,	although	 it	does	not	consider	 the	
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changing	nature	and	objectives	of	regulation,	nor	how	post-crisis	reforms	have	
affected	the	power	of	either	central	bank,	whether	understood	in	relational	or	
empowerment	 terms.	 Some	 recent	 political	 science	 scholarship	 has	 begun	 to	
examine	the	implications	of	the	advent	of	macroprudential	policy.	For	example,	
Casey	 (2014)	 provides	 an	 optimistic	 assessment	 of	 the	 potential	 for	
macroprudential	policy	to	‘save	neoliberalism’.	Arguing	that	the	global	financial	
crisis	 resulted	from	the	 inherently	pro-cyclical	nature	of	risk	taking	 in	 financial	
markets	 (Minksy	1984;	 see	also	Kindleberger	2011[1978];	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	
2009),	 Casey	 suggests	 that	 macroprudential	 regulation	 can	 counteract	 pro-
cyclicality,	 dampen	 the	 credit	 cycle	 and	 reduce	 volatility	 in	 the	 system.	 Casey	
argues	 for	 what	 he	 terms	 ‘soft’	 macroprudential	 regulation,	 in	 which	
instruments	 affecting	 banks’	 balance	 sheets	 and	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	
borrowing	are	used	to	control	overall	volumes	of	credit	‘while	leaving	financial	
markets	 fairly	 liberalised’	 (Casey	 2014:	 17).	 As	 the	 empirical	 chapters	 of	 this	
thesis	 suggest,	 the	 initial	 implementation	 of	 MPR	 appears	 even	 softer	 than	
Casey	makes	out:	rather	than	aiming	to	control	the	credit	cycle,	as	he	suggests,	
most	macroprudential	tools	considered	until	now	have	aimed	to	make	financial	
institutions	more	resilient	in	the	face	of	cyclical	shocks.		
In	 a	 series	 of	 contributions,	 Baker	 (2013a,	 2013b;	 2013c;	 2014;	 2015a)	 has	
provided	 a	 more	 cautious	 assessment	 of	 the	 emergence,	 spread	 and	 initial	
operationalization	of	macroprudential	 ideas	and	policy	 frameworks	within	 the	
international	regulatory	community.	While	Baker	sees	the	macroprudential	shift	
as	a	radical	change	at	the	 level	of	economic	 ideas,	he	observes	that	change	 in	
the	 practice	 of	 financial	 regulation	 and	 supervision	 is	 exhibiting	 a	 very	
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conservative	and	incremental	dynamic.	Baker	attributes	this	to	the	technocratic	
nature	 of	 macroprudential	 policy.	 He	 identifies	 a	 disconnect	 between	 the	
intellectual	 radicalism	 of	 technocratic	 norm	 entrepreneurs	 such	 as	 Andrew	
Haldane	of	the	Bank	of	England	and	Claudio	Borio	of	the	Bank	for	International	
Settlements	and	the	modest	policy	prescriptions	of	those	same	individuals.	This,	
he	 suggests,	 can	be	 attributed	 to	 the	nature	of	 these	 individuals’	 authority	 in	
policy	 debates,	 which	 depends	 on	 their	 ability	 to	 present	 their	 ideas	 as	
scientific,	 evidential	 and	 impartial.	 Further,	 Baker	 argues	 that	 all	 forms	 of	
technocratic	governance	are	prone	to	‘legitimacy	gaps’.	He	suggests	that	while	
technocratic	 agencies	 are	 legitimate	 at	 the	 moment	 when	 elected	 politicians	
choose	to	delegate	powers	to	them,	insulated	from	political	sentiment,	officials	
have	 a	 propensity	 to	 become	 overconfident	 in	 the	 correctness	 of	 their	 policy	
prescriptions.	Baker	sees	this	‘central	bankers’	paradox’	as	the	ultimate	Achilles	
heel	of	macroprudential	policy	(Baker	2015):	the	technocratic	and	mathematical	
effort	to	curb	financial	cycles,	he	argues,	will	lead	to	an	erosion	of	central	banks’	
hard-won	independence.	
While	 Baker	 and	 Casey	 focused	 on	 the	 potentialities	 for	 macroprudential	
policy	 in	 general,	 few	 scholars	 have	 examined	 the	 implications	 of	
macroprudential	 policy	 in	 specific	 institutional	 settings.	 Lucy	 Goodhart	 (2014)	
provides	 one	 recent	 exception,	 examining	 the	 implications	 for	 the	US	 Federal	
Reserve	 of	 the	 new	 legal	 authority	 delegated	 to	 it	 by	 the	 ‘Dodd-Frank	 Wall	
Street	 Reform	 and	 Consumer	 Protection	 Act’	 (hereafter	 the	 Dodd-Frank	 Act),	
which	was	 signed	 into	 law	 in	 the	United	States	 in	2010.	Her	account	 suggests	
the	effort	to	implement	macroprudential	policy	in	the	United	States	is	likely	to	
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undermine	the	Federal	Reserve’s	independence.	Her	reasoning	is	twofold:	first,	
that	 unlike	 in	 the	 monetary	 policy	 arena,	 ‘there	 are	 many	 other	 agencies	
[involved	 in	 financial	 regulation	 and	 supervision]	 that	 can	 provide	 a	 counter-
narrative	 to	 the	 Fed’s	 version	 of	 events,	 reducing	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 it	 can	
project	an	esoteric	authority’	(Goodhart,	L.	2014:18);	second,	that	the	costs	of	
macroprudential	policy	will	fall	mainly	on	a	small	number	of	very	large	financial	
firms,	which	will	find	it	easy	to	mobilise	opposition	in	Congress.		
This	 thesis	 is	 similarly	 concerned	 with	 understanding	 the	 implications	 of	
macroprudential	 policy	 for	 the	 power	 of	 central	 banks.	 However,	 as	 already	
mentioned	(and	explained	at	greater	length	in	Chapter	2),	power	in	this	thesis	is	
understood	not	only	as	autonomy	to	move	policy	in	line	with	the	preferences	of	
central	banks	themselves.		A	more	specific	criticism	of	L.	Goodhart’s	account	is	
that	 it	 does	 not	 place	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 implementation	 of	 new	 policies	
within	a	historical	context.	Rather,	it	attributes	the	relative	conservatism	of	the	
Federal	Reserve’s	macroprudential	policy	to	the	ease	with	which	well-resourced	
financial	 industry	 opponents	 of	 reform	 can	 mobilise	 in	 Congress.	 Without	
denying	 the	 significance	 of	 industry	 and	 Congressional	 opposition	 to	 certain	
forms	 of	 macroprudential	 policy,	 this	 thesis	 provides	 a	 more	 historically	
grounded	explanation.	Institutional	legacies	of	historic	experiments	with	‘proto-
macroprudential’	policies	have	augured	against	their	use	in	the	current	climate.	
Senior	managers	in	the	Federal	Reserve,	some	of	whom	have	direct	memory	of	
the	 use	 of	 such	 tools,	 are	 sceptical	 of	 their	 economic	 justifications,	 and	 their	
potential	efficacy	 in	the	context	of	 the	contemporary	US	financial	system.	The	
Federal	 Reserve’s	 current	 approach	 is	 also	 a	 product	 of	 the	 organisational	
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apparatus	 within	 which	 it	 is	 embedded:	 notwithstanding	 major	 financial	
reforms	 since	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 the	 United	 States	 has	 an	 exceptionally	
fragmented	 regulatory	 architecture	 that	 impedes	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 Federal	
Reserve	to	effect	structural	change	in	the	financial	system	(cf.	Lavelle	2013).		
1.5 ARGUMENT	IN	BRIEF		
As	 already	 mentioned,	 the	 core	 argument	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 the	 major	
advanced	 economy	 central	 banks	 have,	 to	 varying	 extents,	 become	 more	
powerful	since	the	financial	crisis,	with	power	understood	in	both	relational	and	
empowerment	 terms.	 From	a	 relational	 perspective,	 these	 central	 banks	 have	
found	it	easier	to	determine	policies	in	line	with	their	own	preferences	over	the	
preferences	of	other	societal	actors.	From	an	empowerment	perspective,	they	
have	developed	new	policies	and	new	administrative	capacities,	which,	on	the	
whole,	 leave	 them	better	 placed	 than	previously	 to	 attain	 their	 statutory	 and	
self-defined	 policy	 objectives.	 However,	 new	 policy	 ideas	 and	 organisational	
reforms	have	played	out	within	idiosyncratic	institutional	contexts,	which	have	
conditioned	 the	extent	 and	 characteristics	 of	 the	 transformations	observed	 in	
each	case.	
Drawing	on	the	threefold	typology	of	central	bank	power	mentioned	above	
–	authority,	structural	power	and	capacity	–	the	thesis	sets	out	to	answer	three	
specific	research	questions:		
1. How	 has	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 major	 advanced	 economy	 central	 banks	 to	
determine	policies	in	line	with	their	own	preferences	changed	since	the	onset	
of	the	financial	crisis?	
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2. What	 has	 enabled	 these	 central	 banks	 to	 exert	 greater	 authority	 over	
politicians	and	market	participants	since	the	financial	crisis?		
3. How	 capable	 are	 these	 central	 banks	 of	 achieving	 their	 objectives,	
particularly	those	relating	to	financial	stability?		
The	first	of	these	questions	concerns	central	banks’	authority.	From	a	formal,	or	
de	jure,	perspective,	all	three	of	the	central	banks	considered	in	this	thesis	have	
been	 granted	 new	 legal	 authority,	 albeit	 to	 differing	 extents.	 The	 Bank	 of	
England	has	gained	 the	most	new	 formal	powers,	having	been	entrusted	with	
exclusive	 competence	 to	 conduct	macroprudential	 policy	 and	 broad	 authority	
to	carry	out	microprudential	supervision	of	banks,	major	 investment	firms	and	
insurance	companies.	The	Federal	Reserve	has	also	gained	new	legal	powers,	in	
particular	in	relation	to	the	supervision	of	systemically	important	financial	firms.	
However,	 its	 mandate	 in	 relation	 to	macroprudential	 policy	 is	 limited.	 In	 the	
euro	 area,	 policymakers	 agreed	 in	 2012	 to	 establish	 a	 Single	 Supervisory	
Mechanism	(SSM)	centred	on	the	ECB.	A	core	element	of	the	so-called	‘Banking	
Union’,	 the	 SSM	 constitutes	 a	 historic	 transfer	 of	microprudential	 supervisory	
competencies	 from	 national	 central	 banks	 and	 supervisory	 authorities	 to	 the	
ECB.	 Having	 said	 that,	 like	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 the	 ECB	 has	 only	 limited	
macroprudential	authority	beyond	the	banking	sector.	It	also	has	only	a	limited	
role	in	future	bank	resolution.		
From	 an	 informal,	 or	 de	 facto,	 perspective,	 the	 authority	 of	 these	 three	
central	banks	has	also	increased,	especially	in	relation	to	the	financial	industry.	
In	 the	 post-crisis	 era,	 these	 central	 banks	 have	 preferred	 to	 burnish	 their	
reputations	 as	 ‘capital	 hawks’	 than	 to	 pursue	 the	 ‘light	 touch’	 approach	 of	
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yesteryear.	Beyond	the	domain	of	 financial	 regulation,	the	three	organisations	
have	demonstrated	varying	abilities	 to	 influence	wider	macroeconomic	policy.	
Their	governors	have	frequently	waded	into	fiscal	policy	debates.	In	itself,	this	is	
nothing	 new.	 However,	 while	 neither	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 nor	 the	 Bank	 of	
England	 have	 exhibited	 a	 significantly	 greater	 influence	 over	 the	 trajectory	 of	
fiscal	 policy	 than	 they	 did	 prior	 to	 the	 crisis,	 the	 ECB	 has	 played	 a	 highly	
significant	 role	 in	 influencing	 the	 economic	 policies	 of	 crisis-struck	 European	
countries.	Indeed,	it	has	been	criticised	for	appearing	to	dictate	entire	economic	
policy	platforms	to	be	followed	by	these	countries’	governments.		
In	answering	the	second	question	above,	the	thesis	points	first	and	foremost	
to	the	agency	of	central	bankers	themselves.	Central	bankers	in	all	three	cases	
presented	policymakers	with	a	 set	of	prescriptions	 for	 reforming	national	 and	
international	 financial	 regulations	and	regulatory	architectures	 (cf.	Mackintosh	
2014).	Acting	much	like	an	‘epistemic	community’	(Haas	1992),	central	bankers	
were	 guided	 by	 a	 broadly	 cohesive	 set	 of	 normative	 beliefs	 about	 the	
appropriate	role	that	central	banks	should	play	in	financial	regulation.	However,	
their	 diagnoses	 of	 pre-crisis	 failings	 and	 prescriptions	 for	 regulatory	 reform	
differed	 across	 the	 three	 jurisdictions.	 Likewise,	 local	 institutional	 factors	 –	
including	the	distribution	of	power	between	different	branches	of	government,	
stratifications	of	 interests	within	national	regulatory	architectures	and	political	
attitudes	 towards	 financial	 regulation	 –	 shaped	 and	 constrained	 outcomes	 in	
each	case.		
The	 financial	 crisis	 altered	 these	 central	 banks’	 ‘structural	 relations’	 with	
markets	 and	 politicians.	 Financial	 institutions	 were	 revealed	 to	 be	 highly	
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dependent	on	the	stabilising	functions	that	these	organisations	play	as	LOLR	to	
their	 respective	 financial	 systems.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 bargaining	 power	 of	
financial	market	participants	in	regulatory	debates	was	diminished,	enabling	the	
central	banks	 to	adopt	a	more	 stringent	and	prudent	 stance	 than	 in	 the	past.	
Structural	power	also	helps	explain	 the	differences	between	 the	 three	central	
banks	 in	 terms	of	 their	 influence	over	wider	macroeconomic	policy.	The	ECB’s	
purchases	of	crisis-struck	Southern	European	countries’	debt	gave	it	(along	with	
the	European	Commission	and	the	 IMF)	 the	 leverage	necessary	 to	 force	those	
countries	 into	 deep	 fiscal	 austerity	 and	 neo-liberal	 supply-side	 reforms.	 This	
dynamic	was	not	matched	 in	the	United	Kingdom	or	the	United	States,	where	
the	 probability	 of	 sovereign	 default	 has	 never	 been	 regarded	 as	 a	 realistic	
possibility.		
The	 third	 of	 the	 questions	 set	 out	 above	 directs	 our	 attention	 to	 central	
banks’	capacity.	Key	to	any	discussion	of	central	bank	capacity	is	the	‘fitness	for	
purpose’	(Dyson	2009)	of	the	policies	central	banks	are	adopting.	The	pre-crisis	
orthodoxy	 in	 financial	 regulation,	 which	 was	 based	 upon	 simplified	
understandings	 of	 ‘efficient	 markets’	 theories	 (Turner	 2011),	 followed	 an	
essentially	 microprudential	 logic	 of	 ensuring	 the	 safety	 and	 soundness	 of	
individual	 financial	 institutions.	 While	 this	 orthodoxy	 has	 been	 partially	
surpassed	by	a	 set	of	new	macroprudential	 ideas	 (Baker	2013a),	 the	embrace	
and	enactment	of	new	ideas	has	differed	from	one	jurisdiction	to	the	next.	This	
has	fed	 into	differential	policy	development	and	policy	objectives.	The	Federal	
Reserve	 has	 exhibited	 the	 most	 continuity	 with	 the	 pre-crisis	 approach	 to	
financial	 regulation,	 focusing	 mainly	 on	 enhancing	 the	 resilience	 of	 financial	
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institutions.	 Both	 the	 ECB	 and	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 are	 pursuing	 policies	 of	 a	
time-varying	nature	which	aim	 to	 curb	 financial	 excesses	and	mitigate	 cyclical	
systemic	 risks	 through	 the	 financial	 cycle	 (in	addition	 to	enhancing	 resilience).	
The	 thesis	 argues	 that	 focusing	 predominantly	 or	 exclusively	 on	 financial	
institution	resilience	is	likely	to	make	it	more	difficult	for	the	Federal	Reserve	to	
maintain	financial	stability	in	the	medium	term.		
Central	 banks’	 capacity	 is	 also	 dependent	 on	 their	 styles	 of	 policy	
implementation.	The	three	central	banks	exhibit	differing	preferences	for	‘rules-
based’	 or	 ‘discretion-based’	 styles	 of	 regulation	 and	 supervision.	 More	
discretionary	approaches	have	the	benefit	of	making	policy	more	adaptable	 in	
the	face	of	financial	innovation,	which	can	render	detailed	rulebooks	obsolete.	
Rules-based	 approaches	 purportedly	 enhance	 the	 transparency	 of	 decision-
making	and	the	predictability	of	the	overall	regulatory	environment.	According	
to	some	regulators	and	economists,	this	can	lead	to	greater	economic	efficiency	
and	financial	stability	 (see	for	example	Bank	of	England	2009:	28;	Kohn	2011).	
Following	Best	(2005),	this	thesis	takes	a	sceptical	view	of	the	possible	efficiency	
gains	 from	 rules-based	 financial	 regulation.	 It	 argues	 that	 central	 banks	
adopting	more	discretion-based	approaches	are,	other	things	being	equal,	likely	
to	have	greater	capacity	to	attain	their	 financial	stability	objectives	due	to	the	
greater	flexibility	discretion-based	policy	implementation	affords	them.	
A	final	factor	affecting	central	banks’	capacity	to	maintain	financial	stability	is	
the	wider	macroeconomic	policy	environment	 in	which	 they	are	 situated.	The	
central	banks	considered	in	this	thesis	must	adapt	their	monetary	policies	to	the	
prevailing	 fiscal	 policy	 stance	 of	 politicians,	 which,	 as	 discussed,	 they	 have	
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limited	 (if	 varying)	ability	 to	 influence.	 In	 turn,	 the	prevailing	mix	of	 fiscal	and	
monetary	 policy	 deeply	 affects	 risk-taking	 and	 reward	 in	 financial	markets.	 In	
recent	years,	the	combination	of	contractionary	fiscal	policies	and	rock-bottom	
interest	 rates	 has	 created	 major	 financial	 imbalances	 as	 market	 participants	
have	 ploughed	 investments	 into	 riskier	 assets	 in	 a	 so-called	 ‘search-for-yield’	
(BIS	2014).	The	 thesis	argues	 that	 these	 risks	 redouble	 the	necessity	 for	 time-
varying	countercyclical	policies,	which	at	 least	 in	theory,	can	mitigate	systemic	
risks	without	unduly	damaging	the	health	of	the	economy	at	large.		
1.6 METHODOLOGY	
1.6.1 RESEARCH	DESIGN	
The	 thesis	 examines	 the	 transformation	 in	 central	 bank	 power	 after	 the	
financial	 crisis	 through	a	 structured	 focused	comparison	of	a	 small	number	of	
empirical	 case	 studies	 (George	 and	 Bennett	 2005).	 There	 are	 three	 main	
reasons	for	adopting	a	 ‘small-n’	comparative	case	study	research	design.	First,	
this	approach	allows	for	a	 longitudinal	view	of	each	central	bank,	with	specific	
focus	on	the	evolution	of	financial	stability	frameworks	in	each	jurisdiction	and	
the	changing	relationships	between	central	banks,	financial	market	players	and	
other	 public	 authorities.	 A	 longitudinal	 approach	 is	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 any	
research	 that	 intends	 to	 explore	 the	 constraints	 that	 past	 events	 and	 policy	
choices	 place	 on	 contemporary	 actors	 in	 on-going	 processes	 of	 institutional	
change.		
Second,	 concentrating	 on	 a	 small	 number	 of	 case	 studies	 allows	 for	 a	
detailed	 appraisal	 of	 the	 rules	 and	 administrative	 processes	 that	 have	 been	
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agreed	in	each	jurisdiction,	and	of	the	political,	economic	and	social	processes	
that	have	 led	 to	 those	 rules	 and	processes.	By	examining	 the	 chosen	 cases	 in	
detail,	 the	 thesis	 can	 better	 differentiate	 between	 the	 ‘old’	 and	 the	 ‘new’	 in	
financial	stability	policy.	This	approach	provides	space	for	an	appraisal	of	both	
the	initial	reform	of	the	institutional	arrangements	for	financial	stability	in	each	
jurisdiction	 and	 the	 initial	 implementation	 and	 periods	 of	 operation	 of	 those	
new	arrangements.	This	 is	a	key	benefit	of	the	chosen	approach	over	 ‘large-n’	
quantitative	 studies,	 which	 tend	 to	 focus	 only	 on	de	 jure	 aspects	 of	 financial	
governance	 arrangements	 and	 therefore	 fail	 to	 capture	 important	 gaps	
between	 the	behaviour	 prescribed	by	 formal	 rules	 and	 real	 life	 activity	 under	
them.		
The	 third	 benefit	 of	 the	 chosen	 research	 design	 is	 that	 it	 provides	 at	 least	
some	 means	 of	 distinguishing	 between	 factors	 that	 are	 common	 to	 central	
banks	 in	 many	 (or	 all)	 jurisdictions	 and	 factors	 that	 are	 idiosyncratic	 to	
individual	 countries.	 Comparative	 research	 enables	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	
different	potential	influences	on	a	given	phenomenon	to	be	tested	in	different	
empirical	 settings.	 Adopting	 either	 a	 ‘method	 of	 difference’	 or	 a	 ‘method	 of	
agreement’	 (as	 originally	 proposed	 by	 John	 Stewart	 Mill	 in	 1843),	 causal	
variables	can	be	identified	through	a	process	of	logical	inference.	Of	course,	the	
phenomenon	of	 interest	 in	this	thesis	–	namely,	the	expansion	of	central	bank	
power	 since	 the	 financial	 crisis	–	 is	unlikely	 to	be	 the	 result	of	a	 single	 cause.	
Complex	social	phenomena	of	 this	kind	result	 from	the	 interaction	of	multiple	
non-independent	 causal	 mechanisms.	 Under	 such	 circumstances,	 it	 is	
impossible	 to	 isolate	 or	 control	 for	 every	 potential	 causal	 factor,	 and	 the	
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inclusion	of	a	small	number	of	cases	makes	this	approach	even	more	unrealistic.	
Nevertheless,	the	cases	selected	in	this	thesis	are	characterised	by	a	number	of	
broad	 similarities	 that	 make	 them	 apt	 for	 comparison,	 even	 if	 any	
commonalities	 we	 may	 identify	 between	 them	 cannot	 automatically	 be	
extended	to	cases	not	examined	here.	
1.6.2 SELECTION	OF	CASE	STUDIES	
This	 thesis	 focuses	 on	 the	 three	 major	 Western	 central	 banks:	 the	 Bank	 of	
England,	the	US	Federal	Reserve	and	the	ECB.	At	first	sight,	three	more	different	
cases	 could	 hardly	 have	 been	 proposed.	 Most	 obviously,	 the	 ECB	 is	 not	 a	
standalone	 central	 bank,	 but	 rather	 the	 central	 hub	 within	 a	 federal	
‘Eurosystem’	 comprising	18	other	national	 central	banks.	 The	Federal	Reserve	
also	 has	 a	 complex	 structure.	 Like	 the	 Eurosystem,	 it	 is	 not	 a	 unitary	 central	
bank	 but	 a	 federation	 composed	 of	 a	 seven-member	 Board	 of	 Governors,	
located	 in	 Washington	 DC,	 and	 12	 regional	 Federal	 Reserve	 Banks	 located	
throughout	the	United	States.	Unlike	the	ECB,	however,	it	is	embedded	within	a	
single	 national	 setting	 with	 long-established,	 highly	 centralised,	 economic	
policymaking	structures.	The	Bank	of	England	differs	from	the	other	two	cases	
since	 it	 is	 a	unitary	 central	bank.	 It	exercises	authority	within	a	unitary	polity,	
also	 with	 highly	 centralised	 economic	 policymaking	 institutions,	
notwithstanding	 the	 devolution	 of	 certain	 economic	 policymaking	 powers	 to	
Scotland,	Wales	and	Northern	Ireland.		
These	differences	aside,	the	Federal	Reserve	System,	the	Eurosystem	and	the	
Bank	of	England,	have	much	in	common.	All	are	independent	public	authorities,	
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insulated	 from	 the	 control	 of	 elected	 politicians,	 with	 sole	 responsibility	 for	
calibrating	and	 implementing	monetary	policy	 in	 their	 respective	 jurisdictions.	
Although	 there	 are	 differences	 of	 emphasis	 in	 their	 formal	 mandates	 with	
respect	 to	 the	goals	of	price	stability	and	employment,	 in	 the	years	preceding	
the	financial	crisis	each	of	them	placed	overwhelming	emphasis	on	controlling	
inflation.	Each	of	them	is	governed	through	collective	internal	decision-making	
processes	 and	 all	 have	 sought	 to	 represent	 themselves	 as	 scientific,	 apolitical	
and	 concerned	with	matters	 so	 esoteric	 as	 to	warrant	 little	 interest	 from	 the	
population	at	large	(cf.	Marcussen	2006;	Dyson	2009).		
A	 further	 similarity	 between	 the	 chosen	 cases	 is	 that	 since	 2007,	 all	 have	
been	 forced	 to	 respond	 to	 systemic	 banking	 crises	 and	 severe	 economic	
recessions.	In	this	regard,	the	global	financial	crisis	can	be	regarded	as	akin	to	a	
natural	 experiment:	 the	 thesis	 examines	 a	 sample	 of	 cases	 that	 are	 similar	 in	
many	 important	 respects	 and	 which	 have	 been	 exposed	 to	 a	 common	
experience.	Examining	the	variations	in	the	post-crisis	reform	outcomes	in	each	
jurisdiction	 provides	 an	 opportunity	 to	 identify	 and	 weigh	 the	 domestic	 and	
international	 factors	 shaping	 change	 in	 practices	 of	 central	 banking	 and	 the	
power	of	central	banks.		
There	are	benefits	and	drawbacks	to	this	comparison.	On	the	one	hand,	the	
chosen	 cases	 represent	 the	 most	 influential	 central	 banking	 systems	
internationally	 in	terms	of	standard	setting	and	policy	entrepreneurship.	More	
than	 any	 other	 central	 banks,	 these	 three	 institutions	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	
‘upload’	 of	 policy	 norms	 to	 the	 international	 level.	 They	 are,	 therefore,	
inherently	 interesting	 cases	 in	 themselves.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	
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aforementioned	 diversity	 in	 their	 internal	 composition	 poses	 a	 challenge	 in	
terms	 of	 organising	 a	 comparative	 research	 project,	 especially	 accounting	 for	
the	unique	multi-level	character	of	the	ECB.		
1.6.3 RESEARCH	METHODS	AND	DATA	SOURCES	
To	meet	the	first	overarching	objective	set	out	above	–	that	of	explaining	how	
the	 power	 of	 central	 banks	 has	 been	 affected	 as	 result	 of	 the	 heightened	
emphasis	on	financial	stability	policy	–	the	thesis	draws	mainly	upon	sources	in	
the	public	 domain.	 This	 includes	 legislation	 conferring	new	powers	on	 central	
banks	 and	 other	 authorities;	 central	 banks’	 published	 procedural	 documents,	
such	 as	 their	 rules	 of	 procedure;	 and	 official	 financial	 stability-related	
communications,	such	as	warnings	and	recommendations	designed	to	prevent	
or	mitigate	systemic	risks.		
Meeting	 the	 second	 overarching	 objective	 –	 identifying	 the	 mechanisms	
through	which	changes	in	central	bank	power	have	been	realised	–	represents	a	
greater	challenge.	As	discussed	 in	the	next	chapter,	 the	exercise	of	power	has	
both	overt	and	hidden	faces.	It	can	be	difficult	to	identify	precisely	which	actors	
and	 organisations	 have	 been	 most	 influential	 in	 shaping	 institutional	 change	
when	agenda-setting	processes	take	place	away	from	the	public	gaze.	The	thesis	
uses	historical	process	tracing	to	piece	together	the	main	 influences	that	have	
shaped	 the	 reform	 processes	 in	 each	 jurisdiction.	 Historical	 process	 tracing	
involves	 building-up	 a	 ‘thick’	 description	 of	 a	 series	 of	 events,	 drawing	 on	
multiple	 sources	 (Bennett	 2010).	 The	 main	 source	 of	 primary	 information	
informing	 this	 element	 of	 the	 research	 is	 a	 body	 of	 34	 elite	 interviews,	
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conducted	 between	 2010	 and	 2014	 in	 Belgium,	 Germany,	 Spain,	 the	 United	
Kingdom	and	the	United	States.	 Interviews	have	been	conducted	with	current	
and	 former	 central	 bankers,	 supervisory	 officials,	 politicians,	 financial	
journalists,	 market	 participants	 and	 academic	 economists	 with	 first	 hand	
knowledge	 of	 behind-the-scenes	 decision-making	 processes.	 Information	
gathered	 in	 these	 interviews	 has	 been	 cross-checked	 with	 other	 available	
sources,	 including	 the	official	 testimony	of	 central	bankers	and	other	 relevant	
actors	 before	 legislative	 committees;	 the	 memoirs	 of	 key	 players,	 where	
available;	speeches	and	other	public	communications	from	officials	 involved	in	
the	reform	process;	and	contemporary	press	coverage.		
1.7 PLAN	OF	THE	THESIS		 	
The	 thesis	 is	 organised	 as	 follows.	 Building	 on	 the	 initial	 discussion	 of	 the	
literature	above,	 the	next	 chapter	 sets	out	 a	 range	of	perspectives	on	 central	
bank	power	and	explains	how	these	relate	to	scientific	arguments	surrounding	
the	 organisational	 structure	 for	 financial	 stability	 policy.	 This	 chapter	 also	
elaborates	 on	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 power	 and	 provides	 the	 analytical	
framework	that	will	be	used	in	subsequent	chapters	to	explain	how	central	bank	
power	 has	 changed	 since	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	
mechanisms	through	which	those	changes	have	been	effected.	
Chapter	 3	 provides	 a	 historical	 overview	 of	 the	 three	 central	 banks	
considered	 in	 this	 thesis.	 It	 highlights	 how	 the	 functions	 of	 central	 banks	
changed	over	the	course	of	the	twentieth	century	and,	 in	particular,	why	their	
financial	 stability	 functions	 became	 increasingly	 marginalised	 in	 the	 two	
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decades	preceding	the	onset	of	the	global	financial	crisis	 in	2007.	This	chapter	
highlights	 some	 of	 the	 idiosyncrasies	 of	 each	 central	 bank,	 including	 the	
changing	nature	of	their	formal	and	informal	relationships	with	banks,	executive	
politicians	and	legislatures.		
The	 next	 three	 chapters	 provide	 the	main	 empirical	 content	 of	 the	 thesis.	
Chapter	 4	 endeavours	 to	 answer	 the	 first	 research	 question	 set	 out	 above,	
namely	to	identify	how	the	ability	of	the	three	central	banks	to	define	policies	in	
line	 with	 their	 own	 preferences	 has	 changed	 since	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 This	
chapter	 highlights	 the	 variation	 between	 the	 three	 central	 banks	 in	 terms	 of	
both	the	scope	of	their	revised	mandates	and	their	autonomy	from	control	by	
politicians.	It	also	explores	their	de	facto	authority,	focusing	on	changes	in	their	
informal	 relations	with	 financial	market	participants	and	politicians.	Chapter	5	
sets	out	to	 identify	 the	mechanisms	through	which	the	outcomes	discussed	 in	
Chapter	4	came	to	pass.	It	documents	the	role	that	central	banks	have	played	as	
an	 ‘epistemic	 community’	 in	 driving	 reforms.	 The	 chapter	 documents	 the	
differential	 reception	 and	 enactment	 of	 new	 ideas	 about	 central	 banking	 and	
financial	governance	in	different	local	institutional,	cultural	and	(party)	political	
terrains.	 This	 chapter	also	discusses	 the	more	 indirect	 structural	dimension	of	
central	 bank	 power.	 Chapter	 6	 explores	 the	 capacity	 of	 each	 central	 bank,	
offering	a	 judgement	on	the	prospects	for	success	of	the	different	approaches	
they	have	adopted.	Here	power	is	viewed	not	as	a	relational	concept	between	
actors,	but	rather	as	an	ability	 to	achieve	one’s	objectives.	This	chapter	builds	
on	 the	 foregoing	 analysis	 of	 authority	 and	 structural	 power	 to	 evaluate	 the	
particular	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages	 of	 each	 central	 bank	 in	 terms	 of	
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fulfilling	their	financial	stability	objectives.	The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	link	the	
discussion	of	central	bank	power	to	outcomes	in	the	financial	sector.		
The	final	chapter	draws	conclusions	about	the	reasons	for,	and	mechanisms	
of,	institutional	change	in	central	banking	and	financial	regulation;	it	speculates	
on	the	extent	to	which	central	banks’	heightened	power	might	be	expected	to	
endure;	and	discusses	the	implications	of	the	‘financial	stability	turn’	in	central	
banking	 for	 the	 future	 legitimacy	 of	 central	 banks	 as	 politically	 independent	
‘non-majoritarian’	decision-makers.	
	
																																																						
1 	The	 purpose	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 examine	 and	 compare	 transformations	
affecting	 the	 major	 central	 banks	 of	 the	 advanced	 industrial	 economies.	 Its	
claims	are	not	generalisable	to	central	banks	beyond	its	scope,	especially	those	
of	emerging	or	frontier	economies.			
2	In	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s,	 financial	 policies	 of	 a	macroprudential	 nature	were	
also	 used	 in	 some	 East	 European	 and	 East	 Asian	 countries	 (Watson	 and	
Herzberg	2014).	
3	Following	Kingdon	(2011	[1984]),	the	term	‘policy	entrepreneurs’	in	this	thesis	
refers	simply	to	actors	that	invests	time,	energy,	reputation	or	other	resources	
in	the	hope	of	securing	policy	change	of	which	they	approve.		
2 CENTRAL	BANK	POWER:	BETWEEN	DEMOCRACY	AND	THE	MARKET	
2.1 INTRODUCTION	
The	 post-crisis	 transformation	 in	 central	 banks’	 financial	 stability	 functions	
speaks	to	some	of	the	central	 issues	in	political	science,	political	economy	and	
the	associated	sub-field	of	Comparative	Political	Economy	(CPE).	One	such	issue	
concerns	 the	 relationship	 between	 elected	 politicians	 and	 unelected	 ‘non-
majoritarian’	bureaucrats	that	sit	at	one	remove	from	the	democratic	process.	
Political	 scientists	 have	 examined	many	 aspects	 of	 this	 relationship,	 including	
the	 rationales	 underpinning	 politicians’	 decisions	 to	 delegate	 authority	 to	
unelected	 officials,	 the	 means	 by	 which	 political	 ‘principals’	 establish	 and	
maintain	 control	 over	 their	 bureaucratic	 ‘agents’	 and	 the	 implications	 of	
delegation	 in	 terms	of	 the	efficiency	of	policy	outcomes,	distributional	effects	
and	 democratic	 legitimacy	 (see	 McCubbins	 and	 Page	 1987;	 Majone	 1996;	
Thatcher	 and	 Stone	 Sweet	 2002;	 Hawkins	 et	 al.	 2006).	 As	 this	 chapter	 will	
discuss,	 the	emergence	and	 spread	of	 central	 bank	 independence	 (CBI)	 in	 the	
1990s	proved	a	rich	empirical	 terrain	for	political	economy	scholars	 interested	
in	 the	 relationship	 between	 democratic	 and	 non-majoritarian	 forms	 of	
governance	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Burnham	 1999,	 2001,	 2007;	 McNamara	 1998,	
2002;	Marcussen	2005;	King	2005).	
A	 second	 issue,	 which	 is	 particularly	 important	 for	 political	 economy	
scholars,	 concerns	 the	 relationship	 between	 public	 and	 private	 sources	 of	
authority	in	the	production	of	public	policies	(Cuttler	et	al.	1999;	Graz	and	Nölke	
2008).	Central	banks’	financial	stability	functions	involve	the	production	of	rules	
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that	 set	 limits	 on	 market	 participants’	 activities.	 They	 also	 involve	 the	
production	of	rules	that	define	the	very	nature	of	what	financial	institutions	do,	
the	 markets	 they	 operate	 in	 and	 the	 products	 they	 sell.1 	Financial	 market	
participants	contest	 these	 rulemaking	processes	directly	 through	 lobbying	and	
by	funding	the	election	campaigns	of	their	favoured	politicians,	who	in	turn	can	
apply	 pressure	 on	 central	 banks	 through	 formal	 and	 informal	 control	
mechanisms	(see	for	example	Grossman	and	Helpman	2001).	Financial	market	
participants	 also	 influence	 rulemaking	 indirectly	 because	 policymakers,	
including	central	banks,	depend	on	them	to	generate	revenue	and	employment	
and	to	help	stimulate	wider	economic	activity.	It	is	therefore	necessary	to	make	
rules	that	are	attractive	(or	at	least	not	excessively	repellent)	to	internationally	
mobile	 firms	 and	 financial	 transactions.	 This	 indirect,	 or	 ‘structural’,	 power	 of	
business	and	 finance	 is	mediated	by	 the	 ideas	and	analyses	of	public	officials,	
who	may	 give	 greater	 or	 lesser	 credence	 to	market	 participants’	 perspectives	
and	 their	 implied	 or	 actual	 threats	 of	 ‘exit’	 (Bell	 2012).	 In	 turn,	 policymakers’	
ideas	and	perspectives	 reflect	manifold	 factors,	 including	 institutional	 legacies	
of	past	policy	 choices,	 intellectual	 fads	and	 fashions,	 and	 shifting	political	 and	
cultural	logics	(Carstensen	2011).	Understanding	the	factors	that	determine	the	
ability	of	financial	market	participants	to	influence	central	banks’	activities	 is	a	
prerequisite	for	explaining	the	varying	trajectories	of	change	in	central	banking	
after	the	financial	crisis.		
A	 third	 issue	 concerns	 differentiated	 processes	 of	 financial	 system	 and	
capitalist	 change	 in	 response	 to	 changing	 international	 economic	 and	political	
circumstances	 (among	 others	 see	 Zysman	 1983;	 Hall,	 P.	 and	 Soskice	 2001;	
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Hardie	and	Howarth	2013;	Clift	2012,	2014).	This	is	a	concern	that	is	central	to	
the	 sub-field	 of	 CPE.	 Historically,	 the	 functions	 and	 modes	 of	 governance	 of	
central	 banks	 around	 the	 world	 have	 passed	 through	 a	 number	 of	 distinct	
epochs.	 In	 the	 four	 decades	 preceding	 the	 First	 World	 War,	 central	 banks	
operated	 relatively	 autonomously	 from	political	 control:	 they	were	 concerned	
chiefly	with	maintaining	 the	 gold	 standard,	which	was	 a	 largely	 unquestioned	
and	 widely	 shared	 objective.	 Following	 some	 thirty	 years	 of	 monetary	 and	
economic	tumult,	by	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War	many	Western	central	
banks	had	become	largely	subordinate	to	control	by	politicians.	From	the	1970s	
onwards,	 central	 banks	 increasingly	 regained	 their	 independence	 and	 they	
came	to	focus	narrowly	on	maintaining	a	low	and	steady	rate	of	inflation,	to	the	
exclusion	of	many	of	their	traditional	functions	in	relation	to	financial	stability.	
Common	developments	 in	 central	 banking	 arose	because	 central	 bankers	 and	
financial	policymakers	responded	to	(and	participated	in)	common	processes	of	
change	 at	 the	 international	 level.	 This	 included	material	 changes,	 such	 as	 the	
changing	 freedom	 with	 which	 capital	 moved	 across	 international	 borders;	
institutional	 changes,	 such	 as	 the	 rise	 and	 fall	 of	 international	 monetary	
regimes;	and	ideational	changes,	including	the	evolution	of	the	economic	ideas	
and	theories	used	by	central	bankers	to	design	and	 justify	their	monetary	and	
financial	policies.		
Notwithstanding	 these	 broad	 trends,	 as	 several	 authors	 have	 indicated,	
‘convergence’	amongst	central	banks	has	often	been	superficial	(cf.	Marcussen	
2006;	Dyson	2009).	Central	banks	have	tended	to	differ	in	respect	of	the	range	
of	 functions	they	perform,	the	specific	objectives	they	set	 for	themselves,	and	
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the	nature	of	the	relationships	they	form	with	key	interlocutors	in	governments	
and	financial	markets.	Enduring	differences	and	the	appearance	of	new	national	
idiosyncrasies	 reflect	 specific	 historic	 and	 institutional	 contexts.	 They	 also	
reflect	 the	 creative	 and	 reflective	 agency	 of	 institutionally	 situated	 policy	
entrepreneurs,	who	‘translate’	new	ideas	and	policy	prescriptions	into	local	(or	
national)	contexts	(Campbell	2004).	The	most	recent	transformations	in	central	
banking	 have	 followed	 this	 overall	 pattern	 of	 ‘convergence	 within	 national	
diversity’	 (to	 paraphrase	 Lütz	 2004).	 As	 the	 empirical	 chapters	 of	 this	 thesis	
demonstrate,	the	broad	‘financial	stability	turn’	in	central	banking	has	been	far	
from	 uniform	 across	 the	 three	 cases	 considered.	 Transnationally	 networked	
central	 bankers	 in	 coalition	 with	 like-minded	 policymakers	 in	 national	
executives	 –	 or	 ‘sympathetic	 interlocutors’	 (Broome	 and	 Seabrooke	 2016)	 –	
have	 consciously	 reshaped	 their	 domestic	 policy	 environments	 such	 that	 they	
adhere	 to	 newly	 popular	 economic	 ideas	 and	 international	 standards,	 whilst	
conforming	to	domestic	(or	regional)	political	logics.	
This	 chapter	 has	 two	 overarching	 objectives.	 The	 first	 is	 to	 situate	 the	
discussion	 of	 post-crisis	 transformations	 in	 central	 banking	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
core	concerns	of	political	science	and	political	economy	scholarship	highlighted	
here:	 specifically,	 delegation	 to	 non-majoritarian	 actors,	 the	 relationship	
between	 public	 and	 private	 sources	 of	 authority	 in	 public	 policymaking	 and	
variegated	 patterns	 of	 national	 institutional	 change	 in	 response	 to	 changing	
international	 circumstances.	 Section	 2.2	 begins	 this	 task	 by	 reviewing	 existing	
perspectives	on	the	delegation	of	financial	stability	functions	to	central	banks.	It	
reviews	the	economic	arguments	for	and	against	central	bank	autonomy	in	this	
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area	 before	 proposing	 some	 political	 explanations	 for	 cross-national	
divergences	in	central	banks’	mandates,	drawing	on	existing	perspectives	from	
the	CPE	sub-field.	Section	2.3	then	examines	existing	perspectives	on	the	power	
of	financial	market	participants	in	regulatory	processes.	Exploring	the	nature	of	
financial	 power	 is	 important	 for	 understanding	 the	 pressures	 operating	 on	
central	banks	as	they	begin	to	fulfil	their	enhanced	financial	stability	mandates.	
This	section	also	discusses	reasons	why	the	political	power	of	finance	may	differ	
in	different	jurisdictions.			
The	second	overarching	objective	of	this	chapter	 is	 to	provide	a	conceptual	
apparatus	capable	of	explaining	how	the	power	of	central	banks	has	changed	in	
the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	mechanisms	 through	which	 that	
change	has	been	effected.	Developing	 the	 threefold	definition	of	central	bank	
power	–	authority,	structural	power	and	capacity	–	 introduced	 in	the	previous	
chapter,	 Section	 2.5	 details	 how	 the	 concept	 of	 central	 bank	 power	 is	
operationalised	 to	 enable	 comparisons	 across	 the	 three	 case	 studies	 to	 be	
made.	 Section	 2.6	 then	 sets	 out	 an	 agent-centred	 historical	 institutionalist	
analytical	 framework,	which	 guides	 and	underpins	 the	 empirical	 analysis.	 This	
framework	 provides	 a	 conceptualisation	 of	 how	 agents,	 institutions	 and	
structures	interact	to	produce	institutional	change	within	national	settings.	This	
framework	 also	 sets	 out	 a	 number	 of	 mechanisms	 of	 international	 policy	
convergence	 and	 highlights	 how	 convergence	 takes	 place	 alongside	 new	
divergences	and	persistent	difference.	
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2.2 DELEGATING	FINANCIAL	STABILITY	POLICY	
In	many	ways,	the	post-crisis	transformation	in	central	banks’	financial	stability	
functions	is	analogous	to	the	widespread	adoption	of	CBI	as	a	legal	form	in	the	
1990s	 and	 2000s.	 In	 both	 cases,	 politicians	 in	 many	 different	 countries	 have	
delegated	 new	 tasks	 to	 central	 banks,	 all	 within	 a	 relatively	 short	 timeframe.	
They	have	done	so	with	the	active	encouragement	and	support	of	transnational	
networks	of	central	bankers,	financial	regulators	and	academic	and	professional	
economists.	 In	 both	 cases,	 delegation	 of	 powers	 to	 central	 banks	 has	 been	
backed	by	an	ostensibly	robust	economic	rationale.2	
2.2.1 ECONOMIC	RATIONALES	FOR	DELEGATION	TO	CENTRAL	BANKS		
The	 economic	 rationale	 for	 CBI	 grew	 out	 of	 research	 on	 the	 so-called	 ‘time	
inconsistency’	of	policymaking	(Kydland	and	Prescott	1977;	Barrow	and	Gordon	
1983;	Rogoff	1985).	Building	from	‘rational	expectations’	assumptions	about	the	
behaviour	 of	 individuals,	 the	 time-inconsistency	 problem	 suggests	 that	
policymakers	 possessing	 discretion	 over	 the	 setting	 of	 monetary	 policy	 will	
inevitably	lack	credibility	in	the	eyes	of	market	actors.	This	is	because	a	principal	
means	 by	which	 policymakers	 can	 control	 inflation	 is	 through	 influencing	 the	
inflation	 expectations	 of	 households	 and	 firms.	One	means	of	 doing	 this	 is	 to	
pre-announce	their	future	policy	intentions,	for	example,	by	promising	to	raise	
interest	rates	at	some	point	in	the	future.	Having	made	such	an	announcement,	
policymakers	 may	 be	 tempted	 to	 renege	 on	 their	 commitment	 if	 conditions	
subsequently	 change.	 The	 conventional	 wisdom	 holds	 policymakers	 are	
particularly	prone	to	break	their	promises	in	the	run	up	to	elections,	as	running	
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expansionary	 monetary	 policies	 (i.e.	 setting	 lower	 interest	 rates)	 can	 boost	
growth	and	employment	 in	 the	 short	 term	and	 thus	 improve	 their	 chances	of	
re-election.	The	credibility	problem	arises	because	rational	economic	agents	are	
aware	that	policymakers	are	likely	to	renege	on	their	promises.	Thus,	firms	and	
households	 do	 not	 believe	 policymakers	 will	 follow	 through	 on	 their	 policy	
commitments,	thereby	making	their	pre-announcements	ineffective	in	the	first	
place.	 According	 to	 this	 rationale,	 then,	 policymakers	 should	 relinquish	 their	
discretionary	control	over	monetary	policy.	By	establishing	a	rule-based	system	
–	for	instance	by	creating	an	independent	central	bank	with	a	legal	mandate	to	
pursue	price	stability	–	firms	and	households	will	have	more	confidence	in	the	
credibility	of	policy	announcements.		
Economists	have	argued	that	like	monetary	policy,	financial	stability	policy	is	
also	 subject	 to	 a	 time	 inconsistency	 problem	 (Masciandaro	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Cihak	
2010). 3 	This	 view	 holds	 that	 prudential	 regulation	 and	 supervision	 will	 be	
ineffective	unless	market	players	believe	policymakers	will	enforce	rules	when	
they	are	contravened.	However,	if	market	actors	believe	policymakers	will	take	
a	tough	approach	–	for	example,	by	‘blowing	the	whistle’	on	banks	that	breach	
regulatory	 capital	 requirements	 –	 it	 can	be	 rational	 for	 those	policymakers	 to	
act	 leniently	 in	 the	 short-run.	 This	 is	 because	 turning	 a	 blind	 eye	 to	 rule	
breaches	 can	 be	 less	 costly	 for	 the	 financial	 institution	 involved,	 if	 that	
institution	 is	 subsequently	 able	 to	 recover.	 A	 lenient	 approach	 can	 also	 be	
politically	convenient	for	policymakers,	who	tend	to	suffer	reputational	damage	
if	banks	or	other	large	financial	institutions	are	seen	to	fail	‘on	their	watch’.	As	
with	 monetary	 policy,	 the	 time	 inconsistency	 problem	 arises	 because	 –	
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according	 to	 ‘rational	 expectations’	 assumptions	 –	 market	 participants	 know	
that	policymakers	have	a	short-term	incentive	to	act	leniently.	This	means	they	
will	not	really	believe	the	policymakers’	promises	to	be	‘tough’	in	the	first	place.	
The	 time	 inconsistency	 problem	 provides	 a	 basic	 rationale	 for	 delegating	
prudential	regulation	and	supervision	to	independent	technocratic	officials	who	
are	 sufficiently	 insulated	 from	 democratic	 pressures	 as	 to	 be	 able	 to	 adopt	 a	
more	time-consistent	approach.		
Arguably,	 the	 economic	 rationale	 for	 political	 independence	 in	 financial	
stability	 policy	 is	 stronger	 than	 the	 corresponding	 rationale	 in	 relation	 to	
monetary	 policy.	 Financial	 crises	 permanently	 lower	 gross	 domestic	 product	
(Martin	et	al.	2014).	By	preventing	or	diminishing	the	frequency	and	severity	of	
crises,	financial	stability	policy	can	contribute	to	greater	long	run	social	welfare.	
However,	the	tools	required	to	achieve	financial	stability	have	economic	costs	in	
the	short-run	that	are	more	unevenly	distributed	throughout	society	than	costs	
associated	 with	 interest	 rate	 changes.	 For	 example,	 macroprudential	 policies	
such	 as	 ‘loan-to-income’	 or	 ‘loan-to-value’	 ratios	 on	 residential	 mortgage	
lending	 are	 designed	 to	 prevent	 real	 estate	 bubbles.	 The	 short-term	 pain	 of	
such	 policies	 falls	 on	 specific	 groups	 of	 prospective	 homeowners	 who	 are	
prevented	from	accessing	the	credit	 they	need	to	buy	a	home,	and	banks	and	
mortgage	originators	which	will	potentially	make	fewer	profits.	Microprudential	
policy	 is	 more	 targeted	 still.	 It	 is	 focused	 on	 controlling	 the	 activities	 of	
individual	 financial	 institutions.	 Since	 the	 benefits	 of	 financial	 stability	 are	
diffuse	 and	 become	 apparent	 only	 in	 the	 long	 run,	 financial	 stability	 policy	 is	
subject	to	a	‘collective	action'	problem	(Olson	1971).	That	is	to	say,	those	who	
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stand	to	suffer	from	financial	stability	policies,	at	least	in	the	short-run,	will	be	
better	organised	and	will	lobby	more	fiercely	than	those	who	stand	to	gain.		
These	rationalist	arguments	underpin	the	orthodox	case	for	financial	stability	
policy	 to	be	placed	beyond	the	direct	control	of	executive	politicians.	They	do	
not,	 however,	 specify	 a	 specific	 organisational	 structure	 for	 financial	 stability	
policy.	 As	 this	 thesis	 documents,	 the	 division	 of	 labour	 between	 finance	
ministries,	 central	 banks	 and	 independent	 supervisory	 authorities	 varies	 from	
one	country	to	the	next	and	has	shifted	over	time.	Historically,	there	has	been	
no	 consensus	 in	 the	 transnational	 policy	 community	 over	 the	 merits	 and	
drawbacks	of	different	organisational	architectures	for	financial	stability	policy.	
Common	arguments	regarding	the	roles	of	different	public	authorities	differ	 in	
respect	 of	 the	 three	 core	 aspects	 of	 financial	 stability	 policy	 identified	 in	 the	
previous	chapter,	namely,	 crisis	management,	macroprudential	 regulation	and	
microprudential	supervision.		
CRISIS	MANAGEMENT	
Central	banks	have	traditionally	taken	the	lead	in	crisis	management,	acting	as	
lender	 of	 last	 resort	 (LOLR)	 to	 banks	 that	 find	 themselves	 in	 distress	 (see	
Chapter	 3).	 Central	 banks’	 ability	 to	 provide	 LOLR	 facilities	 derives	 from	 their	
exclusive	 right	 to	 issue	 new	 base	money	 (that	 is,	 currency	 and	 bank	 reserves	
held	 on	 account	 at	 the	 central	 bank)	 ‘by	 fiat’.	 However,	 as	 Buiter	 (2009)	
observes,	‘there	is	a	limit	to	the	amount	of	real	resources	that	can	be	extracted	
through	 the	 issuance	 of	 nominal	 base	 money’.4	Since	 central	 banks’	 balance	
sheets	are	relatively	small	relative	to	large	(‘too-big-to-fail’)	commercial	banks,	
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it	is	rare	for	central	banks	to	be	able	to	resolve	an	incipient	banking	panic	using	
their	own	resources	alone.		
Traditionally,	 the	 first	 resort	 for	 central	 banks	 faced	 with	 the	 impending	
failure	of	a	systemically	important	financial	institution	has	been	to	facilitate	(or	
to	 demand)	 that	 other	 still-solvent	 institutions	 step	 in	 to	 purchase	 or	 help	
resolve	their	failing	competitor.	Yet	as	Goodhart	(2002)	argues,	changes	in	the	
structure	 of	 banking,	 particularly	 its	 internationalisation,	 have	 diminished	
central	banks’	ability	to	pressure	private	banks	into	providing	such	solutions	(cf.	
Woll	2014a).	Called	upon	to	rescue	a	failing	firm,	international	banks	will	claim	
that	domestic	pressures	–	such	as	their	fiduciary	responsibilities	to	shareholders	
and	 the	 demands	 of	 their	 ‘home	 country’	 regulators	 –	 prevent	 them	 from	
risking	 their	 capital	 (Goodhart	 2002).	 This	 has	meant	 that	 in	 practice,	 central	
banks	 have	 needed	 to	 rely	 on	 taxpayer	 funds	 to	 pay	 for	 bank	 bailouts.	 This	
provides	 a	 strong	 rationale	 for	 central	 banks	 to	 work	 jointly	 with	 finance	
ministries	in	this	aspect	of	financial	stability	policy.			
MACROPRUDENTIAL	REGULATION	
Few	commentators	dispute	that	central	banks	have	an	important	role	to	play	in	
the	macroprudential	 aspects	 of	 financial	 stability	 policy.	 Most	 debate	 on	 the	
organisational	 structure	 of	 macroprudential	 policy	 centres	 on	 whether	 this	
function	should	belong	exclusively	to	the	central	bank	or	whether	other	public	
authorities	should	also	be	involved.	There	are	two	commonly	cited	reasons	why	
central	 banks	 should	 be	 primarily	 responsible	 for	macroprudential	 regulation.	
First,	central	bank	personnel	are	said	to	possess	informational	advantages,	skills	
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and	 expertise	 that	make	 them	 uniquely	 well	 suited	 to	 the	 task	 of	 identifying	
systemic	risks,	either	in	the	financial	system	at	large	or	at	a	sectoral	level	(Nier	
et	 al.	 2011a,	 2011b).	 These	 advantages	 stem	 from	 the	 macroeconomic	
analytical	 capacities	 needed	 to	 support	 other	 functions	 that	 central	 banks	
perform,	 including	 monetary	 policy,	 oversight	 of	 payments	 systems	 and	 the	
provision	of	LOLR	facilities.		
Second,	 there	 are	 complementarities	 between	 macroprudential	 regulation	
and	 monetary	 policy	 (Goodhart	 and	 Schoenmaker	 1995;	 Goodhart	 2002;	
Whelan	 2012;	 Bank	 of	 England	 2013a).	 In	 general	 terms,	 stable	 prices	 ensure	
that	money	 acts	 as	 a	 reliable	 store	 of	 value,	 which	 is	 important	 in	 providing	
certainty	to	savers	and	borrowers	about	the	real	value	of	their	investments	and	
debts	(Bank	of	England	2013a).	Equally,	by	preventing	financial	crises,	financial	
stability	 policy	 ensures	 financial	 markets	 act	 as	 a	 smooth	 transmission	
mechanism	for	monetary	policy	decisions,	 thereby	helping	central	banks	meet	
their	price	stability	objectives.		
These	arguments	 run	up	against	 the	 counterargument	 that	 central	bankers	
may	 be	 reluctant	 to	 concentrate	 on	 risks	 that	 have	 arisen	 from	 actions	 they	
themselves	 have	 taken.	 Monetary	 policy	 can	 have	 adverse	 consequences	 for	
financial	stability	through	multiple	channels.	For	example,	when	a	central	bank	
lowers	its	policy	interest	rate,	it	stimulates	aggregate	demand.	Consumers	and	
firms	 will	 fund	 a	 proportion	 of	 their	 additional	 consumption	 or	 investment	
through	borrowing,	which	can	be	a	source	of	systemic	risk	if	these	borrowers	do	
not	adequately	 factor-in	 the	costs	of	 servicing	 their	debts	when	 interest	 rates	
eventually	 rise	 (Bank	of	England	2013a).5	The	potential	 for	monetary	policy	 to	
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create	financial	stability	risks	provides	a	rationale	for	including	a	wider	range	of	
perspectives	 in	 the	governance	arrangements	 for	macroprudential	policy	 than	
those	of	central	bankers	alone.		
There	 is	 also	 an	 argument	 for	 including	 microprudential	 supervisors	 in	
macroprudential	 policymaking	 (where	 microprudential	 supervision	 is	 not	
already	a	 function	of	 the	 central	 bank).	 If	macroprudential	 policy	 is	 entrusted	
solely	 to	 decision-makers	 who	 are	 first	 and	 foremost	 concerned	 with	 price	
stability,	 it	 is	possible	they	will	underappreciate	the	consequences	of	decisions	
that	 are	 designed	 to	 mitigate	 systemic	 risks	 for	 the	 safety	 and	 soundness	 of	
individual	 firms.	 For	 example,	 a	 central	 bank	 facing	 a	 looming	 recession	may	
decide	 to	 relax	 capital	 or	 liquidity	 standards	 for	 banks.	 This	 countercyclical	
action	would	potentially	help	support	banks’	 lending	to	 the	real	economy	and	
potentially	 avert	 or	 mitigate	 the	 severity	 of	 a	 credit	 crunch.	 Yet	 from	 a	
microprudential	perspective,	such	an	action	could	enable	banks	to	operate	with	
too	 little	 capital	 or	 liquidity,	 thus	 raising	 the	 possibility	 that	 individual	 firms	
would	fail.		
MICROPRUDENTIAL	SUPERVISION	
Central	banks	role	in	microprudential	supervision	has	been	the	source	of	much	
contestation	 (see,	 for	 example,	 ECB	 2001;	 Briault	 1999,	 2002	 for	 influential	
contributions	 on	 either	 side	 of	 this	 debate).	 As	 with	 macroprudential	 policy,	
there	 are	 informational	 synergies	 between	 monetary	 policy	 and	
microprudential	 supervision.	 The	 transmission	mechanism	 of	monetary	 policy	
flows	 largely	 through	 financial	 intermediation	 in	 the	 banking	 system.	 Thus,	 a	
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central	 bank	 can	benefit	 from	having	 access	 to	proprietary	 information	 about	
banks’	exposures.	This	can	provide	for	better	analysis	and	forecasting	about	the	
impact	of	changes	in	the	monetary	policy	stance	(Peek	et	al.	1999).		
Yet	 economists	 frequently	 point	 to	 potential	 conflicts	 between	 monetary	
policy	 and	 microprudential	 supervision.	 A	 central	 bank	 may	 use	 its	 ability	 to	
create	 money	 by	 pumping	 liquidity	 into	 the	 financial	 system	 or	 otherwise	
monetising	 financial	distress	 (Goodhart	and	Schoenmaker	1995;	Hermings	and	
Carmassi	2008).	This	would	have	the	effect	of	 increasing	the	 ‘moral	hazard’	of	
financial	institutions	taking	excessive	risks	in	the	knowledge	that	the	monetary	
authorities	 will	 pick	 up	 the	 tab	 if	 their	 bets	 turn	 sour.	 Central	 banks	may	 be	
particularly	prone	to	forbearing	on,	or	bailing	out,	troubled	banks	because	the	
reputational	 risk	 associated	 with	 bank	 failures	 could	 negatively	 affect	 their	
reputation	 for	 competence	 and,	 in	 turn,	 their	 cherished	 credibility	 in	 the	
monetary	policy	arena	(Goodhart	2002).			
2.2.2 THE	POLITICS	OF	DELEGATION	
Politicians’	decisions	over	the	design	of	financial	stability	architectures	may	be	
influenced	 by	 arguments	 of	 economists,	 but	 such	 considerations	 are	 rarely	
decisive.	 After	 all,	 the	 economic	 case	 for	 independence	 in	 financial	 stability	
policy	and	the	economic	case	for	CBI	in	monetary	policy	are	very	similar.	Yet	the	
direction	of	change	in	supervisory	structures	prior	to	the	financial	crisis	was	for	
governments	 to	 increase	 their	 control	 over	 prudential	 regulation	 and	
supervision	(Masciandaro	and	Quintyn	2009),	even	as	they	relinquished	control	
over	 monetary	 policy.	 The	 creation	 of	 independent	 financial	 regulatory	
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authorities,	such	as	the	Financial	Services	Authority	(FSA)	in	the	United	Kingdom	
or	the	Bundesanstalt	für	Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht	(BaFin)	in	Germany,	was	
part	 of	 a	 process	 of	 rationalisation	 of	 financial	 regulation,	 wherein	 executive	
politicians	 sought	 to	 enhance	 democratic	 control	 over	 financial	 markets	 by	
establishing	 formalised,	 legalistic	 and	 accountable	 regulatory	 authorities	
(Moran	2002,	2003;	Westrup	2007;	Perez	and	Westrup	2010;	McPhilemy	2013).	
As	this	suggests,	the	organisational	structure	of	 financial	stability	policy	at	any	
given	 moment	 is	 not	 necessarily	 a	 ‘first	 best’	 reflection	 of	 economic	 and	
administrative	 thinking	 (notwithstanding	 the	 customary	 arguments	 to	 the	
contrary	 from	 incumbent	 politicians	 and	 financial	 policymakers).	 Ultimately,	
delegation	of	authority	for	 financial	stability	policy	 is	a	political	act	requiring	a	
political	explanation.		
One	obvious	explanation	for	politicians’	decisions	to	enhance	central	banks’	
mandates	after	the	financial	crisis	is	that	financial	stability	is	a	vote-winner	with	
the	‘median	voter’.	Homeowners	have	a	preference	for	house	prices	to	rise	and	
can	 find	 themselves	 in	 severe	 economic	 difficulty	 if	 they	 do	 not.	 Likewise,	
pensioners	 and	 people	 saving	 for	 retirement	 demand	 safe	 returns	 on	 their	
investments	 and	 protection	 from	 sudden	 episodes	 of	 wealth	 destruction.	 In	
accordance	with	 the	economic	arguments	 reviewed	above,	 it	 could	be	argued	
that	politicians	delegate	financial	stability	policy	to	technocratic	central	banks	in	
order	 to	 provide	 voters	 with	 greater	 assurance	 that	 their	 wealth	 will	 be	
guaranteed.	 This	 explanation	 chimes	 with	 previous	 scholarship	 on	 CBI	 in	
monetary	policy,	which	highlighted	the	popularity	of	CBI	with	the	home-owning	
median	voter	(King	2005).		
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Such	an	explanation	takes	us	only	so	far.	The	exposure	of	western	publics	to	
financial	 risks	 (‘financialisation’)	 is	a	 secular	phenomenon	 that	has	been	going	
on	 for	 many	 decades	 (Langley	 2008).	 Were	 politicians’	 choices	 over	 the	
structure	 of	 financial	 stability	 architectures	 ultimately	 determined	 by	 the	
demands	 of	 the	 median	 voter,	 at	 least	 some	 Western	 central	 banks	 would	
surely	have	been	delegated	strong	financial	stability	mandates	even	before	the	
financial	crisis.	Furthermore,	it	is	difficult	to	explain	the	rapid	transformation	in	
central	banking	 in	 the	 last	 few	years	as	 simply	a	 reflection	of	 the	demands	of	
the	median	 voter.	 To	be	 sure,	 politicians	hope	 to	 gain	 an	electoral	 advantage	
from	strengthening	the	powers	of	central	banks	in	respect	of	financial	stability.	
But	 as	 the	 economic	 arguments	 reviewed	 above	 suggest,	 there	 exist	 many	
potential	 organisational	 structures	 for	 financial	 supervision.	 It	 remains	 to	 be	
explained,	 then,	 why	 central	 banks	 in	 particular	 have	 emerged	 as	 the	 major	
‘winners’	in	bureaucratic	terms	since	the	onset	of	the	financial	crisis.		
The	political	economy	literature	on	post-crisis	delegation	of	financial	stability	
functions	to	central	banks	remains	at	a	nascent	stage.	However,	a	common	rule-
of-thumb	in	comparative	political	economy	scholarship	is	that	political	decisions	
and	 processes	 of	 institutional	 change	 tend	 to	 reflect	 some	 combination	 of	
ideational,	material	and	 institutional	 influences	 (Hall,	P.	1997;	Blyth	2002;	Hay	
2004).	 Following	 this	 heuristic,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 propose	 three	 categories	 of	
explanation	for	post-crisis	delegation	to	central	banks:	policy	entrepreneurship,	
sectoral	politics	and	institutional	constraints.		
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POLICY	ENTREPRENEURSHIP		
Scholarship	on	the	previous	revolution	in	central	banking	–	the	advent	of	CBI	in	
the	1990s	and	the	2000s	–	hints	at	what	could	be	the	core	dynamic	underlying	
the	 remarkably	 rapid	 transformation	 in	 central	 banking	 that	 has	 taken	 place	
since	 the	onset	of	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Several	 explanations	 for	 the	emergence	
and	 worldwide	 spread	 CBI	 suggested	 that	 the	 phenomenon	 was	 ultimately	 a	
reflection	 of	 the	 changing	 ideas	 and	 policy	 entrepreneurship	 (Kingdon	 2011	
[1984])	of	transnational	networks	of	central	bankers,	officials	from	international	
organisations	 (such	 as	 the	 IMF)	 and	 private	 sector	 financial	 experts.	 Such	
networks	 are	 alleged	 to	have	adopted	 the	economic	 ‘dogma’	of	CBI	 and	 then	
persuaded	 politicians	 to	 champion	 their	 ideas	 through	 deliberative	 and	 semi-
coercive	 processes	 (Marcussen	 2005:	 919).	 Scholars	 have	 given	 a	 number	 of	
reasons	 for	 politicians’	 acquiescence	 to	 the	 demands	 of	 such	 networks.	
McNamara	 (2002)	 suggests	 politicians	 adopted	 CBI	 as	 a	means	 of	 legitimising	
their	 rule	 by	 mimicking	 organisational	 forms	 viewed	 as	 successful	 in	 other	
jurisdictions.	Maxfield	(1998)	suggests	that	for	emerging	market	economies,	CBI	
was	 a	 means	 of	 signalling	 creditworthiness	 to	 international	 investors.	 As	
discussed,	King	(2005)	suggested	the	adoption	of	CBI	in	the	United	Kingdom	was	
an	electoral	 strategy	on	 the	part	of	 the	 Labour	Party	aimed	at	 convincing	 the	
electorate	of	its	anti-inflationary	intentions.			
This	 thesis	 argues	 that	 the	 transformation	 of	 central	 banking	 since	 the	
financial	 crisis	 also	 has	 its	 roots	 in	 the	 shifting	 ideas	 of	 transnationally	
networked	 central	 bankers,	 financial	 regulators,	 staff	 of	 international	
organisations,	and	private	sector	analysts.	As	Baker	(2013a:	2)	highlights,	a	rapid	
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ideational	 shift	 took	 place	 in	 late	 2008	 and	 early	 2009,	 wherein	 ‘the	 idea	 of	
macroprudential	 regulation	 (MPR)	 moved	 to	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 policy	 agenda	
and	 became	 the	 principal	 interpretative	 frame	 for	 financial	 technocrats	 and	
regulators	seeking	to	navigate	the	crisis	and	respond	to	it’.	Central	bankers	may	
be	 regarded	 as	 having	 acted	 as	 an	 ‘epistemic	 community’	 (Hass	 1992).	 With	
shared	normative	beliefs	about	the	role	that	central	banks	ought	to	play	in	post-
crisis	 regulatory	 reforms,	 and	 broadly	 similar	 causal	 beliefs	 about	 the	 policy	
problems	 they	 confronted,	 they	 sought	 to	mobilise	 political	 support	 for	 their	
new	macroprudential	thinking	through	processes	of	learning	and	persuasion.	At	
the	 same	 time,	 the	 thesis	 highlights	 the	 particular	 conditions	 that	 have	
facilitated	the	transmission	of	these	actors’	messages.	Specifically,	it	focuses	on	
the	advantages	that	central	bankers	enjoy	by	virtue	of	the	particular	functions	
they	perform	in	the	wider	economy,	and	the	dependency	of	other	actors	(public	
and	private)	on	their	actions,	especially	during	times	of	crisis.	
That	 central	 bankers	 and	 associated	 technocratic	 experts	 have	 been	 the	
primary	 advocates	 for	 enhancing	 central	 bank	 power	 in	 respect	 of	 financial	
stability	 is	 hardly	 controversial.	 However,	 the	 agency	 of	 transnationally	
networked	central	bankers	and	 financial	 experts	does	not	provide	a	 complete	
explanation	for	the	reforms	witnessed	in	recent	years.	The	three	major	Western	
central	banks	considered	in	this	thesis	have	all	emerged	with	enhanced	powers	
in	the	financial	stability	arena.	Yet	they	differ	markedly	in	respect	of	their	new	
mandates	 and	 in	 their	 initial	 efforts	 to	 fulfil	 those	mandates.	 To	 explain	 this	
variation,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 turn	 our	 gaze	 away	 from	 factors	 common	 to	 all	
advanced	economies,	towards	the	idiosyncrasies	of	individual	jurisdictions.	
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VARIETIES	OF	FINANCIAL	CAPITALISM	
National	 financial	 systems	 are	 commonly	 categorised	 as	 being	 either	 capital	
market-based	 or	 bank-based	 (Zysman	 1983;	 Allen	 and	 Gale	 2001;	 Rajan	 and	
Zingales	2003;	for	a	recent	critique	of	this	distinction	see	Hardie	and	Howarth	et	
al.	2013).	As	discussed,	empowering	central	banks	to	take	action	to	prevent	or	
mitigate	 systemic	 risks	 entails	 costs	 and	 benefits	 that	 are	 unevenly	 spread	
throughout	society.	Certain	groups	–	including	both	actors	in	the	financial	sector	
and	 societal	 groups	 that	 depend	 on	 access	 to	 credit	 –	 may	 be	 exposed	 to	
significant	short-term	costs.	Other	things	being	equal,	politicians	are	 less	 likely	
to	 delegate	 strong	 financial	 stability	 powers	 to	 the	 central	 bank	 in	 countries	
where	the	constituencies	that	stand	to	suffer	from	such	delegation	(at	 least	 in	
the	short-run)	are	large,	politically	well	connected	or	central	to	the	health	of	the	
wider	 economy.	 For	 example,	 where	 large,	 highly	 leveraged,	 banks	 play	 a	
central	role	 in	the	provision	of	credit	to	non-financial	 firms,	politicians	may	be	
reluctant	 to	delegate	strong	 financial	 stability	mandates	 to	 their	central	banks	
because	doing	so	could	lead	to	unwelcome	restrictions	on	the	supply	of	credit	in	
the	economy.	Likewise,	where	households	are	heavily	dependent	on	access	to	
cheap	credit	to	smooth	their	consumption,	governments	may	be	disinclined	to	
delegate	 sweeping	 powers	 to	 the	 central	 bank,	 since	 the	 electoral	 costs	 of	
restricting	access	to	credit	would	be	relatively	high.	
The	characteristics	of	national	 ‘varieties	of	 financial	 capitalism’	 (Hardie	and	
Howarth	 et	 al.	 2013)	 will	 not	 map	 neatly	 to	 observed	 levels	 of	 central	 bank	
involvement	 in	 financial	 stability	 policy	 because	 political	 institutions,	 party	
systems	 and	 prevailing	 political	 and	 cultural	 factors	 mediate	 which	 groups’	
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preferences	are	served	 in	the	democratic	process.	 If	politicians	depend	on	the	
support	of	negatively	affected	constituencies,	they	can	be	expected	to	oppose	
such	 delegations.	 Conversely,	 politicians	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 delegate	 strong	
financial	stability	mandates	to	central	banks	when	the	issue	of	financial	stability	
has	become	so	salient	that	the	popularity	of	such	moves	outweighs	the	political	
backlash	 from	 negatively	 affected	 groups.	 In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 financial	
crisis,	 ‘stability	 cultures’	 (Tognato	 2012)	 and	 narratives	 of	 ‘living	 within	 one’s	
means’	 (Stanley	 2014)	 have	 become	 more	 pervasive	 within	 Western	 publics.	
This	 has	 made	 stability-oriented	 macroeconomic	 programmes	 –	 including	
delegation	of	financial	stability	responsibilities	to	central	banks	and,	ultimately,	
greater	restrictions	on	the	supply	of	credit	to	households	–	more	popular	than	
in	the	past.		
INSTITUTIONAL	CONSTRAINTS	
To	the	extent	that	the	varieties	of	 financial	capitalism	literature	provides	for	a	
mediating	role	for	national	institutions	in	the	formation	of	policy	preferences,	it	
shades	 into	 the	 third	 category	 of	 explanation,	 which	 focuses	 specifically	 on	
interaction	 between	 agents	 and	 the	 structural	 and	 institutional	 terrains	 they	
operate	in.	There	are	many	varieties	of	new	institutionalist	scholarship	(see	Hall,	
P.	 and	 Taylor	 1996;	 Peters	 2012)	 and	 it	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	
assess	 how	 each	 of	 them	might	 explain	 the	 changing	 power	 of	 central	 banks	
after	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 As	 set	 out	 in	 Section	 2.5	 below,	 the	 thesis	 builds	 on	
‘historical	 institutionalist’	 insights,	 which	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 dialectical	
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interaction	 between	 interpretive	 agents	 and	 the	 institutional	 and	 structural	
terrains	they	inhabit.		
A	 historical	 institutionalist	 explanation	 for	 the	 nature	 of	 post-crisis	
delegation	 to	 central	 banks	 would	 focus	 on	 the	 interactions	 between	
policymakers	and	the	organisational	structures,	institutional	cultures,	and	policy	
legacies	 they	 confront.	 Policy	 choices,	 once	 made,	 can	 produce	 ‘path	
dependencies’	 and	 ‘sunk	 costs’	 that	 make	 certain	 policy	 choices	 for	
policymakers	more	difficult.	To	 take	one	example,	over	 the	course	of	 the	20th	
century,	 the	 United	 States	 has	 established	 a	 bewildering	 array	 of	 financial	
regulatory	authorities.	The	managers	and	employees	of	each	of	these	agencies	
have	a	material	interest	in	preserving	(or	expanding)	the	range	of	competencies	
that	 is	assigned	to	their	agency.	Likewise	these	agencies	have	developed	long-
standing	 relationships	 both	 with	 the	 financial	 market	 participants	 they	
supervise	 and	 the	 congressional	 politicians	 that	 oversee	 them.	 These	 actors	
often	have	vested	interests	in	maintaining	the	status	quo.	Policy	entrepreneurs	
seeking	 to	 reform	the	US	regulatory	architecture,	 for	example,	 face	resistance	
from	coalitions	of	other	public	bodies	and	 their	allies	 in	Washington	and	Wall	
Street,	keen	to	defend	existing	preferential	relationships.		
To	 summarise	 the	 discussion	 so	 far,	 this	 section	 has	 explored	 the	 reasons	
why	 politicians	 delegate	 powers	 to	 central	 banks	 in	 the	 area	 of	 financial	
stability.	 It	 has	 reviewed	 the	 economic	 rationales	 for	 central	 banks	 to	 play	 a	
leading	 role	 in	 this	 area	 and	 it	 has	 identified	 a	 number	 of	 potential	 political	
explanations	for	the	variegated	paths	of	organisational	reform	that	are	adopted	
in	different	countries.	The	arguments	considered	so	far	concern	the	relationship	
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between	 democratic	 politicians	 and	 non-majoritarian	 bureaucrats	 in	 central	
banks	 and	 other	 independent	 regulatory	 agencies.	 Just	 as	 important	 for	 an	
understanding	 how	 central	 bank	 power	 has	 changed	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	
financial	 crisis	 is	 the	 relationship	 between	 central	 banks	 and	 the	 financial	
market	actors	they	are	responsible	for	overseeing.	It	is	to	this	relationship	that	
we	now	turn.	
2.3 PERSPECTIVES	ON	FINANCIAL	POWER	
Whether	implicitly	or	explicitly,	much	of	the	communication	from	central	banks,	
in	 speeches,	 policy	 reports	 or	 economic	 research,	 is	 couched	 in	 terms	 of	
maximizing	 ‘aggregate	 social	 welfare’	 or	 protecting	 the	 ‘public	 interest’.	 Such	
notions	generally	draw	a	 sceptical	 response	 from	political	economists.	Central	
banks	are	in	the	business	of	making	decisions	with	distributional	consequences.	
Without	 denying	 that	 some	 policies	 may	 be	 ‘positive	 sum’,	 the	 business	 of	
setting	 interest	 rates,	 controlling	 the	money	 supply	or	 regulating	 the	 financial	
system	 creates	 winners	 and	 losers,	 especially	 in	 the	 short-run.	 Thus,	 central	
banks’	actions	are	generally	subject	to	a	high	level	of	contestation	from	affected	
parties	and	their	political	representatives	in	 legislatures	and	governments.	 It	 is	
for	 this	 reason	 that	 central	 bank	 watchers	 tend	 to	 ‘hang	 on	 to	 every	
gubernatorial	semi-colon’	(Haldane	2014:	6).	While	all	advanced	country	central	
banks	 enjoy	 some	 level	 of	 legal	 and	 de	 facto	 independence	 from	 political	
control	 over	 their	 day-to-day	 operations,	 they	 do	 not	 operate	 in	 a	 vacuum.	
Financial	 market	 participants	 and	 wider	 societal	 interest	 groups	 can	 and	 do	
exert	influence	over	central	bank	policy.		
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The	influence	of	the	financial	industry	on	public	policies	may	be	direct,	as,	for	
example,	 when	 financial	 firms	 successfully	 lobby	 central	 banks	 for	 a	 rule	
change.	 It	may	also	be	 indirect,	 such	as	when	policymakers	 feel	 compelled	 to	
implement	 market-friendly	 policies	 in	 order	 to	 enhance	 the	 international	
competitiveness	 of	 their	 ‘home’	 jurisdictions	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 ostensibly	mobile	
financial	capital.	Scholarship	on	the	concept	of	‘structural	power’	(Strange	1988;	
Gill	and	Law	1988;	see	below)	suggests	that	at	any	given	moment,	the	relative	
power	of	business	actors	and	public	officials	depends	 in	part	on	 the	extent	 to	
which	those	actors	are	dependent	on	one	another.	This	is	not	to	say	that	central	
banks’	 actions	 are	 a	 simple	 reflection	 of	 the	 balance	 of	 interdependencies	
between	public	and	private	actors	or	of	 the	particular	stratification	of	societal	
interests	at	a	given	moment.	The	power	of	public	or	societal	actors	is	mediated	
(can	 be	 enhanced	 or	 diminished)	 by	 the	 ideas	 and	 beliefs	 that	 actors	 use	 to	
interpret	 the	 world,	 and	 by	 the	 broad	 intellectual	 climates	 within	 which	
relationships	between	public	and	private	actors	play	out	(cf.	Bell	2012;	Bell	and	
Hindmoor	 2014;	 2015).	 Before	 considering	 further	 how	 ‘ideas’	 mediate	 the	
structural	power	of	finance,	 it	 is	worth	considering	further	the	mechanisms	by	
which	 market	 participants	 help	 shape	 central	 bank	 policies.	 To	 do	 so,	 this	
section	 reviews	 some	 competing	 perspectives	 in	 political	 science	 and	 political	
economy	 scholarship	 on	 the	 power	 of	 private	 interest	 groups	 to	 shape	
regulation	towards	their	own	ends.		
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2.3.1 THE	ECONOMIC	THEORY	OF	REGULATION	
Starting	 in	 the	 1970s,	 public	 choice	 theorists	 applied	 the	 techniques	 of	
microeconomics	 to	 the	 study	 of	 political	 behaviour	 (Stigler	 1971;	 Peltzman	
1976;	 Becker	 1983).	 Challenging	 the	 prevailing	 orthodoxy	 of	 the	 time,	 which	
asserted	that	politicians	work	impartially	and	selflessly	in	the	‘public	interest’	to	
correct	 market	 failures,	 these	 authors	 contended	 that	 the	 behaviour	 of	
politicians,	 like	 that	 of	 economic	 agents	 in	 society	 at	 large,	was	motivated	by	
narrow	self-interest.	Politicians,	 it	was	argued,	trade-off	the	costs	and	benefits	
of	 supporting	one	group	over	another	 (for	more	 recent	 contributions	building	
on	similar	assumptions	see	Grossman	and	Helpman	1994,	2001).	For	example,	a	
politician	would	be	willing	to	support	a	regulation	that	raised	the	price	of	goods	
or	services	if	the	suppliers	of	those	goods	and	services	could	provide	campaign	
funding	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 support	 that	 more	 than	 compensated	 for	 the	
electoral	costs	that	higher	prices	would	engender	(Peltzman	1976).	This	theory	
of	 ‘regulatory	 capture’	 provides	 a	 rationale	 for	 delegating	 powers	 to	
independent	regulatory	agencies,	since	it	is	assumed	that	technocratic	elites	will	
be	more	insulated	from	special	interest	groups	than	politicians	concerned	with	
securing	re-election.		
At	 the	 same	 time,	 some	 scholars	 in	 this	 tradition	 have	 argued	 that	 the	
establishment	 of	 independent	 regulatory	 agencies	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 prevent	
regulation	from	being	captured	by	those	that	are	subject	to	it.	Tirole	(1986)	set	
out	 a	 three-tiered	 principal/supervisor/agent	 model	 of	 ‘collusion’	 in	
organisations.	 His	 model	 suggested	 that	 agents	 (such	 as	 firms	 or	 regulated	
individuals)	make	side	payments	to	supervisors	to	induce	them	into	withholding	
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information	 from	 principals.	 Applied	 to	 a	 business	 regulation,	 this	 model	
suggests	 firms	 will	 bribe	 supervisors	 into	 setting	 policies	 that	 afford	 them	
unjustifiable	rents	(Dal	Bo	2006).	Other	scholarship	on	‘regulatory	capture’	does	
not	 rely	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 firms	 bribing	 regulators.	One	of	 the	most	 discussed	
mechanisms	by	which	capture	 is	 said	 to	occur	 is	 the	so-called	 ‘revolving	door’	
(for	 a	 useful	 review	 see	 Dal	 Bo	 2006).	 The	 promise	 of	 lucrative	 future	
employment	in	a	regulated	firm,	so	the	argument	goes,	may	induce	regulators	
to	 take	 a	 lenient	 approach,	 either	 because	 the	 regulator	 has	 an	 explicit	 or	
implicit	 agreement	 with	 a	 regulated	 firm	 that	 this	 will	 lead	 to	 future	
employment,	or	because	the	regulator	wishes	to	enhance	his	or	her	credentials	
in	 the	 job	 market.	 While	 the	 revolving	 door	 does	 not	 involve	 bribery,	 it	
produces	 regulatory	 capture	 by	 providing	 material	 incentives	 for	 individual	
regulators	to	act	leniently.6		
2.3.2 MACRO-LEVEL	REGULATORY	CAPTURE		
Recent	 literature	 on	 the	 regulatory	 failures	 that	 contributed	 to	 the	 financial	
crisis	has	offered	new	perspectives	on	 the	mechanisms	by	which	 the	 financial	
industry	(in	particular)	exerts	power	in	regulatory	processes.	In	the	aftermath	of	
the	 financial	 crisis,	 allegations	 of	 outright	 bribery	 of	 regulatory	 officials	 were	
few,	although	some	scholars	did	claim	that	regulatory	failures	were	attributable	
to	 the	revolving	door	and	the	material	 incentives	 facing	senior	 regulators	 (see	
Miller	and	Dinan	2009;	Perrow	2010).	More	commonly,	authors	alleged	that	a	
form	 of	 ‘macro-level	 regulatory	 capture’	 had	 taken	 hold,	 wherein	 multiple	
overlapping	 mechanisms	 came	 together	 to	 cause	 regulators	 to	 view	 the	
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preferences	 of	 the	 financial	 industry	 as	 more	 or	 less	 identical	 to	 their	 own	
(Johnson	 and	 Kwak	 2010;	 Baker	 2010).	 For	 example,	 Johnson	 and	 Kwak	 2010	
argued	that	over	the	course	of	the	1990s,	the	US	financial	industry	was	able	to	
convert	 its	enormous	 financial	 resources	 into	political	power	 through	a	 trio	of	
perfectly	 legal	 mechanisms.	 Large-scale	 lobbying	 campaigns	 and	 generous	
donations	 to	 politicians’	 electoral	 funds	 won	 the	 financial	 sector	 friends	 in	
Congress.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 a	 ‘Wall	 Street-Washington	 corridor’	 saw	 former	
bankers	and	finance	industry	insiders	assume	key	positions	of	power	within	the	
US	 administration	 and	 regulatory	 bodies.	 Finally,	 an	 ‘ideology	 of	 finance’	 –	
which	prized	financial	 innovation,	homeownership	and	the	 ideal	of	a	career	 in	
financial	 services	 –	 became	 widespread,	 especially	 within	 academic,	 business	
and	government	elites.	This	was	driven	in	part	by	the	first	two	factors	–	financial	
industry	lobbying	and	the	revolving	door	–	and	in	part	by	cultural	phenomena,	
including	the	glorification	of	financial	excess	in	films	such	as	Oliver	Stone’s	Wall	
Street.		
Similarly,	 Baker	 (2010)	 sets	 out	 a	 ‘multi-level’	 conception	 of	 regulatory	
capture.	 In	addition	to	direct	 lobbying	and	campaign	 finance,	he	points	 to	 the	
tendency	 of	 ‘boom-time’	 politicians	 to	 favour	 policies	 that	will	 leave	 financial	
market	activity	unrestrained	(see	also	Persaud	2009).	Baker	also	highlights	the	
revolving	doors	phenomenon	and	the	cultural	affinities	and	shared	perspectives	
of	 actors	 working	 in	 linked	 academic,	 business	 and	 official	 ‘professional	
ecologies’	 (see	 also	 Seabrooke	 and	 Tsingou	 2009).	 Finally,	 Baker	 (2010:	 653)	
points	to	‘intellectual	or	cognitive	capture’,	wherein	‘the	personal	connections,	
networks	 and	 repeated	 interactions…	 [between	 financial	 market	 participants	
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and	 regulators]	 can	 lead	 to	 the	personnel	of	 leading	banks	heavily	 influencing	
the	 thinking	and	mindsets	of	 regulators.’	Cognitive	 capture	was	most	evident,	
he	suggests,	in	the	long	reign	of	Alan	Greenspan	as	Federal	Reserve	Chairman,	
whose	evangelism	for	efficient	market	ideas	elevated	such	thinking	to	the	status	
of	market	orthodoxy.	
2.3.3 THE	STRUCTURAL	POWER	OF	FINANCE	
Ultimately	 accounts	 of	 regulatory	 capture	 focus	 on	 interactions	 between	
financial	market	actors	and	public	authorities.	Power	is	exerted	either	through	
material	 inducements,	 ideological	 persuasion	 or	 processes	 of	 socialisation.	
However	multifaceted	such	accounts	may	be,	they	give	 little	explanation	as	to	
why	 financial	market	actors	are	powerful	 in	the	first	place,	save	for	the	ample	
material	resources	available	to	them	to	fund	their	lobbying	campaigns.	Yet	the	
ability	 of	 an	 industry	 to	 exert	 influence	 through	 lobbying	 and	 campaign	
donations	 is	 at	 best	 only	 a	 partial	 explanation	 of	 its	 power.	 Another	 body	 of	
political	 economy	 scholarship	 suggests	 that	 the	 political	 power	 of	 financial	
actors	is	structural	(Strange	1988,	1996;	Bell	2012;	Johal	et	al.	2014;	Woll	2014a;	
Culpepper	 and	 Reinke	 2014).	 According	 to	 these	 authors,	 financial	 actors’	
power	stems	not	only	from	their	ability	to	shape	arguments	or	win’	debates,	but	
also	 from	 the	 unique	 role	 that	 finance	 plays	 in	 the	wider	 economy.	 Financial	
market	players	have	power	because	they	perform	specific	functions	that	other	
actors	depend	on.	As	Woll	(2014a:	46)	puts	it:		
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the	power	of	A	over	B	does	not	necessarily	 rest	on	activities	and	 influence	
peddling.	The	degree	to	which	B	needs	A	is	more	important.	The	dependence	
of	B	on	A	is	a	structural	feature	and	not	the	result	of	individual	interactions.		
	
Banks	and	non-bank	financial	intermediaries	perform	several	functions	that	are	
vital	 for	 the	normal	 functioning	of	modern	capitalist	economies.	They	provide	
savers	 with	 a	 means	 of	 investing	 their	 money,	 such	 that	 it	 retains	 (or	 gains)	
value.	 Banks	 facilitate	 payments	 between	 consumers	 and	 firms,	 by	 providing	
customers	 with	 checking	 accounts	 and	 instant	 access	 to	 their	 deposits.	Most	
importantly,	 they	 provide	 firms	 and	 households	with	 the	 credit	 they	 need	 to	
invest.	 The	 provision	 of	 credit	 is	 central	 to	 a	 healthy	 economy.	 To	 the	 extent	
that	 the	 supply	 of	 credit	 affects	 asset	 prices,	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 price	 of	
housing,	the	supply	of	credit	also	determines	how	wealthy	people	are	and	how	
affluent	they	feel.		
The	 importance	 of	 these	 functions	 for	 the	 broader	macro-economy	 places	
financial	firms	in	a	privileged	position	relative	to	politicians	and	their	agents	in	
central	banks	and	regulatory	agencies.	Politicians,	central	bankers	and	financial	
regulators	 are	 aware	 that	 there	 are	 often	 significant	 short	 run	 trade-offs	
between	regulations	 to	promote	 financial	 stability	and	economic	growth.	To	a	
large	 extent,	 politicians’	 electoral	 fortunes,	 and	 central	 bankers’	 bureaucratic	
standing,	 hinge	 on	 economic	 prosperity.	 They	 therefore	 have	 an	 incentive	 to	
ensure	 that	 regulations	 do	 not	 unduly	 constrain	 the	 credit	 supply	 or	 asset	
prices.	 The	 structural	 position	 of	 the	 financial	 industry	 within	 the	 wider	
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economy	thus	sets	limits	on	the	kinds	of	policies	that	public	authorities	will	be	
willing	to	countenance.		
2.3.4 ACCOUNTING	FOR	VARIATION	
As	Bell	 (2012:	662)	notes,	 there	 is	broad	 recognition	 that	 scholarship	 focusing	
on	the	structural	power	of	business	 is	too	‘structuralist’.	The	financial	 industry	
performs	 functions	 that	 are	 central	 to	 the	 economic	 health	 of	 all	 advanced	
economies,	 but	 the	 power	 of	 financial	 actors	 to	 shape	 regulation	 varies	 from	
one	 country	 to	 the	next.	 In	part,	 this	 is	because	national	 varieties	of	 financial	
capitalism	 differ.	 It	 is	 to	 be	 expected	 that	 governments	 in	 countries	 where	
banks	play	a	relatively	more	 important	role	 in	supplying	 firms	and	households	
with	 credit	 will,	 other	 things	 being	 equal,	 adopt	 a	 more	 deferential	 and	
protective	 stance	 towards	 their	 banks	 than	 countries	 where	 capital	 markets	
play	a	greater	 role	 in	 funding	commercial	businesses.	Conversely,	 countries	 in	
which	non-bank	sources	of	funding	are	more	prevalent	may	be	more	inclined	to	
resist	stringent	controls	on	entities	outside	of	the	regulated	banking	sector.			
A	 variety	 of	 additional	 factors	 could	 mediate	 the	 structural	 power	 of	 the	
financial	 industry.	 Some	 authors	 suggest	 that	 power	 is	 exercised	 through	
discursive	 and	 inter-subjective	 processes	 (Barnett	 and	 Duval	 2005).	 The	 ever-
increasing	 complexity	 of	 finance	 effectively	 restricts	 meaningful	 societal	
participation	in	regulatory	processes	to	all	but	a	small	elite	of	industry	insiders,	
government	 officials	 and	 some	 academic	 economists.	Within	 these	 networks,	
market	 participants	 and	 public	 officials	 co-create	 knowledge	 about	 how	
financial	systems	work;	they	define	key	concepts	and	policy	problems;	and	they	
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help	 frame	 the	 sorts	 of	 solutions	 to	 those	 problems	 that	 policymakers	 will	
consider.	Beyond	this,	some	scholars	further	suggest	that	the	structural	power	
of	 finance	 is	 enhanced	 because	 the	 models	 and	 technologies	 that	 regulators	
and	 market	 participants	 rely	 on	 have	 the	 peculiar	 quality	 of	 unwittingly	
transforming	 the	very	nature	of	markets	 they	are	designed	 to	observe.	This	 is	
the	so-called	‘performativity’	of	finance	(see	MacKenzie	2006).		
An	alternative	factor	that	may	mediate	the	structural	power	of	finance	is	the	
ideas	 government	 actors	 possess	 about	 the	 likely	 consequences	 of	 particular	
courses	 of	 action	 (Bell	 2012;	 Bell	 and	 Hindmoor	 2014,	 2015).	 For	 example,	 a	
firm	may	 threaten	 to	 ‘exit’	 a	 jurisdiction	 that	 imposes	more	 costly	 regulatory	
standards	 than	 the	 international	baseline.	 Such	a	 threat	pertains	 to	 the	 firm’s	
structural	power;	the	functions	the	firm	performs	are	deemed	necessary	for	the	
wider	 economy.	 This	 structural	 power	 will	 be	 enhanced	 if	 policymakers	 truly	
believe	 the	 firm’s	 exit	 threat	 to	 be	 credible.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 firm’s	
structural	power	will	be	diminished	if	policymakers	view	such	threats	as	unlikely	
to	 be	 followed	 by	 action.	 Bell	 (2012)	 and	 Bell	 and	 Hindmoor	 (2014,	 2015)	
remind	 us	 that	 central	 banks	 and	 financial	 regulatory	 authorities	 are	 by	 no	
means	 passive	 entities	 to	 be	 fought	 over	 by	 financial	market	 actors	 or	 other	
interest	 groups.	 Central	 bankers	may	 endeavour	 to	 be	 ‘objective’	 in	 reaching	
‘evidence-based’	 judgements	 regarding	 the	probable	 ramifications	of	different	
courses	of	action.	Yet	the	sorts	of	policies	they	choose	to	implement	inevitably	
will	 be	oriented	 towards	prevailing	 intellectual	 fashions	 regarding	 appropriate	
role	 of	 regulation	 and	 public	 authority	 in	 managing	 how	 financial	 markets	
operate.	In	turn,	changing	intellectual	fashions	will	to	a	significant	extent	reflect	
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changing	 political	 priorities	 and	 public	 sentiments	 (Campbell	 2004),	 which	
themselves	 can	 be	 the	 product	 of	 manifold	 factors	 including	 the	 political	
legacies	of	past	events	and	financial	crises	and	the	changing	public	appetite	for	
more	or	less	stringent	approaches	to	regulation.		
Admitting	that	the	structural	power	of	finance	may	be	mediated	by	the	ideas	
and	 intellectual	 fashions	 of	 policymakers	 shifts	 the	 focus	 of	 discussion	 away	
from	the	power	of	financial	market	participants	to	the	power	of	public	officials	
themselves.	The	next	section	addresses	the	flipside	of	the	discussion	of	financial	
power	 presented	 here,	 namely,	 the	 power	 of	 central	 banks	 vis-à-vis	 financial	
actors.	To	do	so,	it	first	examines	a	number	of	prominent	efforts	within	political	
science	and	political	philosophy	to	define	power	as	a	concept	more	generally.	It	
then	sets	out	the	operational	definition	of	central	bank	power	that	will	be	used	
as	the	basis	for	the	comparative	analysis	in	the	empirical	chapters	that	follow.		
2.4 OPERATIONALISING	CENTRAL	BANK	POWER	
2.4.1 POWER	IN	THEORY	
Power	can	be	a	difficult	concept	to	pin	down,	having	been	defined	in	numerous	
and	 often	 very	 different	 ways.	 Conceptualisations	 of	 power	 tend	 to	 reflect	
different	 analytical	 choices	 as	 much	 as	 empirical	 phenomena.	 Contemporary	
social	studies	of	power	tend	to	define	power	either	as	‘power	over’	or	as	‘power	
to’.	Within	the	former	camp,	the	canonical	statement	of	power	was	provided	by	
Dahl	(1957:	202-03):	‘A	has	power	over	B	to	the	extent	that	he	can	get	B	to	do	
something	that	B	would	not	otherwise	do.’	Dahl’s	definition	suggested	power	is	
direct,	 instrumental	 and	 compulsory.	 It	 exists	 where	 there	 is	 open	 and	
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observable	 conflict	 between	actors,	 and	where	one	actor	 (or	 group	of	 actors)	
prevails	over	another.		
Bachrach	and	Baratz	(1962)	famously	challenged	this	view,	suggesting	power	
in	 fact	 has	 two	 ‘faces’.	 One	 face	 is	 observable:	 actors	 with	 openly	 stated	
preferences	 exert	 power	 over	 one	 another	 in	 transparent	 decision-making	
processes.	 The	 other	 face	 is	 covert:	 the	 powerful	 limit	 ‘decision-making	 to	
relatively	 non-controversial	 matters,	 by	 influencing	 community	 values	 and	
political	 procedures	 and	 rituals’	 (Bachrach	 and	 Baratz	 1962:	 949).	 In	 other	
words,	the	second	face	of	power	involves	agenda	setting.	The	powerful	define	
the	 policies	 and	 forms	 of	 behaviour	 that	 are	 considered	 legitimate	 areas	 of	
debate,	 ensuring	 issues	 that	 threaten	 their	 own	 interests	 are	 not	 open	 for	
discussion.	
Lukes	(1974)	subsequently	added	a	‘third	dimension’	of	power.	In	addition	to	
contests	 between	 competing	 groups	 in	 overt	 decision-making	 processes	 (the	
one-dimensional	 view)	 and	 the	more	 covert	 processes	 of	 agenda-setting	 (the	
two-dimensional	 view),	 Lukes	maintained	 that	 power	 was	 also	 exerted	 when	
actors	influence,	shape	and	determine	the	very	wants	and	desires	of	those	they	
exercise	 power	 over.	 For	 Lukes,	 the	 powerful	 convince	 the	 dominated	 to	
acquiesce	in	their	own	domination	through	ideology.	The	enduring	value	of	this	
contribution	was	its	recognition	that	power	may	be	exercised	through	patterns	
of	indirect	normative	control	that	more	often	than	not	take	place	unbeknownst	
either	to	the	powerful	or	the	dominated.		
In	 contemporary	 social	 studies,	 this	 third	dimension	of	power	 is	 commonly	
labelled	 ‘structural	 power’.	 It	 refers	 to	 the	 ability	 of	 actors	 to	 shape	 the	
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structures	 that	 define	 ‘the	 parameters	 of	 what	 is	 socially,	 politically	 and	
economically	 possible	 for	 others’	 (Hay	 2002:	 185).7		Within	 political	 economy	
scholarship	(and	especially	the	sub-field	of	International	Political	Economy),	the	
concept	 of	 ‘structural	 power’	 is	 strongly	 associated	 with	 the	 work	 of	 Susan	
Strange.	She	argued:			
	
The	 possessor	 [of	 structural	 power]	 is	 able	 to	 change	 the	 range	of	 choices	
open	to	others,	without	apparently	putting	pressure	directly	on	them	to	take	
one	decision	or	 to	make	one	 choice	 rather	 than	others.	 Such	power	 is	 less	
‘visible’.	The	range	of	options	open	to	the	others	will	be	extended	by	giving	
them	 opportunities	 they	 would	 not	 otherwise	 have	 had.	 And	 it	 may	 be	
restricted	 by	 imposing	 costs	 or	 risks	 upon	 them	 larger	 than	 they	 would	
otherwise	have	faced,	thus	making	 it	 less	easy	to	make	some	choices	while	
making	it	more	easy	to	make	others	(Strange	1988:31).	
	
Strange	famously	identified	four	key	sources	of	structural	power	in	international	
relations:	 control	 over	 security,	 control	 over	 production,	 control	 over	 finance	
and	control	over	knowledge.	As	several	scholars	have	argued,	this	fell	well	short	
of	 a	 theory	 of	 structural	 power	 because	 it	 offers	 no	 indication	 of	 how	 actors	
come	to	exercise	power	over	these	structures	(Helleiner	2005;	Cohen	2013).	 It	
was	 also	 tautological,	 suggesting	 actors	 exercise	 structural	 power	 because	 of	
their	 power	 over	 structures.	 Even	 so,	 like	 Lukes’	 related	 third	 dimension	 of	
power,	 the	 concept	 of	 structural	 power	 has	 enduring	 resonance:	 the	 basic	
intuition	 that	 some	 forms	of	 power	 are	 exercised	 indirectly	 by	 actors	 shaping	
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and	constraining	the	contexts	in	which	other	actors	operate	gained	widespread	
acceptance.	
Overt	coercive	power	(Dahl	1957),	behind	the	scenes	agenda	setting	power	
(Bachrach	 and	 Baratz	 1962)	 and	 structural	 power	 (Lukes	 1974;	 Strange	 1988)	
are	 all	 relational	 conceptualisations	 of	 power.	 Each	 implies	 a	 causal	 social	
relationship	 in	 which	 actor	 A	 exerts	 ‘power	 over’	 actor	 B	 either	 directly	 or	
indirectly	(cf.	Johal	et	al.	2014).	Viewed	in	relational	terms,	power	is	often	cast	
in	a	negative	light:	A	exercises	power	over	B,	causing	B	to	do	something	that	he	
or	she	would	not	otherwise	do.	From	this	understanding	of	power,	it	is	a	short	
step	 to	 viewing	 power	 as	 a	 form	 of	 domination.	 This	 relational	
conceptualisation	 of	 power	 (‘power	 over’)	 can	 be	 contrasted	 with	 an	
empowerment	 perspective	 (the	 ‘power	 to’	 do	 something).	 According	 to	 this	
alternative	understanding	of	 the	 concept,	 actors	 have	power	when	 they	have	
the	 ability	 to	 achieve	 their	 desired	 ends	 (Morriss	 2002:	 29).	 A	 key	 difference	
between	‘power	over’	and	‘power	to’	is	that	the	latter	refers	to	a	form	of	power	
that	 is	 necessarily	 intentional.	 Whereas	 Lukes’	 maintained	 that	 the	 third	
dimension	of	power	could	be	exercised	unbeknownst	either	to	the	powerful	or	
the	dominated,	when	power	is	exercised	as	a	capacity	it	is	always	intended.		
While	 some	 view	 the	 concepts	 of	 ‘power	 over’	 and	 ‘power	 to’	 as	 rivals	
(Morriss	 2002),	 there	 are	 at	 least	 two	 reasons	 to	 think	 of	 these	 concepts	 as	
complementary.	 First,	 as	 Dowding	 (1991)	 notes,	 ‘power	 over’	 may	 be	
considered	a	subcategory	of	‘power	to’,	since	A’s	ability	to	cause	B	to	change	his	
or	her	behaviour	necessarily	requires	A	to	be	able	to	do	something.	Second,	as	
Pansardi	(2012)	argues,	‘power	to’,	like	‘power	over’,	requires	an	understanding	
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of	 social	 relations.	 As	 actors	 set	 about	 achieving	 their	 objectives,	 exercising	
‘power	over’	other	actors	might	not	be	their	primary	intention.	However,	doing	
just	about	anything	in	the	social	world	involves	interactions	with	others	of	some	
sort.	 Thus,	 having	 the	 ‘power	 to’	 achieve	 one’s	 objectives	 almost	 always	
requires	 one	 to	 exercise	 ‘power	 over’	 other	 actors,	 however	 obliquely	 or	
indirectly.				
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 concepts	 do	 not	 collapse	 into	 one	 another	 entirely.	
While	all	human	interactions	involve	a	relational	element,	‘power	to’	enables	us	
to	explore	actors’	ability	 to	achieve	 their	ends	where	power	 relations	vis-à-vis	
other	 actors	 are	 not	 obvious	 (cf.	Morriss	 2012).	 A	 central	 bank	may	have	 the	
power	 to	 create	new	money,	 either	using	 the	printing	press,	 or	 via	 electronic	
means.	 Such	 a	 power	 is	 difficult	 to	 describe	 in	 relational	 terms.	 To	 be	 sure,	
money	creation	may	benefit	some	actors	in	society	and	penalise	others.	Yet	it	is	
both	 intuitively	 and	 conceptually	 clearer	 to	 describe	 this	 as	 a	 central	 banks’	
‘power	to’	create	money,	rather	than	its	‘power	over’	other	actors	(even	if	the	
latter	 derives	 ultimately	 from	 the	 former).	 Conversely,	 when	 there	 are	 good	
reasons	 for	 emphasising	 the	 nature	 of	 relationships	 between	 actors,	 ‘power	
over’	 concepts	 are	more	 appropriate.	 For	 example,	where	 central	 banks	 have	
participated	 in	 political	 debates	 over	 post-crisis	 regulatory	 reforms,	 we	 are	
interested	 in	assessing	 their	ability	 (or	 lack	of	ability)	 to	move	policy	closer	 to	
their	preferences,	over	the	wishes	of	actors	with	different	preferences.		
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POWER	AS	A	DISPOSITIONAL	PROPERTY	OF	ACTORS	
Before	proceeding,	a	point	of	clarification	is	in	order.	In	analysing	the	power	of	
central	 banks,	 this	 thesis	 is	 concerned	 with	 certain	 enduring	 properties	 of	
central	 banks,	 as	opposed	 to	any	 specific	 actions	 they	have	 taken.	As	Morriss	
(2002)	argues,	much	of	 the	difficulty	and	confusion	surrounding	usages	of	 the	
concept	of	power	in	political	science	stems	from	the	conflation	of	‘dispositional’	
and	 ‘episodic’	 concepts.	 A	 dispositional	 concept	 refers	 to	 the	 capacities	 of	 an	
object	or	actor.	An	episodic	concept	 refers	 to	a	happening	or	event	 (including	
the	exercise	of	dispositions).	Power	 is	a	dispositional	concept.	 In	other	words,	
an	actor	can	possess	power	without	necessarily	choosing	to	exercise	his	or	her	
power.	It	follows	that	one	need	not	necessarily	observe	an	actor	exercising	his	
or	 her	 power	 to	 know	 that	 he	 or	 she	 is	 powerful.	 As	 Morriss	 (2002:	 16)	
illustrates:	
	
When	I	go	to	a	zoo,	I	can	see	that	a	lion	is	powerful	enough	to	eat	me	up	by	
observing	 its	 jaws,	 teeth	 and	 muscles,	 and	 combining	 these	 observations	
with	my	 general	 knowledge	 of	 animals’	 masticatory	 performances.	 If	 I	 am	
still	in	doubt,	I	can	observe	what	the	lion	does	to	a	hunk	of	meat,	and	induce.	
Not	even	the	most	dogmatic	positivist	would	declare	that	he	couldn’t	know	if	
the	lion	could	eat	him	up	until	it	had	actually	done	so.	
	
As	a	dispositional	property,	power	 involves	having	certain	enduring	capacities,	
or	 resources,	 which	 may	 or	 may	 not	 be	 put	 into	 action	 (Pansardi	 2012).	
However,	avoiding	the	‘exercise	fallacy’	–	confusing	power	with	the	exercise	of	
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power	–	does	not	preclude	us	from	observing	the	exercise	of	power	as	a	means	
of	 identifying	 the	 resources	 by	which	 actors	 are	 powerful.	 To	 adapt	Morriss’s	
zoological	 example:	we	know	 that	 the	 lion	 in	 the	 zoo	 is	powerful	because	we	
know	 how	 lions	 (in	 general)	 eat	 other	 animals.	 This	 knowledge	 enables	 us	 to	
recognise	 the	 lion’s	 teeth,	 jaws	 and	 muscles	 as	 the	 sources	 of	 its	 power.	 As	
Dowding	(2008)	notes:	
	
To	confuse	the	dispositional	power	of	an	object	or	an	actor	with	the	exercise	
of	that	power	is	a	mistake.	It	is	not	a	mistake,	of	course,	to	use	the	evidence	
provided	by	the	exercise	of	power	to	examine	the	properties	or	resources	of	
the	actor	to	try	to	understand	the	basis	or	foundations	of	that	actor’s	power.		
	
In	 short,	whilst	 recognising	 that	 power	 is	 a	 dispositional	 concept,	we	 are	 not	
precluded	from	using	the	evidence	of	the	exercise	of	power	to	understand	why	
actors	are	powerful.		
2.4.2 CORE	ELEMENTS	OF	CENTRAL	BANK	POWER		
A	necessary	precondition	for	explaining	how	central	bank	power	has	changed	in	
recent	years	is	an	operational	definition	of	‘central	bank	power’.	Building	on	the	
theoretical	discussion,	this	section	elaborates	a	typology	of	central	bank	power	
based	 on	 three	 core	 elements.	 These	 are	 ‘authority’,	 ‘structural	 power’	 and	
‘capacity’.		
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AUTHORITY		
For	the	purposes	of	this	thesis,	the	concept	of	‘authority’	refers	to	the	ability	of	
central	 banks	 to	 move	 policy	 in	 line	 with	 their	 own	 preferences,	 over	 the	
opposition	of	other	actors.	Conceptually,	this	element	of	central	bank	power	is	
close	to	the	first	and	second	‘faces’	of	power	discussed	above.	That	is	to	say,	it	
concerns	 central	banks’	 ability	 to	get	other	actors	 to	do	what	 they	would	not	
otherwise	do.	 It	also	concerns	central	banks’	ability	 to	win	policy	debates	and	
set	agendas,	both	in	their	core	policy	domains	and	in	policy	areas	tangential	to,	
but	potentially	affecting,	 those	domains	 (cf.	Maxfield	1998:	21).	Authority	 is	a	
relational	concept	of	power;	it	denotes	actors’	‘power	over’	other	actors.			
The	 concept	 of	 authority	 employed	 here	 concerns	 the	 ability	 of	 a	 central	
bank	 to	 ‘choose	 a	 course	 of	 action	 independently…	 without	 yielding	 to	
pressures	of	other	actors’	 (Wooley	1984:	13,	emphasis	 in	 the	original).	 In	 this	
sense,	it	is	similar	to	the	categories	of	‘autonomy’	(Quaglia	2008a;	L.	Goodhart	
2014),	‘behavioural	independence’	(Maxfield	1998)	and	‘political	independence’	
(Wooley	1984:	13)	 that	have	been	discussed	 in	existing	 scholarship	on	central	
banks.	 However,	 the	 concept	 of	 central	 bank	 authority	 employed	 here	 is	
broader	than	these	categories.	This	is	because	it	encompasses	both	the	formal	
legal	 authority	 conferred	 upon	 central	 banks	 by	 executive	 and	 legislative	
politicians	and	the	‘room	for	manoeuvre’	central	banks	have	in	performing	their	
functions	free	from	control	by	other	actors.		
The	 analysis	 distinguishes	 between	de	 jure	and	de	 facto	 aspects	 of	 central	
banks’	 authority.	 De	 jure	 authority	 has	 two	 key	 components.	 First,	 as	 public	
bureaucracies,	central	banks	are	imbued	with	authority	that	has	been	delegated	
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to	them	by	elected	politicians.	Whether	following	‘logics	of	appropriateness’	or	
‘logics	of	consequences’	(March	and	Olsen	1995),	 firms	and	private	 individuals	
comply	with	central	banks’	strictures	first	and	foremost	because	central	banks	
are	 statutory	 bodies,	 which	 ultimately	 can	 compel	 compliance	 with	 their	
decisions	 through	 legal	means.	Any	assessment	of	 the	power	of	 central	banks	
must,	therefore,	start	with	the	range	of	formal	objectives	and	specific	‘powers’	
that	have	been	delegated	to	them	by	politicians.		
The	second	component	of	central	banks’	de	jure	authority	is	the	set	of	formal	
mechanisms	establishing	their	autonomy	from	(or	control	by)	politicians.	Formal	
contracts	 between	 politicians	 (as	 ‘principals’)	 and	 central	 banks	 (as	 ‘agents’)	
tend	to	consist	of	both	ex	ante	and	ex	post	control	mechanisms	(cf.	Hawkins	et	
al.	2006).	Ex	ante	controls	aim	to	prevent	agents	from	straying	away	from	the	
mandates	 delegated	 to	 them	 by	 their	 principals.	 An	 example	 of	 an	 ex	 ante	
control	 mechanism	 is	 requirements	 for	 bureaucratic	 officials	 to	 implement	
detailed	 rulebooks.	 On	 the	 whole,	 ‘rule-based’	 regimes	 leave	 bureaucratic	
officials	with	little	room	to	exercise	their	discretion.	Another	example	of	an	ex	
ante	 control	mechanism	 is	 short	 terms	 of	 appointment	 of	 key	 officials.	Other	
things	 being	 equal,	 the	 shorter	 the	 term	 of	 appointment,	 the	 more	 likely	
bureaucratic	officials	are	to	act	 in	 line	with	the	preferences	of	their	principals,	
who	 can	 decide	 whether	 to	 reappoint	 them	 or	 not.	 Ex	 post	 controls	 provide	
means	 by	 which	 principals	 (and	 the	 interest	 groups	 they	 represent)	 can	
influence	 agents’	 activities	 after	 they	 have	 delegated	 authority	 to	 them.	
Examples	of	ex	post	control	mechanisms	include	requirements	for	central	bank	
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officials	 to	account	 for	 their	decisions	before	 legislative	committees	and	other	
obligations	around	transparency	of	decision-making.		
As	discussed,	authority	also	has	a	de	facto	component.	The	de	facto	authority	
of	 central	 banks	 refers	 to	 their	 ability	 to	 adopt	 policies	 that	 are	 controversial	
and	 which	 are	 likely	 to	 engender	 societal	 resistance,	 whether	 from	 market	
participants,	 public	 interest	 pressure	 groups	 or	 politicians	 in	 the	 executive	 or	
legislative	 branches	 of	 government.	 Even	 the	 most	 insulated	 central	 banks	
respond	 to	 public	 opinion	 to	 some	 extent,	 if	 only	 to	 avoid	 political	 censure	
through	 formal	 mechanisms.	 Elsewhere,	 the	 concept	 of	 authority	 has	 been	
defined	 in	more	 abstract	 terms	 ‘as	 the	 ability	 to	 induce	 deference	 in	 others’	
(Avant	et	al.	2010).8	The	notion	of	‘inducing	deference’	 is	an	apt	in	discussions	
of	 de	 facto	 authority	 because	 it	 directs	 attention	 to	 interactions	 between	
central	 banks	 and	 commercial	 banks,	 such	 as	 agenda	 setting	 and	negotiation,	
where	 power	 is	 more	 contested.	 For	 example,	 an	 authoritative	 central	 bank	
would	be	said	to	induce	deference	if	it	can	set	an	agenda	for	establishing	more	
stringent	 regulatory	 standards	 against	 the	 opposition	 of	 market	 participants	
who	stand	to	be	negatively	affected	by	those	reforms.		
In	assessing	how	the	de	 facto	authority	of	 central	banks	has	changed	since	
the	crisis,	 it	 is	necessary	to	recognise	that	the	nature	of	the	societal	resistance	
to	 central	 banks’	 policies	 depends	 on	 the	 particular	 issues	 at	 hand.	Generally	
speaking,	 central	 banks’	 de	 facto	 authority	 in	 the	monetary	 policy	 domain	 is	
bolstered	by	 the	 fact	 that	 advanced	Western	 societies	 exhibit	 strong	 ‘stability	
cultures’	(Tognato	2012),	meaning	that	there	is	a	high	level	of	public	support	for	
central	 banks’	 efforts	 to	 maintain	 low	 and	 stable	 inflation.	 In	 contrast	 to	
	 88	
monetary	 policy,	 financial	 stability	 policies	 tend	 to	 have	 concentrated	 short-
term	 costs	 and	 benefits	 that	 are	 diffuse	 and	 apparent	 only	 in	 the	 long	 term.	
Financial	market	participants	and	politicians	opposed	 to	 restrictions	on	access	
to	 credit	 will	 lobby	 against	 central	 banks	 adopting	 ‘hawkish’	 financial	
regulations.	Accordingly,	central	banks’	de	facto	authority	in	this	domain	is	likely	
to	be	less	pronounced	than	in	the	monetary	policy	domain.		
Central	 banks’	de	 facto	authority	 does	 not	 stop	 at	 the	 boundaries	 of	 their	
formal	mandates.	While	central	bank	governors	may	be	unlikely	ever	to	opine	
on	 the	 defence	 budget	 (Jones	 2015),	 it	 is	 common	 for	 them	 to	 intervene	 in	
debates	 over	 fiscal	 policy	 or	 other	 aspects	 of	 government	 economic	 policy.	
Moreover,	 as	 this	 thesis	 helps	 to	demonstrate,	 central	 banks	have	historically	
played	an	important	role	in	driving	organisational	reforms	of	domestic,	regional	
and	international	regulatory	architectures	(see,	for	example,	Verdun	1998;	King	
2005;	Mackintosh	2014).	In	exploring	central	banks’	de	facto	authority,	then,	it	
is	 important	 to	explore	how	capable	 these	organisations	have	been	 in	driving	
wider	economic	and	institutional	reforms.		
STRUCTURAL	POWER	
The	 second	 core	 element	 of	 central	 bank	 power	 examined	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	
structural	power.	This	is	defined	as	a	central	bank’s	ability	to	shape	the	context	
in	 which	 other	 actors	 perceive	 and	 define	 their	 preferences.	 Like	 authority,	
structural	 power	 refers	 to	 central	 banks’	 ‘power	over’	 other	 actors	 in	 society.	
However,	it	differs	from	authority	because	of	the	indirect	nature	of	its	exercise.	
Whereas	authority	refers	to	central	banks’	ability	to	win	policy	debates	and	set	
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policy	agendas	over	the	preferences	of	other	actors,	structural	power,	refers	to	
central	 banks’	 ability	 to	 shape	 the	 parameters	 of	 what	 is	 possible	 for	 other	
actors,	 thereby	 influencing	 how	 other	 actors	 frame	 and	 determine	 their	
preferences	in	the	first	place.		
The	 thesis	 contends	 that	 at	 any	 given	moment,	 a	 central	 banks’	 structural	
power	depends	on	the	extent	to	which	other	actors	in	society	‘need’	the	central	
bank.	A	central	bank	is	more	likely	to	be	able	to	exert	a	transformative	change	
over	 the	 objectives	 and	 character	 of	 financial	 regulation	 when	 their	 key	
interlocutors	 –	 specifically,	 governments	 and	 financial	 sector	 actors	 –	 are	
dependent	 upon	 them	 for	 their	 immediate	 political	 or	 economic	 survival.	 For	
example,	 market	 participants	 will	 be	 less	 capable	 of	 mobilising	 political	
opposition	 to	 ‘hawkish’	 central	 bank	 financial	 stability	 policies,	 if	 those	 actors	
are	 simultaneously	 relying	 on	 central	 bank	 liquidity	 provision	 and	 emergency	
lending	facilities	for	their	immediate	economic	survival.	Similarly,	policymakers	
may	 be	 more	 willing	 to	 countenance	 delegating	 greater	 authority	 to	 central	
banks	 at	 times	when	 they	 are	unwilling	or	 unable	 to	use	other	 tools	 (notably	
fiscal	policy)	for	the	purposes	of	countercyclical	stabilisation.		
Beyond	this,	however,	the	thesis	follows	Bell	and	Hindmoor	(2014,	2015)	 in	
contending	 that	 central	 banks’	 structural	 power	 may	 be	 mediated	 by	 their	
‘ideational	 relations’	 with	 interlocutors	 in	 the	 financial	 markets.	 In	 the	 first	
instance,	 it	 falls	 to	 public	 officials	 to	 confront	 policy	 problems	 and	 fashion	
solutions	 to	 them.	 Officials	 must	 interpret	 and	 react	 to	 the	 pressures	 and	
demands	 of	 financial	 market	 actors.	 The	 power	 of	 governmental	 actors	 will	
depend	to	some	extent	on	the	‘causal,	strategic	and	normative	ideas’	they	use	
	 90	
to	 interpret	 such	 pressures	 and	 demands	 (Bell	 and	 Hindmoor	 2015:	 456).	
Central	 banks	 that	 give	 a	 high	 level	 of	 credence	 to	 the	 proselytization	 of	
commercial	 banks	 regarding	 the	 impact	 of	 particular	 prudential	 or	 monetary	
policies	 can	 diminish	 their	 own	 structural	 power	 (cf.	 Bell	 2012).	 Likewise,	 a	
central	bank	that	shares	an	 ‘economic	worldview’	with	senior	bank	executives	
may	inadvertently	diminish	its	power	vis-à-vis	those	actors.		
CAPACITY	
Scholarship	on	the	capacity	of	public	authorities	–	whether	at	the	level	of	states	
in	general	or	individual	sectors	–	has	yielded	a	wealth	of	overlapping	concepts,	
definitions	and	typologies	(see	for	example	Polidano	2000;	Hamilton-Hart	2000;	
Painter	and	Pierre	et	al.	2005).	 In	this	thesis,	the	concept	of	capacity	 refers	to	
central	banks’	ability	to	attain	their	specified	objectives,	such	as	price	stability	or	
financial	stability.	Depending	on	the	nature	of	the	central	banks’	mandate,	such	
objectives	may	be	either	defined	statutorily	or	they	may	be	established	by	the	
central	 bank	 itself.	 Capacity	 is	 distinct	 from	 ‘authority’	 and	 ‘structural	 power’	
because	 it	 concerns	central	banks’	 ‘power	 to’	achieve	 their	given	ends,	 rather	
than	their	‘power	over’	other	actors.	This	is	not	to	say	that	central	banks	do	not	
exercise	 power	 over	 other	 actors	when	 they	perform	 tasks	 in	 pursuit	 of	 their	
price	 stability	 or	 financial	 stability	 objectives.	 Rather,	 the	 concept	 of	 capacity	
recognises	that	central	banks	may	be	more	or	 less	effective	 in	achieving	those	
objectives,	 and	 that	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 their	 operations	 is	 not	 wholly	
determined	by	their	ability	(or	inability)	to	exercise	power	over	other	actors.		
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It	 is	 perfectly	 possible	 that	 a	 central	 bank	 that	 enjoys	 a	 very	 high	 level	 of	
authority	 vis-à-vis	 financial	 market	 participants	 and	 elected	 politicians	 will	
nevertheless	 lack	 capacity.	 For	 example,	 a	 central	 bank	may	 develop	 policies	
that	are	not	‘fit	for	purpose’	(cf.	Dyson	2009).	This	could	be	because	policies	are	
oriented	towards	objectives	that	are	poorly	conceived	or	which	are	unlikely	to	
succeed	in	maintaining	financial	stability.	This	was	clearly	the	case	prior	to	the	
financial	 crisis,	 when	 central	 banks	 (and	 in	 some	 countries	 independent	
financial	regulators)	focused	on	ensuring	the	safety	and	soundness	of	individual	
financial	 institutions	 (mainly	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 consumer	 protection)	 rather	
than	systemic	financial	stability.	As	will	be	shown,	the	central	banks	considered	
in	 this	 thesis	 have	 each	 adopted	 subtly	 different	 policy	 instruments	 after	 the	
financial	crisis	and	they	have	prioritised	different	‘intermediate’	objectives,	such	
as	 dampening	 the	 credit	 cycle	 versus	 enhancing	 the	 resilience	 of	 financial	
institutions.	 The	 evaluation	 of	 the	 ‘fitness	 for	 purpose’	 of	 these	 divergent	
approaches	draws	on	 the	burgeoning	empirical	 literature	 in	economics	on	 the	
effectiveness	of	different	financial	stability	policies.		
A	further	factor	affecting	the	capacity	of	central	banks	is	their	styles	of	policy	
implementation,	 in	 particular	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 central	 banks	 reserve	 to	
themselves	discretion	to	adapt	and	adjust	policies	to	particular	circumstances.	
An	 enduring	 theme	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 central	 banking	 is	 the	 dichotomy	
between	 rules-based	 and	 discretion-based	 styles	 of	 policy	 implementation.	
While	 this	dichotomy	has	 received	most	attention	 in	 regards	 to	 the	monetary	
policy	domain	(see	Kydland	and	Prescott	1977),	the	thesis	documents	that	the	
three	 central	 banks	 have	 exhibited	 differing	 preferences	 for	 ‘rules-based’	 and	
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‘discretion-based’	 approaches	 to	 implementing	 macroprudential	 and	
microprudential	 policies.	 Such	 divergences	 reflect	 organisational	 cultures	 of	
each	 central	 bank	 and	 the	 institutional	 environments	 they	 are	 embedded	
within.		
Finally,	 capacity	 is	 partly	 dependent	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 central	 bank	
policies	 are	 coordinated	 with	 those	 of	 other	 authorities	 involved	 in	 financial	
regulation	or	macroeconomic	policymaking.	In	no	country	does	the	central	bank	
have	control	over	all	aspects	of	financial	regulation	and	supervision.	If	elements	
of	the	regulatory	system	are	working	at	cross-purposes	to	the	central	bank,	the	
central	bank’s	effectiveness	will	naturally	suffer.	For	example,	the	existence	of	
multiple	 regulatory	 agencies	 can	 provide	 opportunities	 for	 financial	 market	
participants	 to	engage	 in	 ‘forum	shopping’,	whereby	 they	evade	regulation	by	
the	central	bank	by	deliberately	seeking	to	be	regulated	by	a	different	agency.	
Central	government	macroeconomic	policy	can	also	have	adverse	consequences	
for	the	capacity	of	the	central	bank.	One	much	discussed	example	is	that	the	tax	
deductibility	 of	 debt	 interest	 payments	 incentivises	 banks	 to	 fund	 themselves	
with	debt	rather	than	equity;	this	is	a	source	of	systemic	risk	that	central	banks	
can	only	partially	offset	through	capital	adequacy	regulation.	
It	is	worth	noting	that	the	factors	shaping	the	relative	capacity	of	the	Federal	
Reserve,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 and	 the	 ECB	 differ	 from	 those	 affecting	 central	
bank	 capacity	 in	 emerging	 economies.	 In	 a	 study	 focusing	 on	 central	 bank	
capacity	 in	 East	 Asia,	 Hamilton-Hart	 (2002)	 draws	 attention	 to	 organisational	
characteristics	of	central	banks	that	affect	their	ability	to	implement	policies	in	a	
consistent	 and	 rule-abiding	 way,	 such	 that	 scope	 for	 corruption	 and	
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opportunistic	behaviour	on	the	part	of	market	participants	is	diminished.	While	
these	 are	 important	 factors	 for	 all	 central	 banks,	 the	 three	 central	 banks	
considered	in	this	thesis	are	each	situated	in	jurisdictions	where	the	rule-of-law	
is	well	 established.	 Broadly	 speaking,	 banks	 seek	 to	 comply	with	 the	 letter	 of	
central	banks’	rules,	even	if	they	will	readily	circumvent	their	spirit	where	there	
is	 a	 profit	 to	 be	 made.	 Accordingly,	 the	 capacity	 to	 ensure	 consistent	
implementation	and	high	 levels	of	compliance	are	 less	relevant	 for	 this	 thesis,	
which	 seeks	 to	 compare	 the	capacity	of	 the	major	advanced	economy	central	
banks	relative	to	each	other.		
TABLE	1:	A	TYPOLOGY	OF	CENTRAL	BANK	POWER	
Core	
elements	
Component	Variables	 Examples	
Authority	
De	jure	
authority	
Delegated	
authority	
	
- Authority	to	set	prudential	regulations.	
- Authority	to	supervise	banks.	
Formal	
autonomy	
	
- Rule-based	vs.	discretion-based	
mandates.	
- Length	of	CB	governor’s	tenure.	
- Parliamentary	oversight	arrangements.	
- De	facto	authority	 - Contractionary	monetary	policies	
- ‘Hawkish’	prudential	policies	
- Influence	beyond	‘formal’	mandate		
Structural	
Power	
- Economic	functions	
of	finance	
- Banks’	provision	of	credit	to	the	real	
economy.	
- Substitutability	of	alternative	forms	of	
finance	
- Economic	functions	
of	central	bank	
- Prudential	rule-maker.	
- Lender	of	last	resort.	
- Central	bankers’	
economic	ideas	
- Beliefs	about	risk	of	capital	flight.	
- Beliefs	about	drivers	of	financial	crises.	
Capacity	
- Policy	objectives	 - ‘Fitness	for	purpose’	of	macro-
prudential	‘toolkit’.	
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- Effectiveness	of	coordination	between	
monetary	policy,	macroprudential	and	
microprudential	objectives.	
- Policy	styles		 - Principles-based	microprudential	
regulation/supervision.	
- Discretionary	macroprudential	policy.	
- Rules-based	stress-testing	frameworks.	
- Policy	coordination	 - Supportiveness	of	fiscal	policy.	
- Inter-agency	regulatory	competition	
2.4.3 INTERACTION	BETWEEN	THE	CORE	ELEMENTS	
The	 three	 core	 elements	 of	 central	 bank	 power	 outlined	 here	 –	 authority,	
structural	 power	 and	 capacity	 –	 are	 not	 mutually	 exclusive	 (see	 Figure	 2).	 A	
central	 bank’s	 capacity	 is	 not	only	 a	 function	 of	 the	 fitness	 for	 purpose	 of	 its	
policy	 objectives	 and	 instruments,	 its	 style	 of	 policy	 implementation	 or	 the	
extent	to	which	its	policies	are	coordinated	with	the	wider	systems	of	economic	
governance	 within	 which	 it	 is	 embedded.	 Capacity	 also	 depends	 on	 the	
authority	 to	 act	 autonomously	 of	 pressures	 from	 financial	 actors	 and	 societal	
interest	groups,	and	these	actors’	political	representatives.	Moreover,	effective	
goal	 attainment	 to	 some	extent	 relies	on	 the	 central	 bank’s	 structural	 power.	
That	 is	 to	 say,	 the	 success	or	 failure	of	 a	 set	of	monetary	or	 financial	 policies	
depends,	 to	 some	 extent,	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 central	 bank	 to	 mould	 the	
national	 financial	 system	 –	 and	 societal	 preferences	 –	 in-line	 with	 its	 own	
preferred	model	of	economic	organisation.		
Similarly,	 a	 central	 bank’s	 authority	 depends	 both	 on	 its	 reputation	 for	
effectiveness	and	its	structural	position.	 If	a	central	bank	 is	seen	to	have	been	
effective	in	meeting	its	objectives,	it	is	more	likely	that	it	will	be	able	to	lead	the	
policy	 agenda.	 Typically,	 central	 banks’	 have	 a	 preference	 for	 low	 inflation,	
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competitiveness	and	fiscal	discipline.	The	existence	of	broad	societal	support	for	
these	policies	will	likewise	strengthen	its	hand	vis-à-vis	public	authorities,	social	
groups	and	other	 interlocutors	 that	do	not	 share	 its	policy	 stance.	Finally,	 the	
structural	power	of	a	central	bank	depends	on	both	its	capacity	and	its	authority	
vis-à-vis	societal	actors.	As	discussed,	a	central	banks’	structural	power	depends	
on	 the	 functions	 it	 performs.	 A	 central	 bank	 that	 fails	 to	 maintain	 financial	
stability	or	a	low	and	steady	rate	of	inflation	risks	breaking	down	the	economic	
structures	 that	 shape	private	actors’	preferences	 in	 support	of	 its	given	policy	
stance.	 In	 crisis	periods,	 central	banks’	ability	 to	 shape	economic	 structures	 is	
obviously	influenced	by	its	authority	vis-à-vis	market	actors	and	politicians,	and	
more	 specifically,	 its	 ability	 to	win	policy	battles	 and	 set	 agendas	 for	 financial	
and	organisational	reform.		
FIGURE	1:	INTERACTION	BETWEEN	CORE	ELEMENTS	OF	CENTRAL	BANK	POWER	
	
Capacity	
Dependence	of	
markets	on	CB	
Structural	
power	
De	facto	
authority	
Formal	
autonomy	
Authority	
Delegated	
authority	
Policy	
coordina=on	
Central	
bankers’	ideas	
Dependence	
of	govt.	on	CB	
Policy	objec=ves	
Policy	styles	
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2.5 	 CONVERGENCE,	DIVERGENCE	AND	INSTITUTIONAL	CHANGE	
The	financial	crisis	marked	a	critical	juncture	for	central	banks	of	most	advanced	
economies.	 It	 brought	 to	 a	 sudden	 close	 an	 era	 in	 which	 central	 banks	 paid	
scant	 attention	 to	 the	 interactions	 between	 financial	 markets	 and	 the	 real	
economy,	 and	 in	 which	 a	 pervasive	 intellectual	 and	 political	 consensus	
supported	their	singular	focus	on	maintaining	a	low	and	steady	rate	of	inflation.	
After	 the	 crisis,	 central	 banks	 have	 experimented	 with	 unconventional	
monetary	policies	against	a	backdrop	of	deflationary	pressures.	They	have	been	
delegated	 new	 formal	 powers	 in	 respect	 of	 macroprudential	 policy,	
microprudential	policy	and	crisis	management.	And	they	have	been	working	to	
establish	new	macroeconomic	models	that	incorporate	newly	fashionable	ideas	
about	 the	 behaviour	 of	 individuals	 and	 assumptions	 about	 the	 operation	 of	
markets.	These	broad	changes	are	common	to	each	of	the	three	central	banks	
considered	 in	 this	 thesis.	As	discussed,	 the	 thesis	 suggests	 that	 these	changes	
are	 attributable	 first	 and	 foremost	 to	 the	 policy	 entrepreneurship	 of	
transnationally	 networked	 central	 bankers	 themselves.	 Acting	 much	 like	 an	
‘epistemic	 community’	 (Haas	 1992),	 central	 bankers	 advocated	 for	
macroprudential	 reforms	based	on	broad	 (if	not	absolute)	consensus	over	 the	
regulatory	mistakes	of	 the	pre-crisis	 era	 and	 the	appropriate	 role	 that	 central	
banks	should	play	in	managing	the	financial	system	after	the	crisis.		
Within	 this	 common	 overarching	 transformation,	 the	 thesis	 demonstrates	
considerable	 diversity.	 The	 thesis	 is	 not	 the	 first	 to	 examine	 cross-national	
variations	in	financial	supervisory	architectures	or	developments	in	central	bank	
governance	(see	for	example	Lütz	2004;	Marcussen	2005;	Busch	2008;	Quaglia	
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2008a	 2008b;	 Dyson	 and	Marcussen	 et	 al.	 2009).	 As	 several	 of	 these	 authors	
have	 argued,	 cross-national	 convergence	 can	 be	 superficial.	 For	 example,	
Marcussen	(2005:	921)	argues	that	‘legal	independence	[of	central	banks]	is	not	
implemented	in	the	same	way	anywhere,	and	legal	or	statutory	independence	is	
far	from	being	the	same	as	behavioural	or	real	 independence’.	 In	their	studies	
of	broader	central	bank	governance,	Dyson	and	Marcussen	et	al.	(2009)	suggest	
central	 banks	 have	 converged	 in	 respect	 of	 their	 legal	 independence,	 their	
monetary	 policy	 objectives,	 their	 inclinations	 towards	 transparency,	 and	 their	
pursuit	of	 ‘quasi-scientific’	 styles	of	policymaking.	 Yet	 these	authors	also	note	
specific	 national	 path	 dependencies,	 most	 notably	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 range	 of	
functions	 central	 banks	 perform	 and	 the	 sorts	 of	 policies	 they	 are	 willing	 to	
countenance.		
Some	 studies	 on	 national	 variation	 in	 financial	 supervisory	 structures	 have	
viewed	 institutional	 variables	 as	 structures	 of	 incentives	 that	 determine	 the	
costs	 and	 benefits	 for	 policymakers	 of	 particular	 policies	 or	 courses	 of	 action	
(Lütz	2004;	Busch	2008;	Quaglia	2008b).	 In	these	accounts,	regulators’	choices	
may	 be	 ‘read-off’	 from	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 national	 financial	 system	 and	 the	
differential	empowerment	of	particular	private	interests	and	societal	groups	in	
the	national	political	system.	As	Crouch	(2005:	3)	suggests,	this	places	actors	‘in	
an	iron	cage	of	 institutions’,	 in	which	they	are	stripped	of	their	capacity	to	act	
innovatively	 to	change	 the	environment	around	 them.	 It	also	 leaves	us	with	a	
narrow	 understanding	 of	 institutions	 as	 structures	 of	 incentives,	 rather	 than	
repositories	 of	 shared	 understandings	 or	 norms,	 which	 might	 influence	 how	
actors	define	their	objectives	and	preferences.	These	approaches	leave	us	with	
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a	view	of	national	regulatory	and	supervisory	regimes	as	rigid,	deterministic	and	
fated	to	evolve	along	characteristic	national	paths.	
This	thesis	aims	to	show	that	convergence	coexists	with	new	divergences	and	
persistent	difference.	Campbell	(2004:	79)	employs	the	concept	of	‘translation’	
to	 describe	 the	 process	 of	 institutional	 change	 that	 occurs	 when	 new	 ideas,	
principles	and	practices	are	enacted	within	 local	 institutional	 terrains.	Such	an	
approach	 is	well	 suited	 to	 explaining	 the	 differential	 transformation	 the	main	
Western	 central	 banks	 since	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Domestic	
institutional	 variables	 –	 including	 both	 the	 differential	 empowerment	 of	
coalitions	 for	and	against	 reform	and	 the	normative	and	 ideational	 aspects	of	
individual	 central	 banks’	 organisational	 cultures	 –	 resulted	 in	 differential	
delegation	 to	 central	 banks	 and	 significant	 variation	 in	 the	 initial	
implementation	 of	 new	macroprudential	 policies.	 The	 concept	 of	 ‘translation’	
suggests	 we	 should	 be	 cautious	 of	 accounts	 of	 cross-national	 institutional	
‘isomorphism’,	because	even	where	different	countries	or	organisations	appear	
to	have	followed	similar	paths	of	reform,	local	practices	may	differ	in	subtle	but	
potentially	significant	ways	(Campbell	2004:	83).	
To	explain	the	coexistence	of	convergence	and	divergence,	the	thesis	builds	
on	 the	 agent-centred	 historical	 institutionalist	 approach	 proposed	 by	 Bell	
(2011).	 In	 common	 with	 most	 new	 institutionalist	 scholarship,	 this	 approach	
starts	from	the	proposition	that	actors	exist	within	environments	that	are	pre-
populated	 by	 existing	 institutions	 (Steinmo	 and	 Thelen	 1992;	 Pierson	 2004).	
Institutions	are	regarded	as	having	both	material	and	ideational	properties.	On	
the	one	hand,	institutions	act	as	more	or	less	formal	rules	or	‘duties’	that	actors	
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must	navigate	or	negotiate	(Bell	2011).	They	have	‘real’	effects,	empowering	or	
disempowering	certain	groups	of	actors	within	 society	and	 implying	costs	and	
benefits	 on	 different	 courses	 of	 action.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 institutions	 are	
themselves	 constituted	 by	 agents	 through	 ideational	 processes	 and	 shared	
understandings.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 actors	 are	 ontologically	 prior	 to	
institutions.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 as	 Bell	 (2011:	 891)	 notes,	 ‘institutions	 have	
properties	that	help	structure	thought	and	behaviour	at	one	remove	from	the	
immediacy	of	thought	or	action	by	agents	at	any	given	point	in	time’.		
This	approach	is	agent-centred	because	it	emphasises	the	role	of	interpretive	
agents	actively	reshaping	their	institutional	terrains.	Some	variants	of	historical	
institutionalism	present	an	excessively	deterministic	view	of	path-dependence,	
which	 affords	 little	 role	 to	 agents	 in	 interpreting	 the	 world	 around	 them.	 By	
contrast,	 the	approach	adopted	here	view	agents	and	 institutions	as	 locked	 in	
an	on-going	dialectical	interaction,	mutually	shaping	one	another	over	time.	Bell	
identifies	 three	 ‘openings’	 that	 allow	 institutionally	 situated	 agents	 to	 re-
constitute	 their	 institutional	 terrains.	 First,	 actors	 interpret	 and	 (re-)construct	
institutions	 using	 subjective	 and	 inter-subjective	 cognitive	 and	 normative	
frameworks,	much	as	constructivist	scholars	suggest	(see	Blyth	2002;	Hay	2004;	
Schmidt	 2008).	 Second,	 within	 their	 constrained	 institutional	 terrains,	 actors	
operate	 with	 ‘bounded	 discretion’,	 which	 enables	 them	 to	 shape	 institutions	
over	time.	Finally,	institutions	do	not	only	constrain	behaviour:	they	also	enable	
it.	 Institutions	 provide	 actors	 with	 resources	 and	 capabilities	 for	 achieving	
change.	Agency	does	not	consist	of	 ‘dull	 conformity	or	blind	compliance’	 (Bell	
2011:	 894).	 Rather	 agents	 act	 innovatively	 with	 bounded	 discretion	 in	
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interpreting	and	reshaping	their	institutional	environments	over	time.		Viewing	
institutions	 as	 resources	 helps	 us	 to	 avoid	 determinist	 notions	 of	 path	
dependency,	 in	 which	 truly	 path	 diverging	 change	 can	 only	 result	 from	 an	
exogenous	 shock.	 As	 Campbell	 (2004)	 suggests,	 actors	 craft	 new	 institutional	
solutions	 by	 recombining	 elements	 of	 their	 repertoire	 of	 already	 existing	
institutions	through	 innovative	processes	of	 ‘bricolage’	 (2004:	69).	 In	this	way,	
new	institutions	emerge	that	combine	elements	of	the	old	and	the	new.		
The	 agent	 centred	 historical	 institutionalist	 approach	 adopted	 here	 also	
provides	a	means	of	bringing	the	analysis	of	power	into	the	conceptualisation	of	
institutional	 change,	 a	 link	 that	 is	 sometimes	 implicit	 or	 under-theorised	 in	
institutionalist	 literature	 (cf.	 Moe	 2005).	 As	 discussed,	 structural	 power	 –	
understood	 as	 the	 ability	 to	 shape	 the	 contexts	 within	 which	 other	 actors	
perceive	and	frame	their	preferences	–	derives	from	the	asymmetric	capabilities	
of	different	actors	and	their	differential	degrees	of	dependence	on	each	other.	
Such	differential	capabilities	are	themselves	institutional	artefacts.	For	example,	
the	 role	 of	 central	 banks	 as	 de	 facto	 guarantors	 of	 systemic	 stability	 in	 their	
respective	 jurisdictions	 is	an	 inter-subjectively	defined	social	 institution,	which	
grew	 out	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 central	 banks	 as	 the	 monopoly	 providers	 of	
currency	 in	 their	 respective	 jurisdictions	 (another	 social	 institution).	 Actors	
shape	and	reshape	institutions	using	bounded	discretion	and	through	processes	
of	ideational	and	institutional	bricolage	(Campbell	2004;	Bell	2011).	Institutions,	
in	 turn,	define	the	differential	capabilities	of	actors	and	are,	 thus,	 the	basis	of	
their	 structural	 power.	 Yet	 the	 structural	 interdependencies	 of	 actors	 do	 not	
wholly	determine	outcomes.	The	agency	of	governments	(and	central	bankers)	
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and	 business	 actors	 matters	 a	 great	 deal	 because	 actors	 interpret	 their	
(structural)	 relationships	 with	 each	 other.	 Actor	 A	may	 give	 greater	 or	 lesser	
credence	to	the	possibility	that	Actor	B	will	withdraw	the	services	upon	which	
Actor	A	depends.	In	this	way,	Actor	A	can	mediate	structural	power	of	Actor	B	
(Bell	2012).	
2.6 CONCLUSION	
This	chapter	has	endeavoured	 to	situate	 the	discussion	of	central	bank	power	
within	existing	debates	over	the	delegation	of	power	to	non-majoritarian	actors	
and	the	relative	power	of	central	banks	vis-à-vis	financial	market	actors.	 It	has	
also	 aimed	 to	 provide	 the	 conceptual	 tools	 and	 theoretical	 foundations	
necessary	 for	 explaining	 the	 combination	 of	 convergence	 and	 divergence	
witnessed	in	the	three	jurisdictions	considered	in	this	thesis.	Section	2.2	set	out	
a	 range	 of	 economic	 and	 political	 explanations	 for	 the	 delegation	 of	 financial	
stability	 functions	 to	 central	 banks.	 Section	 2.3	 examined	 the	 different	 ways	
that	business	in	general,	and	the	financial	industry	in	particular,	exerts	influence	
in	 public	 policy	 processes.	 Section	 2.4	 identified	 the	 three	 different	 core	
elements	 of	 central	 bank	 power	 –	 authority,	 structural	 power	 and	 capacity	 –	
that	 will	 be	 compared	 and	 contrasted	 in	 the	 empirical	 chapters	 to	 follow.	
Finally,	 Section	 2.4	 conceptualised	 the	 interaction	 between	 agents	 and	
institutions	in	processes	of	institutional	change,	highlighting	the	mechanisms	by	
which	cross-national	convergence	co-exists	with	new	divergences	and	perpetual	
difference.	
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The	unifying	 theme	of	 this	chapter	has	been	that	 the	 ideas	and	 intellectual	
fashions	 of	 central	 bankers	 and	 related	 experts	 in	 transnational	 networks	
matter	a	great	deal	to	the	power	of	central	banks.	As	with	the	emergence	and	
spread	of	CBI	in	the	1990s	and	2000s,	the	prime	impetus	for	the	enhancement	
of	central	banks’	 financial	 stability	 functions	since	 the	 financial	crisis	has	been	
the	 active	 advocacy	 of	 the	 transnational	 community	 of	 central	 bankers,	
international	 organisation	 staff	 and	 academic	 and	 private	 sector	 economists.	
These	 actors	 adopted	 macroprudential	 ideas	 as	 their	 new	 orthodoxy	 and	
persuaded	 policymakers	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 empowering	 central	 banks	 to	
implement	 new	macroprudential	 policies.	 Central	 bankers’	 ideas	 also	 play	 an	
important	 role	 in	 shaping	 their	 relationships	 with	 the	 financial	 industry.	 The	
structural	 power	 of	 the	 financial	 industry	 within	 policymaking	 processes	 is	
manifested	 only	 through	 the	 agency	 of	 the	 actors	 involved.	 Actors	 must	
interpret	 their	 respective	 claims	 and	 perspectives	 drawing	 on	 causal	 and	
normative	beliefs	that	enhance	or	diminish	their	power.	Finally,	as	the	final	part	
of	this	chapter	has	demonstrated,	ideas	are	of	course	central	to	any	process	of	
institutional	change.		
In	the	remainder	of	this	thesis,	the	analysis	moves	from	the	abstract	to	the	
empirical.	Chapters	4-6	demonstrate	how	new	ideas	have	been	translated	into	
local	 institutional	 contexts,	 transforming	 the	 power	 of	 central	 banks	 vis-à-vis	
both	 market	 actors	 and	 democratic	 authorities	 in	 the	 process.	 It	 is	 no	
exaggeration	to	say	that	the	changes	discussed	herald	the	beginning	a	new	era	
in	 central	 banking.	 While	 this	 may	 sound	 a	 grandiose	 claim,	 the	 post-crisis	
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transformations	 in	 central	 banking	 are	 merely	 the	 latest	 a	 long	 history	 of	
reinventions	of	central	banking.	It	is	to	this	history	we	now	turn.			
																																																						
1	Building	on	a	distinction	first	proposed	by	the	philosopher	John	Searle,	Rethel	
and	Sinclair	(2012)	distinguish	between	‘regulative’	rules,	which	place	limits	on	
banks’	activities,	and	‘constitutive’	rules,	which	define	what	banks	are	and	what	
they	do.		
2	Many	 economists	 view	 the	 case	 for	 CBI	 in	 respect	 of	 monetary	 policy	 as	
beyond	 question.	 As	 Blinder	 (2010:2)	 puts	 it	 ‘to	 economists,	 at	 least,	 that	
debate	ended	long	ago.’	
3	Haldane	 (2014:	 3)	 summarises	 the	 time-inconsistency	 problem	 in	 monetary	
policy	as	‘the	temptation	to	over-supply	money	or	over-relax	regulations	today,	
often	to	finance	wars	or	to	win	elections,	at	the	expense	of	inflation	tomorrow’.	
See	 Kydland	 and	 Prescott	 1977	 for	 the	 original	 statement	 of	 the	 time	
inconsistency	problem	in	relation	to	monetary	policy.	
4	‘Printing	 money’	 eventually	 will	 drive	 up	 inflation	 expectations	 and	 interest	
rates.	After	a	certain	point,	this	will	drive	down	tax	revenues	and	the	demand	
for	new	base	money.	
5	This	 conflict	 has	 been	 readily	 apparent	 in	 the	 years	 since	 the	 onset	 of	 the	
global	 financial	 crisis.	 A	 prolonged	 period	 of	 very	 low	 interest	 rates	 has	
stimulated	 a	 ‘search	 for	 yield’	 in	 which	 institutional	 investors	 have	 bought	
riskier	 assets	 at	 knocked-down	 prices	 the	 hope	 of	 increasing	 or	 maintaining	
levels	of	return.	
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6	The	work	of	Seabrooke	and	Tsingou	 (2009)	on	 ‘linked	professional	ecologies’	
provides	 a	 perspective	 on	 revolving	 doors	 that	 highlights	 processes	 of	
socialisation	and	learning	rather	than	material	incentives.			
7 	This	 view	 of	 power	 overcomes	 the	 problematic	 assumption	 of	 ‘false	
consciousness’,	which	is	implicit	in	Luke’s	third	dimension	of	power	(Hay	1997;	
2002:	179).		
8	The	 concept	 of	 deference	 is	 preferred	 to	 compliance	 because	 the	 central	
banks	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis	 are	 situated	 in	 advanced	 industrial	 economies	
where	the	rule	of	law	is	well	established.	On	the	whole,	these	central	banks	can	
expect	financial	market	participants	to	‘comply’	with	their	rules	as	a	matter	of	
course,	since	those	rules	are	generally	legally	binding	and	enforceable.	
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3 FINANCIAL	STABILITY	AND	CENTRAL	BANK	POWER	BEFORE	2008	
3.1 INTRODUCTION	
The	origins	of	 the	 three	 central	banks	discussed	 in	 this	 thesis	 could	hardly	be	
more	different.	The	Bank	of	England	was	established	in	1694	and	is	the	second	
oldest	 central	 bank	 in	 the	 world,	 after	 the	 Swedish	 Riksbank	 (established	 in	
1668).	 Created	 initially	 as	 a	 mechanism	 for	 funding	 England’s	 wars	 against	
France,	 it	 was	 not	 until	 the	 19th	 century	 that	 it	 accumulated	 most	 of	 the	
financial	market	 functions	 that	 are	 the	essential	 features	of	 a	modern	 central	
bank.	The	Federal	Reserve	was	established	in	1913,	a	date	by	which	most	other	
industrialised	 countries	 had	 long-since	 established	 their	 central	 banks.	 Unlike	
the	Bank	of	 England,	 it	was	 created	 specifically	out	of	 concerns	over	 financial	
stability.	 Its	 founders	were	motivated	 to	 equip	 the	 chronically	 crisis-prone	US	
banking	system	with	a	lender	of	 last	resort	(LOLR).	The	European	Central	Bank	
(ECB)	was	formally	established	in	1998.	Its	origins	lie	in	the	federalist	ambitions	
of	an	elite	group	of	political	 leaders	concerned	with	cementing	the	unification	
of	 Europe	 through	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 common	 currency.	 Banking	 and	 financial	
stability	were	not	 the	primary	preoccupations	of	 the	 forefathers	of	 either	 the	
ECB	or	 the	euro;	 the	scramble	 to	 reform	the	architecture	of	EU-level	 financial	
regulation	and	supervision	since	2008	attests	to	this.	
In	 order	 to	 evaluate	 how	 the	 power	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 the	 Bank	 of	
England	 and	 the	 ECB	 has	 changed	 since	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 it	 is	
necessary	 to	 appreciate	 how	 their	 power	 developed	 and	 evolved	 in	 the	 pre-
crisis	era.	This	chapter	provides	this	contextualisation.	The	chapter	starts	from	
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the	 premise	 that	 notwithstanding	 important	 variations	 in	 the	 size,	 scope	 and	
functions	of	these	and	other	central	banks,	the	institution	of	central	banking	(in	
general)	has	been	through	a	number	of	distinct	macro-historical	phases.	Central	
banks’	 influence	 in	 economic	 policy	 debates,	 their	 ability	 to	 chart	 an	
independent	 course	 of	 policy	 in	 line	 with	 their	 own	 preferences,	 and	 their	
capacity	 to	 facilitate	 favourable	 macroeconomic	 and	 financial	 outcomes,	 has	
waxed	and	waned	at	different	moments	in	the	history	of	central	banking.	These	
changes	 have	 followed	 macro-historical	 events,	 including	 the	 impact	 of	 the	
World	Wars	and	the	Great	Depression.	Transformations	in	central	banking	have	
also	 reflected	 broad	 structural	 changes	 in	 the	 global	 economy,	 such	 as	 the	
growth	 of	 international	 capital	 mobility,	 technological	 change	 and	 the	
geographic	 expansion	 of	 international	 markets	 for	 goods	 and	 labour	 in	 the	
latter	 part	 of	 the	 20th	 Century.	 More	 proximately,	 the	 changing	 power	 of	
central	 banks	 has	 reflected	 changing	 economic	 theories	 and	 intellectual	
fashions	 amongst	 central	 bankers,	 politicians	 and	 market	 participants.	
Ultimately,	 these	 ideational	 factors	 matter	 because	 ‘structures	 do	 not	 come	
with	 an	 instruction	 sheet’	 (Blyth	 2002).	 In	 other	 words,	 intellectual	 fads	 and	
fashions	 influence	how	actors	produce	and	reproduce	structures	through	time	
and	space	(Giddens	1984:	374).	
In	the	two	decades	preceding	the	financial	crisis,	central	banks	around	the	
world	exhibited	a	considerable	degree	of	convergence.	This	was	most	apparent	
in	 the	 widespread	 adoption	 of	 central	 bank	 independence	 (CBI)	 as	 an	
organisational	model	for	central	bank	governance	(McNamara	2002;	Marcussen	
2005).	Other	elements	of	convergence	included	the	advent	in	many	countries	of	
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inflation	targeting	as	the	primary	organising	principle	for	monetary	policy	(Begg	
2009)	 and	 a	 shift	 towards	 ostensibly	 apolitical,	 ‘quasi-scientific’,	 modes	 of	
policymaking	(Marcussen	2006).	During	this	period,	most	central	banks	came	to	
emphasise	their	responsibilities	in	respect	of	monetary	policy,	at	the	expense	of	
other	 concerns,	 including	 financial	 stability.	 In	 some	 countries,	 this	 was	
reflected	in	organisational	reforms	that	stripped	the	central	bank	of	its	banking	
supervisory	 functions.	 These	 changes	 took	 place	 within	 an	 ideational	 context	
dominated	by	a	particular	neoliberal	 ‘interpretive	 frame’	 (Baker	2006,	2013a).	
Dominant	 economic	 theories	 and	 beliefs	 held	 markets	 to	 be	 essentially	 self-
correcting.	 Because	 this	 ideational	 context	 also	 held	 politicians	 to	 be	 self-
serving	and	venal,	it	privileged	‘depoliticising’	governing	strategies,	which	place	
at	one	remove	the	political	character	of	economic	policies	(Burnham	2001).	
For	 all	 their	 similarities,	 in	 no	 two	 countries	 are	 central	 banks	 identical.	
Central	 banks’	 legal	 statutes,	 their	 functions	 and	 their	 de	 jure	 and	 de	 facto	
relations	with	other	societal	actors	all	exhibit	important	national	idiosyncrasies	
(Deane	 and	 Pringle	 1994;	 Davies	 and	 Green	 2010).	 One	 motivation	 for	 this	
thesis	 is	 to	 explain	 how	 ‘history’	 has	 influenced	 the	 responses	 of	 the	 United	
States,	 the	United	 Kingdom	and	 the	 euro	 area	 to	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 in	
2007.	 To	 do	 so,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 explore	 the	 historic	 trajectories	 and	
peculiarities	of	each	central	bank.	Accordingly,	after	first	discussing	the	macro-
history	of	central	banking	since	 its	origins	 in	the	17th	century,	this	chapter	will	
turn	 to	 the	micro-institutional	 development	 of	 each	 central	 bank,	 focusing	 in	
particular	 on	 the	 role	 that	 each	 has	 played	 in	 the	 management	 of	 financial	
stability	throughout	its	history.		
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3.2 THE	MACRO-HISTORY	OF	CENTRAL	BANKING	
While	 recognising	 the	 great	 diversity	 between	 central	 banks	 in	 different	
countries,	 it	 is	possible	 to	 identify	 a	number	of	broad	 trends	 in	 the	history	of	
central	banking	that	transcend	individual	cases.	Scholars	have	tended	to	identify	
four	 distinct	 ‘ages’	 of	 central	 banking,	 which	 have	 loosely	 corresponded	 to	
transformations	 in	 the	 international	 monetary	 order	 (Capie	 et	 al.	 1994;	
Marcussen	 2006;	 Goodhart	 2010).	 The	 power	 of	 central	 banks	 –	 whether	
understood	 in	relational	 terms	as	their	ability	to	move	policy	 in	 line	with	their	
own	 preferences,	 or	 empowerment	 terms	 as	 their	 ability	 to	 attain	 specified	
objectives	–	has	ebbed	and	flowed	through	these	different	ages.	Likewise,	 the	
functions	 of	 central	 banks	 have	 varied	 considerably	 over	 time,	 not	 least	with	
respect	to	the	maintenance	of	financial	stability.			
3.2.1 EMERGENCE,	1668	-	1873	
The	first	age	of	central	banking	involved	the	initial	emergence	of	central	banks,	
beginning	in	Sweden	and	England	in	the	17th	Century	and	subsequently	in	many	
other	 industrialised	 countries	 in	 the	 19th	 Century	 (see	 Table	 2).	 There	were	 a	
number	 of	 motivations	 behind	 the	 formation	 of	 central	 banks.	 In	 some	
countries,	 including	 Austro-Hungary	 and	most	 Scandinavian	 countries,	 central	
banks	were	established	at	least	in	part	to	provide	commercial	banking	services	
where	otherwise	 there	would	have	been	none	 (Capie	et	 al.	 1994:	5).	Another	
motivation	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 central	 banks	 was	 to	 enhance	 monetary	
stability	 by	 placing	 the	 power	 to	 issue	 currency	 in	 a	 quasi-autonomous	
institution	 at	 one	 remove	 from	 governments,	 many	 of	 which	 had	 issued	
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excessive	quantities	of	paper	money	during	times	of	war,	stoking	high	rates	of	
inflation.	The	most	significant	motivation	for	the	formation	of	central	banks	was	
the	 desire	 of	 governments	 to	 be	 able	 to	 raise	 debts	 to	 finance	 wars.	 During	
times	 of	 war,	 this	 function	 –	 providing	 a	 source	 of	 funds	 for	 wartime	
expenditures	–	has	 tended	to	supersede	all	others,	 including	 the	maintenance	
of	price	stability.		
Most	 central	 banks	 established	 before	 the	 end	 of	 the	 19th	 century	 were	
typically	 private,	 profit-seeking,	 companies.	 Central	 banks	 typically	 competed	
with	other	 commercial	banks,	 including	 in	 the	 issuance	of	 currency.	However,	
the	 role	 of	 central	 banks	 as	 banker	 to	 their	 respective	 governments	 marked	
them	 out	 from	 the	 competition.	 As	 Capie	 et	 al.	 (1994),	 R.	 Hall	 (2008),	
Eichengreen	 (2008)	 and	 others	 have	 argued,	 the	 convertibility	 of	 bank	 notes	
into	gold	during	this	first	age	of	central	banking	was	often	suspended,	especially	
during	times	of	war.	One	outcome	of	such	suspensions	was	that	governments	
conferred	special	status	on	the	notes	 issued	by	their	central	banks,	effectively	
establishing	 central	 bank	 liabilities	 as	 ‘legal	 tender’.	 In	 turn,	 this	 helped	
establish	the	primacy	of	central	bank-issued	bills,	notes	and	deposits	as	the	pre-
eminent	forms	of	currency	circulating	in	their	respective	economies	(Capie	et	al.	
8).	
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TABLE	2:	ADVANCED	ECONOMY	CENTRAL	-	BANKS	DATES	OF	ESTABLISHMENT	
Central	Bank		 Year	of	Establishment	
Swedish	Riksbank	 1668	
Bank	of	England	 1694	
First	Bank	of	the	United	States	 1791	
Bank	of	France	 1800	
Bank	of	the	Netherlands	 1814	
National	Bank	of	Austria	 1816	
Bank	of	Norway	 1816	
Second	Bank	of	the	United	States	 1816	
Danish	National	Bank	 1818	
Bank	of	Spain	 1829	
Bank	of	Russia	 1860	
German	Reichsbank	 1875	
Bank	of	Japan	 1882	
Bank	of	Italy	 1893	
Swedish	National	Bank	 1905	
United	States	Federal	Reserve	System	 1913	
3.2.2 THE	INTERNATIONAL	GOLD	STANDARD,	1873	-	1914	
In	 the	 final	 quarter	 of	 the	 19th	 Century,	 a	 second	 era	 of	 central	 banking	
emerged.	 Until	 the	 mid-19th	 century,	 only	 Britain	 had	 been	 on	 the	 gold	
standard.	While	 a	 number	 of	 countries	 had	 shifted	 onto	 gold	 in	 the	 1860s,	 a	
turning	point	 came	 in	 the	early	 1870s	when	Germany	decided	 to	 abandon	 its	
bimetallic	 gold	and	 silver	 standard	 in	 favour	of	 gold.	 Several	 countries	quickly	
followed.	 Thus	began	 the	age	of	 the	 international	 gold	 standard	 (Eichengreen	
2008).	During	this	period,	which	lasted	until	the	onset	of	the	First	World	War	in	
1914,	 the	 foremost	objective	 for	almost	all	 central	banks	was	 to	maintain	 the	
value	of	 the	domestic	currency	by	preserving	 its	convertibility	 into	gold.	Then,	
as	 now,	 the	 primary	 instrument	 for	 achieving	monetary	 policy	 objectives	was	
altering	short-term	 interest	 rates.	As	Knafo	 (2014)	suggests,	 the	advent	of	 the	
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international	 gold	 standard	 came	 about	 because	 European	 governments	 and	
central	 banks	wished	 to	 emulate	 the	 ostensibly	 successful	monetary	 policy	 of	
Britain.	 In	particular,	 the	gold	standard	 facilitated	 the	expansion	of	commerce	
by	providing	a	stable,	state-controlled,	paper	currency.	
Central	 banks	 operated	 relatively	 autonomously	 from	 government	
interference	 during	 this	 period.	 This	 relative	 autonomy	was	 supported	 by	 the	
prevalence	 of	 laissez	 faire	 economic	 doctrines,	 which	 foresaw	 no	 role	 for	
governments	to	intervene	countercyclically	in	the	economy	and	which	provided	
strong	 backing	 for	 the	 ostensibly	 ‘rule-based’	 sound	 money	 approach	 to	
monetary	 policymaking	 that	 the	 link	 to	 gold	 implied	 (Eichengreen	 2008).	
According	 to	 the	 orthodox	 view	 of	 the	 gold	 standard,	 any	 central	 bank	 faced	
with	 a	 prospective	 balance	 of	 payments	 deficit	 would	 have	 to	 raise	 interest	
rates	to	restore	competitiveness,	or	face	the	prospect	of	gold	reserves	flowing	
out	 of	 the	 country.	 In	 fact,	 monetary	 policy	 under	 the	 gold	 standard	 rarely	
adhered	 to	 these	 so-called	 ‘rules	 of	 the	 game’1,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 short	 run	
(Eichengreen	 2008).	 Sometimes,	 deviations	 from	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game	 could	
involve	 temporary	 suspensions	 of	 the	 convertibility	 of	 paper	 currencies	 into	
gold,	in	order	to	prevent	damaging	outflows	in	crisis	periods	(Hall,	R.	2008).	At	
other	 times,	 central	 banks	 could	 temporarily	 lower	 rates	 in	 a	 crisis	 situation,	
restoring	competitiveness	by	stimulating	the	economy	through	cheaper	credit.	
In	 short,	 central	 banks	 under	 the	 gold	 standard	 were	 by	 no	means	 as	 highly	
constrained	 and	 rule-bound	 as	 some	 contemporary	 proponents	 of	 the	
restoration	of	the	gold	standard	imagine.				
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During	 the	 era	 of	 the	 international	 gold	 standard,	 the	 functions	 and	
institutional	 form	 of	 central	 banks	 began	 to	 coalesce	 upon	 a	 single	 model.	
Institutional	reforms	saw	central	banks	become	more	like	branches	of	the	state	
than	 private	 enterprises.	 Central	 banks	 increasingly	 withdrew	 from	 direct	
competition	 with	 their	 commercial	 counterparts	 and	 in	 some	 continental	
European	 countries	 they	began	 returning	profits	 to	 their	 governments,	 rather	
than	 to	 shareholders.	 In	 exchange,	many	 central	 banks	were	 provided	with	 a	
public	monopoly	over	the	issue	of	currency.		
It	was	at	this	time	that	central	banks’	financial	stability	functions	also	began	
to	develop.	During	the	1870s	and	1880s	numerous	continental	European	central	
banks	 acted	 as	 crisis	 managers,	 intervening	 as	 the	 LOLR	 to	 quell	 incipient	
banking	 panics	 and	 to	 restore	 confidence	 following	 stock	 market	 crashes.	 In	
1873,	the	British	journalist	Walter	Bagehot	endorsed	this	function	in	his	highly	
influential	 book,	 Lombard	 Street.	 Bagehot	 argued	 that	 central	 banks	 should	
intervene	to	prevent	banking	panics	by	lending	freely	against	good	collateral	at	
a	 high	 level	 of	 interest.	 This	 dictum	 quickly	 became	 the	 received	 wisdom	 in	
central	banking	circles.	Still,	central	banks’	financial	stability	functions	remained	
highly	contingent	and	informal.	As	Capie	et	al.	(1994:	15)	suggest,	‘on	occasions	
[central	banks]	might	help	 to	 rescue	 financial	 institutions,	but	 it	was	on	an	ad	
hoc,	cooperative,	basis	without	general	commitment	and	without	accepting	any	
formal	regulatory	or	supervisory	role’.		
The	outbreak	of	the	First	World	War	ushered	in	a	period	of	upheaval	in	the	
world	 of	 central	 banking.	 This	 upheaval	 traversed	 the	 international	monetary	
system,	 the	 functions	 of	 central	 banks,	 their	 relationships	 with	 governments	
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and	 the	 economic	 ideas	 and	 objectives	 underpinning	 monetary	 and	 financial	
stability	policies.	Most	European	countries	suspended	the	convertibility	of	their	
currencies	into	gold	a	few	days	before	war	was	declared	in	1914.	As	in	previous	
conflicts,	 central	 banks	 were	 co-opted	 into	 their	 respective	 countries’	 war	
efforts,	which	in	practice	meant	that	they	printed	money	to	finance	the	public	
deficits.	 During	 the	 war,	 the	monetary	 base	 doubled	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	
tripled	 in	 France	 and	 quadrupled	 in	 Germany	 (Ahamed	 2003).	 After	 the	
hostilities	 ceased,	 central	 banks	 in	 Europe	 and	 the	 United	 States	 made	 an	
ultimately	disastrous	attempt	to	restore	the	gold	standard.	Gold	bullion	was	in	
short	 supply	 in	Europe	and	European	currencies	 re-fixed	 to	gold	at	unrealistic	
rates.	This	decision	was	a	major	contributory	 factor	 leading	to	the	Wall	Street	
Crash	and	the	ensuing	Great	Depression	(Ahamed	2009).		
C.	Goodhart	(2010)	describes	the	period	from	1914	to	1931-33	as	a	‘confused	
interregnum’	in	the	history	of	central	banking.	Central	bankers	desire	to	restore	
the	 gold	 standard	 was	 rooted	 in	 their	 ideational	 proclivities,	 particularly	 the	
nostalgia	 for	 the	 ostensibly	 ‘rule-based’	 and	moral	 discipline	 imposed	 by	 the	
adherence	to	gold	(Hall,	R.	2008).	The	immediate	post-war	era	was	also	one	in	
which	 support	 for	 central	 bank	 independence	 remained	 strong.	 Having	
subordinated	 their	 central	 banks	 to	 government	 control	 during	 the	 war,	 the	
governments	 of	 industrialised	 countries	 committed	 to	 restoring	 central	 bank	
independence	when	the	war	ended.	 In	1920,	 the	League	of	Nations	staged	an	
international	 financial	 conference	 in	 Brussels	 in	 which	 the	 34	 countries	
participating	agreed	 the	 recommendation	 that	 ‘banks,	and	especially	Banks	of	
Issue,	should	be	freed	from	political	pressure	and	should	be	conducted	solely	on	
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the	 lines	 of	 prudent	 finance’	 (League	 of	 Nations	 1922).	 This	 was	 seen	 as	 an	
essential	prerequisite	for	curbing	inflation	in	the	aftermath	of	the	war.	
3.2.3 SUBORDINATION	TO	GOVERNMENT	CONTROL,	1933	-	1971	
The	 Great	 Depression	 of	 1929-33	 heralded	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 third	 age	 of	
central	 banking.	 Blamed	 for	 their	 policy	 mistakes	 in	 the	 early	 pre-war	 years,	
central	 banks	 increasingly	 came	 under	 greater	 political	 control.	 Against	 a	
political	 backdrop	of	 the	 rise	 socialism	 and	 the	 build-up	 to	 the	 Second	World	
War,	 support	 for	 central	bank	 independence	ebbed.	 This	was	also	a	period	 in	
which	 more	 interventionist	 forms	 of	 macroeconomic	 policy	 were	 gaining	
support,	influenced	in	part	by	the	emergence	of	Keynesian	economic	theory.		
From	the	1930s	through	to	the	1970s,	finance	ministers	and	other	executive	
politicians	often	had	a	hand	in	setting	interest	rates.	During	this	period,	central	
bank	 policy	 was	 directed	 towards	 multiple	 goals	 including	 full	 employment,	
growth,	 price	 stability	 and	 maintaining	 the	 exchange	 rate	 (Marcussen	 2006).	
Both	macroeconomic	policy	and	financial	policy	became	more	interventionist.	In	
the	 1950s,	 monetary	 policy	 was	 generally	 conducted	 through	 quantitative	
controls	 on	 bank	 lending	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 active	 manipulation	 of	 credit	
conditions	 (see	 Elliot	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Perez	 1998).	 On	 the	 regulatory	 side,	
competition	between	banks	was	stifled	through	policies	such	as	ceilings	on	the	
interest	 rates	 that	 banks	 could	 pay	 to	 depositors.	 ‘Structural	 policies’	 placed	
prohibitions	on	the	sorts	of	 financial	activity	different	categories	of	 firm	could	
participate	 in.	 Financial	 services	 companies	 tended	 to	 specialise	 in	 particular	
market	 segments,	 whether	 it	 was	 the	 provision	 or	 mortgages	 or	 finance	 for	
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consumer	goods.	This	was	a	period	 in	which	banking	crises	were	exceptionally	
rare	 (Reinhart	and	Rogoff	2009).	Stability	did	not	arise	out	of	central	bankers’	
devotion	to	systemic	 financial	 stability.	Rather,	 stability	was	a	product	of	anti-
competitive	regulations	that	afforded	banks	bumper	profits	and	enabled	them	
to	operate	with	little	leverage	by	today’s	standards.			
The	 international	 monetary	 system	 during	 the	 era	 of	 subordination	 to	
government	control	was	based	on	the	so-called	‘gold-dollar	standard’.	National	
currencies	 were	 pegged	 to	 the	 dollar,	 with	 the	 possibility	 of	 periodic	
adjustments	 in	 the	exchange	 rate.	The	dollar,	 in	 turn,	 could	be	exchanged	 for	
gold	at	the	US	Treasury’s	‘Teller	Window’	at	a	rate	of	35	dollars	per	ounce.	The	
beginning	of	the	end	for	this	system	began	in	the	1960s	with	the	emergence	of	
the	 Eurodollar	markets	 in	 London	 and	 an	 associated	 increase	 in	 international	
capital	mobility.	Capital	mobility	undermined	the	system	of	fixed	but	adjustable	
exchange	 rate	 pegs,	 forcing	 destabilising	 devaluations.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
rising	 stock	 of	 US	 dollars	 held	 outside	 the	 United	 States	 placed	 increasing	
pressure	 on	 the	 convertibility	 of	 dollars	 into	 gold	 (Eichengreen	 2012).	 This	
pressure	 culminated	 with	 the	 seminal	 decision	 in	 1971	 of	 the	 Nixon	
administration	 to	 suspend	 the	 convertibility	 of	 the	 dollar	 into	 gold,	 thereby	
brining	the	Bretton	Woods	era	to	a	close.			
3.2.4 ORTHODOXY	RESTORED,	1989	-	2007	
It	would	be	almost	two	decades	before	a	‘fourth	age’	of	central	banking	would	
emerge.	 Following	 the	 abandonment	 of	 their	 exchange	 rate	 pegs	 in	 the	 early	
1970s,	 many	 countries	 found	 themselves	 freed	 from	 balance	 of	 payments	
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constraints.	However,	boom-time	conditions	were	quickly	punctured	by	the	oil	
price	 shock	 of	 1973,	 which	 ushered	 in	 a	 period	 of	 high	 inflation	 and	 high	
unemployment,	 or	 ‘stagflation’.	 Reacting	 to	 the	 inflationary	 pressure,	 by	 the	
mid	1970s,	central	banks	around	the	world	began	to	privilege	the	objective	of	
price	stability	over	other	macroeconomic	goals	 (Capie	et	al.	1994	p	29).	 In	the	
monetary	 policy	 domain,	 central	 banks	 began	 targeting	monetary	 aggregates,	
either	by	varying	short-term	interest	rates	or	by	directly	controlling	the	size	of	
the	monetary	base	(bank	reserves	and	currency	 in	circulation).	Though	central	
banks	 were	 largely	 unsuccessful	 at	 hitting	 their	 targets	 through	 most	 of	 the	
1970s,	eventually	they	succeeded	in	bringing	inflation	under	control	in	the	early	
1980s,	albeit	only	after	raising	interest	rates	to	very	high	levels	and	precipitating	
severe	economic	downturns.		
The	 policy	 of	 targeting	 of	 monetary	 aggregates	 itself	 gave	 way	 to	 more	
discretionary	 approaches	 during	 the	 1980s.	 Central	 banks	 began	 using	 their	
main	policy	 instrument	–	short-term	interest	rates	–	to	target	expected	future	
inflation.	During	this	period,	economists	and	policymakers	came	to	focus	less	on	
the	 precise	 operational	 techniques	 of	 monetary	 policy,	 such	 as	 whether	 to	
control	 the	 price	 or	 the	 quantity	 of	 money,	 and	 more	 on	 the	 governance	
arrangements	 around	 the	 conduct	 of	 monetary	 policy.	 The	 degree	 of	
independence	 of	 the	 central	 bank	 from	 political	 control	 took	 on	 special	
significance.		
The	beginning	of	the	fourth	age	of	central	banking	can	be	dated	to	the	1989	
reform	of	the	Reserve	Bank	of	New	Zealand,	under	which	it	was	granted	formal	
legal	 independence.	 During	 the	 1990s,	 this	 legal	 innovation	 was	 adopted	 in	
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many	 scores	 of	 countries	 across	 the	 advanced	 and	 developing	 worlds.	 As	
Marcussen	 (2005:	 916)	 put	 it,	 it	 was	 a	 ‘veritable	 collective	 endeavour	 on	 a	
world-wide	scale’.	The	proximate	transmitters	of	this	institutional	reform	were	
international	financial	organisations	such	as	the	IMF,	which	convey	their	policy	
preferences	 via	 technical	 assistance,	 training	 programmes	 and	 conditional	
lending	programmes.	Ultimately,	however,	the	roots	of	this	transformation	lay	
in	a	loose	consensus	amongst	leading	public	officials	–	finance	ministry	staff	and	
central	 bankers	 –	 around	 the	 desirability	 of	 establishing	 monetary	 stability	
(Baker	 2006).	 This	 loose	 consensus	 was	 supported	 by	 the	 simultaneous	
resurgence	 of	 a	 set	 of	 complementary	 ideas,	 including	 belief	 in	 the	
epistemological	 rigour	 of	 micro-founded	 economic	 models,	 based	 on	
assumptions	of	 rational	 utility	maximisation,	 and	wider	 tropes	 concerning	 the	
self-correcting	nature	of	financial	markets	and	the	virtues	of	sound	money.		
For	 Burnham	 (2001),	 central	 bank	 independence	 is	 evidence	 of	 governing	
strategies	of	‘depoliticisation’,	the	conscious	effort	on	the	part	of	politicians	and	
civil	servants	to	place	at	one	remove	the	political	(or	distributional)	character	of	
economic	 decision-making.	 Indeed,	 as	 Marcussen	 (2006)	 has	 highlighted,	
central	banks	in	the	advanced	industrial	countries	went	beyond	depoliticisation	
to	 present	 themselves	 as	 ‘apolitical’.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 they	 began	 to	 present	
themselves	 more	 like	 scientific	 organisations,	 forging	 connections	 with	
academia	 and	 developing	 reputations	 as	 research	 powerhouses.	 At	 the	 same	
time,	central	banks	presented	monetary	policy	as	a	highly	technical	endeavour,	
divorced	from	politics.	As	Bowman	et	al.	(2012)	note,	the	scientisation	and	the	
technocratic	 credentials	 of	 central	 bankers	 helped	 reinforce	 the	 case	 for	
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independence.	 Put	 differently,	 it	 reinforced	 central	 banks’	 relational	 ‘power	
over’	their	interlocutors	in	the	executive	branches	of	governments.	
The	three	decades	immediately	preceding	the	financial	crisis	also	witnessed	
the	 transformation	 of	 the	 role	 of	 central	 banks	 in	 financial	 stability.	 The	
constraints	 that	had	stultified	competition	between	banks	 in	 the	 two	decades	
after	the	Second	World	War,	such	as	restrictions	on	inter-state	branching	in	the	
United	 States	 and	 limitations	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 individual	 firms	 to	 engage	 in	
multiple	different	financial	activities	in	the	United	Kingdom,	were,	by	the	1970s	
losing	 their	 effectiveness.	 During	 the	 1960s	 banks	 began	 to	 rely	 more	 on	
wholesale	 funding,	 notably	 through	 the	 so-called	 Eurodollar	markets	 based	 in	
London.	 Banks	were	 becoming	more	 international	 and	 unstable.	 In	 1974,	 the	
relatively	 small	 Herstatt	 Bank	 in	 Germany	 collapsed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 failed	
speculation	in	international	currency	markets,	causing	many	of	its	international	
creditors	to	suffer	losses	(Kindleberger	2011[1978]).		
In	 response	 to	 these	 developments,	 prudential	 regulation	 became	 more	
formalised,	programmatic	and	international.	In	1974,	banking	supervisors	of	the	
leading	 central	 banks	 took	 their	 first	 steps	 towards	 international	 cooperation	
and	 coordination,	 establishing	 the	 ‘Committee	 on	 Banking	 Regulations	 and	
Supervisory	Practices’,	which	would	 later	be	renamed	the	Basel	Committee	on	
Banking	 Supervision.	 Several	 years	 of	 informal	 discussions	 and	 meetings	
culminated	 in	 the	 agreement	 of	 the	 Basel	 Concordat	 in	 1983,	 which	 set	 out	
principles	 for	 cooperation	 between	 ‘home’	 and	 ‘host’	 country	 authorities	 of	
international	 banks	 (see	 Goodhart	 2011).	 This	 agreement	 foreshadowed	 the	
even	 more	 influential	 Basel	 Accord	 of	 1988,	 wherein	 the	 central	 banks	 and	
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financial	 supervisory	authorities	coalesced	around	the	use	of	capital	adequacy	
requirements	as	the	main	prudential	tool	for	mitigating	risk-taking	by	banks	and	
they	agreed	to	set	minimum	capital	requirement	of	8%	of	banks’	risk-weighted	
assets.			
Despite	 the	greater	 resources	devoted	 to	 regulatory	 and	 supervisory	 tasks,	
prudential	 regulation	 became	 increasingly	 separate	 from	 monetary	 policy	
during	the	1990s	and	2000s.	Some	countries	–	notably	the	United	Kingdom	and	
Germany	–	 formally	 separated	out	prudential	 regulation	and	supervision	 from	
central	 banks	 (see	 Masciandaro	 et	 al.	 2008).	 Where	 prudential	 supervisory	
functions	continued	to	reside	with	central	banks,	they	were	generally	regarded	
as	 secondary	 in	 prestige	 to	 monetary	 policy.	 The	 roots	 of	 the	 separation	
between	 monetary	 and	 prudential	 policy	 lay	 in	 the	 prevalence	 of	 orthodox	
economic	 ideas.	 In	 particular	 the	 notion	 that	 financial	 markets	 are	 self-
correcting	enabled	central	banks	to	coalesce	around	the	 idea	that	maintaining	
price	stability	was	a	sufficient	condition	for	maintaining	financial	stability.	This	
period	also	saw	the	rise	of	the	so-called	‘Greenspan	Put’;	that	is,	the	contention	
that	 it	 is	better	 to	 ‘clean’	up	 the	mess	of	a	burst	 financial	bubble	by	 lowering	
rates	after	the	event	than	it	is	to	‘lean’	against	the	emergence	of	a	bubble	in	the	
first	place	by	raising	rates	ahead	of	time.		
During	 this	 era,	 advanced	 economy	 central	 banks’	 ‘power’	 exhibited	
divergent	tendencies.	From	a	relational	perspective,	central	banks’	‘power	over’	
other	 actors	 increased	 in	 the	 field	 of	 monetary	 policy	 as	 they	 became	
increasingly	free	to	determine	policy	free	from	governmental	 interference.	Yet	
simultaneously,	central	banks’	remits	narrowed;	their	ability	to	control	financial	
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market	 activity	 dwindled	 and	 some	 governments	 stripped	 them	 of	 their	
supervisory	 powers.	 Likewise,	 central	 banks’	 structural	 power	 in	 financial	
markets	 was	 diminished	 by	 the	 dominant	 economic	 ideas	 of	 the	 time,	 which	
gave	 credence	 to	 the	 notion	 that	 internationally	mobile	 financial	 firms	would	
relocate	 (‘exit’)	 to	 other	 jurisdictions	 if	 any	 single	 jurisdiction	 chose	 to	 adopt	
particularly	stringent	financial	regulations.		
3.3 THE	FEDERAL	RESERVE	
3.3.1 EMERGENCE	AND	PRE-HISTORY	
As	mentioned	above,	the	Federal	Reserve	stands	out	from	the	other	two	central	
banks	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis	 because	 financial	 stability	 was	 a	 pre-eminent	
consideration	 in	 its	 foundation.	 During	 the	 19th	 century,	 the	 United	 States’	
banking	system	was	primitive	and	fragmented	(Ahmed	2010).	Lacking	a	central	
bank	or	a	stable	currency,	bank	runs	and	more	generalised	banking	panics	were	
a	 frequent	 occurrence.	 A	 particularly	 severe	 bank	 run	 in	 1907	 convinced	 the	
nation’s	 high	 financiers	 and	 politicians	 of	 the	 need	 for	 monetary	 reform.	 In	
1908,	 Congress	 established	 a	 National	 Monetary	 Commission	 to	 investigate	
possible	 reforms.	When	 this	 commission	 failed	 to	produce	concrete	proposals	
for	reform,	a	group	of	six	prominent	bankers	and	politicians	convened	in	secret	
on	 Jekyll	 Island,	 off	 the	 coast	of	Georgia,	 to	discuss	options	 for	 establishing	 a	
new	 central	 bank.	 While	 their	 call	 for	 a	 National	 Reserve	 Association,	
comprising	a	privately	owned	central	bank	with	a	network	of	branches	across	
the	 country,	 failed	 to	win	 support	 in	Congress,	 in	1913,	 a	modified	version	of	
their	 plan	 was	 introduced	 the	 House	 of	 Representatives,	 sponsored	 by	
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Congressman	 Carter	 Glass.	 This	 bill	 proposed	 a	 new	 Federal	 Reserve	 System,	
composed	of	a	Federal	Reserve	Board	in	Washington	DC	and	12	regional	Federal	
Reserve	Banks	to	be	situated	in	major	cities	across	the	United	States.	Ultimately	
successful,	 President	Woodrow	Wilson	 signed	 this	 bill	 into	 law	 as	 the	 Federal	
Reserve	Act	in	1913.		
The	 creation	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 took	 place	 against	 a	 backdrop	 of	 an	
enduring	 struggle	 between	 competing	 societal	 coalitions	 in	 the	United	 States,	
each	with	divergent	material	interests	and	disparate	ideas	about	the	utility	of	a	
central	bank.	On	the	one	hand,	 there	 is	a	 long	history	of	populist	 suspicion	of	
banking,	finance	and	the	institution	of	central	banking	in	the	United	States.	This	
emanates,	in	particular,	from	Southern	agrarian	states,	which	have	traditionally	
feared	 the	 accumulation	 of	 power	 at	 the	 federal	 level	 of	 government	 and	
amongst	 East-coast	 financiers.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 financial	 community	
(based	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 in	 New	 York),	 supported	 by	 internationally	 oriented	
business	and	to	some	extent	the	urban	middle	class,	have	generally	supported	
the	development	of	the	nation’s	financial	system.	This	has	included	support	for	
the	establishment	of	the	legal	and	regulatory	institutions	necessary	to	support	a	
modern	financial	system.		
When	it	was	established	in	1913,	the	Federal	Reserve	was,	in	fact,	the	United	
States’	third	attempt	at	creating	a	central	bank.	A	first	central	bank,	which	has	
come	to	be	known	as	 the	 ‘First	Bank	of	 the	United	States’,	was	established	 in	
1791,	 on	 a	 proposal	 from	 Treasury	 Secretary	 Alexander	 Hamilton.	 Privately	
owned,	this	bank	acted	as	banker	to	the	Federal	Government	–	making	loans	to	
the	government	and	taking	deposits	of	public	 funds	–	and	 it	 issued	banknotes	
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that	could	be	used	as	a	medium	of	exchange	(currency).	The	First	Bank	of	 the	
United	 States	 was	 opposed	 by	 Southern	 Agrarian	 states,	 which	 stood	 to	 lose	
materially	from	the	emergence	of	a	national	central	bank,	since	their	own	state-
chartered	banks	already	issued	their	own	currencies	and	could	be	relied	upon	as	
a	 source	 of	 credit	 (Lavelle	 2013:	 36).	 Spearheading	 this	 opposition	 was	 the	
President,	Thomas	Jefferson,	who	perceived	banking	and	finance	 in	general	 to	
be	a	source	of	instability.	In	1811,	the	First	Bank	of	the	United	States’	initial	20-
year	 charter	 was	 allowed	 to	 expire	 and	 it	 ceased	 operating.	 Subsequently,	 a		
‘Second	Bank	of	the	United	States’,	was	established	in	1816.	It	too	functioned	as	
banker	to	the	Federal	government	and	competed	with	state-chartered	banks	in	
the	issue	banknotes.	Like	its	predecessor,	the	Second	Bank	of	the	United	States	
ceased	operating	after	its	initial	20-year	charter	was	not	renewed.	Opposition	to	
the	Second	Bank	of	the	United	States	was	led	by	the	President,	Andrew	Jackson,	
who	allied	with	Democrats,	old	Jeffersonians	and	small	bankers	and	businesses	
concerned	about	being	denied	access	to	credit	(Lavelle	2013:	37).		
Suspicion	 of	 central	 banks	 was	 still	 very	 much	 in	 evidence	 some	 seventy	
years	 later	at	 the	 time	of	 the	 formation	of	 the	Federal	Reserve.	Arguably,	 the	
decentralised	constitution	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System	is	itself	a	reflection	of	
these	tensions.	Yet	the	Federal	Reserve	was	not	merely	a	compromise	between	
Southern	 farmers	 and	 East-coast	 financiers.	 Rather,	 as	 Greider	 (1987:	 277)	
argues,	 it	 also	 reflected	 a	 historic	 compromise	 between	 public	 and	 private	
(financier-led)	 control	 of	 the	 monetary	 system.	 Indeed,	 this	 compromise	 is	
clearly	evident	 in	 the	composition	of	 the	Federal	Reserve	System.	The	Federal	
Reserve	 Board	 in	 Washington	 D.C.	 would	 be	 effectively	 under	 government	
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control:	it	was	to	be	composed	of	seven	members	including	the	Secretary	of	the	
Treasury,	 the	 Comptroller	 of	 the	 Currency	 and	 five	 others	 appointed	 by	
Congress.	 The	 12	 regional	 Federal	 Reserve	 Banks	 would	 be	more	 like	 private	
bankers’	 cooperatives.	 They	would	 issue	 stock,	which	would	 be	 purchased	 by	
commercial	 banks.	 These	 commercial	 banks	 would	 then	 become	 the	 Reserve	
Banks’	 ‘member	 banks’.	 The	 member	 banks	 would	 then	 have	 the	 right	 to	
appoint	six	of	the	nine	directors	of	each	Reserve	Bank.			
3.3.2 SUBORDINATION	TO	GOVERNMENT	CONTROL	
As	 a	 relative	 latecomer	 to	 the	 international	 community	 of	 central	 banks,	 the	
Federal	 Reserve	was	 not	 in	 existence	 during	 the	 era	 of	 the	 international	 gold	
standard,	 in	 which	 central	 banks	 enjoyed	 relative	 independence	 from	
government	 control.	 Rather,	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 coincided	
with	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 First	World	War.	 From	 the	 outset,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	
Board	generally	accepted	the	discount	rates	decided	by	the	Treasury	(Capie	et	
al.	1994).	At	the	same	time,	during	its	initial	years	of	operation,	there	remained	
some	 ambiguity	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 System	 constituted	 the	
nation’s	 central	bank,	or	merely	a	 loosely	 coordinated	network	of	12	 regional	
banks	 (Todd	 2012).	 Notably,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Bank	 of	 New	 York	 (FRBNY)	
operated	with	 little	constraint	 from	the	Federal	Reserve	Board	 in	Washington.	
Under	the	Governorship	of	Benjamin	Strong,	the	FRBNY	was	criticised	for	being	
too	 close	 to	 the	 commercial	 banks	 in	 Wall	 Street.	 It	 was	 also	 criticised	 for	
behaving	 as	 though	 it	 was	 the	 de	 facto	 central	 bank	 of	 the	 United	 States,	
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extending	large	loans	to	European	financial	institutions	in	an	effort	to	shore-up	
financial	stability	in	Europe.	
During	 the	 Great	 Depression,	 the	 power	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Board	
relative	 to	 the	banker-led	regional	Federal	Reserve	Banks	 increased.	The	1933	
Glass-Steagall	Act	extended	the	powers	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Board	over	the	
Regional	 Federal	Reserve	Banks,	 in	particular,	 by	placing	 responsibility	 for	 the	
regulation	and	supervision	of	bank	holding	companies	with	the	Federal	Reserve	
Board.	Two	years	later,	the	Banking	Act	of	1935	further	centralised	authority	in	
the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Board	 (which	 it	 renamed	 the	 ‘Board	 of	Governors	 of	 the	
Federal	Reserve	System’)	by	effectively	removing	the	legal	basis	for	the	regional	
Reserve	Banks	 to	 act	 as	 semiautonomous	organisations,	 free	 to	manage	 their	
own	portfolios	(Meltzer	2003:	415).		
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 power	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 System	 as	 a	 whole	
diminished	 relative	 to	 the	 Treasury.	 While	 the	 Banking	 Act	 removed	 the	
Secretary	of	the	Treasury	and	the	Comptroller	of	the	Currency	from	the	Board	
of	Governors,	other	Depression-era	legislation	effectively	subordinated	the	Fed	
to	government	control.	For	instance,	the	Emergency	Banking	Act	of	1933	forced	
the	Fed	to	cooperate	with	the	government	or	face	its	policies	being	overridden.	
Likewise,	the	‘Thomas	Amendment’	to	the	Agricultural	Adjustment	Act	enabled	
the	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Treasury	 to	 control	 the	 Fed’s	 credit	 policy	 (Capie	 et	 al.	
1994).	Executive	control	over	the	Federal	Reserve	increased	further	still	as	the	
economy	as	a	whole	shifted	onto	a	war	footing.	For	example,	in	1941,	President	
Roosevelt	ordered	the	Federal	Reserve	to	 impose	restrictions	on	the	provision	
of	 consumer	 credit,	 including	 for	 automobiles	 and	 other	 durable	 goods.	 This	
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measure	was	 justified	by	 the	need	 to	ensure	 that	productive	 resources	would	
be	redirected	to	the	war	effort	(Elliot	et	al.	2013).		
During	and	 immediately	after	 the	Second	World	War,	 the	Federal	Reserve	
committed	 to	maintaining	 low	 interest	 rates.	 This	 obligation	was	 removed	 in	
1951,	when	the	‘Treasury	Accord’	set	out	a	new	framework	for	monetary	policy	
decision-making,	 somewhat	 increasing	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 central	 bank	
(Lavelle	 2013:	 50).	 Yet	 even	 after	 this	 date,	 the	 Fed	 frequently	 bowed	 to	
pressure	 from	 the	 administration	 (see	 Todd	 2012).	 Much	 depended	 on	 the	
personalities	involved.	For	example,	in	1965	Federal	Reserve	Chairman	William	
McChesney	 Martin	 faced	 down	 President	 Lyndon	 B	 Johnson	 over	 the	 Fed’s	
decision	 to	 raise	 rates	 during	 the	midst	 of	 the	 Vietnam	War.	 A	 decade	 later,	
Martin’s	 successor,	 Arthur	 Burns,	 took	 a	 much	 more	 acquiescent	 approach	
when	President	Nixon	demanded	an	easing	of	monetary	conditions	(see	Meltzer	
2010).			
The	 period	 of	 subordination	 to	 government	 control	was	 one	 in	which	 the	
Federal	Reserve’s	capacity	to	exert	control	over	financial	market	conditions	was	
relatively	strong.	 Indeed,	by	today’s	standards,	the	Federal	Reserve	was	highly	
interventionist.	 As	 Elliot	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 have	 documented,	 the	 Fed	 operated	
numerous	policies	that	would	today	be	classed	as	‘macroprudential	measures’.	
After	 the	Second	World	War,	 the	Fed	continued	 to	 impose	 restrictions	on	 the	
terms	of	consumer	credit,	constraining	demand	for	credit	for	durable	goods	into	
the	 early	 1950s.	 	 Congress	 also	 gave	 the	 Fed	 power	 to	 impose	 new	 limits	 on	
mortgage	underwriting	standards,	at	the	behest	of	the	President.	Other	proto-
macroprudential	policies	 included	variations	on	margin	requirements	 for	stock	
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market	 investors	 (which	 limited	 the	 amount	 of	 leverage	 investors	 could	 take	
on);	 the	 imposition	of	 voluntary	 restraints	 on	banks’	 supply	 of	 credit	 to	 ‘non-
productive’	uses;	and	varying	reserve	requirements	for	regulated	banks,	which	
influence	the	volume	of	credit	in	the	economy.		
It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 these	 powers	 were	 always	 controversial	 and	
generally	 unpopular	 in	 Congress.	 Congress	 revoked	 the	 Fed’s	 ability	 to	 apply	
selective	 credit	 controls	 in	 the	 mid-1950s.	 Subsequently,	 the	 1969	 Credit	
Control	 Act	 renewed	 the	 Fed’s	 formal	 authority	 to	 impose	 countercyclical	
financial	regulations,	although	the	central	bank	did	not	make	extensive	use	of	it	
before	 the	 Act	 was	 rescinded	 in	 1982.	 Having	 said	 that,	 as	 late	 as	 1980,	 the	
Federal	Reserve	did	 impose	credit	 controls,	albeit	 for	 the	purposes	of	 tackling	
inflation,	 rather	 than	as	a	means	of	bursting	asset	price	bubbles	or	mitigating	
other	 systemic	 risks.	 Imposing	 a	 series	 of	 reserve	 requirements	 on	banks	 and	
money	market	funds	(institutional	investment	funds	that	act	much	like	banks)	it	
invoked	a	sharp	decline	in	the	supply	of	credit	for	mortgages,	consumer	goods	
and	automobiles	(Elliot	et	al.	2013).	This	would	prove	to	be	the	last	experiment	
with	countercyclical	controls	on	the	supply	of	credit	in	the	United	States.	
3.3.3 ORTHODOXY	RESTORED	
The	 era	 of	 central	 bank	 independence	 in	 the	United	 States	 began	when	 Paul	
Volcker	succeeded	Arthur	Burns	as	Chairman	of	the	Federal	Reserve.	Faced	with	
chronic	and	deeply	engrained	high	 inflation,	Volcker’s	Federal	Reserve	made	a	
major	policy	shift	in	1979	when	it	started	targeting	monetary	aggregates	rather	
than	interest	rates.	This	policy	shift	had	the	effect	of	sending	the	Federal	Funds	
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Rate	 up	 to	 unprecedented	 levels,	 precipitating	 a	 sharp	 recession.	 The	 Fed’s	
policy	 engendered	 considerable	 resistance	 within	 Congress	 and	 the	
Administration,	 but	 ultimately	 inflation	was	 tamed	 and	 the	 reputation	 of	 the	
Fed	 as	 an	 independent,	 inflation-busting,	 central	 bank	was	 greatly	 enhanced.	
Effectively	establishing	the	Federal	Reserve’s	independence,	this	event	owed	to	
internal	organisational	changes	and	policy	decisions	within	the	Federal	Reserve	
itself,	rather	than	any	legislative	initiative	on	the	part	of	politicians	(L.	Goodhart	
2014).		
Like	other	central	banks,	the	Federal	Reserve	in	the	1980s	came	to	focus	less	
on	 macroeconomic	 objectives	 and	 more	 on	 the	 narrow	 pursuit	 of	 monetary	
stability	 (Bernanke	2013).	 Indeed,	under	the	Chairmanship	of	Alan	Greenspan,	
who	 was	 perhaps	 the	 world’s	 most	 influential	 evangelist	 for	 liberal	 market	
ideas,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 appeared	 to	 succumb	 to	 the	 illusion	 that	 the	
maintenance	 of	 price	 stability	 would	 be	 a	 sufficient	 condition	 for	 the	
maintenance	 of	 financial	 stability.	 When	 the	 collapse	 of	 Long	 Term	 Capital	
Management	(LTCM),	a	hedge	fund,	threatened	to	provoke	a	systemic	financial	
crisis	 in	 1997,	 Greenspan’s	 Fed	 responded	 by	 lowering	 interest	 rates	
aggressively.	It	reacted	in	the	same	way	to	the	bursting	of	the	dot-com	bubble	
in	1999,	and	to	the	terror	attacks	of	September	11th	2001.	Greenspan	was	firmly	
of	the	opinion	that	it	would	be	futile	for	a	central	bank	to	take	action	to	deflate	
speculative	bubbles;	 the	most	 it	 could	do	was	 to	 ‘mop-up’	after	a	bubble	had	
burst	by	lowering	interest	rates	(Davies	and	Green	2010:	5).		
Under	Greenspan’s	19-year	 tenure,	proto-macroprudential	 tools	 fell	out	of	
use,	giving	way	to	a	doctrine	of	‘post-hoc	intervention’	(Golub	et	al.	2014).	The	
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Federal	 Reserve	 became	 highly	 respected	 for	 presiding	 over	 largely	
uninterrupted	 growth	 and	 systemic	 financial	 stability.	 However,	 from	 an	
empowerment	 perspective	 (see	 Chapter	 2),	 its	 power	 in	 the	 financial	 stability	
domain	was	 greatly	 diminished.	While	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 retained	 a	 role	 in	
regulation	and	supervision	of	banks	and	bank	holding	companies,	neither	it	nor	
the	wider	regulatory	architecture	within	which	it	was	embedded	kept	pace	with	
innovation	and	structural	change	 in	US	 financial	markets.	The	Federal	Reserve	
had	no	role	in	the	supervision	of	the	large	investment	banks	at	the	epicentre	of	
the	 financial	 crisis	 in	 2007.	 Likewise,	 it	 had	 virtually	 no	 jurisdiction	 over	 non-
bank	securitisation	entities,	such	as	off-balance	sheet	Asset	Backed	Commercial	
Paper	 Conduits,	 which	 played	 an	 increasingly	 important	 role	 in	 the	
intermediation	 of	 credit	 in	 the	United	 States	 in	 the	 two	 decades	 prior	 to	 the	
financial	collapse.		
The	Federal	Reserve’s	 relational	 power	differed	 in	 respect	of	 the	different	
functions	it	performed	(cf.	Kohn	2014a).	After	the	‘Volcker	Revolution’	of	1979,	
it	 enjoyed	 a	 high	 level	 of	 autonomy	 with	 respect	 to	 monetary	 policy.	 It	
periodically	raised	rates	to	tackle	inflation,	sometimes	against	the	wishes	of	the	
incumbent	administration	(see,	for	instance,	Greenspan	2007:	119-121;	Suskind	
2004:	 46). 2 	The	 Fed’s	 autonomy	 in	 respect	 of	 prudential	 regulation	 and	
supervision	was	never	equal	 to	 its	autonomy	 in	 the	monetary	policy	arena.	 In	
part,	 this	 is	 because	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 shares	 power	 with	 many	 other	
regulatory	 and	 supervisory	 agencies.	 Unlike	 monetary	 policy	 –	 where	 the	
Federal	 Reserve	 has	 a	monopoly	 over	 the	 creation	 of	 new	base	money	 –	 the	
functions	 of	 regulation	 and	 supervision	 are	 a	 collective	 endeavour	 involving	
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multiple	public	agencies,	each	of	which	must	compromise	with	one	another	 in	
pursuing	its	objectives	(see	Chapter	6).	These	agencies	have	been	established	at	
different	times	reflecting	different	crises,	political	priorities	and	power	struggles	
throughout	 US	 history	 (Lavelle	 2013).	 The	 Office	 of	 the	 Comptroller	 of	 the	
Currency	–	which	 is	 today	an	offshoot	of	 the	Treasury	–	predates	 the	Federal	
Reserve	 itself.	 Many	 regulatory	 agencies	 were	 established	 during	 the	 Great	
Depression,	 including	 the	 Federal	 Deposit	 Insurance	 Company	 and	 the	
Securities	and	Exchange	Commission.	In	addition,	each	state	has	a	collection	of	
banking,	 securities	 and	 insurance	 regulators.	 The	 variable	 nature	 of	 the	 Fed’s	
autonomy	 is	 also	 enshrined	 in	 the	 formal	 mechanisms	 establishing	 its	
accountability	 to	 Congress.	 In	 the	 late	 1970s,	 Congress	 passed	 legislation	
requiring	 the	 Government	 Accountability	 Office	 to	 audit	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	
Board	and	the	12	Federal	Reserve	Regional	Banks.	However,	it	excluded	several	
functions	 from	 this	 oversight	 including	 transactions	 involving	 foreign	 central	
banks	and	governments,	deliberations	and	decisions	relating	to	monetary	policy	
and	 transactions	 under	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 Federal	 Open	Market	 Committee	
(the	Fed’s	rate	setting	body).		
3.4 BANK	OF	ENGLAND	
3.4.1 EMERGENCE	AND	EARLY	HISTORY	
The	‘Governor	and	Company	of	the	Bank	of	England’,	was	established	under	the	
Finance	 Act	 of	 1694	 as	 a	 privately	 owned,	 joint	 stock	 bank.	 Created	 as	 a	
mechanism	for	the	government	to	raise	debts	to	 finance	 its	wars	with	France,	
the	entire	£1.2	million	capital	of	the	Bank	was	lent	to	the	government	upon	its	
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foundation.	 The	 Bank	 acquired	 other	 functions	 only	 gradually.	 The	 first,	 and	
arguably	most	important,	was	the	issuance	of	banknotes.	Bank	of	England	notes	
became	 ‘legal	 tender’	 in	1812.	 In	1844,	an	Act	of	Parliament	prohibited	other	
note	 issuing	 banks	 from	 being	 established	 and	 prevented	 those	 already	 in	
existence	 from	 expanding	 their	 stock	 of	 notes	 in	 circulation.	 This	 effectively	
cemented	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	 position	 as	 the	monopoly	 supplier	 of	 paper	
money,	 although	 the	 last	 banknote	 to	 be	 printed	 by	 a	 private	 bank	 in	 Britain	
was	issued	as	late	as	1921.	
Unlike	 most	 other	 countries,	 Britain	 adhered	 to	 the	 gold	 standard	
throughout	most	of	 the	19th	 century.	During	 the	era	of	 the	 international	 gold	
standard	 (1873-1914),	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 operated	 relatively	 independently	
from	 government,	 although	 it	 was	 never	 entirely	 immune	 from	 political	
pressures.	As	Eichengreen	(2008)	and	other	scholars	have	shown,	the	Bank	was	
never	 slavishly	 bound	 by	 the	 ‘rules	 of	 the	 game’	 of	 the	 gold	 standard	 (see	
Section	 3.2.2	 above).	 Discount	 rates	 reflected	 multiple	 objectives	 beyond	
preserving	gold	reserves,	 including	preserving	the	Bank’s	own	profitability,	the	
impact	 on	 macroeconomic	 conditions	 and	 the	 effect	 on	 government	 debt	
servicing	 costs.	 The	 Bank	 did,	 however,	 strive	 at	 all	 times	 to	 maintain	 the	
convertibility	of	currency	into	gold.	Convertibility	had	been	suspended	in	1797	
as	a	consequence	of	the	Napoleonic	Wars.	After	it	was	restored	in	1821,	it	was	
preserved	until	the	start	of	the	First	World	War	in	1914.	 		
Over	 the	course	of	 the	19th	Century,	 the	Bank	of	England	also	emerged	as	
the	 LOLR	 to	 the	 London	 banking	 system.	When	 the	 discount	 house	Overend,	
Gurney	&	Co	collapsed	in	1866,	the	Bank	of	England	discounted	large	amounts	
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of	bills	and	extended	loans	in	an	effort	to	stem	the	ensuing	panic.	This	occasion	
was	 an	 important	 milestone	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Bank’s	 LOLR	
functionality,	mainly	because	the	Bank’s	actions	were	regarded	as	having	been	
insufficient	to	quell	the	panic	(Eichengreen	2008:	35).	Two	decades	later,	when	
the	collapse	of	Baring	Brothers	caused	an	incipient	panic,	the	Bank	acted	more	
forcefully.	 Indeed,	 the	 Bank	went	 so	 far	 as	 to	 borrow	 additional	 bullion	 from	
foreign	 central	 banks	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 channel	 liquidity	 to	 the	 banking	
system	 whilst	 preserving	 the	 credibility	 of	 its	 commitment	 to	 maintain	
convertibility	of	sterling	into	gold	(Eichengreen	2008:	33).						
3.4.2 SUBORDINATION	TO	GOVERNMENT	CONTROL	
The	First	World	War	marked	the	beginning	of	the	gradual	subordination	of	the	
Bank	to	government	control.	At	the	outset	of	hostilities,	convertibility	of	sterling	
into	 gold	was	 suspended.	 Under	 pressure	 to	 help	 finance	 the	war	 effort,	 the	
Governor	of	 the	Bank,	Walter	Cunliffe,	clashed	with	the	Treasury	 in	1917.	The	
latter	 made	 it	 clear	 to	 the	 Governor	 that	 the	 government	 was	 ultimately	
responsible	 for	 monetary	 policy,	 that	 the	 Bank’s	 private	 interests	 around	 its	
own	profitability	were	of	secondary	importance,	and	that	the	government	stood	
ready	 take	 direct	 control	 of	 the	 Bank	 should	 it	 refuse	 to	 comply	 with	 its	
directions.	After	the	War,	there	was	widespread	support	for	a	return	to	a	more	
independent	 form	 of	 central	 banking,	 including	 restoring	 the	 ostensible	
discipline	imposed	by	maintaining	the	link	to	gold.3	Under	the	Governorship	of	
the	enigmatic	Montagu	Norman,	the	Bank	achieved	this	objective	in	1925,	after	
subjecting	 the	 country	 to	 a	period	of	 highly	 deflationary	monetary	policy.	 Yet	
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the	interwar	gold	standard	would	prove	to	be	a	short-lived	affair.	Facing	chronic	
balance	 of	 payments	 deficits	 and	 a	 shortage	 of	 bullion,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	
came	off	the	gold	standard	in	1931,	never	to	return.	
This	 relationship	between	 the	Bank	and	 the	 government	was	 formalised	 in	
1946	 when	 the	 Labour	 government	 of	 Clement	 Attlee	 nationalised	 the	 Bank	
under	the	Bank	of	England	Act.	As	Burnham	(2007)	argues,	this	did	not,	in	itself,	
weaken	 the	 position	 of	 the	 Bank	 relative	 to	 HM	 Treasury,	 nor	 the	 Governor	
relative	to	the	Chancellor.	Indeed,	by	providing	a	statutory	basis	for	the	Bank’s	
powers	over	commercial	bankers,	and	by	codifying	the	Bank’s	relations	with	HM	
Treasury,	 the	 Act	 arguably	 strengthened	 the	 Bank,	 both	 in	 relational	 and	
empowerment	terms.4		
It	 was	 not	 until	 the	 1970s	 that	 HM	 Treasury’s	 ascendance	 over	 the	 Bank	
became	 more	 apparent.	 In	 the	 early	 1970s,	 the	 Bank	 announced	 a	 new	
monetary	 policy	 regime.	 ‘Competition	 and	 Credit	 Control’,	 as	 the	 policy	 was	
named,	 involved	 the	 abandonment	 of	 interventionist	 constraints	 on	 credit	 –	
such	as	quantitative	 lending	 limits	–	and	a	more	market-determined	approach	
to	setting	Bank	Rate	(Moran	1986).	The	policy	produced	volatile	interest	rates,	
high	 inflation	 and	was	 quickly	 abandoned.	 However,	 its	 lasting	 legacy	was	 to	
prompt	HM	Treasury	 to	become	more	assertive	 in	 its	 relations	with	 the	Bank.	
From	the	early	1970s,	HM	Treasury	took	it	upon	itself	to	announce	interest	rate	
decisions.	 Inspired	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 monetarism,	 the	 Treasury	 also	 began	
publishing	targets	for	growth	in	monetary	aggregates	–	such	as	broad	money,	or	
‘M3’	–	in	the	mid-1970s.		
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Under	 the	 Premiership	 of	 Margaret	 Thatcher,	 relations	 between	 the	
government	 and	 the	 Bank	 deteriorated.	 Dissatisfied	 with	 a	 lack	 of	 success	 in	
meeting	 monetary	 targets,	 in	 1983	 Thatcher	 decided	 not	 to	 reappoint	 the	
Governor,	Gordon	Richardson.	His	replacement,	Robert	Leigh-Pemberton,	was	a	
figure	many	 believed	 would	 be	 easily	 controlled	 (Elgie	 and	 Thompson	 1998).	
Beyond	 the	 immediate	 relationships	 between	 key	 personalities,	 there	 was	 a	
high	level	of	political	opposition	to	central	bank	independence	in	Britain	in	the	
1980s	and	early	1990s.	Such	opposition	stemmed	from	several	factors	including	
functionalist	concerns	that	uncoordinated	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	would	lead	
to	 sub-optimal	 outcomes;	 ‘democratic’	 concerns	 that	monetary	 policy	was	 an	
inappropriate	 policy	 area	 for	 delegation	 to	 unelected	 technocrats;	 and	
nationalistic	 tendencies	 to	 oppose	 a	 model	 of	 governance	 associated	 with	
continental	Europe,	particularly	Germany	(Howarth	and	Loedel	2005).	Arguably,	
domestic	institutional	factors	were	also	important.	In	particular,	the	unitary	and	
highly	 centralised	 ‘Westminster	 model’	 of	 British	 government,	 wherein	 the	
Cabinet	and	especially	the	Prime	Minister	enjoy	very	strong	formal	and	informal	
authority,	was	 thought	 to	be	 incompatible	with	a	model	of	 central	banking	 in	
which	 the	 central	 bank	 itself	 occupies	 a	 highly	 authoritative	 position	 (Busch	
1994).	
3.4.3 ORTHODOXY	RESTORED	
Under	the	premiership	of	John	Major,	the	United	Kingdom	formally	entered	the	
Exchange	Rate	Mechanism	in	1990.	As	Quaglia	(2008a)	suggests,	its	subsequent	
withdrawal	from	this	monetary	regime	two	years	later,	on	a	date	forever	to	be	
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remembered	 as	 ‘Black	 Wednesday’,	 marked	 the	 first	 in	 a	 series	 of	
developments	that	would	transform	the	governance	of	monetary	policy	 in	the	
United	 Kingdom	 and	 strengthen	 the	 central	 bank’s	 authority	 relative	 to	 the	
government.	Shortly	after	Black	Wednesday,	HM	Treasury	set	an	inflation	target	
for	the	Bank	of	England	to	pursue.	Under	the	leadership	of	Chancellor	Kenneth	
Clarke,	 in	 1994	 HM	 Treasury	 ceased	 its	 practice	 of	 examining	 the	 Bank’s	
Inflation	Report	prior	to	publication.	HM	Treasury	also	granted	authority	to	the	
Bank	to	determine	the	timing	of	interest	rate	decisions	and	it	decided	to	publish	
the	minutes	 of	monthly	meetings	 between	 the	 Chancellor	 and	 the	 Governor.	
Finally,	with	 the	election	of	 the	New	Labour	government	 in	1997,	 the	Bank	of	
England	 finally	gained	 formal	 legal	 independence.	 Led	by	Prime	Minister	Tony	
Blair	and	Chancellor	Gordon	Brown,	the	new	government	resolved	to	transform	
the	 central	 bank,	 establishing	 an	 operationally	 independent	 Monetary	 Policy	
Committee	to	take	decisions	over	the	size	and	timing	of	interest	rate	changes.		
Offsetting	 this	 major	 enhancement	 in	 the	 Bank’s	 formal	 autonomy,	 the	
government	 also	 set	 about	 rationalising	 the	 United	 Kingdom’s	 fragmented	
system	 of	 financial	 regulation	 and	 supervision.	 It	 decided	 to	 establish	 a	 one-
stop-shop	 financial	 services	 regulator	 and	 supervisor	 –	 the	 Financial	 Services	
Authority	 (FSA)	 –	 that	 would	 bring	 together	 the	 existing	 array	 of	 quasi-self-
regulatory	 financial	 supervisory	agencies	and	 take	on	 the	Bank’s	 responsibility	
for	banking	regulation	and	supervision.	Under	the	new	regime,	responsibility	for	
ensuring	 financial	 stability	 would	 be	 shared	 between	 HM	 Treasury,	 the	 Bank	
and	 the	 FSA,	 with	 the	 respective	 roles	 of	 each	 organisation	 set	 out	 in	 a	
Memorandum	of	Understanding.		
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Even	before	this	reform,	financial	regulation	and	supervision	were	in	a	state	
of	 considerable	 change.	 Beginning	 in	 the	 1970s,	 a	 gradual	 process	 of	
formalisation,	codification	and	juridification	had	taken	place	in	the	organisation	
and	 methods	 of	 financial	 supervision	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (Moran	 2003).	
Arguably,	these	changes	were	reflective	of	structural	and	sociological	changes	in	
the	UK	economy	and	society,	in	which	growing	public	aversion	to	risk	combined	
with	increasing	exposure	of	individuals	to	the	vagaries	of	financial	markets	(via	
their	 pensions	 and	 mortgages)	 produced	 heightened	 public	 demand	 for	
regulation	 (Giddens	 1991;	 Beck	 1992;	 Clarke	 2000;	 cf.	McPhilemy	 2013).	 The	
more	 immediate	 impetus	for	reform	was	a	succession	of	 increasingly	 frequent	
financial	 crises	 and	 ‘fiascos’	 of	 various	 kinds.	 In	 the	 early	 1970s,	 a	 crisis	 of	
minimally	 regulated	 ‘secondary	 banks’	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 the	
international	 fallout	 from	the	collapse	of	 the	German	bank	Herstatt	prompted	
the	 Bank	 of	 England	 to	 establish	 a	 separate	 ‘Supervision	 Division’	 (Blanden	
1974).	The	formalisation	of	banking	regulation	and	supervision	continued	with	
the	passage	of	 the	Banking	Act	of	 1979	and	 in	 response	 to	 further	 crises	 and	
scandals,	such	as	the	collapse	of	Johnson	Matthey	bank	 in	1984,	the	failure	of	
the	Bank	of	Commerce	and	Credit	International	in	1992,	and	the	fiasco	of	Nick	
Leeson’s	rogue	trading	at	Barings	Bank	in	1995.		
The	 Governor,	 Eddie	 George,	 was	 reported	 to	 have	 considered	 resigning	
when	 he	 heard	 that	 the	 Government	was	 planning	 to	 relieve	 the	 Bank	 of	 its	
supervisory	 competencies	 (Peston	 1997).	 However,	 the	 reform	 gave	
organisational	expression	 to	 the	 trend	of	de	 facto	de-prioritisation	of	 financial	
stability	 and	 prudential	 supervision	 amongst	 the	 objectives	 of	 central	 banks.	
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This	 trend	 reflected	growing	 confidence	–	of	 central	bankers,	 finance	ministry	
officials	 and	 market	 participants	 –	 in	 the	 self-correcting	 nature	 of	 financial	
markets	and	the	ostensible	benefits	of	 financial	 innovation.	At	 the	same	time,	
the	creation	of	the	FSA	brought	UK	financial	services	regulation	and	supervision	
under	 greater	 democratic	 control.	 It	 diminished	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 capital	
markets	 relied	 on	 self-regulation	 and	 placed	 authority	 for	 financial	 market	
governance	in	the	hands	of	officials	that	were	somewhat	more	accountable	to	
the	executive	than	central	bankers	(Westrup	2007).	
The	FSA	presided	over	a	further	formalisation	of	financial	supervision	and	an	
enormous	expansion	in	the	volume	and	scope	of	financial	regulation.	Regulation	
became	 more	 voluminous	 and	 expensive,	 but	 also	 less	 focused	 on	 core	
prudential	concerns,	such	as	the	underlying	business	risks	that	firms	were	taking	
or	 the	 risks	 they	 posed	 to	 financial	 stability	 as	 a	 whole.	 This	 played	 into	 the	
hands	 of	 ‘bulge	 bracket’	 financial	 firms,	 which	 benefited	 from	 the	 liberal	
orientation	 of	 financial	 policy	 whilst	 also	 enjoying	 de	 facto	 protection	 from	
competition	from	new	entrants	to	the	markets,	for	which	compliance	with	the	
increasing	volume	of	regulation	was	relatively	more	burdensome	(see	Persaud	
2005).	
Against	the	backdrop	of	buoyant	financial	markets	and	increasingly	pervasive	
beliefs	 in	 the	efficiency	of	 financial	markets,	 the	FSA	was	 routinely	derided	 in	
the	press	as	a	 ‘box-ticker’s	 charter’	 (Harrison	2006).	Famously,	Prime	Minister	
Tony	Blair	(2005)	gave	a	speech	in	which	he	declared:	
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something	 is	 seriously	 awry	when	 […]	 the	 Financial	 Services	 Authority	 that	
was	 established	 to	 provide	 clear	 guidelines	 and	 rules	 for	 the	 financial	
services	sector	and	to	protect	the	consumer	against	the	fraudulent,	is	seen	as	
hugely	 inhibiting	 of	 efficient	 business	 by	 perfectly	 respectable	 companies	
that	have	never	defrauded	anyone.		
	
It	 would	 appear	 paradoxical	 that	 the	 FSA	 has	 now	 become	 a	 byword	 for	 the	
‘failed’	 light	 touch	approach	 to	 financial	 regulation	and	 supervision.	However,	
this	 apparent	 paradox	 disappears	 when	 we	 consider	 that	 the	 increasingly	
formalised	nature	of	financial	regulation	and	supervision	in	London	was	itself	a	
symptom	 of	 the	 increasing	 structural	 power	 of	 financial	market	 actors	 in	 the	
United	Kingdom	during	the	1980s	and	1990s.	An	influx	of	foreign	financial	firms	
to	the	City	of	London	brought	a	more	litigious	culture,	undermining	the	informal	
‘club	 governance’	 of	 the	 old	 regime	 (Moran	 2003).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
economy	as	a	whole	became	dependent	on	the	continuation	of	the	finance	led-
boom.	Adapting	to	these	changes,	regulators	adopted	what	in	hindsight	appears	
to	have	been	an	excessively	lawyerly	and	formalistic	approach.	Yet	the	content	
of	 regulations	 –	 such	 as	 the	 setting	 of	 capital	 adequacy	 requirements	 or	 the	
amount	 of	 liquid	 assets	 banks	 were	 required	 to	 hold	 in	 reserve	 –	 was	
excessively	 liberal.	 In	 retrospect,	 the	 decision	 to	 remove	 banking	 supervision	
from	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 accelerated	 the	 ascendance	 of	 financial	 markets	
relative	 to	 public	 sources	 of	 authority.	 Financial	 services	 governance	 in	 the	
United	Kingdom	became	more	responsive	to	the	demands	of	politicians,	who,	in	
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turn,	were	in	thrall	to	the	interests	of	the	City	(see	Warwick	Commission	2009;	
Persaud	2009).		
3.5 THE	EUROPEAN	CENTRAL	BANK	
3.5.1 EMERGENCE	
Established	on	1st	June	1998,	the	ECB	is	by	far	the	youngest	of	the	three	central	
banks	considered	 in	 this	 thesis.	The	culmination	of	 several	decades	of	gradual	
and	often	halting	attempts	to	institutionalise	monetary	cooperation	in	Europe,	
the	 supranational	 ECB,	 and	 the	 single	 currency	 over	 which	 it	 presides,	 are	 a	
uniquely	 ambitious	 innovation	 in	 the	 history	 of	 central	 banking.	 Efforts	 to	
deepen	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 integration	 of	 Europe	 were	 always	 elite	
driven.	 The	 process	 that	 led	 to	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 euro	 and	 the	 ECB	may	 be	
attributed	 to	 a	 convergence	 in	 the	 preferences	 of	 key	 politicians	 in	 the	 EU’s	
most	important	member	states,	above	all	France	and	Germany.	For	the	French	
political	 establishment,	 guided	 by	 senior	 figures	 such	 as	 former	 President	
Giscard	 d’Estaing,	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 common	 European	 currency	 and	 a	 single	
monetary	authority	was	a	means	of	challenging	the	supremacy	of	the	German	
Deutsche	Mark.	For	German	politicians,	led	by	Federalist	figures	such	as	former	
Chancellor	 Helmut	 Schmidt,	 monetary	 integration	 was	 both	 a	 necessary	 next	
step	 for	completing	 the	 internal	market	and	a	means	of	 reconciling	Europe	 to	
the	restoration	of	Germany’s	economic	power	after	the	Second	World	War.			
While	 convergent	political	preferences	provided	 the	background	conditions	
for	monetary	 integration,	as	 several	 authors	have	noted,	Europe’s	 community	
of	national	central	bankers	was	highly	influential	in	designing	the	architecture	of	
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the	new	European	monetary	authority	(Howarth	and	Loedel	2005;	Dyson	1994;	
Verdun	1999).	Most	notably,	in	1988,	an	expert	committee,	convened	under	the	
Chairmanship	of	European	Commission	President	Jacques	Delors	and	composed	
of	 national	 central	 bank	 governors,	 set	 forth	 a	 three-stage	 project	 for	 EMU.	
These	 stages	 comprised	 liberalising	 capital	 movements	 within	 the	 EU	 (1990-
1994),	establishing	 the	ECB	within	a	quasi-federal	European	System	of	Central	
Banks	 (ESCB)	 (1994-1999)	and	 irrevocably	 fixing	exchange	 rates	against	a	new	
currency	 (1999	onwards).	The	Delors	Report	was	written	 into	 the	1992	Treaty	
on	 European	 Union	 (TEU)	 –	 ‘the	 Maastricht	 Treaty’	 –	 with	 few	 substantive	
changes.	It	envisaged	a	highly	independent	central	bank,	with	a	foremost	focus	
on	 price	 stability.	 These	 principles	 reflect	 the	 characteristic	 preference	 of	
central	bankers	for	freedom	to	pursue	‘sound	money’	objectives	in	the	absence	
of	interference	from	politicians.	At	the	same	time,	this	institutional	design	also	
conformed	 closely	 to	 German	 national	 preferences,	 which	 are	 shaped	 by	 the	
traumatic	experience	of	hyperinflation	in	the	interwar	years	and	the	subsequent	
emergence	 of	 a	 strong	 cultural	 predilection	 for	 ‘stability-oriented’	
macroeconomic	and	monetary	policies	(see	Tognato	2012).		
It	 is	 often	 said	 that	 the	 ECB	 was	 modelled	 on	 the	 German	 Bundesbank	
(Howarth	and	Loedel	2005;	Quaglia	2008a;	Dyson	2009;	Howarth	2009).	Like	the	
Bundesbank,	 the	ECB	would	enjoy	a	high	 level	of	political	autonomy.	 It	would	
focus	predominantly	on	monetary	policy	and,	within	that,	its	primary	objective	
would	be	to	maintain	price	stability.	Both	central	banks	were	based	in	Frankfurt.	
Moreover,	both	had	‘federal’	structures,	comprising	Land	and	Federal	officials	in	
the	case	of	the	Bundesbank	and	national	and	supranational	officials	in	the	case	
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of	the	ECB.	In	fact,	to	some	extent,	the	ECB	was	even	more	‘German’	than	the	
Bundesbank	 itself.	Notably,	 its	 independence	would	enjoy	quasi-constitutional	
status,	 being	 enshrined	 in	 both	 the	 treaties	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	
founding	 statute	of	 the	ECB	and	 the	ESCB	 (TEU	Article	130;	 ECB/ESCB	Statute	
Article	 7) 5 .	 By	 contrast,	 the	 Bundesbank	 never	 enjoyed	 a	 constitutionally	
protected	status,	even	if	in	practice	it	operated	as	a	highly	autonomous	central	
bank,	 with	 strong	 public	 support	 for	 its	 stability-oriented	 policies	 (see	Marsh	
1992).		
3.5.2 PRE-CRISIS	YEARS		
Following	an	initial	period	in	of	criticism	in	the	early	2000s,	the	ECB	successfully	
established	a	reputation	as	a	credible	monetary	authority.	The	analytical	basis	
for	 its	monetary	 policy	 decisions,	which	 involved	 a	 combination	 of	 traditional	
analysis	 of	 macroeconomic	 variables	 and	 a	 focus	 on	 monetary	 aggregates,	
resulted	 in	 predictable	 policy	 decisions,	 notwithstanding	 the	 reservations	 of	
some	 members	 of	 the	 international	 community	 of	 central	 bankers	 and	
monetary	 experts	 over	 its	 analytical	 merits	 (see	 Howarth	 2009).	 The	 ECB’s	
credibility	was	reinforced	as	a	result	of	the	low	rate	of	inflation	in	the	euro	area	
–	a	product	of	 the	so-called	Great	Moderation	(Bowman	et	al.	2012)	–	and	by	
the	gradual	 strengthening	of	 the	euro	exchange	 rate,	after	an	 initial	period	of	
weakness	shortly	after	the	single	currency	was	introduced.		
In	contrast	 to	 its	position	 in	the	monetary	policy	arena,	 the	ECB	had	only	a	
limited	role	to	play	in	financial	services	governance.	The	1990s	and	2000s	were	
a	 period	 in	 which	 financial	 markets	 in	 the	 EU	 underwent	 considerable	
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integration	both	 in	 terms	of	 the	 volume	of	 cross-border	 financial	 transactions	
and	 capital	 flows,	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 institutional	 framework	 within	 which	
European	 consumers	 and	 providers	 of	 financial	 services	 operated.	 With	
progress	 towards	EMU	 largely	 settled,	 in	1999	 the	European	Commission	 (EC)	
launched	a	 ‘Financial	Services	Action	Plan’	(FSAP),	which	aimed	to	reinvigorate	
stalled	efforts	to	establish	a	Single	European	Market	for	financial	services	and	to	
capitalise	on	the	opportunities	offered	by	the	creation	of	a	single	currency	(EC	
1999).	Regarded	as	highly	successful	(EC	2007a),	the	FSAP	led	to	an	outpouring	
of	 new	 EU-level	 financial	 services	 legislation.	 Indirectly,	 it	 also	 led	 to	 the	
emergence	 of	 a	 new,	 more	 integrated,	 system	 of	 EU-level	 policymaking	 for	
financial	services.	In	2001	a	‘Committee	of	Wise	Men’	was	convened	under	the	
chairmanship	 of	 Alexandre	 Lamfalussy,	 the	 former	 President	 of	 the	 European	
Monetary	 Institute,	 which	 was	 the	 forerunner	 to	 the	 ECB.	 Following	 the	
recommendations	of	this	Committee,	a	complex	four-level	system	of	committee	
governance	was	established	 (initially	 in	 the	securities	sector),	wherein	existing	
informal	networks	of	national	financial	regulators	and	supervisors	were	formally	
incorporated	within	 the	 EU-level	 policymaking	process	 (Eberlein	 and	Newman	
2008).		
The	 ECB	 played	 only	 a	 minimal	 role	 in	 these	 innovations.	 The	 founding	
fathers	 of	 the	 ECB	 had	 afforded	 the	 central	 bank	 a	 limited	 role	 in	 financial	
supervision.	 Under	 Article	 5	 of	 the	 TEU,	 the	 ESCB	 was	 assigned	 the	 task	 of	
contributing	 ‘to	 the	 smooth	 conduct	 of	 policies	 pursued	 by	 the	 competent	
authorities	 [of	member	 states]	 relating	 to	 the	prudential	 supervision	of	 credit	
institutions	and	the	stability	of	the	financial	system’.	It	also	had	the	right	to	be	
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consulted	 on	 legislation	 falling	 within	 its	 field	 of	 competence.	6 	During	 the	
2000s,	 the	ECB	periodically	pitched	 for	an	expansion	of	 its	 supervisory	 role.	In	
2001,	it	published	a	paper	setting	out	the	case	for	attributing	both	macro-	and	
micro-prudential	responsibilities	to	national	central	banks,	which,	by	extension,	
would	have	enhanced	 its	own	 role	 in	 coordinating	 supervision	at	 the	EU	 level	
(ECB	 2001).	 A	 year	 later,	 the	 ECB’s	 then-President	 Wim	 Duisenburg	 and	 his	
deputy	 Tomasso	 Padoa-Schioppa	 made	 public	 their	 long-standing	 interest	 in	
seeing	 the	 ECB	 itself	 take	 on	 a	 stronger	 supervisory	 role.	 Their	 move	 was	
blocked	in	the	European	Council	under	opposition	from	the	British	and	German	
finance	ministers,	both	of	which	were	supporting	the	single	supervisor	model	of	
financial	supervision	at	the	time	(Crooks	2002).	Subsequently,	policymakers	did	
agree	 greater	 European	 coordination	 in	 banking	 supervision,	 extending	 the	
Lamfalussy	 Process	 from	 the	 securities	 sector	 to	 the	 banking	 (and	 insurance)	
sectors.	 Yet	 reflecting	 British	 and	 German	 interests	 in	 maintaining	 political	
control	 over	 financial	 services	 governance	 (Westrup	 2007),	 this	 process	
privileged	 financial	 supervisory	 authorities	 over	 central	 banks.	 Thus,	 a	
Committee	of	European	Banking	Supervisors	(CEBS)	was	established	in	London	
in	 2004,	 in	 which	 central	 bankers	 and	 the	 ECB	were	 invited	 to	 participate	 as	
non-voting	observers	only.		
It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 Lamfalussy	 process	 fell	 far	 short	 of	 outright	
supranationalisation	 of	 financial	 services	 governance.	 It	 involved	 enhanced	
cooperation	 between	 national	 officials	 within	 a	 fundamentally	 decentralised	
system,	 wherein	 the	 responsibility	 for	 the	 safety	 and	 soundness	 of	 financial	
institutions	and	the	stability	of	national	financial	systems	continued	to	reside	at	
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the	national	 level	(see	McPhilemy	2014).	As	the	next	chapter	highlights,	 it	was	
only	with	the	onset	of	the	global	financial	crisis	that	this	decentralised	system	of	
financial	 services	 governance	 –	 and	 the	 limited	 role	 it	 afforded	 to	 central	
bankers	–	would	start	to	be	reappraised.		
3.6 CONCLUSION		
This	chapter	has	demonstrated	that	the	institution	of	central	banking	has	been	
in	a	process	of	continual	evolution	since	its	emergence	in	the	late	17th	century.	
The	four	ages	of	central	banking	identified	–	emergence,	the	international	gold	
standard,	 subordination	 to	government	control	and	 the	 return	 to	orthodoxy	–	
have	 seen	 central	 banks	 lose	 and	 gain	 functions	 and	 establish	 very	 different	
institutional	relations	with	their	key	interlocutors	in	governments	and	financial	
markets.	The	chapter	has	also	demonstrated	the	great	diversity	of	political	and	
economic	forces	that	have	shaped	the	development	of	each	central	bank.	In	the	
United	States,	the	emergence	and	development	of	the	Federal	Reserve	mirrors	
the	major	struggles	in	US	society,	between	agrarian	and	metropolitan	interests,	
between	state	and	federal	levels	of	government	and	between	public	and	private	
sources	 of	 authority.	 In	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	
metamorphosed	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 from	 a	 private	 financial	
market	institution	geared	towards	the	protection	of	the	interests	of	the	City	of	
London	 to	 an	 instrument	 for	 the	 exertion	 of	 public	 control	 over	 financial	
markets.	 The	 ECB	was	born	 in	 the	 era	of	market	 orthodoxy,	with	 an	 ancestry	
untainted	by	the	history	of	subordination	to	government	control.	
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Notwithstanding	 the	differences	between	them,	on	 the	eve	of	 the	 financial	
crisis	 in	 2007,	 the	 three	 central	 banks	 shared	 a	 number	 of	 common	
characteristics.	All	enjoyed	considerable	autonomy	to	determine	 interest	rates	
free	 from	 interference	 from	 their	 political	 ‘masters’.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	
institutions’	mandates	 (with	 the	 partial	 exception	 of	 the	 US	 Federal	 Reserve)	
were	narrow.	For	all	three	central	banks,	price	stability	had	become	their	most	
important	 objective.	 This	was	 established	 formally	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	
England	and	the	ECB	and	on	a	de	facto	basis	in	the	case	of	the	Federal	Reserve.	
Financial	 stability	had	become	a	secondary	concern.	 In	 the	EU,	 this	was	partly	
because	 the	 ECB’s	 mandate	 in	 the	 financial	 stability	 arena	 was	 limited	 and	
ambiguous.	 In	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 financial	 stability	 had	 become	 a	 shared	
competence	between	the	tripartite	authorities	(the	Bank,	HM	Treasury	and	the	
FSA).	 In	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 had	 responsibility	 for	
microprudential	supervision	of	bank	holding	companies	and	the	state	member	
banks	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System,	but	it	had	no	statutory	duty	in	respect	of	
financial	 stability.	 Underlying	 these	 developments	 was	 the	 ascendance	 of	
orthodox	economics	and	the	widespread	acceptance	of	efficient	market	 ideas.	
In	 turn,	 this	 ascendance	 was	 supported	 by	 the	 growth	 and	 development	 of	
financial	 markets,	 which,	 appeared	 to	 most	 observers	 to	 be	 a	 remarkably	
benign	and	positive	development.		
During	 the	 immediate	 pre-crisis	 period,	 central	 bank	 governors	 –	 above	 all	
the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 US	 Federal	 Reserve	 –	 were	 commonly	 characterised	 as	
omniscient	 Delphic	 oracles,	 singularly	 responsible	 for	 establishing	 the	
conditions	for	ostensibly	stable	finance-led	economic	growth	and	prosperity.	It	
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is	 a	 matter	 of	 some	 irony,	 then,	 that	 the	 pre-crisis	 period	 was	 one	 in	 which	
central	 banks	 were	 extremely	 passive	 relative	 both	 to	 the	 interventionism	 of	
the	post-war	years,	and	 to	 the	hyper-innovation	of	 the	crisis	 response.	As	 the	
next	 chapter	 demonstrates,	 the	 financial	 crisis	 heralded	 another	 twist	 in	 the	
long	history	of	 central	 banking	with	 all	 three	 central	 banks	 accumulating	new	
functions	 and	 overhauling	 their	 formal	 and	 informal	 relationships	 with	
politicians	and	financial	market	actors	alike.	
																																																						
1	According	 to	 John	 Maynard	 Keynes’	 famous	 formulation,	 the	 ‘rules	 of	 the	
game’	 of	 the	 gold	 standard	 held	 that	 any	 country	 faced	 with	 a	 balance	 of	
payments	deficit	would	be	required	to	raise	interest	rates,	or	face	the	prospect	
of	gold	flowing	out	of	its	central	banks’	coffers,	as	overseas	merchants	and	their	
bankers	exchanged	unwanted	national	 currency	 into	gold	at	 the	 central	bank.	
By	raising	rates,	a	central	bank	could	restrict	the	money	supply	and	cause	prices	
to	 fall.	 This	 would	 increase	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 the	 country	 vis-à-vis	 its	
trading	partners,	dampening	the	demand	for	gold	at	the	central	bank.	
2	For	 example,	 supporters	 of	 President	 George	 HW	 Bush	 accused	 the	 Federal	
Reserve	 of	 running	 an	 excessively	 restrictive	 monetary	 policy	 in	 1990-91,	
contributing	to	Bush’s	election	defeat	to	Bill	Clinton.		
3	This	 view	 was	 expressed	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 most	 prominently	 by	 the	
Cunliffe	Committee	in	1918,	which	argued	for	a	return	to	the	gold	standard	at	
the	pre-war	rates	of	exchange.	
4 	The	 incumbent	 Governor,	 Thomas	 Catto,	 was	 reappointed	 following	
nationalisation	on	secure	terms	of	employment	(Burnham	2007).	While	the	Act	
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gave	 the	 Treasury	 a	 power	 of	 direction	 over	 the	 Bank,	 this	 power	was	 never	
used	and	quickly	took	on	the	status	of	a	‘nuclear	option’	that	could	be	exercised	
only	 in	 the	 most	 extreme	 situations.	 As	 if	 to	 underline	 the	 Bank’s	 relative	
autonomy	 post-nationalisation,	 a	 series	 of	 disputes	 regarding	 the	 conduct	 of	
exchange	 rate	 policy	 soured	 relations	 between	 the	 Bank	 and	 the	 Treasury	
during	the	1950s.			
5 	Both	 documents	 prohibit	 members	 of	 the	 ECB’s	 decision-making	 bodies	
(including	national	central	bank	governors)	 from	seeking	or	 taking	 instructions	
from	national	or	EU-level	political	bodies.	
6	The	Maastricht	 Treaty	 also	 contained	 a	 mechanism	 whereby,	 under	 certain	
circumstances,	the	ECB	could	take	on	‘specific	tasks	concerning	policies	relating	
to	 the	 prudential	 supervision	 of	 credit	 institutions	 and	 other	 financial	
institutions	with	 the	exception	of	 insurance	undertakings’	 (Article	105(6)	 TEU,	
now	Article	127(6)	TFEU;	emphasis	added).	The	emphasised	words	indicate	that	
this	provision	was	intended	to	prevent	the	ECB	from	becoming	a	pan-European	
banking	supervisor.	Despite	this,	Article	127(6)	has	been	used	as	the	legal	basis	
for	the	creation	of	the	SSM,	a	development	that	some	lawyers	regard	as	illegal	
(Barker,	2012).			
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4 HOW	HAS	CENTRAL	BANK	POWER	CHANGED?	
4.1 INTRODUCTION	
When	 Forbes	 magazine	 issues	 its	 annual	 list	 of	 the	 ‘World’s	 Most	 Powerful	
People’,	 the	Chairman	of	 the	United	 States	 Federal	 Reserve	 is	 rarely	 far	 from	
the	top.	Most	commentators	agree	that	central	banks	are	powerful,	but	it	is	not	
always	clear	what	people	mean	when	they	talk	of	central	banks’	 ‘power’.	This	
chapter	examines	how	the	ability	of	the	major	advanced	economy	central	banks	
to	move	policy	 in	 line	with	 their	own	preferences	has	 changed	 in	 recent	 years	
(see	Chapter	2).	This	understanding	of	power,	which	we	may	label	‘central	bank	
authority’,	aligns	with	intuitive	notions	of	power	in	popular	discourse,	including	
in	 the	 Forbes	 list	 (Howard	 2014).	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 it	 is	 concerned	 with	 central	
banks’	‘power	over’	actors	with	whom	they	have	direct	interactions,	specifically	
financial	 market	 participants	 and	 executive	 politicians	 in	 governments.	 To	
paraphrase	Dahl	(1957),	central	bank	authority	concerns	central	banks’	ability	to	
cause	other	actors	to	do	things	they	would	not	otherwise	do.			
A	 starting	 point	 for	 explaining	 how	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 central	 banks	
considered	 in	 this	 thesis	has	changed	 is	 recognition	 that	 their	authority	varies	
across	 the	 different	 functions	 they	 perform.	 As	 bureaucratic	 agencies	 of	 the	
state,	the	ability	of	these	central	banks’	to	determine	outcomes	in	a	given	policy	
domain	 depends,	 in	 part,	 on	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 formal	 mandate	 delegated	 to	
them	by	politicians.	This	includes	the	range	of	objectives	delegated	to	them	and	
the	specific	 ‘powers’	assigned	to	them	in	 law.	A	central	bank’s	ability	to	move	
policy	 in	 line	with	 its	own	preferences	also	depends	on	how	autonomous	 it	 is.	
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Autonomy,	 in	 turn,	depends	on	 the	 level	of	discretion	afforded	 to	 the	 central	
bank	 in	 its	 statutory	 mandate,	 including	 whether	 it	 is	 required	 to	 follow	
prescriptive	 rules	 or	 if	 it	 has	 freedom	 to	determine	 for	 itself	 how	 to	meet	 its	
statutory	 objectives.	 Autonomy	 also	 depends	 on	 what	 principal-agent	 theory	
terms	‘ex	post	control	mechanisms’.	That	 is	to	say,	 it	depends	on	the	strength	
and	 efficacy	 of	 the	 accountability	 arrangements	 and	 other	 means	 by	 which	
politicians	 (as	 ‘principals’)	 control	 the	actions	of	 their	 ‘agents’	 after	 they	have	
delegated	authority	to	them.	
The	authority	of	central	banks	also	depends	on	 less	 formal	aspects	of	 their	
relationships	 with	 other	 actors.	 Central	 banks	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 able	 to	 move	
policy	 in	 line	 with	 their	 own	 preferences	 if	 their	 goals	 are	 widely	 shared	 by	
society	 as	 a	whole.	 Even	 the	most	 independent	 (or	 least	 accountable)	 central	
banks	 respond	 to	 public	 pressures	 (Kane	 1980).	 A	 key	 determinant	 of	 central	
bank	authority	in	a	given	policy	domain	is,	therefore,	the	nature	of	the	policies	
they	 are	 planning	 to	 implement,	 which	 actors	 are	 affected	 by	 them,	 and	
whether	 or	 not	 adversely	 affected	 groups	 have	 the	 knowledge	 and	
organisational	 capacity	 to	 mobilise	 themselves	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 central	
bank.	 Additionally,	 central	 banks’	 authority	will	 depend	 on	 other	 elements	 of	
central	 bank	 power	 (see	 Section	 2.4).	 For	 example,	 a	 central	 bank’s	 ability	 to	
move	 policy	 in	 line	with	 its	 own	 preferences	 depends	 crucially	 on	 ‘structural’	
features	 of	 its	 relationships	 with	 other	 parties	 (see	 Chapter	 5).	 Likewise,	 a	
central	 bank’s	 persuasiveness	 in	 policy	 debates	 will	 be	 reinforced	 if	 it	 has	 a	
reputation	 for	 successfully	 attaining	 its	 objectives	 of	 monetary	 and	 financial	
stability	(see	Chapter	6).		
	 149	
As	 this	 chapter	 demonstrates,	 from	 a	 formal	 or	 de	 jure	 perspective,	 the	
authority	 of	 each	 of	 the	 three	 central	 banks	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis	 has	
increased.	Most	 obviously,	 this	 is	 because	 in	 each	 case,	 the	 central	 bank	 has	
been	delegated	new	 formal	 rights	and	 responsibilities	 in	 the	 financial	 stability	
domain.	Although	there	are	some	differences	between	them,	each	central	bank	
now	operates	 in	 an	expanded	policy	 space	 that	 encompasses	microprudential	
policy,	 macroprudential	 policy	 and	 crisis	 management,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	
existing	 monetary	 policy	 domain.	 Moreover,	 in	 no	 case	 have	 politicians	
significantly	 diminished	 the	 autonomy	 of	 their	 central	 banks,	 either	 by	
narrowing	ex	ante	discretion	within	their	mandates	or	by	imposing	significantly	
tighter	ex	post	 controls	 on	 their	 operations.	While	 there	 are	 clear	 differences	
between	each	central	bank	in	terms	of	their	formal	autonomy,	these	differences	
have	not	been	radically	altered	in	post-crisis	reforms.	
The	three	central	banks	have	also	demonstrated	increased	authority	from	an	
informal,	 or	 de	 facto,	 perspective.	 Each	 has	 shown	 increased	 willingness	 to	
implement	policies	that	contradict	the	stated	preferences	of	key	interlocutors	in	
financial	markets	 and	 the	 executive	 branches	 of	 national	 governments.	 Here,	
however,	 some	 significant	 differences	 between	 the	 three	 cases	 may	 be	
observed.	 Both	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 and	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 have	
demonstrated	their	willingness	to	take	a	tough	stance	in	the	face	of	significant	
opposition	 from	 industry	 representatives	 and	 their	 political	 supporters	 in	 the	
executive	 and	 legislative	 branches	 of	 governments.	 They	 have	 reversed	 the	
customary	 image	of	British	and	US	authorities	as	bastions	of	deregulation	and	
‘light-touch’	 supervision,	 taking	 a	 consistently	 prudent	 stance	 in	 international	
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negotiations	 over	 financial	 policies	 and	 in	 their	 interpretation	 and	
implementation	 of	 internationally-agreed	 standards	 (see,	 for	 instance,	 Bair	
2012).	 The	 ECB	 is	 just	 beginning	 to	 develop	 its	 regulatory	 and	 supervisory	
capacities	 within	 the	 Single	 Supervisory	 Mechanism	 (SSM),	 which	 began	
operating	 in	 November	 2014.	 It	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 whether	 it	 will	 adopt	 a	
similarly	 prudent	 approach,	 or	 if	 it	will	 follow	 the	 somewhat	 less	 prescriptive	
policies	 favoured	 by	 some	 of	 its	 key	 members	 in	 recent	 years,	 including	 the	
French	 and	German	authorities	 (see	Howarth	 and	Quaglia	 2013).	However,	 in	
contrast	 to	 the	 other	 two	 central	 banks,	 the	 ECB	 has	 demonstrated	
considerable	 authority	 in	 the	 macroeconomic	 domain.	 It	 has	 implemented	
monetary	 policies	 that	 have	 at	 times	 been	 opposed	 by	 its	 most	 powerful	
political	 ‘principal’,	 the	 German	 government.	 It	 has	 also	 been	 a	 key	 driver	 of	
fiscal	austerity	and	structural	 reforms	–	going	beyond	 its	 immediate	monetary	
policy	remit	–	across	the	EU,	notwithstanding	significant	popular	opposition	 in	
crisis-struck	Southern	European	countries.		
The	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 organised	 as	 follows.	 The	 next	 section	
examines	 how	 the	 formal	 mandates	 of	 the	 three	 central	 banks	 have	 been	
reformed	 in	 recent	 years,	 focusing	 in	 particular	 on	 the	 key	 areas	 of	 financial	
stability	 policy	 discussed	 in	 the	 introduction,	 namely	 microprudential	 policy,	
macroprudential	policy	and	crisis	management.	The	third	section	continues	the	
analysis	of	the	formal	aspects	of	central	banks’	authority,	focusing	on	the	legal	
provisions	 that	 establish	 each	 central	 bank’s	 independence	 from,	 and	 control	
by,	executive	and	legislative	politicians.	The	fourth	section	turns	to	the	informal,	
or	de	 facto,	 aspects	 of	 central	 banks’	 authority,	 examining	 their	 relationships	
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with	legislative	and	executive	politicians,	and	financial	market	participants.	The	
concluding	section	summarises	the	foregoing	analysis.		
4.2 DELEGATED	AUTHORITY	 	
Most	 countries’	 central	 banks	 are	 nominally	 ‘independent’	 (see	 Marcussen	
2005).	However,	as	Alan	Sproul,	the	third	president	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	
of	 New	 York,	 once	 put	 it,	 central	 bank	 independence	 does	 not	 mean	
‘independence	from	the	government	but	independence	within	the	government’	
(Sproul	 1952,	 quoted	 in	 Meltzer	 2003:	 713,	 n.238).	 While	 central	 banks	
sometimes	have	idiosyncratic	 legal	structures,	to	all	 intents	and	purposes	they	
are	statutory	bodies.	In	the	jurisdictions	considered	in	this	thesis,	central	banks	
exercise	 authority	 delegated	 to	 them	 by	 elected	 politicians	 and	 they	 are	
accountable	to	national	(or,	in	the	case	of	the	EU,	regional)	legislatures.	A	first	
step	 in	 setting	 out	 how	 these	 central	 banks’	 authority	 has	 changed	 since	 the	
financial	 crisis	 is,	 therefore,	 to	 specify	 the	 range	 of	 objectives	 and	 formal	
powers	that	have	been	delegated	to	them.		
4.2.1 MICROPRUDENTIAL	POLICY	
As	 the	 previous	 chapter	 identified,	 prior	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 the	 Federal	
Reserve,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 and	 the	 ECB	 differed	 in	 respect	 of	 their	 formal	
powers	 to	 conduct	 microprudential	 prudential	 regulation	 and	 supervision.	
Specifically,	while	 neither	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 nor	 the	 ECB	 played	much	 of	 a	
role	 in	 this	 area,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 was	 responsible	 for	 regulating	 and	
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supervising	 several	 categories	 of	 bank,	 including	 bank	 holding	 companies	 and	
state	banks	that	are	members	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System.	
After	the	financial	crisis,	the	three	central	banks	have	converged	in	respect	of	
their	 microprudential	 supervisory	 authority,	 at	 least	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 formal	
responsibilities.	In	the	United	States,	the	2010	Dodd	Frank	Act	(DFA)	established	
the	 Federal	 Reserve	 as	 the	 primary	 regulator	 of	 all	 systemically	 important	
financial	 institutions	(SIFIs).	Section	165	of	the	DFA	grants	the	Federal	Reserve	
new	authority	in	relation	to	bank	holding	companies	with	assets	over	50	billion	
dollars,	 the	 US	 operations	 of	 some	 foreign	 banking	 organisations,	 and	
systemically	 important	 ‘non-bank’	 financial	 institutions,	 such	 as	 insurance	
companies	 and	 investment	 firms.	 The	 DFA	 requires	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 to	
establish	 prudential	 standards	 for	 these	 institutions	 that	 are	 more	 stringent	
than	 the	 standards	 applying	 to	 less	 systemically	 important	 firms,	 including	
requirements	for	risk-based	capital,	 leverage,	 liquidity,	risk-management,	 large	
exposures,	 resolution	planning	and	reporting	of	credit	exposures	 (DFA	Section	
165(b)).	Under	the	DFA,	the	Fed	is	required	to	establish	a	programme	of	stress	
tests,	in	coordination	with	other	federal	agencies,	to	ensure	these	firms	will	be	
resilient	in	the	face	of	adverse	financial	or	macroeconomic	developments.1	The	
scope	 of	 Federal	 Reserve	 supervision	 now	encompasses	 all	 of	 the	major	Wall	
Street	 investment	banks	that	were	at	the	centre	of	the	financial	crisis	 in	2008,	
with	 the	 obvious	 exception	 of	 Lehman	 Brothers. 2 	Combined	 with	 the	
aforementioned	provisions	in	the	DFA,	it	now	has	broad	authority	to	determine	
rules	for,	and	conduct	supervision	of,	systemically	banks	in	the	United	States.		
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There	are,	however,	 limits	 to	 the	 Federal	Reserve’s	 formal	 authority	 in	 the	
microprudential	 policy	 domain.	 Under	 the	 DFA,	 the	 responsibility	 for	
designating	 non-bank	 financial	 institutions	 as	 ‘systemically	 important’	 –	 and	
therefore	 meriting	 enhanced	 supervision	 by	 the	 Fed	 –	 was	 delegated	 to	 the	
newly	 created	 Financial	 Stability	 Oversight	 Council	 (FSOC)	 (see	 below).	 As	 of	
December	2014,	the	FSOC	had	designated	only	three	non-banks	as	systemically	
important.	 As	 a	 practical	matter,	 this	 is	 a	 clear	 limit	 on	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	
supervisory	 reach.	 It	 should	 also	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 is	 by	 no	
means	 the	 only	 regulatory	 agency	 involved	 in	 supervising	 systemically	
important	 banks.	 As	 before	 the	 crisis,	 the	 Fed	 is	 the	 ‘umbrella	 supervisor’	 of	
financial	groups	at	a	consolidated	level.	It	must	cooperate	closely	with	an	array	
of	primary	supervisors	of	the	various	financial	entities	within	each	group,	which	
creates	 challenges	 of	 misaligned	 incentives	 and	 intra-agency	 turf-wars	
(discussed	further	in	Chapter	6).		
In	the	United	Kingdom,	the	Bank	of	England	has	gone	from	having	practically	
no	 role	 in	 this	 area	 to	 a	 comprehensive	 remit	 for	 prudential	 regulation	 and	
supervision	of	banks,	 insurance	companies	and	 large	 securities	 firms.	 In	2010,	
the	 incoming	 Conservative-Liberal	 Democrat	 coalition	 government	 announced	
its	 intention	to	disband	the	Financial	Services	Authority	(FSA),	which	had	been	
created	 by	 the	 previous	 administration	 some	 13	 years	 earlier	 as	 a	 ‘one-stop-
shop’	regulator	of	all	 financial	services	companies	(see	Chapter	3).	 In	 its	place,	
the	 new	 government	 introduced	 a	 new	 ‘twin	 peaks’	 regulatory	 system	
consisting	 of	 two	 new	 regulatory	 authorities:	 the	 Prudential	 Regulation	
Authority	 (PRA)	and	 the	Financial	Conduct	Authority	 (FCA).	 The	PRA’s	primary	
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objective	 is	 to	promote	the	 ‘safety	and	soundness’	of	 the	financial	 institutions	
that	 it	 authorises.	 The	 FCA	 has	 responsibility	 for	 upholding	 market	 integrity	
(including	 promoting	 transparency	 and	 preventing	 financial	 crime),	 promoting	
competition	and	ensuring	consumer	protection.3	
The	PRA	was	established	as	a	 ‘subsidiary’	of	the	Bank	of	England,	reflecting	
concerns	 over	 conflicts	 of	 interest	 between	 monetary	 policy	 and	 prudential	
supervision	 (see	 HM	 Treasury	 2010).	 Supervisory	 decisions	 in	 respect	 of	
individual	 firms	 are	 reserved	 to	 the	 PRA	board	 (PRA	2014).	 Likewise,	 the	 PRA	
board	 decides	 strategic	 decisions	 on	 the	 direction	 of	 regulatory	 policy.	 In	
practice,	however,	the	PRA	is	closely	 integrated	with	the	rest	of	the	Bank.	The	
Governor	chairs	the	PRA	board	and	the	PRA	Chief	Executive	Officer	(CEO)	is	the	
Bank’s	Deputy	Governor	for	prudential	regulation.	With	a	view	to	maintaining	a	
degree	of	 separation	between	prudential	policy	and	monetary	policy,	 the	PRA	
CEO	 does	 not	 sit	 on	 the	 Bank’s	 Monetary	 Policy	 Committee.	 Still,	 in	 most	
respects,	 the	 PRA	 is	 closely	 integrated	 with	 the	 wider	 Bank	 of	 England.	 For	
instance,	 the	PRA’s	policymaking	 functions	have	been	subsumed	within	a	new	
‘Prudential	Policy	Directorate’,	which	reports	both	to	the	PRA	board	and	to	the	
new	Financial	Policy	Committee	(see	below).	
In	effect,	then,	the	Bank	of	England	has	formal	authority	for	microprudential	
regulation	 and	 supervision	 of	 all	 large	 financial	 institutions,	 including	 banks,	
building	 societies,	 credit	 unions,	 insurance	 companies	 and	 large	 investment	
firms.	Indeed,	the	Bank	of	England’s	supervisory	remit	now	exceeds	its	authority	
prior	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 FSA	 in	 1997,	 since	 previously	 its	 supervisory	
responsibilities	 extended	 mainly	 to	 banks.	 The	 Bank	 is	 responsible	 for	
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authorising	 firms	 to	 carry	 out	 various	 categories	 of	 financial	 activity	 and	 for	
supervising	their	compliance	with	rules	on	an	on-going	basis.	While	much	of	the	
financial	 regulation	 applying	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 is	 determined	 at	 the	 EU-
level,	the	Bank	has	responsibility	for	implementing	that	policy	through	domestic	
rules	and	guidance,	and	for	participating	in	intergovernmental	negotiations	over	
new	regulations.	At	the	EU	level,	this	includes	participating	in	working	groups	of	
bodies	such	as	the	European	Banking	Authority,	which	was	established	in	2011	
with	 a	 remit	 to	 create	 a	 ‘Single	 Rulebook’	 for	 all	 banks	 in	 the	 EU.	 At	 the	
international	 level	 Bank	 of	 England	 also	 participates	 in	 international	
negotiations	 in	 forums	 such	 as	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 on	 Banking	 Supervision	
(BCBS)	and	the	Financial	Stability	Board	(FSB).		
The	ECB	too	has	gained	new	formal	authority	 in	 the	microprudential	policy	
domain.	 On	 the	 4th	 November	 2014,	 the	 ECB	 became	 responsible	 for	 the	
microprudential	 supervision	 of	 all	 banks	 in	 the	 euro	 area.	 This	 development	
arose	from	the	decision	to	establish	the	ECB	as	the	central	organisation	within	
the	‘Single	Supervisory	Mechanism’	(SSM).	The	SSM	is	one	of	two	pillars	of	the	
so-called	 ‘Banking	 Union’,	 along	 with	 the	 ‘Single	 Resolution	 Mechanism’	 for	
handling	bank	failures.	For	approximately	130	‘significant’	banks,	the	ECB	leads	
joint	 supervisory	 teams	 composed	 of	 officials	 from	 the	 ECB	 and	 national	
supervisors.	 For	 these	 large	 banks,	 the	 ECB	 is	 responsible	 for	 all	 key	
microprudential	 supervisory	 tasks,	 including	 granting	 authorisations,	 ensuring	
on-going	 compliance	 and	 carrying	 out	 supervisory	 reviews	 of	 banks’	 own	
internal	 capital	adequacy	assessments.	Additionally,	 the	ECB	 is	 responsible	 for	
issuing	 regulations,	guidelines	and	general	 instructions	 to	national	 supervisory	
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authorities	in	respect	of	some	6000	less	significant	banks	that	will	remain	under	
national	supervision	(Council	Regulation	1024/2013,	Articles	4,	6).		
On	 the	 whole,	 the	 ECB’s	 new	 microprudential	 authority	 relates	 to	
supervision,	 rather	 than	 regulation.	However,	 as	with	 the	national	 competent	
authorities	of	individual	member	states,	the	ECB	will	play	a	role	in	implementing	
European	 regulations	 and	 directives,	which	will	 in	 practice	 require	 it	 to	make	
rules	and	issue	guidance.	Like	the	other	central	banks	considered	in	this	thesis,	
the	ECB	also	influences	the	creation	of	new	financial	regulations	in	international	
negotiations.	 At	 the	 EU-level,	 the	 ECB	 has	 ‘observer’	 status	 in	 the	 European	
Banking	Authority	(EBA).	It	is	a	full	member	of	both	the	BCBS	and	the	FSB.		
While	 the	population	of	banks	 falling	within	ECB’s	supervisory	remit	 is	very	
large,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	ECB	has	no	direct	authority	over	insurance	or	
securities	 firms.	 In	 this	 respect,	 its	 mandate	 is	 not	 as	 encompassing	 that	 of	
either	the	Bank	of	England	or	the	Federal	Reserve.	Furthermore,	unlike	either	of	
the	 other	 two	 central	 banks	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis,	 decision-making	within	
the	 ECB	 is	 essentially	 an	 intergovernmental	 process	 involving	 representatives	
from	the	18	euro	area	member	states	that	currently	participate	in	the	Banking	
Union	 (several	 non-euro	 area	 states	 have	 indicated	 their	 intention	 to	 join).	
Supervisory	decisions	are	the	responsibility	of	a	new	Supervisory	Board	within	
the	 ECB,	 composed	of	 a	 Chair	 and	 a	Vice	Chair,	 four	 ECB	 representatives	 and	
one	representative	from	each	country’s	national	competent	authority.	Ultimate	
decision-making	authority	resides	with	the	ECB’s	highest	decision-making	body,	
the	 Governing	 Council,	 which	 is	 itself	 composed	 of	 national	 central	 bank	
governors	of	the	euro	area	and	six	ECB	executive	officials.4		
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4.2.2 MACROPRUDENTIAL	POLICY	
In	contrast	to	the	microprudential	policy	domain,	the	three	central	banks	differ	
significantly	 in	 respect	 of	 their	 macroprudential	 mandates.	 The	 ‘big	 ticket’	
macroprudential	 reform	 in	 the	 United	 States	 did	 not	 primarily	 involve	 the	
central	bank.	Rather,	the	DFA	established	the	FSOC	under	the	chairmanship	of	
the	Secretary	of	 the	Treasury.	 The	FSOC	 is	 a	deliberative	and	decision-making	
body	 composed	 of	 ten	 voting	 members	 and	 five	 non-voting	 members.	 The	
Chairperson	of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 is	 one	of	 the	 voting	members;	 the	others	
are	heads	of	other	financial	regulatory	agencies	in	the	United	States.5	The	DFA	
also	 established	 within	 the	 Treasury	 a	 quasi-independent	 Office	 for	 Financial	
Research	 (OFR)	 to	 provide	 analytical	 and	 statistical	 support	 to	 the	 FSOC’s	
deliberations.		
Aside	from	its	Chairman’s	participation	as	a	voting	member	of	the	FSOC,	the	
Federal	 Reserve’s	 role	 in	 macroprudential	 policy	 derives	 mainly	 from	 its	
capacities	as	the	SIFI	regulator.	Prudential	rules,	such	as	those	for	bank	capital	
and	liquidity	adequacy,	can	be	put	to	either	macroprudential	or	microprudential	
ends.	 Given	 its	 authority	 to	 determine	 and	 enforce	 these	 rules,	 the	 Federal	
Reserve	 has	 considerable	 scope	 to	 pursue	 a	 macroprudential	 agenda.	 In	
particular,	the	enhanced	(micro-)	prudential	authority	delegated	to	the	Fed	has	
two	arguably	macroprudential	characteristics.	First,	stress	tests	necessarily	take	
into	 account	 forward-looking	 assessments	 of	 systemic	 risks	 and	 possible	
adverse	developments	in	the	financial	system.	The	Fed	can	emphasise	particular	
sectors	 or	 financial	 activities	 in	 its	 adverse	 stress	 test	 scenarios,	 thereby	
requiring	banks	to	have	more	capital	as	a	buffer	against	potential	losses	in	those	
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areas.	 Second,	 the	 DFA	 requires	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 to	 tailor	 its	 prudential	
standards,	such	that	the	most	systemically	significant	firms	are	held	to	the	most	
stringent	rules.		
Section	121	of	the	DFA	further	enhances	the	Federal	Reserve’s	authority	by	
enabling	 it	 to	 take	 a	 range	 of	 actions	 to	mitigate	 risks	 posed	 by	 systemically	
important	 firms,	 if	 it	 considers	 those	 firms	 to	 pose	 a	 ‘grave	 threat’	 to	 US	
financial	stability.	These	actions	range	from	prohibiting	firms	from	engaging	 in	
mergers	 and	 acquisitions,	 to	 requiring	 divestitures	 of	 assets	 and	 off-balance	
sheet	 items	 (that	 is,	 forcing	 banks	 to	 break	 up).	 Though	 not	 normally	
categorised	 as	 such,	 these	 instruments	 may	 be	 considered	 ‘macroprudential’	
since	 they	 mitigate	 systemic	 risks	 arising	 from	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 financial	
system.	However,	to	use	these	instruments,	the	Federal	Reserve	must	have	the	
support	of	at	least	two-thirds	of	the	voting	members	of	the	FSOC.	As	discussed	
below,	achieving	agreement	within	the	FSOC	is	by	no	means	straightforward.			
In	contrast	to	the	arrangements	in	the	United	States,	the	Bank	of	England	has	
broad	 authority	 to	 conduct	 macroprudential	 policy.	 In	 2011,	 the	 Bank	 of	
England	created	an	 interim	Financial	Policy	Committee	 (FPC)	 in	anticipation	of	
changes	 that	would	be	 introduced	 in	 the	Financial	 Services	Act	2012.	 The	FPC	
helps	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 achieve	 its	 statutory	 financial	 stability	 objective,	
which	was	 introduced	under	 the	outgoing	 Labour	administration	 in	2009.	 The	
FPC	 is	required	to	 identify,	monitor	and	mitigate	systemic	risks	to	UK	financial	
stability,	in	particular	risks	arising	from	the	structure	of	the	UK	financial	system,	
the	 distribution	 of	 risk	 among	 market	 participants,	 and	 from	 levels	 of	 debt,	
leverage	 and	 credit	 growth	 (Financial	 Services	 Act	 2012:	 Chapter	 6).	 The	
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Governor	 chairs	 the	 FPC,	 which	 is	 also	 composed	 of	 the	 Bank’s	 Deputy	
Governors,	 the	 Chief	 Executive	 of	 the	 FCA,	 four	 external	 members,	 and	 two	
senior	executives	from	within	the	Bank.	
When	 it	 comes	 to	 taking	action	 to	mitigate	or	eliminate	 systemic	 risks,	 the	
FPC	 has	 two	 statutory	 ‘powers’	 (Bank	 of	 England	 2013a).	 First,	 it	 can	 issue	
recommendations.	These	recommendations	can	be	addressed	to	anyone,	but	if	
they	 are	 addressed	 to	 either	 the	 PRA	 or	 the	 FCA,	 they	 may	 be	 made	 on	 a	
‘comply-or-explain’	 basis.	 ‘Comply	 or	 explain’	 mechanisms	 are	 designed	 to	
increase	the	likelihood	that	recommendations	will	induce	deference	on	the	part	
of	 their	 recipients.	 In	 practice,	 this	 provision	 is	 relevant	 only	 in	 the	 case	 of	
prospective	recommendations	to	the	FCA,	since	it	is	highly	improbable	that	the	
PRA	–	as	an	integrated	part	of	the	Bank	of	England	–	would	ever	refuse	or	fail	to	
comply	with	a	recommendation	from	the	FPC.		
The	second	statutory	‘power’	of	the	FPC	is	the	power	to	issue	‘directions’	to	
the	 PRA	 and	 the	 FCA	 in	 respect	 of	 certain	 macroprudential	 tools.	 Under	 a	
direction,	compliance	is	mandatory.	The	Treasury	is	responsible	for	designating	
which	macroprudential	tools	fall	within	the	FPC’s	powers	of	direction.	As	of	May	
2015,	it	had	given	the	FPC	control	over	three	macroprudential	tools:	it	can	raise	
or	 lower	 bank	 capital	 requirements	 against	 lending	 to	 specific	 sectors	 of	 the	
economy,	it	can	impose	a	countercyclical	capital	buffer	and	it	can	impose	‘loan-
to-value’	and	‘loan-to-income’	limits	on	the	size	of	mortgage	loans	available	to	
prospective	homeowners.		 	
In	comparative	terms,	ECB’s	 formal	authority	 in	respect	of	macroprudential	
policy	lies	between	that	of	the	Bank	of	England	and	that	of	the	Federal	Reserve.	
	 160	
Formal	 authority	 for	 macroprudential	 policy	 in	 the	 EU	 is	 assigned	 to	 the	
European	Systemic	Risk	Board	(ESRB),	which	was	established	in	2011	as	part	of	
a	new	European	System	of	Financial	Supervision.6	The	ECB	dominates	the	ESRB.	
The	ECB	President	serves	as	the	ESRB	Chair	and	the	ECB	staffs,	funds	and	hosts	
the	ESRB	Secretariat.	More	than	half	of	the	additional	staff	recruited	to	help	run	
the	ESRB	work	within	the	ECB	 itself,	notably	 in	helping	to	collate,	process	and	
channel	 supervisory	 information	 from	 national	 authorities	 to	 the	 new	
macroprudential	body	(see	Israël	2013).		
The	 ESRB	 has	 been	 criticised	 as	 somewhat	 ineffectual	 in	 its	 first	 years	 of	
operation	(McPhilemy	and	Roche	2013).	It	is	required	to	‘provide	warnings	and,	
where	 appropriate,	 issue	 recommendations	 for	 remedial	 action,	 including,	
where	appropriate,	for	legislative	initiatives’	(Regulation	1092/2010:	Article	16).	
Warnings	and	recommendations	may	be	addressed	to	the	member	states,	the	
three	microprudential	 ‘European	Supervisory	Authorities’	 (which	were	created	
alongside	the	ESRB	in	2011)	or,	 in	the	case	of	recommendations	for	 legislative	
action,	the	European	Commission.	Recommendations	carry	a	comply-or-explain	
requirement.	However,	 it	 is	unclear	whether	 in	practice	 the	comply-or-explain	
mechanism	 has	 induced	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	 deference	 on	 the	 part	 of	 its	
recipients	 than	 had	 the	 recommendations	 not	 carried	 such	 a	 requirement.	
Some	members	of	the	General	Board	of	the	ESRB	have	expressed	the	view	that	
the	 formal	 nature	 of	 such	 mechanisms	 can	 have	 the	 paradoxical	 effect	 of	
diminishing	compliance	because	the	organisations	they	address	feel	compelled	
to	respond	with	legalistic	explanations	of	their	non-compliance	(see	McPhilemy	
and	Roche	2013).		
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The	ECB’s	authority	in	macroprudential	policy	has	been	further	enhanced	as	
a	consequence	of	the	SSM.	Under	the	Regulation	establishing	the	SSM,	the	ECB	
is	 authorised	 to	 implement	 a	 range	 of	 macroprudential	 tools	 affecting	 banks	
domiciled	in	countries	participating	in	the	SSM	(Regulation	1024/2013	Article	5).	
The	 ECB	 may	 raise	 capital	 requirements	 in	 those	 countries,	 including	 the	
countercyclical	capital	buffer	and	buffers	designed	to	mitigate	systemic	risks	in	
specific	sectors	or	asset	classes.	However,	the	ECB	shares	this	authority	with	the	
national	 competent	 authorities	 of	 member	 states.	 It	 may	 raise	 requirements	
above	 the	 level	 set	 by	 national	 authorities,	 but	 it	 cannot	 require	 a	 national	
authority	 to	 remove	 or	 lower	 any	 macroprudential	 instruments	 it	 has	
implemented	of	its	own	volition.		
More	generally,	 financial	stability	 remains	a	national	competence	 in	 the	EU	
even	for	member	states	participating	 in	the	Banking	Union	and	the	euro	area.	
Reflecting	this,	 the	ESRB	has	 issued	recommendations	to	all	member	states	to	
establish	 their	own	national	macroprudential	authorities	at	 the	domestic	 level	
(ESRB	 Recommendations	 2011/3,	 2013/1).	 In	 practice,	 these	 new	 national	
bodies	have	primary	responsibility	for	taking	action	to	mitigate	systemic	risks	to	
financial	stability	that	may	arise	within	individual	countries.			
4.2.3 CRISIS	MANAGEMENT	
As	with	macroprudential	policy,	the	formal	authority	of	the	three	central	banks	
differs	 significantly	 in	 respect	 of	 crisis	management.	 In	 the	United	 States,	 the	
DFA	diminished	the	Federal	Reserve’s	authority	in	this	policy	domain.	The	DFA	
amends	 Section	 13(3)	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Act,	 under	 which	 the	 Federal	
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Reserve	 had	 previously	 been	 able	 to	 extend	 liquidity	 assistance	 to	 financial	
entities	 other	 than	 deposit	 taking	 banks.	 This	 previously	 obscure	 and	 rarely	
used	clause	 in	 the	Federal	Reserve	Act	was	 invoked	on	many	occasions	during	
the	 financial	 crisis	 as	 the	 legal	 justification	 for	 emergency	 lending	 to	 troubled	
financial	 institutions,	 including	the	highly	controversial	 loans	made	to	facilitate	
the	 rescues	 of	 Bear	 Stearns	 and	 American	 Insurance	 Group	 (AIG).	 Under	 the	
DFA,	the	Federal	Reserve	can	no	longer	lend	to	non-bank	institutions	on	a	firm-
specific	basis.	Rather,	emergency	lending	to	such	firms	must	have	‘broad-based	
eligibility’	and	must	be	designed	to	provide	liquidity	to	the	financial	system	as	a	
whole.	Furthermore,	any	future	lending	under	this	clause	must	be	pre-approved	
by	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	(DFA	Section	1104).				
The	DFA	also	introduced	a	new	Orderly	Liquidation	Authority	(OLA),	which	is	
designed	 to	 manage	 the	 resolution	 of	 systemically	 important	 financial	
institutions	(DFA	Title	II).	The	authority	to	conduct	resolutions	was	delegated	to	
the	Federal	Deposit	Insurance	Corporation	rather	than	the	Federal	Reserve.	The	
role	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 in	 this	 process	 is	 limited	 to	 making	 the	 initial	
determination	that	a	firm	has	reached	the	point	of	needing	to	be	resolved.	The	
Federal	Reserve	shares	this	determination	authority	with	the	FDIC	and	the	SEC	
(for	 securities	 firms)	 and	 the	 Federal	 Insurance	 Office	 (for	 insurance	
companies).	
In	contrast	to	these	arrangements,	the	Bank	of	England’s	formal	authority	in	
crisis	management	has	been	enhanced.	Following	the	disorderly	failure	of	banks	
such	 as	 Northern	 Rock	 and	 Bradford	 and	 Bingley,	 the	 Labour	 government	
introduced	a	number	of	reforms	in	the	area	of	crisis	management	through	the	
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Banking	Act	2009.	This	legislation	instituted	a	new	‘Special	Resolution	Regime’,	
which	 like	the	OLA,	 is	designed	to	ensure	the	critical	 functions	of	failing	banks	
and	 other	 financial	 firms	 can	 be	 transferred	 in	 an	 orderly	 fashion	 to	 a	willing	
buyer	 or	 a	 publicly-owned	 entity,	 and	 that	 any	 losses	 are	 born	 in	 the	 first	
instance	by	the	failed	firms’	shareholders	and	its	unsecured	creditors.		
The	 Banking	 Act	 2009	 established	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 as	 the	 resolution	
authority	for	the	United	Kingdom.	The	Bank	has	the	responsibility	for	resolving	
failing	 banks,	 building	 societies	 and	 investment	 firms	 incorporated	 in	 the	 UK.	
The	only	exception	is	cases	where	the	Treasury	determines	that	the	failing	firm	
needs	to	be	taken	into	public	ownership,	 in	which	case	the	Treasury	takes	the	
lead	(Bank	of	England	2014a).	It	also	falls	to	the	Bank	of	England,	in	cooperation	
with	 firms’	 prudential	 supervisors	 (either	 the	 PRA	 or	 the	 FCA)	 to	 determine	
when	firms	have	reached	the	point	of	needing	to	be	resolved.	This	regime	has	
recently	 been	 strengthened	 by	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 EU	 Bank	 Recovery	 and	
Resolution	Directive,	which	also	gives	the	Bank	of	England	authority	to	resolve	
UK	 branches	 of	 failing	 non-European	 Economic	 Area	 banks,	 building	 societies	
and	investment	firms.		
Like	the	Federal	Reserve,	and	in	contrast	to	the	Bank	of	England,	the	ECB	has	
only	 a	 limited	 role	 to	 play	 in	 new	 arrangements	 for	 resolving	 failing	 financial	
institutions.	Within	the	‘Single	Resolution	Mechanism’	(SRM)	–	the	second	pillar	
of	the	Banking	Union	along	with	the	SSM	–	it	falls	to	the	ECB	to	determine	when	
a	 bank	 has	 reached	 the	 point	 of	 resolution.	 However,	 an	 independent	 Single	
Resolution	 Board	 will	 be	 responsible	 for	 conducting	 the	 resolution	 and	 the	
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European	Commission	and	the	Council	will	have	final	right	to	approve	or	reject	
the	resolution	process.	
One	area	 in	which	 the	 formal	 authority	of	 the	ECB	as	 a	 crisis	manager	has	
been	enhanced	 is	 in	 respect	of	EU	member	states	 facing	balance	of	payments	
crises.	 Following	 a	 request	 from	 euro	 area	 heads	 of	 state	 and	 government	 in	
March	 2010	 (see	 Council	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 2010),	 the	 ECB	 has	 worked	
alongside	 the	 European	 Commission	 and	 the	 International	Monetary	 Fund	 in	
the	so-called	‘Troika’	to	provide	financial	assistance	to	crisis-struck	EU	member	
states	including	Ireland,	Portugal,	Cyprus,	and	Greece.	The	ECB’s	formal	role	in	
the	 Troika	 involved	 assessing	 the	 need	 for	 bilateral	 and	 IMF	 assistance	 and	
monitoring	countries’	compliance	with	the	conditions	attached.	These	functions	
were	formalised	in	an	intergovernmental	treaty	to	establish	a	European	Stability	
Mechanism	 (ESM),	which	 is	 a	 publicly-financed	 fund	 for	managing	 balance	 of	
payment	crises	in	the	EU.	Under	the	treaty,	the	ECB	will	be	involved	in	assessing	
systemic	 risks	 posed	 by	 individual	 member	 states,	 evaluating	 their	 financial	
needs,	and	agreeing	the	terms	of	any	conditionality	that	will	be	attached	to	ESM	
assistance	(Darvas	and	Merler	2013).	
Beyond	these	formal	dimensions	of	its	crisis	management	authority,	the	ECB	
has	 played	 a	 substantial	 role	 as	 lender	 of	 last	 resort	 (LOLR)	 both	 to	 teetering	
financial	institutions	and	crisis-struck	governments.	As	discussed	in	Section	4.4,	
these	discretionary	actions	have	required	the	ECB	to	expand	its	own	authority	
by	 creatively	 reinterpreting	 its	 mandate.	 At	 times,	 the	 ECB	 encountered	
considerable	 resistance.	For	example,	 in	2012	 the	ECB	 launched	a	programme	
dubbed	 ‘Outright	 Monetary	 Transactions’	 (OMT).	 This	 programme,	 which	
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constituted	 a	 promise	 to	 buy	 potentially	 unlimited	 quantities	 of	 European	
countries’	 sovereign	 debt,	 was	 subject	 to	 a	 legal	 challenge	 in	 the	 German	
Constitutional	 Court.	While	 the	 challenge	was	 ultimately	 defeated	 after	 being	
referred	to	the	European	Court	of	Justice,	this	legal	challenge	could	have	led	to	
a	significant	curtailment	of	the	ECB’s	crisis	management	authority.	
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TABLE	3:	DELEGATED	AUTHORITY	COMPARED	
	 United	States	 United	Kingdom	 EU	
Microprudential	
policy	
• Lead	
organisation:	
Federal	Reserve	
• Regulates	and	
supervises	bank	
holding	
companies,	state	
Federal	Reserve	
System	member	
banks	and	FSOC-
designated	SIFIs.	
• Lead	
organisation:	
Bank	of	England	
• Bank/PRA	
regulates	and	
supervises	banks,	
building	societies,	
credit	unions,	
insurance	
companies,	and	
large	investment	
firms.	
• Lead	organisation:	
ECB	
• Supervises	
Banking	Union	
area	banks	>€30	
billion	by	assets;	
largest	3	banks	
per	member	
state.	Regulatory	
competence	
shared	with	EBA.	
Macroprudential	
policy	
• Lead	
organisation:	
FSOC	
• Chair	participates	
in	FSOC.	De	facto	
macroprudential	
authority	arising	
from	
microprudential	
banking	
authority.	
• Lead	
organisation:	
Bank	of	England	
• FPC	has	exclusive	
cross-sectoral	
competence;	can	
'direct'	PRA	and	
FCA.	
• Lead	organisation:	
ESRB	
• Leading	role	in	
ESRB.		
• In	BU	area,	shared	
competence	with	
national	
authorities	over	
certain	
macroprudential	
instruments	for	
the	banking	
sector.	
Crisis	
management	
• Lead	
organisation:	
Federal	Deposit	
Insurance	
Corporation	
• Fed	LOLR	
authority	
restricted.		
• Lead	
organisation:	
Bank	of	England	
• Treasury	
conducts	
resolutions	where	
public	funds	are	
used.		
• Lead	organisation:	
Special	Resolution	
Board	
• ECB’s	LOLR	
authority	under	
challenge	at	ECJ.		
• ECB	performs	
various	functions	
in	ESM.	
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4.3 FORMAL	AUTONOMY	
The	ECB	has	traditionally	been	the	most	autonomous	of	the	three	central	banks.	
As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 its	 independence	 is	 enshrined	 in	 the	 Treaty	 on	
European	 Union,	 giving	 it	 quasi-constitutional	 status	 (Howarth	 and	 Loedel	
2005).	The	ECB	also	has	the	authority	to	determine	for	itself	the	target	rate	for	
inflation.	 In	 the	 terminology	 of	 Debelle	 and	 Fischer	 (1994),	 this	 gives	 it	 both	
‘instrument	independence’	and	a	degree	of	‘goal	independence’.	That	is	to	say,	
the	ECB	is	both	free	to	choose	the	tools	by	which	it	meets	 its	monetary	policy	
objectives	and	it	also	has	a	role	in	setting	those	objectives	in	the	first	place.7	The	
Bank	of	England	has	historically	been	the	least	autonomous	of	the	three	central	
banks.	The	Bank	gained	formal	independence	in	1997,	which	was	late	relative	to	
most	other	advanced	economies.	Even	after	1997,	its	monetary	policy	target	is	
written	 into	 statute	 and	 HM	 Treasury	 has	 retained	 strong	 controls	 over	 the	
appointment	of	key	personnel.	For	example,	members	of	the	MPC	and	FPC	are	
appointed	for	just	three-year	terms,	which	can	be	renewed	only	once.	Neither	
the	Bank	of	England	nor	the	Federal	Reserve	has	a	constitutional	guarantee	of	
independence.	However,	since	the	late	1970s	the	Federal	Reserve	has	enjoyed	a	
relatively	 free	hand	 (see	Chapter	 3).	Members	 of	 the	Board	of	Governors	 are	
appointed	 for	 14-year	 terms,	 providing	 insulation	 from	 immediate	 political	
pressure.	 Moreover,	 the	 Fed	 has	 a	 multi-objective	 mandate	 to	 pursue	 price	
stability,	maximum	employment	and	moderate	 long-term	 interest	 rates.8		 This	
provides	 it	 with	 a	 degree	 of	 goal	 independence,	 since	 it	 must	 determine	 for	
itself	which	objectives	to	prioritise	at	any	given	moment.		
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Post-crisis	 reforms	 have	 done	 little	 to	 alter	 these	 formal	 aspects	 of	 the	
central	banks’	autonomy	in	the	monetary	policy	domain.	Central	banks	continue	
to	enjoy	a	high	level	of	instrument	independence	in	relation	to	monetary	policy.	
Arguably,	they	have	also	demonstrated	greater	goal	 independence	than	 in	the	
past,	creatively	reinterpreting	their	statutory	price	stability	objectives	to	pursue	
policies,	 such	 as	 quantitative	 easing,	 that	 appear	 more	 obviously	 targeted	 at	
boosting	 economic	 growth	 than	 maintaining	 stable	 prices.	 Yet	 post-crisis	
reforms	have	led	to	a	number	of	new	formal	constraints	being	placed	on	central	
banks.	 Such	 constraints	 are	 present	 in	 the	 ex	 ante	 ‘delegation	 contracts’	
between	politicians	and	central	banks	(see	Chapter	2),	which	define	how	much	
discretion	 central	 banks	 have	 in	 exercising	 their	 mandates.	 Likewise,	 certain	
new	ex	post	mechanisms	have	also	made	 it	somewhat	easier	 for	politicians	to	
censure	or	otherwise	seek	 to	alter	 the	behaviour	of	central	banks	where	 they	
are	dissatisfied.	This	 section	considers	 these	 two	dimensions	of	 central	banks’	
formal	authority	(findings	are	summarised	in	Table	4).		
4.3.1 EX	ANTE	CONSTRAINTS	
Central	 banks	 are	 inherently	more	 constrained	 in	 the	 financial	 stability	 policy	
domain	 than	 they	 are	 in	 regards	 to	monetary	 policy.	While	 there	 have	 been	
periods	 in	 which	 monetary	 policy	 has	 been	 guided	 by	 ostensibly	 fixed	 rules,	
such	as	the	era	of	the	international	gold	standard9	(see	Chapter	3),	as	discussed,	
central	banks	have	generally	enjoyed	a	high	 level	of	discretion	 in	determining	
how	to	meet	their	particular	monetary	policy	objectives.	By	contrast,	the	detail	
of	 central	 banks’	 activities	 in	 relation	 to	 microprudential	 policy	 and	
	 169	
macroprudential	 policy	 is	 to	 a	 significant	 extent	 pre-specified	 in	 international	
agreements	 and	national	 or	 supranational	 legislation.	 To	be	 sure,	 each	of	 the	
central	banks	considered	in	this	thesis	plays	a	leading	role	in	transgovernmental	
networks	such	as	 the	BCBS	and	the	FSB.	Yet	no	single	member	 institution	can	
dictate	their	outputs	(cf.	Drezner	2007).	More	importantly,	central	banks	do	not	
have	a	free	hand	when	it	comes	to	implementing	the	outputs	of	the	BCBS	or	the	
FSB	 in	 their	 respective	 jurisdictions.	 This	 is	 because	 informal	 agreements	 of	
international	standard	setting	bodies	are	often	written	into	national	(or,	in	the	
EU,	 supranational)	 legislation,	 which	 closely	 defines	 how	 much	 discretion	 a	
central	bank	has	in	implementing	the	rules.		
There	 are,	 however,	 certain	 differences	 between	 the	 three	 cases.	 The	
Federal	Reserve	has	 fewer	 formal	ex	ante	 constraints	 than	either	 the	Bank	of	
England	or	the	ECB.	 In	the	United	States,	Congress	grants	the	Federal	Reserve	
the	authority	to	make	rules,	meaning	that	it	falls	mainly	to	the	central	bank	to	
implement	 the	 internationally	 agreed	 standards	of	 the	BCBS	 and	 the	 FSB.	 Yet	
the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 policymaking	 discretion	 is	 limited	 by	 the	 densely	
populated	regulatory	 landscape	within	which	 it	operates.	The	DFA	did	 little	 to	
alter	 this	 situation.	 While	 the	 reforms	 abolished	 one	 banking	 regulator,	 the	
Office	for	Thrift	Supervision,	it	remains	the	case	that	the	Federal	Reserve	must	
collaborate	with	an	array	of	federal	regulatory	agencies	when	writing	new	rules.	
For	the	banking	sector,	the	most	important	of	these	organisations	are	the	Office	
of	the	Comptroller	of	the	Currency	and	the	Federal	Deposit	Insurance	Company	
(see	 Chapter	 6	 for	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 challenges	 of	 policy	 coordination).	 The	
fragmented	 nature	 of	 the	 US	 regulatory	 architecture	 acts	 as	 a	 check	 on	 the	
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Federal	 Reserve’s	 authority	 because	 it	 cannot	 act	 unilaterally	 in	 making	
prudential	regulations.	
The	discretion	of	both	the	ECB	and	the	Bank	of	England	is	limited	by	the	fact	
that	both	must	implement	a	voluminous	body	of	European	financial	legislation.	
This	 legislation	 comprises	 high-level	 (‘framework’)	 legislation	 in	 the	 form	 of	
directives	and	regulations	agreed	by	the	European	Parliament	and	the	European	
Council.	 It	 also	 includes	 more	 detailed	 binding	 technical	 standards	 and	 non-
binding	 guidance	 produced	 by	 the	 three	microprudential	 ESAs	 (the	 European	
Banking	Authority	(EBA),	the	European	Securities	and	Markets	Authority	(ESMA)	
and	 the	 European	 Insurance	 and	 Occupational	 Pensions	 Authority	 (EIOPA)).	
Furthermore,	 one	 of	 the	 earlier	 regulatory	 initiatives	 to	 emerge	 from	 the	
financial	crisis	in	the	EU	was	the	decision	to	press	ahead	with	the	creation	of	a	
‘single	 rulebook’	 for	 the	banking	 sector.	 In	practice,	 this	meant	 that	most	EU-
level	 prudential	 rules	 were	 rewritten	 into	 a	 new	 ‘Capital	 Requirements	
Regulation’	 (CRR)	 that	 applies	 directly	 to	 firms	 throughout	 the	 EU	 without	
needing	 to	 be	written	 into	 national	 legislation	 or	 rules.	 Naturally,	 this	 greatly	
limits	 the	 ability	 of	 national	 central	 banks	 (and	 the	 ECB	 as	 the	 competent	
authority	for	large	euro	area	banks)	to	make	prudential	regulations	in	line	with	
their	own	preferences.	
This	is	not	to	say	that	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	ECB	lack	any	rulemaking	
discretion.	 The	 CRR	 is,	 in	 fact,	 replete	 with	 options	 and	 areas	 of	 ambiguity,	
giving	 national	 authorities	 considerable	 scope	 to	 define	 how	 the	 rules	 should	
interpreted	in	their	respective	jurisdictions	(McPhilemy	2014).	For	example,	the	
Bank	of	England	has	considerable	latitude	to	implement	and	enforce	the	CRR	in	
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line	with	its	own	preferred	interpretations	and	it	frequently	issues	‘Supervisory	
Statements’	and	other	guidance	to	firms,	setting	out	its	expectations	regarding	
how	 they	 should	 comply	 with	 the	 European	 legislation.10	The	 ECB	 operates	
under	similar	constraints.	It	implements	the	CRR	in	accordance	with	the	options	
and	discretions	exercised	by	individual	member	states.	However,	the	ECB	does	
have	some	powers	to	make	rules	and	guidance,	both	for	the	large	banks	that	it	
is	directly	responsible	for	supervising	and	the	smaller	banks	that	continue	to	be	
supervised	at	the	national	level.	As	the	ECB	matures	as	a	supervisory	authority,	
it	 is	 expected	 that	 it	 will	 play	 a	 more	 prominent	 role	 in	 issuing	 rules	 and	
guidance	for	banks	in	countries	participating	in	the	Banking	Union.	
4.3.2 EX	POST	CONTROL	MECHANISMS	
Central	banks’	formal	autonomy	is	limited	by	ex	post	control	mechanisms.	Such	
mechanisms	provide	a	means	by	which	legislative	and	executive	politicians	can	
hold	central	banks	to	account	for	their	actions.	Ex	post	control	mechanisms	also	
provide	 avenues	 by	 which	 politicians	 could	 force	 a	 central	 bank	 to	 change	
course	 over	 a	 given	 issue	 (although	 open	 conflict	 between	 central	 banks	 and	
executive	 authorities	 is	 generally	 rare).	 The	 main	 formal	 accountability	
mechanism	for	each	of	the	three	central	banks	considered	in	this	thesis	consists	
of	monitoring	and	reporting	requirements.	All	three	central	banks	face	broadly	
similar	 constraints	 in	 this	 regard.	 Their	 governors	must	 appear	 before	 various	
legislative	committees	 (usually	quarterly)	 to	explain	 their	monetary	policy	and	
financial	 stability	 decisions	 and	 to	 face	 questions	 on	 whichever	 topics	
lawmakers	choose	to	ask	them	about.	In	each	case,	the	legislative	committee(s)	
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tasked	with	holding	the	central	bank	to	account	have	few	if	any	formal	means	of	
sanctioning	 the	 central	 bank	 or	 intervening	 in	 its	 activities,	 should	 it	 be	
unsatisfied	with	central	bankers’	testimony.	
In	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 DFA	 marginally	 increased	 the	 level	 of	 ex	 post	
constraint	operating	on	the	Federal	Reserve.	The	requirement	for	the	Secretary	
of	the	Treasury	to	approve	future	liquidity	assistance	to	non-bank	financial	firms	
provides	 the	administration	with	an	unprecedented	veto	over	one	element	of	
the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 LOLR	 functionality.	 This	 is	 a	 clear	 diminution	 of	 the	
Federal	Reserve’s	autonomy,	even	if	conflict	between	the	central	bank	and	the	
administration	in	this	area	proves	to	be	rare.	The	creation	of	the	FSOC	provides	
a	 further	 channel	 by	 which	 the	 Treasury	 (if	 supported	 by	 other	 regulatory	
agencies)	 could	 intervene	 in	 the	Federal	Reserve’s	operations.	 This	 is	because	
the	 FSOC,	 which	 is	 chaired	 by	 the	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Treasury,	 can	 issue	
recommendations	 to	 the	Federal	Reserve	 (or	any	other	agency)	on	a	 ‘comply-
or-explain’	 basis.	 There	 are,	 however,	 no	 existing	 statutory	 means	 of	
sanctioning	 the	 Federal	 Reserve.	While	 Congress	 could	 legislate	 to	 curtail	 the	
Federal	Reserve’s	power,	or	to	subject	it	to	greater	Congressional	oversight	via	
the	 Government	 Accountability	 Office	 (a	 Congressional	 body	 established	 to	
‘audit’	public	agencies),	legislative	action	to	curtail	the	Federal	Reserve’s	power	
is	unlikely	to	succeed	absent	the	support	of	the	President.		
In	the	UK,	the	possibilities	for	government	intervention	in	the	Central	Bank’s	
activities	are	more	clearly	articulated.	The	Financial	Services	Act	2012	sets	out	
circumstances	 in	 which	 the	 Treasury	 can,	 in	 extremis,	 issue	 directions	 to	 the	
Bank,	 suspending	 its	 independence	 in	 respect	 of	 monetary	 policy.	 For	 these	
	 173	
powers	to	become	active,	the	Bank	must	have	first	notified	the	Treasury	that	a	
‘material	 risk’	 to	public	 funds	 is	 likely	 to	arise.	The	Financial	Services	Act	2012	
also	requires	the	Treasury	to	make	recommendations	to	the	Bank	in	respect	of	
aspects	of	financial	stability	and	wider	government	economic	policy	on	a	more	
regular	 basis	 (Bank	 of	 England	 Act	 1998	 Clause	 (9E),	 as	 amended).	 Such	
recommendations	relate	to	how	the	FPC	should	 interpret	 the	Bank’s	statutory	
financial	 stability	 objective	 and	 any	 other	 issues	 the	 Treasury	 is	 concerned	
about.	 This	 power	 of	 recommendation	 has	 been	 used	 on	 a	 yearly	 basis	 since	
2012	(see	for	example	Osborne	2013).	
In	 the	 EU,	 the	 formal	 options	 for	 politicians	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 ECB’s	
operational	activities	are	few.	According	to	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	
European	Union,	the	President	of	the	Council	may	attend	meetings	of	the	ECB	
Governing	 Council	 and	 submit	 motions	 for	 deliberation	 (TFEU	 Article	 284).	
However,	 the	 Council	 President	may	not	 vote	 in	 the	meetings.	Under	 current	
legislation,	the	ESRB	may	not	issue	warnings	and	recommendations	to	the	ECB,	
as	 the	 FSOC	 can	 to	 the	 Federal	 Reserve.	 As	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 the	
United	States,	the	European	Parliament	has	no	formal	sanctions	over	the	ECB.	
Any	alteration	to	the	ECB’s	remit	would	require	new	legislation.	Any	reduction	
in	 its	 formal	 autonomy	 would	 require	 treaty	 change.	 Given	 the	 universal	
support	 for	 the	 institution	 of	 central	 bank	 independence	 amongst	 European	
centrist	parties,	such	an	eventuality	is,	to	say	the	least,	unlikely.	
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TABLE	4:	FORMAL	AUTONOMY	COMPARED	
	 United	States	 United	Kingdom	 EU	
Ex	ante	
constraints	
• Financial	stability	
policy	inherently	less	
instrument	
independent.	
• Federal	Reserve	has	
broad	authority	to	
implement	
international	
agreements.	
• Must	cooperate	in	
rule	making	with	
other	federal	
regulatory	agencies.	
• Financial	stability	
policy	inherently	less	
instrument	
independent.	
• Implements	detailed	
European	and	UK	
secondary	legislation.	
• Loopholes	and	
ambiguity	in	EU	law	
provides	discretion,	
even	amid	‘maximum	
harmonisation’.		
• Financial	stability	
policy	inherently	less	
instrument	
independent.	
• Implements	detailed	
European	and	
member	state	
secondary	legislation	
and	rules.	
• Expected	to	develop	
common	rules	and	
guidance	in	due	
course.	
Ex	post	
control	
mechanisms	
• Monitoring	by	and	
reporting	to	
Congress.	
• Government	
Accountability	Office	
oversight	(excluding	
monetary	policy)	
(see	Chapter	3).	
• Treasury	Secretary	
approval	required	
for	certain	LOLR	
actions.	
• Monitoring	by	and	
reporting	to	
Parliament.	
• New	mechanism	for	
executive	suspension	
of	independence	in	
extremis.	
• Annual	HM	Treasury	
recommendations	on	
interpretation	of	
financial	stability	
objective.			
• Monitoring	by	and	
reporting	to	
European	Parliament	
and	European	
Council.		
• ECB	president	
reports	to	EP	as	Chair	
of	ESRB.		
• No	other	substantive	
control	mechanisms.	
4.4 DE	FACTO	AUTHORITY	
Important	as	they	are,	statutory	control	mechanisms	are	only	the	most	visible	
channels	 through	which	politicians	–	and	 the	 interest	groups	 they	 represent	–	
transmit	their	preferences	to	central	banks.	When	commentators	worry	about	
the	 politicisation	 of	 central	 banking	 after	 the	 financial	 crisis	 (Kohn	 2014a;	 L.	
Goodhart	 2014;	 Baker	 2015b)	 their	 concern	 is	 not	 primarily	 that	 new	 legal	
mechanisms	have	been	devised	to	limit	central	banks’	independence.	Rather,	it	
is	 that	 central	 banks	 have	 strayed	 into	 areas	 that	 are	more	 controversial	 and	
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politically	contested	than	monetary	policy	and	that	societal	resistance	to	central	
banks’	decisions	will	ultimately	undermine	central	banks’	de	facto	authority.		
In	the	monetary	policy	domain,	central	banks’	de	facto	authority	is	generally	
strong	in	part	because	there	is	broad	normative	support	 in	society	at	 large	for	
the	objective	of	price	stability.	Support	for	low	and	stable	inflation	is	a	bedrock	
of	 the	 so-called	 ‘stability	 culture’	 that	 is	 most	 associated	 with	 Germany,	 but	
which	also	influences	popular	discourse	over	economic	policy	in	many	countries	
(see	Tognato	2012;	Howarth	and	Rommerskirchen	2013).	Against	the	backdrop	
of	 such	 stability	 cultures,	 the	 increasingly	 singular	 focus	 of	 central	 banks	 on	
maintaining	a	low	and	steady	rate	of	inflation	in	the	three	decades	prior	to	the	
financial	 crisis	 led	 to	central	banking	being	seen	as	a	 largely	 technical	activity.	
During	 that	 period,	 central	 banks	 became	 increasingly	 ‘scientised’	 (Marcussen	
2006);	 they	 forged	 links	 with	 academic	 economists	 and	 presented	 their	
decisions	as	impartial	and	evidence-based.	Central	banks	projected	an	image	of	
themselves	 as	 apolitical;	 their	 sole	 uncontroversial	 focus	was	 to	maintain	 the	
rate	 of	 inflation	 at	 the	most	 socially	 desirable	 level.	 The	 effects	 of	monetary	
policy	 are,	 of	 course,	 anything	 but	 apolitical.	 Anti-inflationary	 policies	 have	
distributional	 consequences	 that	 other	 things	 being	 equal	 benefit	 savers	 and	
penalise	borrowers.	For	 this	 reason,	 some	authors	view	the	 ‘apoliticisation’	of	
monetary	policy	as	merely	an	outgrowth	of	deliberate	governing	 strategies	of	
‘depoliticisation’	 (cf.	 Burnham	 2001:	 128;	 2014).	 Depoliticisation	 involves	
obfuscating	 the	 distributional	 character	 of	 political	 decisions	 by	 delegating	
responsibility	 for	 decision-making	 to	 autonomous,	 ostensibly	 neutral,	 public	
agencies.	
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The	broadening	of	central	bank	mandates	calls	their	autonomy	into	question.	
The	 three	 key	 areas	 of	 financial	 stability	 policy	 focused	 upon	 in	 this	 thesis	 –	
microprudential	 policy,	 macroprudential	 policy	 and	 crisis	 management	 –	 are	
more	controversial	 than	monetary	policy.	This	 is	not	because	Western	publics	
are	 somehow	 in	 favour	 of	 financial	 instability.	 Rather	 it	 is	 because	 the	
distributional	consequences	of	financial	stability	policies	are	easier	to	discern.	A	
frequently	 discussed	 concern	 in	 relation	 to	 both	 prudential	 policies	 (whether	
micro-	or	macro-)	is	that	their	short-term	costs	fall	narrowly	on	a	relatively	small	
number	of	actors,	while	the	benefits	are	diffuse	and	emerge	only	over	the	long	
run	(Watson,	C.M.	and	Kincaid	2013).	Hence,	prudential	policies	are	subject	to	a	
‘collective	action’	dynamic	(Olsen	1963):	those	who	stand	to	suffer	will	be	highly	
motivated	to	mobilise	in	opposition	to	the	central	bank,	while	those	who	stand	
to	 benefit	 will	 be	 disorganised	 and	 largely	 unaware	 of	 the	 stakes	 involved.	
Whether	 the	 adversely	 affected	 groups	 are	 banks	 complaining	 about	 the	
imposition	of	more	stringent	prudential	regulations,	or	politicians	upset	at	their	
constituents’	 inability	 to	 access	 credit	 to	 buy	 homes	 or	 invest	 in	 their	
businesses,	 the	 ‘danger’	 for	 central	 banks	 is	 that	 political	 pressure	 will	 be	
brought	 to	 bear,	 causing	 them	 reputational	 damage	 and	 requiring	 them	 to	
change	course.		
Crisis	 management	 is	 perhaps	 the	 most	 controversial	 area	 of	 financial	
stability	policy	since	it	 involves	actions	that	have	direct	material	consequences	
for	 the	wealth	 and	 property	 rights	 of	 private	 firms	 and	 individuals.	 Discussed	
further	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 central	 banks	 have	 in	 recent	 years	 provided	 vast	
loans	to	troubled	financial	institutions.	Many	commentators	have	accused	them	
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of	effectively	acting	at	the	behest	of	the	beneficiaries	of	such	interventions	(see,	
for	 example,	Warren	 et	 al.	 2014;	 Bair	 2012).	 Central	 banks’	 supporters	 retort	
that	providing	liquidity	in	exchange	for	collateral	does	not	constitute	a	bailout,	
and	that	such	actions	are	consistent	with	the	statutory	objectives	of	maintaining	
price	 stability	 and	 financial	 stability	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Blinder	 2013;	Geithner	
2014).	At	issue	in	such	debates	are	difficult	technical	judgements	regarding	the	
solvency	of	 the	 firms	 in	 receipt	 of	 liquidity	 assistance,	 the	 size	 of	 any	 implicit	
subsidies	 provided	 to	 financial	 institutions	 and	 the	 motivations	 of	 central	
bankers	in	coming	to	their	aid.	
In	 these	 more	 contested	 areas,	 agenda-setting	 and	 behind-the-scenes	
negotiations	 may	 be	 as	 (or	 more)	 important	 for	 central	 banks’	 ability	 to	
determine	 policy	 outcomes	 than	 the	 formal	 structure	 of	 their	 delegated	
authority.	Thus,	to	understand	central	banks’	de	facto	authority	after	the	crisis,	
it	 is	 also	 necessary	 to	 explore	 the	 informal	 dimensions	 of	 their	 relationships	
with	other	actors	and	how	battles	over	policy	play	out	in	practice.	This	section	
evaluates	 the	 post-crisis	 evolution	 of	 the	 three	 central	 banks’	 informal	
relationships	 with	 three	 key	 sets	 of	 interlocutors,	 namely,	 financial	 market	
participants,	legislatures	and	executive	politicians.	
4.4.1 RELATIONS	WITH	FINANCIAL	MARKETS		
Despite	much	commentary	to	the	contrary	(see,	for	example,	Johnson	and	Kwak	
2009),	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 implementation	 of	 its	 enhanced	microprudential	
mandate	in	the	DFA	provides	little	evidence	that	it	 is	‘captured’	by	Wall	Street	
interests.	 To	 be	 sure,	 lobbying	 by	 banks	 and	 their	 political	 supporters	 has	 at	
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times	been	fierce.	For	example,	banks	fought	a	sustained	campaign	against	the	
implementation	 of	 the	 so-called	 ‘Volcker	 Rule’,	 a	 ban	 on	 banks	 trading	 in	
financial	markets	 purely	 for	 their	 own	 gain	 that	was	 named	 after	 the	 former	
Chairman	of	the	Federal	Reserve,	Paul	Volcker.	However,	while	banks	did	secure	
a	 number	 of	 loopholes	 and	 exemptions	 (see	 Chon	 2014a;	 Chon	 2014b),	 the	
Volcker	 Rule	 may	 also	 be	 viewed	 as	 an	 example	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	
autonomy	 from	 financial	 interests.	 Many	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 harshest	
critics	 conceded	 that	 banks	 ultimately	 lost	 the	 argument	 on	 the	 merits	 of	
restrictions	on	proprietary	 trading	by	banks	 (Johnson	2013)	 and	 that	 the	 final	
Volcker	Rule	was	tougher	than	they	had	expected	it	to	be	(see	for	example	Neil	
Barofsky	2014,	quoted	in	Vigna	2014).	
Discussed	 at	 length	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 has	 exhibited	 a	
preference	 for	 prudential	 policies	 focused	 on	 the	 resilience	 of	 systemically	
important	firms,	rather	than	countering	cyclical	fluctuations	in	credit	conditions	
or	 asset	 prices.	 This	 approach	 is	 by	 no	 means	 a	 soft	 option	 for	 systemically	
important	banks.	The	Federal	Reserve	has	implemented	a	stress-testing	regime	
and	 a	 programme	 of	 ‘Comprehensive	 Capital	 Analysis	 and	 Reviews’	 that	 has	
greatly	 strengthened	 the	 capitalisation	 of	 the	 largest	 banks.	 According	 to	
Federal	Reserve	officials,	by	2014	the	18	largest	banks	had	increased	their	Tier	1	
common	equity	by	more	than	$500	billion	since	2008,	more	than	doubling	their	
buffers	of	loss	absorbing	capital	(Alvarez	2014).	Moreover,	the	Federal	Reserve	
has	 been	 willing	 to	 go	 beyond	 internationally	 agreed	 standards.	 Its	 leverage	
ratio	of	five	per	cent	for	systemically	important	banks	and	six	per	cent	for	their	
deposit	taking	subsidiaries	exceeds	the	Basel	III	minimum	of	three	per	cent.	The	
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Federal	 Reserve	 has	 also	 taken	 a	 more	 hawkish	 stance	 than	 some	 other	 US	
authorities	 in	 negotiations	 over	 bank	 capital	 regulation	 at	 the	 international	
level.	 For	example,	during	 the	negotiations	over	 the	Basel	 III	 capital	 ratio,	 the	
Fed	 advocated	 a	 three	 per	 cent	 capital	 ‘surcharge’	 for	 systemically	 important	
financial	institutions.	This	was	higher	than	the	one	per	cent	advocated	by	other	
US	banking	regulators	and,	indeed,	higher	than	the	two-and-a-half	per	cent	that	
was	finally	agreed	(Bair	2012).		
In	 the	 past,	 firms	 considered	 ‘too-big-to-fail’	 enjoyed	 an	 implicit	 subsidy	
because	 their	 cost	of	borrowing	 reflected	 the	widespread	perception	 that	 the	
government	 would	 guarantee	 their	 debts	 in	 the	 event	 of	 their	 failure	 (IMF	
2014).	There	is	evidence	to	suggest	that	this	implicit	subsidy	is	now	substantially	
reduced	in	the	United	States	(GAO	2014),	both	because	of	explicit	prohibitions	
in	 the	DFA	on	 future	public	bailouts	and	because	of	 the	Federal	Reserve’s	on-
going	efforts	to	strengthen	resilience	and	resolvability	of	systemically	important	
firms.	 Elliot	 (2014)	 estimates	 that	 the	 cumulative	 impact	 of	 new	 prudential	
regulations	on	 systemically	 important	 firms	 raises	 their	 costs	 of	 funding	by	 at	
least	24	basis	points,	more	than	offsetting	any	residual	competitive	advantages	
of	being	seen	as	 too-big-to-fail.	While	 this	may	be	an	overly	optimistic	view	–	
few	regulators	have	claimed	victory	 in	 the	battle	 to	end	 ‘too-big-to-fail’	–	 this	
suggests	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 ability	 to	 set	 policies	 that	 run	 counter	 to	 the	
preferences	of	 the	 largest	 financial	 institutions	has	 indeed	 increased	since	 the	
financial	crisis.		
While	the	Federal	Reserve	has	acted	with	a	much	heavier	regulatory	touch	
after	 the	 financial	crisis,	perceptions	of	 regulatory	capture	can	be	expected	to	
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persist.	 In	 2014,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 faced	 a	 wave	 of	 criticism	 that	 its	
supervisors	 were	 too	 deferential	 and	 insufficiently	 challenging	 of	 the	
systemically	important	banks	they	are	responsible	for	overseeing.	The	criticism	
followed	 the	 publication	 of	 secretly	 recorded	 audiotapes	 of	 Federal	 Reserve	
Bank	of	New	York	(FRBNY)	officials	discussing	the	supervision	of	Goldman	Sachs	
(Bernstein,	 J.	 2014)	 and	 a	 report	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 internal	 Office	 of	
Inspector	General	criticising	 the	FRBNY’s	supervision	of	 JP	Morgan	Chase	 (OIG	
2014).	 These	 criticisms	 prompted	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Board	 to	 announce	 a	
review	of	its	procedures	for	reconciling	divergent	views	amongst	its	supervisors	
and	 methods	 for	 ensuring	 supervisors	 at	 all	 levels	 of	 seniority	 receive	 the	
information	 they	 need.	 In	 light	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 more	 robust	 overall	
regulatory	 stance,	 this	 episode	 should	 not	 be	 regarded	 as	 exemplifying	 the	
perpetuation	of	the	sorts	of	macro-level	regulatory	capture	present	prior	to	the	
financial	crisis	(see	Baker	2010).	Rather,	it	reflects	the	inherent	challenges	that	
financial	supervisors	face	 in	striking	a	balance	between	acting	as	both	 ‘doctor’	
and	‘cop’	to	the	financial	markets	(Davies	1996);	that	is,	supervisors	need	to	be	
close	enough	to	firms	to	be	able	to	elicit	relevant	information	on	the	potential	
business	 risks	 that	 firms	 face,	 whilst	 also	 taking	 an	 adequately	 challenging	
stance	to	ensure	that	rule	breeches	are	promptly	addressed.	
If	 anything,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 UK	 authorities	 and	 market	
participants	 has	 been	 through	 an	 even	 greater	 transformation.	 Following	 the	
criticism	levelled	at	the	FSA	for	its	supervision	of	failed	banks	such	as	Northern	
Rock	 and	 RBS	 (see	 FSA	 2013),	 the	 trust	 and	 collegiality	 between	 firms	 and	
supervisors	that	was	characteristic	of	the	FSA’s	pre-crisis	supervisory	approach	
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has	been	largely	eroded	(see	McPhilemy	2013).	After	an	internal	audit	into	the	
supervisory	 failures	 surrounding	 Northern	 Rock,	 the	 FSA	 in	 2008	 launched	 a	
‘Supervisory	 Enhancement	 Programme’,	 which	 among	 other	 things	 involved	
hiring	more	 staff,	 requiring	 senior	 management	 to	 become	more	 involved	 in	
day-to-day	supervisory	decisions	and	redirecting	resources	from	its	conduct	of	
business	operations	 towards	 its	prudential	 tasks.	 In	 the	 transition	 to	 the	PRA,	
senior	 supervisors	 promised	 a	more	 intensive	 and	 judgement-based	 approach	
and	they	abandoned	some	of	the	elements	of	their	pre-crisis	approach	to	firms	
(Bailey	 2013).	 Notably,	 the	 practice	 of	 rewarding	 well-run	 firms	 with	 less	
intensive	 and	more	 infrequent	 supervision	 (a	 ‘regulatory	 dividend’)	 has	 been	
scrapped.	 One	 PRA	 supervisor	 interviewed	 for	 this	 thesis	 took	 the	 view	 that	
prudential	 supervision	had	was	now	highly	 formalised,	with	officials	careful	 to	
ensure	that	any	firm-level	decisions	are	backed-up	with	a	clear	and	defensible	
evidence	trail	(author	interview,	London,	December	12	2014).	
Other	elements	of	the	pre-crisis	supervisory	approach	have	lived	on,	albeit	
in	modified	form.	One	example	 is	the	pre-crisis	 innovation	of	 ‘principles-based	
regulation’	(see	Black	et	al.	2007;	Black	2008),	whereby	firms	were	required	to	
adhere	to	the	spirit	of	high-level	principles	 in	addition	to	the	letter	of	detailed	
rules	 (see	 Chapter	 6).	 The	 concept	 of	 principles	 based	 regulation	 has	 been	
largely	preserved	under	 the	new	organisational	arrangements,	albeit	 renamed	
as	a	‘judgement-based	approach’	(see	Bank	of	England	2014b).	This	should	not	
be	 regarded	 as	 evidence	 of	 a	 continuing	 ‘light	 touch’,	 even	 if	 before	 the	
financial	 crisis	 the	 principles-based	 regime	 became	 intertwined	with	 the	 light	
touch	approach.	 In	 theory,	at	 least,	 requirements	 for	 firms	 to	adhere	 to	high-
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level	principles	provide	scope	for	supervisors	to	intervene,	even	where	firms	are	
obeying	 the	 letter	 of	 detailed	 regulations	 (author	 interview,	 London,	 6	
September	2014).	More	generally,	principles-based	approaches	give	supervisors	
a	 greater	 degree	 of	 discretion	 to	 enforce	 rules	 in	 line	with	 their	 overall	 ‘risk-
appetite’.	Since	the	Bank	of	England	has	generally	adopted	a	risk-averse	stance	
since	the	crisis,	its	judgement-based	approach	has	been	a	source	of	strength	vis-
à-vis	markets,	rather	than	weakness.		
Like	 the	Federal	Reserve,	 the	Bank	of	England	has	adopted	a	much	heavier	
touch	 in	 its	 implementation	 of	 new	 prudential	 rules,	 whether	 for	 risk-based	
capital,	leverage	or	liquidity.	However,	despite	this	–	and	the	enhancements	in	
its	 supervisory	 practices	 –	 its	 authority	 vis-à-vis	 financial	 market	 participants	
remains	 unproven	 (cf.	 PCBS	 2013).	 The	 UK	 financial	 services	 industry,	 and	 its	
regulatory	authorities,	have	been	damaged	by	a	series	of	scandals	in	the	years	
since	 the	 crisis.	 These	 included	 the	 industrial-scale	 mis-selling	 of	 payment	
protection	 insurance,	collusion	by	banks	 in	 the	setting	of	 the	so-called	 ‘LIBOR’	
interbank	 interest	 rate	 and	 manipulation	 of	 foreign	 exchange	 markets.	 The	
behaviour	that	gave	rise	to	these	scandals	in	some	instances	took	place	before	
the	 creation	of	 the	new	 regulatory	architecture	and	much	of	 the	 challenge	of	
tackling	 abusive	 practices	 within	 financial	 markets	 lies	 with	 the	 FCA,	 not	 the	
Bank.	Nevertheless,	as	 long	as	scandals	such	as	these	continue	to	emerge,	the	
Bank	will	face	continued	criticism	for	failing	to	‘rein	in’	the	bankers.		
As	 a	 prudential	 supervisor,	 the	 ECB	 lacks	 the	 historic	 linkages	 with	
commercial	banks	that	national	central	banks	and	supervisory	authorities	have.	
This,	 of	 course,	was	 part	 of	 the	 rationale	 for	 establishing	 the	 SSM	 in	 the	 first	
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place.	That	is	to	say,	one	reason	why	policymakers	chose	to	create	the	SSM	was	
as	a	means	of	overcoming	the	tendencies	towards	regulatory	capture,	national	
bias	 and	 economic	 patriotism	 in	 European	 banking	 supervision,	 which	 were	
amply	revealed	during	the	financial	crisis	(Veron	2013;	Clift	and	Woll	2012).	 In	
an	 attempt	 to	 commence	 its	 new	 supervisory	 responsibilities	 with	 a	 ‘clean	
slate’,	 the	ECB	 in	2013	undertook	an	unprecedented	effort	 to	understand	 the	
extent	of	the	risks	on	banks’	balances	sheets.	This	‘Asset	Quality	Review’	(AQR)	
was	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 ‘Comprehensive	 Assessment’	 that	 also	 included	 a	 set	 of	
stress	 tests	 conducted	 in	 close	 cooperation	 with	 the	 European	 Banking	
Authority.		
Some	insiders	have	expressed	scepticism	over	the	extent	to	which	the	AQR	
process	was	 truly	 able	 to	 eliminate	 national	 variation	 and	 home	 bias	 (author	
interview,	London,	December	12	2014).	National	competent	authorities,	rather	
than	 the	 ECB,	 were	 responsible	 for	 contracting	 and	 training	 external	
consultants.	The	ECB	has	also	been	criticised	 for	proposing	a	 relatively	benign	
stress	scenario	for	the	stress	test	component	of	the	Comprehensive	Assessment	
(Steil	 and	Walker	 2014).	 Overall,	 however,	 it	 remains	 too	 early	 to	 determine	
how	robust	the	ECB	will	be	in	its	supervisory	approach	to	the	banking	sector.	A	
more	significant	test	of	the	ECB’s	authority	vis-à-vis	banks	would	be	the	failure	
of	a	‘national	champion’	of	a	large	euro	area	member	state	such	as	BNP	Paribas	
of	France	or	Deutsche	Bank	of	Germany.	Were	such	a	bank	to	fail,	the	ECB	could	
find	itself	under	strong	pressure	from	executive	politicians	of	the	bank’s	home	
country	to	find	an	alternative	to	resolution.	
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4.4.2 RELATIONS	WITH	LEGISLATURES	
In	 the	 United	 States,	 Congressional	 debates	 concerning	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	
have	become	more	polarised	and	partisan	since	 the	 financial	 crisis	 (see	Kaiser	
2013;	Blinder	2013).	This	 is	 reflected	 in	the	 increasingly	 fractious	confirmation	
hearings	 for	 nominees	 for	 the	 Board	 of	 Governors.	While	 historically	 Federal	
Reserve	Chairmen	have	been	confirmed	with	near	unanimity	in	the	Senate,	the	
most	recent	two	confirmations	(Ben	Bernanke	in	2010	and	Janet	Yellen	in	2014)	
featured	 sizeable	 opposition	 minorities.	 The	 heightened	 politicisation	 of	 the	
Federal	 Reserve	 in	 Congress	 is	 also	 reflected	 in	 an	 ever-increasing	 number	 of	
legislative	initiatives	mentioning	the	Fed	(see	L.	Goodhart	2014).	A	longstanding	
Republican-led	 initiative	 to	 ‘audit	 the	 Fed’	 by	 increasing	 the	 oversight	 of	 the	
Government	 Accountability	 Office	 over	 its	 operations	 was,	 at	 the	 time	 of	
writing,	close	to	being	passed	in	both	houses	of	Congress	(see	Paul	2009).		
It	 is	 difficult	 to	 identify	 specific	 instances	 of	 Congressional	 influence	 over	
Federal	 Reserve	policies.	 Congress	 is	 by	no	means	 the	only	 source	of	 political	
pressure	acting	on	the	Federal	Reserve.	Moreover,	as	mentioned	above,	Fed’s	
multi-objective	 mandate	 means	 that	 many	 different	 policies	 can	 appear	
compatible	with	 its	objectives.	Added	 to	 this	 fungiblility	of	policy	objectives	 is	
the	 absence	 of	 an	 explicit	 statutory	 financial	 stability	 objective	 (although	 the	
Federal	 Reserve,	 like	 most	 central	 banks,	 has	 a	 de	 facto	 financial	 stability	
objective	 arising	 from	 its	 role	 as	 lender	 of	 last	 resort).	 In	 general	 terms,	
Congress	 is	 a	 poor	 check	 on	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 authority	 because	 the	
relevant	 committees	 lack	 both	 the	 expertise	 and	 the	 incentives	 to	 challenge	
meaningfully	the	substance	and	complex	detail	of	its	work	(Wooley	1984;	Cheryl	
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Schonhardt-Bailey	 2013).	 Members	 of	 Congress	 tend	 to	 ‘sound	 tough’	 in	
hearings.	 However,	 as	 one	 former	 FRB	 governor	 interviewed	 for	 this	 thesis	
observed,	the	standard	of	questioning	is	often	poor	and	members	of	Congress	
prefer	grandstanding	for	the	media	to	engaging	in	well-informed	debate	(author	
interview,	Washington	DC,	July	17	2014).		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Congressional	 debates	 over	 Federal	 Reserve	 do	 help	
define	 the	 broad	 parameters	 of	 what	 is	 politically	 feasible	 for	 the	 Federal	
Reserve	to	pursue.	As	mentioned,	the	Federal	Reserve’s	 initial	 implementation	
of	its	enhanced	mandate	in	the	prudential	domain	has	been	skewed	to	ensuring	
the	 resilience	 and	 resolvability	 of	 systemically	 important	 financial	 institutions,	
rather	 than	 the	 more	 statist	 objective	 of	 controlling	 credit	 growth	 and	 asset	
prices	through	the	use	of	discretionary	countercyclical	policies	(see	Chapter	6).	
This	preference	for	resilience-focused	policies	is	at	least	partly	attributable	to	a	
form	of	self-censorship	of	Federal	Reserve	policymakers,	whose	policy	choices	
are	 inevitably	 conditioned	 by	 the	 public	 opinions	 and	 popular	 sentiments	
expressed	 within	 Congress	 and	 beyond.	 Commenting	 on	 the	 historic	 use	 of	
countercyclical	policies	in	the	in	the	United	States	in	the	1940s	and	1950s,	one	
senior	Federal	Reserve	official	interviewed	for	this	thesis	remarked	‘I	shudder	to	
think	what	the	equivalent	political	reaction	would	be	today’	(author	interview,	
Washington	DC,	11th	July	2014).		
In	the	United	Kingdom,	the	Treasury	Select	Committee	(TSC)	provides	a	high	
profile	forum	for	the	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	England	to	account	for	the	Bank’s	
actions.	 As	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 it	 is	 not	 uncommon	 for	 appearances	 of	 the	
Governor	and	Deputy	Governors	 to	 feature	on	 the	nightly	news.	Questions	 to	
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the	 governor	 tend	 to	 be	 less	 aggressive	 than	 the	 questioning	 faced	 by	 the	
Federal	 Reserve	 Chairman,	 although	 also	more	 penetrating	 (author	 interview,	
Washington	 DC,	 17th	 July	 2014).	 For	 most	 of	 the	 post	 crisis	 period,	 relations	
between	 the	TSC	and	 the	Bank	were	 frosty.	 In	2011	and	2012,	 the	TSC	 called	
repeatedly	for	the	Bank	of	England	to	adopt	enhanced	oversight	procedures,	in	
particular	by	replacing	 its	Court	of	Directors	with	a	new	‘supervisory	board’	to	
be	composed	of	non-executive	directors	with	power	to	review	both	procedural	
aspects	of	the	Bank’s	operations	and	its	decisions	in	respect	of	monetary	policy	
and	financial	stability	(TSC	2011a).	Under	the	Governorship	of	Mervyn	King,	the	
Bank	 rebuffed	 these	 calls,	 opting	 instead	 to	 create	 a	 less	 powerful	 ‘Oversight	
Committee’	 as	 a	 sub-committee	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Directors.	 Under	 the	
governorship	 of	 Mark	 Carney,	 relations	 between	 the	 Bank	 and	 the	 TSC	
improved.	To	 the	gratification	of	 the	TSC,	 the	Bank	announced	 in	2014	 that	 it	
would	 enhance	 the	 transparency	 arrangements	 around	 its	 monetary	 policy	
deliberations	and	make	further	governance	reforms	(Bank	of	England	2014c).	As	
the	 Chair	 of	 the	 TSC,	 Andrew	 Tyrie,	 has	 stated,	 these	 reforms	mean	 that	 the	
Court	of	Directors	will	become	a	supervisory	board	‘in	all	but	name’	(quoted	in	
Giles	2014).		
Relative	to	the	US	Congress,	and	to	a	 lesser	extent	 the	UK	Parliament,	 the	
European	 Parliament	 has	 little	 ability	 to	 constrain	 the	 scope	 of	 action	 of	 the	
ECB.	 While	 the	 power	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 to	 initiate	 and	 formulate	
policy	 has	 been	 enhanced	 in	 recent	 years,	 it	 lacks	 the	 visibility	 and	 direct	
linkages	to	electorates	that	national	legislatures	enjoy.	Appearances	of	the	ECB	
President	before	the	Economic	and	Monetary	Affairs	(ECON)	Committee	of	the	
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European	Parliament	rarely	attract	media	attention.	This	is	partly	attributable	to	
the	 ECB	 President,	 who	 tends	 not	 to	 impart	 any	 new	 information	 in	 his	
prepared	 statements.	 The	 low	 profile	 of	 these	 events	 diminishes	 the	 MEP’s	
ability	 to	 stimulate	 public	 debate	 of	 the	 ECB’s	 operations.	 By	 extension,	 it	
inhibits	the	extent	to	which	MEPs	can	place	meaningful	constraint	on	the	ECB’s	
scope	for	action.		
The	ability	of	the	European	Parliament	to	hold	the	ECB	to	account	is	made	
more	 difficult	 by	 the	 ECB’s	 relatively	 restrictive	 communication	 policies.	 The	
ECB	does	not	publish	 the	minutes	or	 the	voting	records	of	 the	meetings	of	 its	
Governing	 Council.	 This	 can	 make	 it	 difficult	 for	 MEPs	 to	 ask	 pertinent	 or	
probing	questions	relating	to	the	ECB’s	core	monetary	policy	tasks	(Amtenbrink	
and	Van	Duin	2009;	Claeys	et	al.	2014).	The	same	is	true	of	the	ECB	President’s	
appearances	 before	 the	 European	 Parliament	 as	 Chair	 of	 the	 ESRB.	 The	 ESRB	
does	 not	 publish	 a	 prioritised	 assessment	 of	 financial	 stability	 risks,	 which	
makes	 it	 more	 challenging	 for	 MEPs	 to	 effectively	 challenge	 its	 analysis	
(McPhilemy	and	Roche	2013).	This	is	not	to	say	that	greater	transparency	would	
necessarily	 be	 sufficient	 to	 improve	 the	 quality	 of	 questioning.	 As	 in	 the	 US	
Congress,	the	incentives	for	Members	of	the	European	Parliament	to	engage	in	
the	 technical	 detail	 of	 monetary	 or	 financial	 stability	 policies	 are	 few.	
Conversely,	 there	 is	 a	 relatively	high	 risk	 that	 a	misjudged	effort	 to	engage	 in	
matters	of	substance	would	reveal	an	embarrassing	lack	of	knowledge.		
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4.4.3 RELATIONS	WITH	EXECUTIVES	
In	 the	United	 States,	 the	 relationship	between	 Federal	 Reserve	 and	executive	
politicians	 has	 been	 extremely	 close	 during	 the	 post-crisis	 period	 (author	
interview,	Washington	DC	 July	 16	 2015).	 Ever	 since	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 financial	
crisis	 in	 2007,	 there	 has	 been	 minimal	 observable	 conflict	 between	 the	
Administration	 and	 the	 Federal	 Reserve.	 Fed	 and	 Treasury	 officials	 worked	
hand-in-glove	in	the	design	of	the	TARP	bailouts	of	Wall	Street	firms	and	in	the	
Federal	 Reserve’s	 provision	 of	 emergency	 liquidity	 assistance.	 Tim	 Geithner,	
who	 served	 as	 Treasury	 Secretary	 from	 2009	 to	 2013	 has	 remarked	 of	 his	
relationship	 with	 Ben	 Bernanke,	 ‘I	 doubt	 there	 has	 ever	 been	 a	 closer	
relationship	 between	 a	 Treasury	 Secretary	 and	 a	 Fed	 Chairman’	 (Geithner	
2014).	 The	 Administration	 supported	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 ultra-
accommodative	monetary	policies	 (quantitative	easing).	 In	 return,	 the	Federal	
Reserve	Chairman	has	at	times	appeared	to	support	the	administration’s	fiscal	
policies	(see	Bernanke	2009).		
This	unity	between	the	administration	and	the	Fed	over	monetary	policy	has	
caused	 some	 to	question	 the	Federal	Reserve’s	 independence	 (Meltzer	2013).	
Yet	 the	real	 test	of	Federal	Reserve’s	post-crisis	 independence	has	yet	 to	 take	
place.	 Exiting	 from	 quantitative	 easing	 and	 eventually	 raising	 interest	 rates	
could	unsettle	 the	unity	between	the	Federal	Reserve	and	the	Administration.	
The	political	 constituencies	 in	 favour	of	 a	 dovish	 stance	over	monetary	policy	
are	 large.	This	 includes	homeowners	and	small	and	medium	sized	enterprises,	
which	 have	 benefited	 in	 recent	 years	 from	 lower	 interest	 rates	 on	 their	
mortgages	and	other	debts.	It	also	includes	higher	income	groups	and	financial	
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market	actors,	which	have	benefited	from	the	upward	pressure	on	asset	prices.	
Likewise,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 relatively	 hawkish	 stance	 in	 financial	 stability	
policies	may	ultimately	generate	tensions	with	the	administration	which	can	be	
expected	 to	 be	more	 sensitive	 to	 industry	 lobbying	 and	 calls	 to	 facilitate	 the	
flow	of	credit	from	the	banking	system	to	the	real	economy.	
In	 the	United	 Kingdom,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 and	
the	 executive	 has	 also	 been	 close,	 albeit	 from	 a	 poor	 starting	 point.	 In	 2007	
differences	between	the	Governor	of	the	Bank,	Mervyn	King,	and	the	Chancellor	
of	 the	 Exchequer,	 Alistair	 Darling,	 emerged	 over	 how	 the	 failure	 of	 the	
mortgage	 lender	Northern	Rock	 should	 be	handled.	 The	 row	escalated	 to	 the	
point	 where	 the	 Chancellor	 consulted	 Treasury	 staff	 over	 the	 possibility	 of	
overruling	 the	 Bank.	 He	 was	 advised	 that	 while	 it	 would	 be	 legally	 possible,	
using	a	general	power	of	direction	contained	in	the	Bank	of	England	Act	1946,	
such	 a	 move	 would	 send	 a	 negative	 signal	 to	 the	 markets	 at	 an	 already	
precarious	moment	 (TSC	 2011a:	 Chapter	 6).	 As	 the	Chancellor	 later	 reflected,	
‘the	Bank	was	 independent	 and	 the	Governor	 knew	 it…	The	 fact	 that	we	had	
given	 the	 Bank	 independence	 had	 a	 downside	 as	 well	 as	 an	 upside’	 (Darling	
2011:	23).	Relations	between	the	Bank	and	the	Treasury	were	also	damaged	in	
2010	 when	 Governor	 King	 appeared	 overstep	 his	 mandate	 by	 offering	 tacit	
support	to	the	fiscal	policy	proposals	of	the	opposition	Conservative	Party.		
Following	the	election	of	the	Conservative	government,	and	the	appointment	
of	Mark	Carney	as	Mervyn	King’s	successor,	relations	between	the	government	
and	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 have	 improved.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 tensions	
between	the	Bank	and	the	Government	have	been	entirely	absent.	One	area	of	
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conflict	 arose	 over	 the	 Treasury’s	 announcement	 in	 2013	 that	 it	 would	 be	
expanding	 its	 so-called	 ‘Help-To-Buy’	 scheme.	 Launched	 during	 a	 period	 of	
double-digit	house	price	inflation	in	much	of	the	South	East	of	the	country,	this	
policy	 involved	 guaranteeing	 a	 proportion	 of	 new	 mortgages	 on	 residential	
properties	to	help	new	buyers	into	the	market.	It	coincided	with	deliberations	in	
the	FPC	over	options	to	dampen	the	housing	market.	While	any	hint	of	conflict	
between	the	Treasury	and	the	Bank	was	played	down,	the	government’s	policy	
clearly	restricted	the	range	of	macroprudential	tools	the	Bank	of	England	could	
contemplate	 employing.	 It	 would	 be	 acutely	 embarrassing	 for	 the	 Bank	 to	
impose	loan-to-value	limits	on	mortgages	at	a	time	when	the	government	was	
explicitly	helping	people	with	smaller	deposits	to	buy	houses	(Fleming	2014).		
A	further	area	of	conflict	between	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	Government	
has	been	the	Bank’s	approach	to	its	microprudential	supervisory	responsibilities	
(discussed	 further	 in	 Chapter	 6).	 The	Bank	has	 taken	 a	 stringent	 line	 on	bank	
capital	adequacy	regulations	after	the	financial	crisis,	drawing	the	ire	of	many	in	
government	who	feel	that	such	policies	have	acted	to	constrain	bank	lending	to	
the	 real	economy	and	 thus	held	back	economic	growth.	These	 concerns	were	
shot	 into	the	open	in	mid-2013,	when	the	Liberal	Democrat	business	minister,	
Vince	Cable,	 lambasted	 the	Bank	as	behaving	 like	 a	 ‘capital	 Taliban’.	 There	 is,	
however,	little	indication	that	the	Bank	of	England	has	responded	with	a	lighter	
regulatory	touch.	On	the	contrary,	its	approach	to	banking	supervision	has	been	
consistently	more	exacting	for	banks	than	the	equivalent	supervisory	processes	
in	the	euro	area.	This	was	exemplified	by	the	severity	of	 the	stress	scenario	 it	
employed	for	its	stress	tests	in	2014	(Bank	of	England	2014d).	Notwithstanding	
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these	 skirmishes,	 the	 most	 significant	 post-crisis	 test	 of	 Bank	 of	 England’s	
authority	 vis-à-vis	 the	 executive	 authorities	 remains	 prospective.	 The	 Bank	 of	
England	has	maintained	‘Bank	Rate’,	as	the	UK	policy	interest	rate	is	known,	at	
0.5%	since	March	2009.	As	in	the	United	States,	raising	interest	rates	is	likely	to	
pitch	 the	 central	 bank	 against	 the	 government	 of	 the	day,	which	 could	 suffer	
electorally	from	a	slowdown	in	output	and	the	wealth	effects	on	homeowners	
whose	mortgage	interest	payments	will	rise.		
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 and	 the	 Bank	 of	 England,	 the	 ECB’s	
authority	 vis-à-vis	 executive	 politicians	 has	 been	on	 show	 for	 all	 the	world	 to	
see.	 Of	 the	 three	 central	 banks	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis,	 the	 relationship	
between	 ECB	 and	 executive	 politicians	 is	 the	 most	 complex	 for	 the	 simple	
reason	that	 the	ECB	conducts	monetary	policy	 (and	now	prudential	policy)	 for	
18	 different	 countries.	 To	 some	 extent,	 the	 ECB’s	 authority	 vis-à-vis	 heads	 of	
government	 is	 supported	 by	 its	 ability	 to	 play	 divergent	 national	 preferences	
against	one	another.	While	support	for	structural	reform	and	fiscal	austerity	in	
Southern	 European	 debtor	 countries	 has	 attracted	 the	 support	 of	 Northern	
European	political	 leaders,	 its	various	bond	buying	programmes	–	a	 lifeline	for	
Southern	 European	 countries	 –	 have	 been	 deeply	 unpopular	 in	 Northern	
countries,	above	all	in	Germany.		
Beginning	 in	 2010,	 the	ECB	embarked	upon	a	 series	of	 highly	 controversial	
actions	in	which	it	linked	support	for	embattled	sovereigns	and	their	respective	
banking	 sectors	 to	 explicit	 economic	 and	 fiscal	 conditions,	 including	 major	
reductions	 in	 public	 spending,	 tax	 increases	 and	 numerous	 ‘neo-liberal’	
structural	reforms	such	as	labour	market	reform	and	large-scale	privatisations.	
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For	example,	 in	2010,	 the	ECB	Governing	Council	 refused	 to	allow	the	Central	
Bank	 of	 Ireland	 to	 continue	 providing	 Emergency	 Liquidity	 Assistance	 to	 Irish	
banks,	unless	the	Irish	government	requested	an	international	bailout	from	the	
IMF,	 the	 European	 Commission	 and	 the	 ECB	 (the	 ‘Troika’)	 and	 announced	 a	
package	 of	 reforms	 including	 ‘fiscal	 consolidation,	 structural	 reform	 and	
financial	sector	restructuring’	(ECB	2010).	
In	perhaps	the	most	overt	and	dramatic	display	of	 its	authority	to	date,	the	
ECB	President,	 Jean	Claude	Trichet,	wrote	to	the	prime	ministers	of	Spain	and	
Italy	in	the	summer	of	2011,	setting	out	demands	for	those	countries	to	adopt	
extensive	fiscal	and	structural	reforms.	At	the	time,	these	countries	were	facing	
spiralling	costs	of	borrowing	in	international	bond	markets.	The	implication	was	
that	 the	 ECB	would	 reward	 those	 countries	 by	 intervening	 in	 the	markets	 for	
their	sovereign	debt	 if	 they	complied	with	 its	conditions.	Leaked	to	the	 Italian	
press,	 the	 letter	 to	 Italian	 Prime	 Minister	 Silvio	 Berlusconi	 demanded	 a	
comprehensive	 package	 of	 reforms	 including	 ‘full	 liberalisation	 of	 public	
services’,	 ‘large	 scale	 privatisations’	 and	 ‘a	 thorough	 review	 of	 hiring	 and	
dismissal	 practices’	 (Corriere	Della	 Sera	 2011).	 It	 also	 called	 for	 a	 frontloaded	
austerity	 drive,	 backed	 up	 with	 constitutional	 change	 to	 tighten	 fiscal	 rules.	
When	 both	 countries	 agreed	 to	 the	 terms,	 the	 ECB	 duly	 bought	 their	
government	 bonds	 and	 their	 costs	 of	 borrowing	 declined.	 When	 Italy	 later	
reneged	on	its	commitments,	the	ECB	diminished	its	purchases	of	 Italian	debt,	
causing	Italian	bond	yields	to	rise	(Irwin	2013:	322).	Ultimately,	a	spike	in	Italian	
bond	 yields	 in	 November	 2011	 precipitated	 Prime	 Minister	 Berlusconi’s	
resignation	and	his	replacement	by	Mario	Monti,	a	consummate	EU	insider.	
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Caught	between	debtor	and	creditor	countries,	the	ECB’s	relations	with	the	
German	 government	 have	 also	 been	 severely	 strained	 in	 recent	 years.	
Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	has	clashed	with	the	ECB	on	several	occasions,	from	
her	 public	 criticism	 of	 the	 ECB’s	 purchases	 of	 covered	 bonds	 in	 2009	 (Atkins	
2009)	to	a	major	struggle	over	the	extent	of	private	sector	 involvement	 in	the	
restructuring	 of	 Greek	 debt	 (Spiegel	 et	 al.	 2011).	 Merkel	 supported	 the	 ECB	
purchases	of	peripheral	European	countries’	debt	in	2011	and	2012,	even	as	the	
Bundesbank	 President,	 Axel	 Weber,	 and	 Germany’s	 most	 senior	 ECB	 official,	
Jürgen	 Stark,	 resigned	 in	 protest.	 More	 recently,	 relations	 with	 the	 German	
Chancellery	 have	 again	 deteriorated.	 Initially	 credited	 with	 working	
collaboratively	 with	 Merkel	 (Spiegel	 2014),	 the	 current	 ECB	 President,	 Mario	
Draghi,	 alienated	 the	 German	 Chancellor	 when	 he	 called	 for	 more	 fiscal	
stimulus	in	Germany	(Barkin	et	al.	2014).	The	ECB’s	announcement	of	full-scale	
quantitative	 easing	 in	 2015	 further	 strained	 relations	 with	 its	 most	 powerful	
backer.		
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TABLE	5:	DE	FACTO	AUTHORITY	COMPARED	
	 United	States	 United	Kingdom	 EU	
Legislatures	 • Partisan	Congress	
defines	parameters	
of	acceptable	
regulatory	policy.	
• Parliament	poses	
some	constraint	on	
Bank	of	England,	but	
no	legislative	threat.			
• European	
Parliament	largely	
ineffective	at	
holding	ECB	to	
account.	
Executive	
politicians	
• Few	public	
differences	since	
2008.	
• Major	test	of	
relationship	yet	to	
come.	
	
• Public	demonstration	
of	independence	in	
2007,	but	government	
legislated	to		restrict	
it.	
• Occasional	public	
disagreements.	
• Major	test	of	
relationship	yet	to	
come.	
• ECB	authority	clear	
and	visible	vis-à-vis	
Southern	and	
Northern	European	
countries	alike.		
• Difficult	ECB-
Germany	relations	
limit	scope	for	
unconventional	
monetary	policy.	
Market	
actors	
• Fed	criticised	for	
supervisory	
failings.	‘Tough’	
prudential	policy	
implementation.	
• Supervisory	
enhancements	
following	Northern	
Rock/RBS	failures.	
‘Tough’	prudential	
policy	
implementation.		
• SSM	supervision	
designed	to	
overcome	national	
bias,	regulatory	
capture,	and	
financial	
repression.		
4.5 CONCLUSION	
This	 chapter	 has	 evaluated	 authority	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 the	 Bank	 of	
England	 and	 the	 European	 Central	 Bank.	 It	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 all	 three	
central	 banks	 have	 been	 delegated	 new	 formal	 authority.	 Of	 the	 three	
organisations,	 the	 reformed	 mandate	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 is	 by	 far	 the	
broadest.	In	addition	to	its	monetary	policy	functions,	the	Bank	has	operational	
control	 over	 all	 aspects	 of	 financial	 stability	 policy	 including	 microprudential	
policy,	macroprudential	policy	and	crisis	management.	 In	contrast,	neither	 the	
Federal	 Reserve	 nor	 the	 ECB	 has	 been	 assigned	 responsibility	 for	 conducting	
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bank	 resolutions,	 although	 both	 will	 be	 responsible	 for	 determining	 when	 a	
bank	has	reached	the	point	of	failure.	Furthermore,	the	formal	authority	of	the	
Fed	and	the	ECB	in	macroprudential	policy	is	not	as	encompassing	as	that	of	the	
Bank	of	England,	although	in	this	domain	the	ECB	has	a	somewhat	greater	role	
than	the	Federal	Reserve.			
In	formal	terms,	the	ECB	remains	the	most	autonomous	of	the	three	central	
banks	after	the	financial	crisis.	This	derives,	first	and	foremost,	from	the	explicit	
provisions	 setting	 out	 its	 independence	 in	 the	 TEU	 and	 similar	 safeguards	
contained	in	the	legislation	establishing	the	SSM	and	the	ESRB.	By	contrast,	the	
Bank	of	England	stands	out	as	the	central	bank	with	the	least	formal	autonomy.	
The	 Treasury	 retains	 strong	 control	 over	 the	 appointments	 process	 and	 new	
legislation	provides	new	mechanisms	by	which	the	government	can	intervene	in	
the	Bank’s	operations.	The	combination	of	a	broad	 financial	 stability	mandate	
and	relatively	little	formal	autonomy	suggests	that	the	Bank	of	England	could	be	
the	most	vulnerable	to	political	intrusion	in	its	operations	in	years	to	come.		
Finally	the	chapter	considered	how	central	banks’	informal	relationships	with	
key	 interlocutors	 had	 changed	 after	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Both	 the	 Federal	
Reserve	 and	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 have	 adopted	 a	 stringent	 approach	 in	 their	
implementation	 of	 prudential	 policies	 after	 the	 crisis.	 The	 ECB-SSM	 is	 a	 new	
institution,	 but	 there	 are	 grounds	 to	 believe	 it	 will	 adopt	 a	 similarly	 robust	
stance	 in	 its	 new	 supervisory	 functions.	 In	 all	 three	 cases,	 legislatures	 remain	
relatively	powerless	to	constrain	the	activity	of	their	central	banks,	although	the	
increased	 level	of	partisanship	 in	 the	US	Congress	 suggests	 it	 exerts	a	greater	
overall	influence	than	its	UK	and	EU	counterparts.		
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Where	 the	 three	 central	 banks	 show	 greater	 differentiation	 is	 in	 their	
relationships	with	executive	politicians.	The	ECB	has	already	proved	its	mettle.	It	
has	openly	intervened	in	the	fiscal	and	macroeconomic	affairs	of	member	states	
and	 it	 has	 been	 unafraid	 to	 wage	 open	 battle	 with	 the	 EU’s	 most	 powerful	
member	 state,	 Germany.	 The	 Bank	 of	 England	 has	 been	 involved	 in	 some	
skirmishes	 with	 the	 government,	 partly	 on	 account	 of	 clashes	 between	 the	
previous	 Governor,	Mervyn	 King,	 and	 the	 Labour	 Chancellor,	 Alastair	 Darling,	
and	partly	on	account	of	the	Bank’s	conservative	stance	in	microprudential	and	
macroprudential	 policy.	 Overall,	 however,	 both	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 and	 the	
Federal	 Reserve	 currently	 enjoy	 good	 relations	 with	 their	 respective	 treasury	
departments.	 Only	 as	 they	 begin	 to	 exit	 from	 their	 extraordinarily	
accommodative	monetary	policy	stance	will	these	central	banks’	authority	vis-à-
vis	executive	politicians	be	truly	tested.		
	
																																																						
1 	The	 DFA	 also	 enhanced	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 in	 relation	 to	
systemically	important	payment,	clearing	and	settlement	systems.	This	includes	
financial	market	utilities,	and	the	payment,	clearing	and	settlement	activities	of	
large	banks	and	non-bank	institutions.		
2	Bear	Stearns	and	Merrill	Lynch	merged	with	banks	already	supervised	by	the	
Federal	 Reserve.	 Goldman	 Sachs	 and	 Morgan	 Stanley	 converted	 into	 bank	
holding	companies.	
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3	The	FCA	also	carries	out	prudential	supervision	of	firms	not	authorised	by	the	
PRA.	 This	 includes	 smaller	 investment	 firms,	 such	 as	 personal	 investment	
companies,	mortgage	intermediaries	and	non-deposit	taking	lenders.		
4	A	‘non-objection’	procedure	is	designed	to	ensure	that	the	Supervisory	Board	
will	be	the	de	facto	decision-maker	on	most	issues.	
5	The	 voting	members	 include	 the	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Treasury,	 the	 Chairman	of	
Federal	Reserve;	the	Comptroller	of	the	Currency;	the	Director	of	the	Bureau	of	
Consumer	 Financial	 Protection;	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Securities	 and	 Exchange	
Commission;	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Federal	 Deposit	 Insurance	 Corporation;	 the	
Chairman	of	 the	Commodity	 Futures	 Trading	Commission;	 the	Director	 of	 the	
Federal	 Housing	 Finance	 Agency;	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 National	 Credit	 Union	
Administration	 Board;	 and	 a	 Presidentially-appointed	 independent	 member	
with	 insurance	 expertise.	 Non-voting	 members	 include	 the	 Director	 of	 the	
Office	 for	Financial	Research,	 the	Director	of	 the	Federal	 Insurance	Office	and	
representatives	from	state-level	banking,	insurance	and	securities	regulators.		
6	The	reforms	that	created	the	ESFS	were	the	first	major	 institutional	overhaul	
of	 financial	 regulation	and	 supervision	 introduced	 in	 response	 to	 the	 financial	
crisis.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 ESRB,	 the	 ESFS	 is	 composed	 of	 three	 ‘European	
Supervisory	 Authorities’	 (ESAs),	 which	 provide	 a	 venue	 for	 intergovernmental	
regulation	and	supervisory	cooperation	in	the	banking,	securities,	insurance	and	
pensions	sectors.		
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7	In	 the	 monetary	 policy	 domain,	 all	 three	 central	 banks	 enjoy	 ‘instrument’	
independence	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 their	 policy	 decisions	 do	 not	 need	 to	 be	
approved	by	executive	politicians.	
8 	This	 is	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘dual	 mandate’	 with	 price	 stability	 and	
moderate	long-term	interest	rates	considered	as	essentially	the	same.		
9	As	 many	 authors	 have	 argued,	 even	 during	 the	 time	 of	 the	 gold	 standard,	
monetary	 policy	 rules	 were	 honoured	 more	 in	 their	 breech	 than	 in	 their	
observation	(see	Eichengreen	2008,	Hall,	R.	2008,	Knafo	2013).	
10 	It	 should	 be	 noted,	 however,	 where	 competent	 authorities	 creatively	
interpret	 European	 rules	 for	 reasons	 of	 economic	 nationalism,	 they	 may	
provoke	a	response	from	the	one	or	more	of	the	ESAs,	which	can	issue	guidance	
to	ensure	uniform	standards	are	applied	across	the	EU.	
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5 MECHANISMS	OF	CHANGE	IN	CENTRAL	BANKING	
5.1 INTRODUCTION	
In	 the	 aftermath	of	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 American,	 British	 and	 European	Union	
(EU)	 policymakers	 delegated	new	 formal	 authority	 to	 their	 central	 banks.	 The	
Federal	Reserve,	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	find	
themselves	with	expanded	mandates	and	a	high	level	of	formal	autonomy,	even	
if	 the	 new	 policy	 areas	 they	 have	 entered	 into	 threaten	 to	 expose	 them	 to	
greater	politicisation	and	scrutiny.	Although	there	are	some	variations	between	
them,	 each	 has	 been	 implementing	 prudential	 policies	 that	 are	 substantially	
more	costly	 for	 the	 large	 systemically	 important	 financial	 institutions	 they	are	
responsible	 for	 overseeing.	 Moreover,	 none	 of	 them	 has	 refrained	 from	
intervening	 in	policy	debates	 that	 lie	beyond	their	 immediate	monetary	policy	
and	financial	stability	mandates.	The	ECB,	in	particular,	has	demonstrated	a	high	
degree	 of	 authority	 in	 its	 relations	 with	 national	 executive	 politicians.	 It	 has	
pursued	 monetary	 policies	 that	 have	 met	 with	 significant	 opposition	 in	
Germany.	At	the	same	time,	it	has	taken	the	unprecedented	step	of	making	its	
interventions	 in	 euro	 area	 sovereign	 bond	 markets	 explicitly	 conditional	 on	
fiscal	austerity	and	neoliberal	structural	reforms.		
This	 chapter	 sets	 out	 to	 explain	 how	 these	 changes	 came	 to	 pass.	
Commentators	on	financial	regulation	often	insist	that	there	exists	a	‘regulatory	
cycle’	 (Braithwaite	 2008;	 see	 also	 Bernstein,	M.	 1955).	 In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 a	
scandal	or	crisis,	a	spasm	of	public	anger	and	the	feeling	that	‘something	ought	
to	be	done	about	it’	compels	politicians	to	react	(Clarke	2000:	25).	They	impose	
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new	regulations,	which	in	retrospect	appear	excessively	stringent	(Green	2012;	
Persaud	2015).	Over	time,	regulations	are	gradually	loosened,	until	some	other	
scandal	or	crisis	starts	the	cycle	over	again.	This	view	suggests	that	a	tightening	
of	prudential	regulation	and	an	enhanced	focus	on	systemic	financial	risks	were	
only	 to	 be	 expected	 after	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 However,	 there	 was	 nothing	
inevitable	about	the	particular	organisational	arrangements	that	have	emerged	
over	the	last	eight	years.	Having	failed	to	identify	financial	stability	risks	prior	to	
the	 financial	 crisis,	 still	 less	 to	 take	action	 to	mitigate	 them,	 it	 is	puzzling	 that	
central	banks	should	have	emerged	as	the	main	beneficiaries	of	the	post-crisis	
reorganisation	of	financial	services	regulation	in	each	of	the	three	jurisdictions	
under	discussion.		
The	 first	 part	 of	 this	 chapter	 argues	 that	 the	 proximate	 cause	 of	 these	
transformations	 was	 the	 policy	 advocacy	 of	 central	 bankers	 themselves	 (cf.	
Baker	 2013a;	 Mackintosh	 2014;	 De	 Rynck	 2015;	 Epstein	 and	 Rhodes	 2016).	
Central	 bankers	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 diagnosing	 the	 inadequacies	 of	 existing	
financial	 regulations	 and	 supervisory	 frameworks.	 They	 also	 promoted	
themselves	 as	 the	 only	 organisations	with	 the	 expertise,	 specialist	 knowledge	
and	political	independence	necessary	to	implement	new	and	improved	policies	
for	 financial	 stability.	 The	 advocacy	 of	 central	 bankers	 resembled	 that	 of	 an	
‘epistemic	 community’	 (Haas	 1992).	 Working	 within	 and	 through	
transgovernmental	 regulatory	 forums	 centred	 on	 the	 Bank	 for	 International	
Settlements	 (BIS),	 central	 bankers	 were	 guided	 by	 a	 broadly	 cohesive	 set	 of	
normative	 beliefs	 about	 the	 role	 that	 central	 banks	 should	 play	 in	 prudential	
regulation	 and	 supervision.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 central	 bankers	 and	 financial	
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experts	promoted	and	popularised	new	macroprudential	ideas	without	entirely	
repudiating	orthodox	‘efficient	markets’	assumptions	or	regulatory	tropes.	The	
precise	mix	 of	 ‘new’	 and	 ‘old’	 thinking	has	 differed	 in	 each	 jurisdiction	 and	 is	
reflected	 in	 the	 different	 policy	 objectives	 and	 styles	 of	 implementation	 that	
each	central	bank	is	choosing	to	pursue	(see	Chapter	6).		
As	 the	previous	chapter	documented,	 the	 institutional	arrangements	 in	 the	
United	 States	 exhibited	 much	 more	 continuity	 than	 in	 the	 other	 two	
jurisdictions.	The	Federal	Reserve	was	empowered	to	carry	out	the	lion’s	share	
of	day-to-day	systemic	risk	regulation,	but	it	was	not	entrusted	with	the	task	of	
identifying	 or	 mitigating	 systemic	 risks.	 Nor	 was	 the	 fragmented	 regulatory	
architecture	 in	 the	United	 States	 reformed.	 The	 transformation	 of	 the	 formal	
authority	of	both	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	ECB	has	been	more	dramatic.	The	
United	 Kingdom	 undertook	 a	 wholesale	 reorganisation	 of	 the	 architecture	 of	
financial	 supervision,	 scrapping	 the	 Financial	 Services	 Authority	 (FSA)	 just	 15	
years	after	its	creation.	In	the	EU,	the	creation	of	the	Banking	Union	represents	
a	 giant	 leap	 towards	 integrated	 financial	 services	 governance	 and	 has	 even	
been	described	as	a	greater	pooling	of	sovereignty	than	the	creation	of	the	euro	
(Buti	 2013;	 Bowles	 2013).	 To	 explain	 these	 divergent	 outcomes,	 this	 chapter	
draws	 upon	 the	 agent-centred	 historical	 institutionalist	 analytical	 framework	
discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2.	 Central	 bankers	 did	 not	write	 their	 new	 ideas	 onto	 a	
tabula	rasa.	Central	bankers’	policy	entrepreneurship	played	out	within	existing	
institutional	 terrains	 and	 existing	 stratifications	 of	 interests	 in	 favour	 of,	 and	
against,	 reform.	These	 local	constraints	are	 the	primary	explanatory	 factor	 for	
the	differentiated	outcomes	in	each	case.	
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Existing	cultural,	political	and	institutional	contexts	help	explain	variations	in	
post-crisis	 delegation	 to	 central	 banks.	 However,	 domestic	 variables	 do	 not	
explain	why	market	 participants	 and	 some	 executive	 politicians	 have	 been	 so	
acquiescent	to	central	banks’	demands	and	policy	preferences	in	contests	over	
prudential	 regulation	 or	 wider	 macroeconomic	 policies.	 To	 explain	 this	
acquiescence,	 the	 second	 part	 of	 this	 chapter	 turns	 to	 a	 more	 indirect	 and	
oblique	 face	 of	 central	 bank	 power.	 It	 argues	 that	 central	 banks’	 authority	 in	
their	 relations	 with	 market	 participants	 and	 governmental	 actors	 has	 been	
underpinned	 by	 the	 heightened	 dependency	 of	 those	 actors	 on	 the	 core	
functions	central	banks	perform.	Most	importantly,	central	banks	are	endowed	
with	 the	unique	capability	of	 creating	and	destroying	new	 ‘base	money’	 (cash	
and	bank	reserves).	This	is	the	basis	of	central	banks	‘structural	power’;	it	gives	
central	 banks	 leverage	 over	 market	 participants	 and	 incumbent	 politicians	
because	 both	 sets	 of	 actors’	 fortunes	 hinge	 on	 how	 central	 banks	 choose	 to	
exercise	this	unique	capability.	
The	chapter	argues	that	the	structural	power	of	central	banks	reached	new	
heights	 during	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Transformations	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 credit	
intermediation	in	Europe	and	the	United	States	in	the	three	decades	leading	up	
to	the	financial	crisis	created	the	illusion	that	financial	markets	and	institutions	
had	broken	free	of	their	traditional	dependence	on	central	bank	support	in	the	
form	of	liquidity	insurance.	In	fact,	indirect	and	implicit	dependence	on	central	
bank	 liquidity	had	 increased.	 This	became	apparent	during	 the	 financial	 crisis,	
when	 central	 banks	 extended	 vast	 loans	 to	 banks	 and	 ‘shadow	 bank’	 entities	
that	had	previously	been	regarded	as	outside	the	purview	of	public	safety	nets.	
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Central	 banks	 transformed	 themselves	 into	 ‘lender	 of	 only	 resort’	 for	 cash-
starved	 financial	 institutions	 (Giles	2008).	They	also	became	 ‘market	maker	of	
last	 resort’,	 buying	 and	 selling	 private	 sector	 securities	 that	 private	 investors	
had	shunned	(Buiter	and	Sibert	2007).	In	this	environment,	the	structural	power	
of	the	financial	 industry	was	diminished	(cf.	Johal	et	al.	2014;	see	also	Chapter	
2).	 The	 threat	 that	 financial	 firms	 would	 ‘exit’	 jurisdictions	 imposing	
unfavourable	 policies	 lacked	 credibility	 and	 the	 generalised	 bias	 towards	
financial	industry	preferences	in	policymaking	circles	was	reduced.	
Executive	politicians	also	became	more	dependent	on	 central	banks	during	
the	 financial	 crisis.	 Unwilling	 or	 unable	 to	 use	 fiscal	 policy	 as	 a	 means	 of	
countercyclical	 adjustment,	monetary	 policy	 became	 ‘the	 only	 game	 in	 town’	
when	 it	 came	 to	 stimulating	 the	 demand	 for	 goods	 and	 services	 (Bini	 Smaghi	
2014;	Buiter	2014).	The	nature	of	the	dependence	of	politicians	on	their	central	
banks	 has,	 however,	 differed	 between	 the	 three	 jurisdictions.	 While	
governments	 in	 all	 three	 jurisdictions	 have	 relied	 on	 their	 central	 banks	 to	
provide	 monetary	 stimulus	 to	 their	 respective	 economies,	 in	 the	 euro	 area	
some	 governments	 came	 to	 depend	 on	 the	 ECB	 to	 help	 restore	 market	
confidence	in	their	sovereign	credit;	this	placed	the	ECB	at	an	unusual	structural	
advantage	 and	 explains	why	 it	 has	 been	 able	 to	 exercise	 such	 a	 high	 level	 of	
influence	over	economic	policies	in	those	countries.	
The	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter	 proceeds	 as	 follows.	 The	 next	 section	
examines	the	role	that	central	bankers	have	played	as	policy	entrepreneurs	 in	
transgovernmental	 networks,	 exploring	 some	 of	 the	 ideational	 contradictions	
apparent	 in	 the	 so-called	macroprudential	 turn	 in	 financial	 regulation.	Next	 it	
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discusses	 the	 policy	 entrepreneurship	 of	 central	 banks	 in	 the	 three	 specific	
jurisdictions	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Section	 5.4	 explores	 the	 structural	
dimension	 of	 central	 bank	 power.	 It	 attributes	 the	 unusual	 degree	 of	
acquiescence	 of	 market	 participants	 and	 governments	 to	 central	 banks’	
preferences	 to	 the	 changed	 dependencies	 of	 those	 actors	 on	 central	 bank	
liquidity	before	and	during	the	financial	crisis.	The	final	section	concludes.	
5.2 A	TRANSGOVERNMENTAL	EPISTEMIC	COMMUNITY	
The	 international	 central	 banking	 community	 is	 highly	 networked	 even	 in	
benign	 economic	 times.	 Central	 bank	 governors	meet	 several	 times	 a	 year	 as	
part	of	the	G7	and	G20	groupings	of	leading	finance	ministries	and	central	banks	
(see	Baker	2006).	In	addition,	central	bank	governors	meet	every	two	months	in	
Switzerland	 at	 the	 BIS,	 the	 ‘central	 bankers’	 central	 bank’.	 International	
cooperation	between	central	banks	in	specific	issue	areas	is	organised	through	
several	BIS-hosted	organisations.	The	most	important	of	these	organisations	are	
the	Basel	Committee	on	Banking	Supervision	(BCBS)	and	the	Financial	Stability	
Board	(FSB)	(which	was	known	as	the	Financial	Stability	Forum	before	2009).		
From	 the	 latter	 half	 of	 2007,	 international	 cooperation	 between	 central	
banks	 stepped	 up	 even	 further.	 As	 Mackintosh	 (2014)	 has	 argued,	 an	 elite,	
close-knit,	 group	 of	 central	 bankers	 and	 some	 non-central	 bank	 financial	
supervisors	from	a	small	number	of	Western	economies	acted	as	an	‘epistemic	
community’	(Haas	1992)	in	providing	political	leaders	of	the	G20	countries	with	
diagnoses	of	 the	 regulatory	 failings	 that	had	contributed	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis	
and	 prescriptions	 for	 remedial	 institutional	 and	 regulatory	 reforms.	 At	 the	
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international	level,	one	of	the	early	achievements	of	this	epistemic	community	
was	to	persuade	G20	political	leaders	to	transform	the	Financial	Stability	Forum	
–	a	somewhat	neglected	transgovernmental	network	of	central	bank	governors	
that	had	been	created	in	1999	–	into	the	FSB,	with	a	mandate	to	identify	risks,	
find	 solutions	 and	 promote	 national	 compliance	 with	 international	 financial	
standards.	One	of	the	principal	architects	of	this	reform	was	Tim	Geithner,	the	
President	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Bank	 of	 New	 York	 (FRBNY)	who	 became	US	
Treasury	Secretary	in	2009.	Geithner	(2009a)	billed	the	FSB	as	a	‘fourth	pillar’	of	
the	 global	 financial	 architecture,	 alongside	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	
(IMF),	 the	World	Bank	and	 the	World	Trade	Organisation.	 The	FSB	 in	 fact	has	
few	 formal	 powers	 beyond	 those	 of	 its	 predecessor	 organisation	 (Helleiner	
2014).	 Still,	 its	 creation	 represented	 an	 early	 triumph	 for	 the	 central	 banking	
community	as	it	cemented	the	position	of	central	banks	as	the	leading	actors	in	
designing	international	rules	and	standards	for	financial	stability.	Notably,	some	
commentators	viewed	the	creation	of	the	FSB	as	a	defeat	for	the	International	
Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF),	 which	 might	 have	 been	 expected	 to	 take	 the	 lead	 in	
global	 financial	governance	after	 the	 financial	crisis	 (author	 interview,	 June	11	
2014,	by	phone).			
The	elite	central	banking	community	very	publicly	embraced	the	call	for	new	
macro-prudential	approaches	to	financial	stability.	Building	on	Peter	Hall’s	much	
cited	 research	 on	 policy	 paradigms	 (Hall,	 P.	 1993),	 Andrew	 Baker	 (2013a:	 17)	
characterised	this	embrace	as	an	example	of	‘third	order’	policy	change;	that	is,	
‘a	radical	change	in	the	overarching	terms	of	policy	discourse,	 in	the	hierarchy	
of	goals	behind	policy	and	in	causal	assumptions	or	accounts	of	how	the	world	
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facing	policymakers	actually	works’.	Prior	to	the	crisis,	efficient	markets	thinking	
had	 informed	 common	 sense	 assumptions	 and	 economic	 rationales	
underpinning	 regulatory	policies.	Markets	were	assumed	 to	clear,	asset	prices	
were	 assumed	 to	 be	 objective	 reflections	 of	 all	 available	 information	 and	
financial	innovation	was	assumed	to	disperse	risk	to	those	who	were	best	able	
to	bear	it	(cf.	Turner	2009a,	2011).		
Baker	 identifies	 four	 key	 concepts	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 what	 he	 regards	 as	 a	
dominant	 new	 ‘interpretative	 frame’	 in	 the	 elite	 central	 banking	 community:	
these	 are	 ‘fallacies	 of	 composition’,	 ‘pro-cyclicality’,	 ‘herding’,	 and	 ‘complex	
interconnectedness’.	Each	of	these	concepts	implies	a	reorientation	of	financial	
regulation	 and	 supervision.	 Recognition	 that	 markets	 are	 characterised	 by	
fallacies	of	composition	suggests	the	need	to	refocus	regulation	away	from	the	
behaviour	of	individual	firms	towards	the	risks	emerging	from	the	behaviour	of	
collectivities.	 Recognition	 that	 markets	 are	 subject	 to	 pro-cyclical	 dynamics	
suggests	the	need	for	time-varying	policies	to	‘lean	against’	the	build-up	of	risks	
over	a	financial	cycle.	Recognition	that	investors	are	prone	to	herding	suggests	
that	firms	should	become	more	resilient	to	periods	of	exceptional	market	stress,	
when	 normally	 liquid	 markets	 suddenly	 dry	 up.	 Finally,	 recognition	 of	
complexity	 and	 interconnectedness	 suggests	 that	 in	 addition	 to	 dynamic	
countercyclical	policies,	time-invariant	structural	reforms	are	needed	to	address	
the	distribution	of	risk	within	the	financial	system.	The	aim	of	such	policies	is	to	
ensure	 that	 financial	 losses	 in	 one	 firm	 or	market	 segment	 do	 not	 propagate	
throughout	the	global	financial	system	as	a	whole	(see	Chapter	6).	
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Baker	(2013a)	and	Baker	and	Widmaier	(2014)	view	macroprudential	ideas	as	
a	repudiation	of	the	old	 ‘efficient	markets’	 interpretive	frame	(see	also	Tucker	
2011).	 Similarly,	 Mackintosh	 (2014:	 27)	 views	 the	 transformation	 in	 central	
bankers’	 ideas	 as	 nothing	 less	 than	 a	 ‘paradigm	 shift	 in	 the	 global	 regulatory	
approach	 to	 financial	 markets’.	 However,	 there	 is	 considerable	 continuity	
between	 the	 pre-	 and	 post-crisis	 dominant	 intellectual	 frameworks	 guiding	
financial	regulation.	New	macroprudential	ideas	have	not	entirely	displaced	the	
old	 orthodoxy.	 Instead,	 new	 ideas	 have	 come	 to	 rest	 alongside	 existing	
assumptions	 and	 accounts	 of	 how	 markets	 operate.	 Arguably,	 the	 notion	 of	
‘ideational	 layering’	 is	 a	 more	 accurate	 description	 of	 the	 intellectual	
transformation	 that	has	occurred	 than	 ‘paradigm	shifts’	or	 ‘third	order’	policy	
change.	 To	 paraphrase	 Carstensen	 (2011)	 central	 bankers	 and	 associated	
financial	 policymakers	 have	 been	more	 like	 ‘bricoleurs’	 than	 ‘paradigm	men’.	
That	 is	to	say,	they	have	pragmatically	and	creatively	combined	old	 ideas	with	
new	 ones	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 respects	 political	 and	 cultural	 logics,	 rather	 than	
logical	coherence.		
Incoherency	 and	 bricolage	 is	 clearly	 evident	 in	 one	 of	 the	most	 important	
areas	of	post-crisis	 reregulation,	namely,	bank	capital	adequacy	 requirements.	
In	 2010,	 the	 BCBS	 agreed	 a	 new	 iteration	 of	 its	 international	 framework	 for	
bank	 capital	 regulation.	 ‘Basel	 III’,	 as	 the	 agreement	 is	 known,	 contains	 an	
ostensibly	 countercyclical	 macroprudential	 instrument	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	
‘countercyclical	 capital	 buffer’	 (CCB).	 Despite	 its	 name,	 the	 CCB	 is	 based	 on	
orthodox	 economic	 analysis	 and	 an	 essentially	 microprudential	 logic	 of	
strengthening	 banks’	 resilience,	 rather	 than	 ‘leaning	 against’	 the	 build	 up	 of	
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risks	before	they	crystallise.	The	BCBS	guidance	on	the	CCB	makes	clear	that	the	
CCB	 is	 intended	 to	 ensure	 that	 banks	 build	 up	 an	 additional	 cushion	 of	 loss	
absorbing	capital	during	periods	of	credit	growth	so	that	the	banking	system	as	
a	whole	will	have	sufficient	capital	on	hand	to	withstand	a	subsequent	period	of	
financial	stress,	without	banks’	solvency	being	questioned.	The	CCB	is	explicitly	
not	 intended	 as	 a	 means	 of	 dampening	 the	 growth	 of	 credit	 during	 boom	
periods,	still	less	as	a	means	of	stabilising	asset	prices.	That	its	use	could	play	a	
role	in	curbing	the	credit	cycle	is	to	be	considered	a	fortuitous	side	benefit	only	
(BCBS	2010).		
The	reluctance	to	justify	the	CCB	as	anything	other	than	a	means	of	boosting	
banks’	 resilience	 in	 the	 face	 of	 financial	 cycles	 is	 attributable	 to	 the	 enduring	
resonance	of	rational	expectations	finance	theory	within	the	transgovernmental	
community	of	central	bankers	and	associated	financial	policymakers	involved	in	
crafting	 post-crisis	 capital	 regulations.	 Many	 members	 of	 this	 elite	 central	
banking	 community,	 as	 well	 as	 some	 highly	 influential	 academic	 economists,	
base	 their	 thinking	 on	 bank	 capital	 regulation	 on	 applications	 of	 the	 1958	
Modigliani-Miller	 (MM)	 theorem	 to	 the	 banking	 sector	 (Miles	 et	 al.	 2011,	
Admati	et	al.	2011,	Admati	and	Hellwig	2013,	Tucker	2013).	The	MM	theorem	
states	 that	 ceteris	 paribus,	 the	 particular	 mix	 of	 debt	 and	 equity	 in	 a	 firm’s	
funding	 structure	 is	 irrelevant	 for	 its	 overall	 funding	 costs.	 This	 is	 because	
investors	will	‘reward’	better	capitalised	firms	by	charging	less	to	lend	to	them	
(see	Modigliani	and	Miller	1958).	Applied	to	banks,	the	MM	theorem	suggests	
that	 requiring	 a	 bank	 to	 have	 more	 capital	 will	 not	 affect	 its	 overall	 cost	 of	
funding,	nor,	 in	turn,	 its	propensity	to	 lend.	Significantly,	 the	Modigliani-Miller	
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theorem	 augurs	 against	 using	 capital	 requirements	 as	 a	 means	 of	 leaning	
against	 credit	 cycles	 since	 it	 suggests	 that	 varying	 capital	will	 not	 –	of	 itself	 –	
vary	 the	 cost	 of	 funding	 for	 banks	or	 affect	 their	 propensity	 to	 lend	 (see	 also	
Miles	et	al.	2011).1	At	the	same	time,	because	the	MM	theorem	views	capital	as	
inherently	 costless	 for	 a	 bank,	 it	 also	 justifies	 requiring	 banks	 to	 have	
significantly	more	capital	at	all	times	as	a	buffer	against	losses.	Thus,	adherence	
to	the	MM	view	plays	 into	re-regulatory	anti-bank	sentiment	of	the	post-crisis	
era,	 in	which	 there	 is	 broad	political	 and	public	 support	 for	 imposing	 tougher	
prudential	standards	on	individual	firms.	
As	 a	 central	 plank	 of	 the	 old	 efficient	 markets	 orthodoxy,	 the	Modigliani-
Miller	 starts	 from	 the	 basic	 assumption	 that	 the	 aggregation	 of	 individually	
rational	 decisions	 will	 lead	 to	 collectively	 rational	 outcomes:	 markets	 will	
recognise	how	much	safer	a	better	capitalised	bank	has	become	and	reward	it	
with	 just	 the	 right	 offset	 in	 the	 form	 of	 lower	 borrowing	 costs.	 Such	 an	
assumption	 is	 clearly	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 thrust	 of	 much	 macro-prudential	
thinking,	 in	 which	 investors	 are	 viewed	 as	 perpetually	 myopic	 and	 prone	 to	
herding	 (Persaud	 2000,	 Gennaioli	 et	 al.	 2012),	 and	 markets	 as	 a	 whole	 pass	
through	 gyrations	 of	 excessive	 credit	 expansion	 and	 periodic	 crises	 (Minsky	
1986,	 Kindleberger	 2011[1978]).	 Recognising	 that	 the	 macroprudential	
ideational	 shift	has	 in	 fact	 involved	a	 splicing	 together	of	elements	of	old	and	
new	thinking	about	the	operation	of	markets	is	important	for	understanding	the	
differential	 policy	 directions	 that	 each	 central	 bank	 has	 taken	 in	 the	 financial	
stability	 arena	 after	 the	 crisis	 (see	 Chapter	 6).	 Suffice	 it	 here	 to	 say	 that	 the	
embrace	 of	 new	 ideas	 has	 differed	 across	 the	 three	 cases.	 This	 differential	
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embrace	 has	 also	 been	 reflected	 in	 the	 actions	 of	 central	 bankers	 as	 policy	
entrepreneurs	in	their	respective	domestic	jurisdictions,	to	which	we	now	turn.		
5.3 CENTRAL	BANKS	AS	DOMESTIC	POLICY	ENTREPRENEURS	
5.3.1 REFORMING	US	FINANCIAL	REGULATION	
The	 strengthening	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 delegated	 authority	 after	 the	
financial	 crisis	 is	mainly	 attributable	 to	 the	 actions	 and	 preferences	 of	 senior	
officials	 in	 the	 US	 administration	 and	 representatives	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve.	
When	the	Obama	Administration	took	office	 in	2009,	 it	quickly	began	working	
on	 a	white	 paper	 that	would	 provide	 a	 blueprint	 for	 the	 regulatory	 overhaul.	
The	 key	 figure	 responsible	 for	 the	 reforms	 was	 Treasury	 Secretary	 Geithner.	
Geithner	 would	 ensure	 that	 Federal	 Reserve	 officials	 played	 a	 central	 role	 in	
drafting	the	reforms,	inviting	a	number	of	his	former	colleagues	from	the	Fed	to	
the	Treasury	to	work	on	the	proposals.	This	included	Patrick	Parkinson,	a	senior	
Federal	Reserve	economist	who	would	go	on	to	become	the	head	of	the	Fed’s	
Division	 for	 Banking	 Supervision	 and	 Regulation	 later	 in	 2009.	 Another	
influential	 figure	 in	 the	 administration	 was	 Larry	 Summers,	 Chairman	 of	 the	
Council	of	Economic	Advisors.	It	was	public	knowledge	that	Summers	harboured	
ambitions	of	succeeding	Ben	Bernanke	as	Chairman	of	the	Federal	Reserve	and,	
indeed,	he	narrowly	failed	to	do	so	when	Bernanke	stepped	down	in	2014.		
Many	 Congressional	 lawmakers	 were	 instinctively	 opposed	 to	 delegating	
more	 authority	 to	 the	 Federal	 Reserve.	As	 discussed	 in	Chapter	 3,	 the	United	
States	has	a	long	tradition	of	populist	antipathy	towards	central	banks	(see	also	
Lavelle	2013).	In	early	2009,	distrust	of	the	Federal	Reserve	had	spread	beyond	
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the	 libertarian	wing	 of	 the	Republican	 Party	 to	 include	moderate	Republicans	
and	many	Democrats.	Congressman	Barney	Frank,	Chair	of	the	House	Financial	
Services	 Committee	 and	 a	 key	 ally	 of	 the	 Administration	 in	 Congress,	 initially	
supported	making	 the	central	bank	 the	systemic	 risk	 regulator	 (Guha	and	Van	
Duyn	2009)	but	he	changed	his	mind	in	March	2009	following	revelations	that	
Fed	officials	had	known	about,	but	declined	to	prevent,	the	payment	of	bonuses	
to	 executives	 at	 the	bailed-out	 insurance	 giant	AIG	 (Kaiser	 2013).	 Lawmakers’	
opposition	reflected	public	opinion	at	the	time:	one	poll	conducted	in	June	2009	
placed	 the	 Fed	 last	 in	 a	 list	 of	 nine	 government	 departments	 and	 agencies	 in	
terms	of	levels	of	public	approval	(Saad	2009).	
Officials	 from	 other	 regulatory	 authorities	 joined	 Dodd,	 Frank	 and	 other	
Congressional	 figures	 in	 their	 opposition	 to	 an	 expanded	 role	 for	 the	 Fed.	
Prominent	 among	 this	 group	 was	 the	 Chair	 of	 the	 Federal	 Deposit	 Insurance	
Corporation	 (FDIC),	 Sheila	 Bair.	 Under	 Bair’s	 leadership,	 the	 FDIC	 had	
guaranteed	 vast	 quantities	 of	 bank	 debt	 as	 part	 of	 the	 package	 of	 measures	
introduced	 alongside	 the	 Bush	 Administration’s	 $700	 billion	 Troubled	 Asset	
Relief	 Programme	 (TARP).	 Even	 so,	 she	 was	 a	 vociferous	 critic	 of	 ‘bailouts’,	
including	 both	 government	 capital	 injections	 and	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	
emergency	lending	schemes.	Bair	opposed	greater	delegation	to	the	Fed	on	the	
grounds	that	it	had	already	overstepped	its	mandate	and	had	not	been	held	to	
account	 for	what	 she	 saw	as	 overly	 generous	 treatment	 of	 failing	 banks	 (Bair	
2012).	She	was	also	vigorous	in	defending	the	FDIC’s	bureaucratic	prerogatives,	
especially	 its	 potential	 role	 in	 new	 mechanisms	 for	 resolving	 systemically	
important	financial	institutions.			
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Notwithstanding	 the	 Fed’s	 manifold	 opponents,	 the	 administration’s	
subsequent	white	 paper,	 released	 in	 June	 2009,	was	 highly	 favourable	 to	 the	
central	bank	(see	US	Department	of	the	Treasury	2009).	It	proposed	to	establish	
the	 Federal	 Reserve	 as	 the	 supervisor	 of	 a	 new	 category	 of	 systemically	
important	 financial	 holding	 companies	 (which	 it	 termed	 ‘Tier	 1	 FHCs’)	 and	 it	
would	be	down	to	the	central	bank	to	decide	which	firms	classified	as	such.	The	
Fed	would	then	have	the	authority	to	subject	these	firms	to	higher	capital	and	
liquidity	requirements,	commensurate	with	the	systemic	risks	they	posed.	As	a	
concession	 to	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 opponents	 (especially	 Bair),	 the	 white	
paper	also	proposed	to	establish	a	Financial	Services	Oversight	Council	(FSOC)2	
to	 help	 existing	 agencies	 to	 work	 together	 on	 systemic	 issues.	 However,	 the	
white	paper	envisaged	the	FSOC	would	have	a	limited	mandate:	it	would	serve	
advisory	and	coordinative	functions	only,	with	no	powers	to	compel	compliance	
with	its	advice.		
During	 the	 yearlong	 legislative	 battle	 that	 took	place	 in	 Congress	 following	
the	 publication	 of	 the	 white	 paper,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 and	 its	 allies	 in	 the	
administration	fought	a	concerted	battle	to	protect	and	potentially	strengthen	
the	central	bank’s	formal	authority	in	respect	of	financial	stability.	 In	speeches	
and	 official	 testimony,	 Federal	 Reserve	 officials	 strenuously	 defended	 their	
expertise	 and	 they	 emphasised	 the	 complementarities	 between	 financial	
stability	policy	and	monetary	policy.	For	example,	Daniel	Tarullo,	 the	Board	of	
Governors	member	with	responsibility	for	supervisory	 issues,	told	a	hearing	of	
the	Senate	Banking	Committee	in	2009:	
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There	 are	 some	 important	 synergies	 between	 systemic	 risk	 regulation	 and	
monetary	policy,	as	 insights	garnered	 from	each	of	 those	 functions	 informs	
the	 performance	 of	 the	 other.	 Close	 familiarity	 with	 private	 credit	
relationships,	 particularly	 among	 the	 largest	 financial	 institutions	 and	
through	 critical	 payment	 and	 settlement	 systems,	 makes	 monetary	 policy	
makers	better	able	 to	anticipate	how	their	actions	will	affect	 the	economy.	
Conversely,	 the	 substantial	 economic	 analysis	 that	 accompanies	 monetary	
policy	 decisions	 can	 reveal	 potential	 vulnerabilities	 of	 financial	 institutions	
(Tarullo	2009).	
	
Geithner	 pointed	 to	 an	 emerging	 international	 consensus	 over	 the	 role	 of	
central	 banks	 in	 financial	 stability	 policy.	 Testifying	 in	 Congress,	 he	 alluded	 to	
the	unhappy	record	of	the	UK	FSA	as	evidence	against	the	case	for	stripping	the	
Federal	Reserve	of	its	supervisory	authority:		
	
If	 you	 look	 at	 the	 experience	 of	 countries	 in	 this	 financial	 crisis	 who	 have	
taken	 [supervision]	 away	 from	 their	 central	 bank…	 I	 think	 they	 found	
themselves	in	a	substantially	worse	position	than	we	did	as	a	country,	with	in	
many	ways	a	worse	crisis,	with	more	leverage	in	their	banking	systems,	with	
less	 capacity	 to	 act	 when	 the	 crisis	 unfolded…	 The	model	 where	 you	 take	
those	responsibilities	away	from	the	central	bank	and	vest	them	somewhere	
is	 not	 an	 encouraging	 model,	 in	 our	 judgment.	 I	 think	 you	 see	 those	
countries,	 if	 you	 listen	 carefully,	 moving	 in	 the	 other	 direction	 (Geithner	
2009b).	
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Ultimately,	these	appeals	were	successful	and	the	basic	design	for	systemic	risk	
regulation	put	 forward	 in	 the	administration’s	white	paper	became	 law	 in	 the	
form	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Consumer	Protection	and	Wall	Street	Reform	Act	(DFA).	
While	 the	 terminology	 of	 ‘Tier	 1	 FHCs’	 was	 dropped,	 the	 central	 bank	 did	
become	the	regulator	of	systemically	important	firms.	However,	more	authority	
was	handed	to	the	FSOC	than	either	the	Federal	Reserve	or	the	administration	
would	have	preferred.	Most	notably,	the	FSOC,	rather	than	the	Fed,	ended	up	
with	the	authority	to	designate	firms	as	systemically	important.	This	has	proven	
to	be	a	major	impediment	to	effective	macroprudential	regulation.		
While	the	DFA	strengthened	the	Federal	Reserve’s	authority,	it	was,	overall,	
an	incremental	reform	of	the	US	regulatory	system.	It	did	not	tackle	the	issue	of	
fragmentation:	one	agency	(the	Office	of	Thrift	Supervision)	was	abolished,	but	
two	 more	 (the	 FSOC	 and	 the	 Consumer	 Financial	 Protection	 Bureau)	 were	
created.	Moreover,	regulation	in	the	United	States	continues	to	be	institution-
focused.	 Firms	 are	 regulated	 according	 to	 the	 legal	 category	 they	 fall	 into,	
rather	 than	 according	 to	 the	 functions	 they	 perform.	 The	 system	 remains	
geared	 towards	 a	 microprudential	 approach	 to	 financial	 stability	 policy.	 The	
broad	 continuity	 between	 the	 pre-	 and	 post-crisis	 regulatory	 landscapes	 is	 in	
part	a	 reflection	of	 the	half-hearted	embrace	of	macroprudential	policy	 in	 the	
United	 States	 (Baker	 2014:	 177).	 Whether	 in	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 or	 in	 the	
administration,	 financial	 policymakers	 in	 the	 United	 States	 have	 consistently	
exhibited	a	preference	for	building	resilience	of	financial	institutions	rather	than	
‘leaning	 against’	 the	 emergence	 of	 credit	 bubbles	 or	 other	 imbalances	 in	
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particular	markets	(see	Chapter	6).	Writing	after	leaving	office,	Geithner	(2014)	
noted		
	
I	 didn’t	 think	 there	 was	much	 we	 could	 do	 about	manias	 and	 beliefs.	We	
couldn’t	ban	fads	or	mandate	judicious	thinking	[…]	I	always	thought	our	top	
reform	 priority	 should	 be	 more	 conservative	 rules	 requiring	 financial	
institutions	to	hold	more	capital.	
	
The	incremental	nature	of	the	US	reforms	is,	however,	also	attributable	to	the	
inertia	 generated	 by	 the	 highly	 institutionalised	 and	 fragmented	 nature	 of	
power	 in	 the	 US	 regulatory	 system.	 Early	 on	 in	 the	 reform	 process,	 the	
Administration	decided	not	 to	pursue	an	ambitious	overhaul	of	 the	regulatory	
architecture.	Officials	reasoned	that	any	such	proposal	would	engender	a	power	
struggle	 between	 the	 existing	 regulatory	 agencies	 and	 between	 the	
Congressional	committees	responsible	for	overseeing	them.	This	would	slow	the	
progress	of	 the	 reforms	 and	use	up	 valuable	political	 capital.	 Commenting	on	
the	 possibility	 of	merging	 the	 Securities	 and	 Exchange	 Commission	 (SEC)	 and	
the	 Commodities	 Futures	 Trading	 Commission	 (CFTC),	 Barney	 Frank	 allegedly	
told	Tim	Geithner,	‘Sure,	you	can	merge	the	SEC	and	the	CFTC.	You	just	can’t	do	
it	 in	 the	United	 States’	 (Geithner	 2014:	 401).	 Likewise,	when	 the	Chair	 of	 the	
influential	 Senate	 Banking	 Committee,	 Senator	 Chris	 Dodd,	 proposed	 to	
transform	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 Comptroller	 of	 the	 Currency	 into	 a	 new	 ‘super-
regulator’	 along	 similar	 lines	 to	 the	 FSA	 in	 the	United	 Kingdom,	 the	 proposal	
was	 attacked	 from	 all	 angles.	 According	 to	 Bair	 (2012)	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	
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‘pulled	out	 all	 the	 stops’	 to	defend	 its	 supervisory	powers.	At	 the	 same	 time,	
community	banks	and	thrifts	lobbied	against	the	reforms,	fearing	they	would	be	
required	to	submit	to	overly	burdensome	regulations	designed	with	large	global	
banks	in	mind.	Geithner	(2014:	402)	later	wrote	of	the	proposal:	‘it	was	dead	on	
arrival’.		
5.3.2 REFORMING	UK	FINANCIAL	REGULATION	
In	the	United	States	an	alliance	between	central	bankers	and	a	recently	installed	
administration	 resulted	 in	 a	 strengthened	 central	 bank	 mandate	 within	 the	
context	 of	 incremental	 change	 in	 the	 overall	 regulatory	 architecture.	 In	 the	
United	 Kingdom,	 a	 similar	 alliance	 between	 the	 central	 bank	 and	 a	 recently	
installed	 government	 resulted	 in	 a	 fundamental	 redesign	 of	 the	 system	 of	
financial	supervision	in	the	UK	and	a	major	expansion	in	the	formal	authority	of	
the	central	bank.				
Party	politics	played	an	important	role	in	the	UK	case	(cf.	Johal	et	al.	2012).	
Over	the	course	of	2009,	the	Labour	administration	had	resolved	to	institute	a	
set	of	 incremental	 reforms	 to	 the	architecture	 for	 financial	 supervision	 that	 it	
had	put	in	place	when	it	entered	office	in	1997.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	this	
consisted	 of	 a	 tripartite	 arrangement	 in	 which	 responsibility	 for	 financial	
stability	was	 shared	between	 the	Treasury,	 the	Bank	of	England,	and	 the	FSA,	
the	 latter	 organisation	 being	 a	 universal	 ‘one-stop-shop’	 regulator	 and	
supervisor	for	the	entire	financial	services	industry.	The	Labour	administration’s	
post-crisis	reforms	involved	altering	the	statutory	basis	of	both	the	FSA	and	the	
Bank	 of	 England	 so	 that	 both	 organisations	 would	 have	 a	 legal	 objective	 to	
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maintain	 financial	 stability.	 It	 also	 involved	 creating	 a	 new	 ‘Financial	 Stability	
Committee’	within	 the	Bank	of	England	 to	give	strategic	direction	on	how	the	
Bank	 should	 meet	 its	 new	 financial	 stability	 objective	 and	 to	 consider	 issues	
relating	to	the	Bank’s	powers	to	resolve	individual	institutions.		
During	 this	period,	 the	Governor	of	 the	Bank,	Mervyn	King,	began	 to	make	
public	his	view	that	the	Bank	should	be	delegated	additional	powers	in	relation	
to	prudential	regulation	and	supervision.	At	the	annual	Mansion	House	dinner	
in	June	2009,	he	offered	the	following	metaphor	to	describe	the	Bank’s	existing	
financial	stability	capabilities:	
	
The	 Bank	 finds	 itself	 in	 a	 position	 rather	 like	 that	 of	 a	 church	 whose	
congregation	 attends	 weddings	 and	 burials	 but	 ignores	 the	 sermons	 in	
between.	Like	the	church,	we	cannot	promise	that	bad	things	won’t	happen	
to	 our	 flock	 –	 the	 prevention	 of	 all	 financial	 crises	 is	 in	 neither	 our	 nor	
anyone	 else’s	 power,	 as	 a	 study	 of	 history	 or	 human	 nature	would	 reveal.	
And	 experience	 suggests	 that	 attempts	 to	 encourage	 a	 better	 life	 through	
the	power	of	voice	is	not	enough.	Warnings	are	unlikely	to	be	effective	when	
people	 are	 being	 asked	 to	 change	 behaviour	 that	 seems	 to	 them	 highly	
profitable.	So	it	is	not	entirely	clear	how	the	Bank	will	be	able	to	discharge	its	
new	 statutory	 responsibility	 if	 we	 can	 do	 no	 more	 than	 issue	 sermons	 or	
organise	burials	(King	2009).		
	
Sitting	 beside	 the	 Governor	 as	 he	 delivered	 those	 remarks	 was	 a	 deeply	
unimpressed	 Chancellor	 of	 the	 Exchequer,	 Alistair	 Darling.	 In	 his	 subsequent	
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memoir,	 Darling	 recalled	 that	 King’s	 speech	 ‘was	 a	 naked	 attempt	 to	 wrest	
powers	from	the	FSA.	As	such	–	and	all	those	present	knew	it	–	it	was	a	direct	
challenge	to	government	policy,	and	therefore	to	me’	(Darling	2011:	254).		
The	governor’s	desire	to	recapture	the	Bank’s	lost	supervisory	powers	found	
a	 more	 favourable	 reception	 with	 the	 opposition	 Conservative	 Party.	 In	 the	
autumn	of	2008,	the	Conservatives	had	employed	Sir	James	Sassoon,	previously	
a	senior	official	 in	the	Treasury	and	a	former	 investment	banker,	 to	conduct	a	
review	of	the	regulatory	architecture	in	the	UK.	Published	the	following	spring,	
Sassoon’s	Tripartite	Review	argued	that	macroprudential	policy	should	be	at	the	
heart	of	any	new	regime	and	that	the	Bank	of	England	was	the	organisation	best	
placed	for	the	job	(Tripartite	Review	2009).	The	review	also	mooted	the	idea	of	
moving	 to	 a	 ‘twin	 peaks’	 regulatory	 structure	 (discussed	 in	 Chapter	 4),	which	
would	 involve	 abolishing	 the	 FSA	 and	 replacing	 it	 with	 two	 new	 regulatory	
agencies,	 one	 responsible	 for	 conduct-of-business	 issues	 and	 one	 responsible	
for	micro-prudential	regulation	and	supervision	under	the	control	of	the	Bank	of	
England.	 Shortly	 after	 the	 publication	 of	 this	 review,	 the	 Conservative	 Party	
adopted	 the	 twin	 peaks	 proposal	 as	 its	 official	 policy,	 setting	 out	 in	 a	 white	
paper	the	basic	outline	of	the	regulatory	regime	that	would	be	created	after	the	
2010	General	Election	(Conservatives	2009).	
Critics	 of	 the	 Conservatives’	 proposed	 reforms	 argued	 it	 was	 merely	 a	
smokescreen	for	a	lack	of	action	on	issues	of	substance,	particularly	their	refusal	
to	back	an	outright	prohibition	on	banks	performing	both	retail	and	investment	
banking	 functions	 (Gapper	 2009).	 It	 is	 certainly	 the	 case	 that	 the	 proposals	
represented	 an	 opportune	 means	 for	 the	 opposition	 Conservative	 Party	 to	
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differentiate	 itself	 from	 the	 Labour	 government	 (cf.	 Johal	 et	 al.	 2012).	
Embarrassingly	 for	 the	 Conservatives,	 this	 interpretation	 of	 their	 motivations	
was	 lent	credence	when	leaked	diplomatic	cables	revealed	that	Governor	King	
had	 told	 the	 US	 ambassador	 that	 the	 then	 leader	 of	 the	 opposition	 David	
Cameron	and	his	then	Shadow	Chancellor	George	Osborne	‘had	a	tendency	to	
think	 about	 issues	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 politics,	 and	 how	 they	 might	 affect	 Tory	
electorability’	(Leigh	and	Wintour	2010)	
Yet	 the	 Conservative’s	 proposals	 were	 also	 in	 line	 with	 the	 policy	
prescriptions	 of	 the	 transgovernmental	 community	 of	 central	 bankers	 and	
financial	 policy	 experts.	 Lord	 Sassoon	 defended	 his	 proposals	 by	 pointing	 to	
supportive	 statements	 on	 the	 role	 of	 central	 banks	 in	macroprudential	 policy	
from	the	Financial	Stability	Forum	and	the	US	Treasury	(Armitstead	and	Aldrick	
2009).	He	also	expressed	his	strong	support	for	the	work	of	the	Chairman	of	the	
FSA,	Adair	Turner,	who	was	simultaneously	carrying	out	a	more	detailed	review	
of	 the	 underlying	 causes	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Turner	 was	 an	 enthusiastic	
advocate	 for	 macroprudential	 policy,	 including	 policies	 to	 ‘lean	 against’	 the	
build	up	of	credit	bubbles	such	as	countercyclical	capital	requirements	and	loan-
to-value	 ratios	 on	 mortgage	 lending.	 Neither	 the	 Tripartite	 Review	 nor	 the	
Conservative’s	 white	 paper	 delved	 deeply	 into	 the	 instruments	 for	
macroprudential	policy,	but	neither	did	either	of	them	demur	from	the	need	to	
establish	 countercyclical	 macroprudential	 policies.	 Indeed,	 Sassoon’s	 review	
even	 contained	 an	 approving	 description	 of	 Spain’s	 experience	with	 ‘dynamic	
provisioning’,	which	was	a	 rare	example	of	a	Western	central	bank	employing	
countercyclical	macroprudential	 policy	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 In	
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short,	 the	 substance	 of	 the	 reforms	 involved	 establishing	 a	 countercyclical	
macroprudential	 policy	 framework	 operated	 by	 the	 central	 bank.	 While	 this	
represented	a	winning	electoral	strategy	for	the	Conservative	party,	it	was	also	
a	triumph	for	the	central	banking	community.	
The	post-crisis	reorganisation	of	financial	services	regulation	and	supervision	
involved	 considerably	 more	 discontinuity	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 than	 in	 the	
United	States.	While	this	is	partly	a	reflection	of	the	UK	authorities’	enthusiasm	
for	macroprudential	 policy,	 it	was	 also	 a	 product	 of	 the	 centralised	 nature	 of	
power	in	the	United	Kingdom’s	system	of	government.	With	a	working	majority	
in	Parliament,	the	Conservative-Liberal	Democrat	government	faced	few	major	
impediments	 in	 implementing	 its	 chosen	 policies.	 UK	 parliamentarians	 did	
succeed	 in	 persuading	 the	 government	 to	 make	 some	 changes	 to	 the	 2012	
Financial	Services	Bill	that	would	establish	the	new	regime	in	law.	For	example,	
rules	clarifying	the	right	of	the	Chancellor	to	overrule	the	Bank	of	England	in	a	
crisis	 situation	 were	 included	 at	 the	 suggestion	 of	 the	 Treasury	 Select	
Committee	 (see	Chapter	 4).	However,	 lawmakers	made	no	high-level	 changes	
on	a	par	with	those	introduced	by	the	US	Congress	in	the	negotiations	over	the	
DFA.		
The	absence	of	a	major	turf	war	between	different	regulatory	agencies	also	
facilitated	 the	 more	 transformational	 reform	 that	 took	 place	 in	 the	 United	
Kingdom.	As	Chairman	of	 the	FSA,	Adair	 Turner	might	have	been	expected	 to	
defend	 the	 FSA	 against	 the	 coalition	 government’s	 proposals	 to	 abolish	 his	
agency.	However,	Turner	was	one	of	the	United	Kingdom’s	foremost	advocates	
for	a	new	macroprudential	regime	and	he	declared	himself	‘agnostic’	regarding	
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the	possibility	of	transferring	microprudential	supervisory	powers	from	the	FSA	
to	the	Bank	of	England	(Turner	2009b).	He	also	took	the	view	that	the	Governor	
of	the	Bank	of	England	should	be	delegated	the	task	of	chairing	any	committee	
set	up	to	conduct	macroprudential	policy,	whether	it	was	inside	or	outside	the	
central	bank.	Also	in	distinction	to	the	United	States,	none	of	the	main	industry	
associations	lobbied	strongly	against	the	proposals.	Indeed,	the	British	Bankers	
Association,	which	represents	the	majority	of	UK	banks,	and	the	Association	for	
Financial	 Markets	 in	 Europe,	 which	 represents	 most	 of	 the	 London-based	
investment	 banking	 industry,	 both	 supported	 the	proposed	 twin	peaks	model	
(TSC	 2011b).	 Overall,	 the	 opponents	 to	 reform	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 were	
fewer	than	in	the	United	States	and	there	were	fewer	avenues	(or	‘veto	points’)	
by	which	reform	opponents	could	block	the	government	from	implementing	its	
desired	policies.		
5.3.3 REFORMING	EU	FINANCIAL	REGULATION	
The	 ECB’s	 trajectory	 towards	 greater	 formal	 authority	 in	 respect	 of	 financial	
stability	 was	 more	 convoluted.	 The	 centralisation	 of	 authority	 for	 banking	
supervision	 within	 the	 euro	 area	 took	 place	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 the	
incremental	 supranationalisation	 of	 European	 banking	 governance,	which	 had	
been	 on-going	 for	 several	 decades	 (see	 Posner	 2007;	 2010;	 Mügge	 2010;	
McPhilemy	 2014;	 see	 also	 Chapter	 3).	 Throughout	 this	 process,	 EU	 member	
states	resisted	pooling	sovereignty	for	banking	supervision	at	the	EU	level.	This	
was	 for	 several	 reasons	 including	 the	 impulse	 to	 protect	 competitive	
advantages	 of	 domestic	 firms	 and	 the	 widely	 held	 contention	 that	 since	 the	
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burden	 of	 bailing	 out	 failed	 banks	 lay	 with	 domestic	 taxpayers,	 it	 would	 be	
politically	 unacceptable	 to	 hand	 responsibility	 for	 controlling	 prudential	
supervision	to	supranational	authorities.	In	other	words,	‘he	who	pays	the	piper	
should	 call	 the	 tune’.	 Against	 this	 background,	 previous	 efforts	 by	 the	 ECB	 to	
encourage	politicians	 to	grant	 it	greater	authority	 for	banking	supervision	had	
come	 to	 little.	 EU	 member	 states	 cooperated	 with	 one	 another	 over	
microprudential	 regulation	 and	 supervision,	 but	 they	 did	 so	 through	
transgovernmental	 networks	 of	 national	 financial	 supervisors,	 who	 retained	
responsibility	for	supervising	firms	at	the	national	level.		
Since	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 the	 architecture	 for	 financial	
governance	in	the	EU	has	been	through	two	major	waves	of	reform.	The	first	set	
of	reforms	emerged	in	response	to	the	initial	problems	in	European	banks	that	
arose	 during	 the	 2007-09	 global	 financial	 crisis.	 In	 November	 2008,	 the	
European	 Commission	 (EC)	 convened	 a	 High	 Level	 Group	 under	 the	
chairmanship	 of	 former	Banque	 de	 France	 Governor	 Jacques	 de	 Larosière	 ‘to	
make	proposals	to	strengthen	European	supervisory	arrangements	covering	all	
financial	sectors,	with	the	objective	to	establish	a	more	efficient,	integrated	and	
sustainable	European	system	of	supervision’	(EC	2008).	The	High	Level	Group’s	
subsequent	 report	 –	 the	 De	 Larosière	 Report	 –	 recommended	 that	 the	 ECB	
should	be	at	the	heart	of	the	new	macroprudential	arrangements.	However,	the	
Group	decided	against	recommending	that	the	ECB	should	become	responsible	
for	microprudential	supervision	of	financial	institutions.		
Accordingly,	the	De	Larosière	Report	envisioned	a	new	European	System	of	
Financial	 Supervision	 composed	 of	 two	 pillars.	 A	microprudential	 pillar	would	
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comprise	three	European	Supervisory	Authorities	(ESAs).	The	ESAs	would	have	a	
mandate	 to	 promote	 enhanced	 cooperation	 between	 the	 national	 authorities	
responsible	for	regulating	and	supervising	banks,	securities	firms	and	insurance	
companies.	 This	 was	 an	 incremental	 reform	 that	 made	 relatively	 modest	
enhancements	to	existing	arrangements	for	cross-border	cooperation	between	
national	officials.	The	macroprudential	pillar	of	the	ESFS	would	comprise	a	new	
EU-level	European	Systemic	Risk	Council,	with	a	mandate	 to	 identify	and	help	
mitigate	or	prevent	systemic	 risks	 to	 financial	 stability.	Subsequently	 renamed	
the	European	Systemic	Risk	Board	(ESRB),	this	body	was	to	be	composed	of	the	
central	 bank	 governors	 of	 every	 member	 state	 as	 well	 as	 a	 number	 of	 key	
officials	 from	 various	 EU-level	 institutions.	 Its	 secretariat	 would	 be	 located	
within	the	ECB	and	the	ECB	President	would	be	its	first	Chair.	
The	broad	central	banking	community	played	an	 important	role	 in	shaping	
the	 High	 Level	 Group’s	 recommendations.	 The	 original	 proposal	 for	 a	
macroprudential	body	at	the	EU-level	came	from	a	submission	to	the	High	Level	
Group	 from	 the	 former	 Chairman	 of	 the	UK	 FSA,	 Howard	Davies,	 and	 former	
senior	FSA	official,	David	Green.	Their	proposal	called	for	a	body	that	would	be	
evenly	balanced	between	central	bankers	and	financial	supervisors	(proposal	on	
file	with	author).	The	High	Level	Group	agreed	with	the	need	for	a	Systemic	Risk	
Council,	but	determined	that	 it	should	be	composed	almost	entirely	of	central	
bankers,	with	supervisors	invited	to	participate	in	its	deliberations	on	an	ad	hoc	
basis	only.	This	stance	reflected	the	publicly	expressed	view	of	many	European	
central	bankers,	who	gave	speeches	during	the	period	of	the	High	Level	Group’s	
deliberations	 stressing	 central	 banks’	 unique	 informational	 advantages	 in	
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relation	 to	 systemic	 risk	 analysis	 and	 the	 need	 for	 political	 independence	 in	
macroprudential	decision-making	(see,	for	example,	Wellink	2008;	Landau	2008,	
Thomopoulos	 2009;	 Papademos	 2009).	 Central	 bankers	 also	 expressed	 these	
views	in	private	to	the	members	of	the	High	Level	Group	(author	interview,	06	
December	2014,	London),	six	of	eight	of	whom	were	themselves	former	central	
bankers.		
The	 High	 Level	 Group’s	 recommendation	 for	 only	 incremental	 changes	 to	
microprudential	 supervisory	 arrangements	was	 also	 in	 line	with	 the	weight	of	
central	banker	opinion	at	the	time.	Some	central	bankers,	including	at	least	one	
member	 of	 the	 ECB’s	 six-person	 Executive	 Board,	 did	 press	 for	 the	 ECB	 to	
become	 the	 centralised	microprudential	 banking	 supervisor	 for	 the	whole	 EU	
(High	 Level	 Group	 2009:	 42;	 Bini	 Smaghi	 2009).	 However,	 this	 was	 not	 the	
majority	 view	 of	 the	 ECB	 Governing	 Council,	 which	 comprises	 the	 Executive	
Board	and	the	governors	of	every	national	central	bank	in	the	euro	area.	Many	
central	 bankers	 opposed	 handing	 prudential	 supervision	 to	 the	 ECB	 on	
functional	 grounds,	 reasoning	 that	 it	 would	 risk	 undermining	 the	 ECB’s	
independence	and	its	clarity	of	purpose	in	respect	of	monetary	policy	(De	Rynke	
2015:	 4).	 The	 De	 Larosière	 Report	 highlighted	 these	 concerns,	 arguing	 that	
microprudential	 supervisory	duties	 ‘could	 impinge	on	 [the	ECB’s]	 fundamental	
mandate’	 and	 that	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 crisis,	 the	 involvement	 of	 national	
treasuries	 in	 bank	 bailouts	 could	 ‘could	 result	 in	 political	 pressure	 and	
interference,	thereby	 jeopardising	the	ECB's	 independence’	 (High	Level	Group:	
43).	 As	 Hodson	 (2012:	 24)	 argues,	 the	 ECB’s	 unwillingness	 to	 pursue	
centralization	 of	 microprudential	 supervisory	 authority	 at	 this	 time	 also	
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reflected	bureaucratic	politics.	 Several	national	 central	banks	 in	 the	euro	area	
are	 responsible	 for	 banking	 supervision	 within	 their	 respective	 jurisdictions.	
Thus,	the	central	bank	governors	of	those	member	states	had	a	vested	interest	
in	opposing	centralised	supervision	within	the	ECB.		
The	 second	 great	 spurt	 of	 organisational	 reform	 in	 European	 financial	
governance	 began	 in	 2012	 in	 response	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 European	
sovereign	debt	crisis.	At	the	heart	of	the	crisis	was	a	pernicious	feedback	 loop	
between	sovereign	credit	and	banks’	ability	to	attract	funding	(see	Angeloni	and	
Wolff	 2012).	 Banks	 in	 recession-struck	 European	 countries	 owned	 large	
quantities	 of	 their	 ‘home’	 countries’	 sovereign	 debt.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	
governments	had	provided	implicit	or	explicit	guarantees	to	their	banks,	which	
had	led	to	doubts	over	their	sovereign	creditworthiness.	These	doubts,	in	turn,	
redoubled	markets’	concerns	over	bank	balance	sheets.	The	ECB’s	own	 lender	
of	 last	 resort	 (LOLR)	 operations	 had	 reinforced	 this	 nexus.	 In	 late	 2011,	 the	
ECB’s	 ‘Longer	Term	Refinancing	Operations’	 (discussed	below)	provided	banks	
with	approximately	€1	trillion	 in	cheap	 loans.	Banks	used	much	of	this	cash	to	
purchase	 sovereign	debt	 (De	Grauwe	2012),	which	had	 the	 intended	effect	of	
bringing	down	sovereign	borrowing	costs,	but	further	increased	the	exposure	of	
commercial	banks	to	the	weaknesses	of	their	respective	governments.		
The	ECB	played	a	pivotal	role	in	shaping	the	official	response	to	this	crisis.	In	
contrast	to	its	stance	in	2008-09,	it	acted	strongly	to	promote	the	centralisation	
of	 microprudential	 supervisory	 authority.	 Some	 central	 bankers	 became	
persuaded	 that	 the	 capacity	 to	 act	 effectively	 as	 LOLR	 required	 first-hand	
knowledge	 of	 the	 financial	 resources	 (capital	 and	 liquidity)	 of	 the	 banks	 in	
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receipt	 of	 emergency	 funds.	 During	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 the	 ECB	 lent	 to	 banks	
based	on	 information	provided	by	national	 supervisory	authorities,	which	had	
an	 incentive	 to	 underestimate	 the	 solvency	 problems	 of	 their	 banks	 (Bini	
Smaghi	2014).	This	argument	came	to	override	more	traditional	concerns	that	
integrating	 prudential	 supervision	 and	 monetary	 policy	 might	 undermine	
central	 banks’	monetary	 policy	 independence	 (De	 Rynck	 2015).	 From	 a	more	
political	perspective,	 the	bureaucratic	 imperative	 for	national	central	banks	 to	
retain	 their	 supervisory	 competencies	 also	 came	 to	 be	 outweighed	 by	 the	
widely	 perceived	 necessity	 of	 breaking	 the	 bank-sovereign	 ‘doom-loop’.	 For	
many	national	central	banks	and	competent	authorities,	centralised	supervision	
became	a	price	worth	paying	 if	 their	European	partners	would	agree	 to	 share	
the	burden	of	future	bailouts	(author	interview,	31	October	2012,	Madrid).		
In	 February	 and	March	 of	 2012,	 two	 ECB	 Executive	 Board	members	 gave	
speeches	calling	for	the	creation	of	EU-level	resolution	mechanisms	to	share	the	
burden	of	bank	bailouts	and	thus	break	the	link	between	banks	and	sovereigns	
(Praet	 2012;	 Cœuré	 2012).	 This	was	 followed	 by	 a	 call	 from	 the	German	 ECB	
Executive	Board	member,	 Jörg	Asmussen,	 for	EU-level	supervision	 (Barker	and	
Spiegel	 2012).	 Momentum	 for	 centralisation	 of	 banking	 supervision	 gathered	
pace	 with	 the	 first	 public	 intervention	 of	 ECB	 President	Mario	 Draghi	 on	 the	
matter,	 who	 testified	 before	 the	 European	 Parliament	 that	 ‘ensuring	 a	 well-
functioning	 Economic	 and	 Monetary	 Union	 implies	 strengthening	 banking	
supervision	 and	 resolution	 at	 European	 level’	 (Draghi	 2012).	 In	 advocating	
centralised	banking	supervision,	Draghi	and	Asmussen	also	worked	closely	with	
the	President	of	 the	European	Council,	Herman	van	Rompuy	(De	Rynck	2015),	
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who	 published	 a	 report	 ahead	 of	 the	 June	 2012	 European	 Council	 Summit	
calling	 for	 ‘an	 integrated	 financial	 framework	 [that]	 elevates	 responsibility	 for	
supervision	to	the	European	level’	(Rompuy	2012).		
The	 success	 of	 this	 ECB-led	 supranational	 policy	 entrepreneurship	 was,	
however,	 conditional	 upon	 the	willingness	 of	 key	member	 states	 to	 go	 along	
with	 the	 proposals	 (cf.	 Veron	 2014).	 By	 mid-2012,	 the	 UK	 government	 had	
ditched	 its	 longstanding	opposition	to	deeper	 integration	 in	European	banking	
governance	 in	favour	of	a	two-track	strategy:	 it	actively	encouraged	euro	area	
countries	to	pool	sovereignty,	but	sought	safeguards	for	 its	own	 interests	as	a	
non-euro	 area	 country	 in	 the	 Single	 Market.	 The	 UK	 position	 reflected	 the	
material	interest	of	the	UK	in	seeing	stability	return	to	the	euro	area,	its	largest	
trading	 partner.	 It	 also	 reflected	 the	 UK	 authorities’	 view	 that	 Economic	 and	
Monetary	Union	had	created	 functional	spillovers	–	or	a	 ‘remorseless	 logic’	as	
Osborne	put	 it	–	 for	banking	and	ultimately	 fiscal	union.	French	policymakers’	
dropped	 their	 longstanding	 objections	 to	 integrated	 supervision	 when	 the	
solvency	of	their	own	banks	–	and	even	the	French	government	–	began	to	be	
questioned	 in	 late	2011.	 French	banks	 found	 themselves	unable	 to	 attract	US	
dollar	funding	in	wholesale	funding	markets,	and	they	became	highly	reliant	on	
access	to	ECB	emergency	liquidity	support.	In	this	respect,	France	found	itself	in	
a	similar	position	to	Southern	European	member	states;	its	structural	power	vis-
à-vis	 the	 central	 bank	 was	 diminished	 (see	 below).	 Most	 surprisingly,	 the	
German	 government	 also	 supported	 centralised	 supervision.	 In	mid-2012,	 the	
German	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	resolved	to	defend	the	integrity	of	the	euro	
area	at	virtually	any	cost	(Spiegel	2014).	As	part	of	this	resolve,	Merkel	signalled	
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her	 willingness	 to	 support	 centralised	 supervision,	 albeit	 only	 of	 the	 largest	
systemically	 important	 banks.	 Subsequently,	 Germany	 partially	 reversed	 its	
support	for	the	SSM,	becoming	the	primary	veto	player	in	the	negotiations	over	
the	 enabling	 legislation	 (see	 Epstein	 and	 Rhodes	 2016).	 Notably,	 it	 was	 at	
Germany’s	 insistence	that	the	ECB	was	afforded	only	indirect	responsibility	for	
supervising	smaller	banks	in	the	euro	area.		
The	 SSM	 represents	 a	 major	 step	 forward	 for	 the	 project	 of	 European	
integration	and	a	triumph	for	the	ECB.	Nevertheless,	 its	 final	 form	reflects	the	
complex	 institutional	 terrain	 into	 which	 it	 has	 been	 inserted.	 For	 example,	
despite	 successive	 attempts	 to	 close	 loopholes	 and	 eliminate	 national	
regulatory	divergences,	the	latest	iteration	of	the	European	capital	regulations	–	
the	 Capital	 Requirements	 Directive	 IV	 (CRD-IV)	 and	 the	 Capital	 Requirements	
Regulation	(CRR)	–	contain	areas	of	ambiguity	and	national	discretion	(discussed	
further	in	Chapter	6).	This	means	that	the	ECB/SSM	will	be	required	to	supervise	
banks	that	are	subject	to	different	rules	depending	on	the	member	states	they	
are	located	in.	Furthermore,	the	SSM	has	been	established	to	supervise	banks	in	
18	 member	 states,	 each	 of	 which	 remains	 ultimately	 responsible	 for	
maintaining	financial	stability	within	its	borders.	Accordingly,	the	ECB	has	been	
afforded	 limited	 authority	 in	 respect	 of	 macroprudential	 policy.	 It	 can	 apply	
macroprudential	measures	only	within	the	scope	of	the	CRD-IV/CRR.	While	this	
gives	 it	 some	 authority	 over	macroprudential	 capital	 buffers	 for	 banks,	 other	
measures,	 such	 as	 loan-to-value	 ratios	 on	 residential	 mortgage	 lending,	 are	
beyond	 its	 control.	 Moreover,	 the	 ECB	 has	 no	 authority	 to	 apply	
macroprudential	policies	relating	to	the	 insurance	or	securities	markets.	To	be	
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sure,	the	ECB	plays	a	dominant	role	in	the	ESRB,	which	has	a	broad	mandate	to	
look	at	 risks	across	 the	EU	and	across	all	 financial	 sectors.	However,	 the	ESRB	
has	no	authority	to	direct	national	authorities	to	take	action.	In	practice,	it	has	
appeared	 unable	 to	 tackle	 systemic	 risks	 that	 arising	 from	 matters	 that	 are	
sensitive	 for	 some	member	states,	 such	as	 the	 regulatory	 treatment	of	banks’	
sovereign	exposures	(see	McPhilemy	and	Roche	2013).		
5.3.4 SUMMARY	
So	far,	this	chapter	has	focused	on	the	role	that	central	bankers	have	played	as	
policy	entrepreneurs,	shaping	the	initial	post-crisis	reforms	in	each	jurisdiction.	
It	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 advocacy	 and	 changed	 policy	 ideas	 of	 central	 bankers	
themselves	have	been	the	proximate	cause	of	the	transformations	witnessed	in	
each	 case.	 In	 each	 jurisdiction,	 however,	 central	 bankers’	 policy	
entrepreneurship	played	out	in	distinct	political	and	institutional	settings,	which	
has	conditioned	the	types	of	reforms	that	were	ultimately	put	in	place.		
This	account	explains	the	variation	in	the	delegation	of	formal	authority	to	
central	banks	 in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	crisis.	However,	 it	does	not	explain	why	
central	 banks	 have	 been	 capable	 of	 exerting	 greater	 de	 facto	 authority	 over	
their	key	interlocutors	in	the	post-crisis	era.	As	the	previous	chapter	highlighted,	
all	 three	 central	 banks	 have	 adopted	 a	 relatively	 hawkish	 approach	 to	 the	
implementation	 of	 their	 new	 prudential	 mandates.	 Moreover,	 the	 ECB	 in	
particular	 has	 demonstrated	 a	 high	 level	 of	 authority	 in	 its	 relations	 with	
sovereign	governments,	pressuring	crisis-struck	debtor	countries	into	unpopular	
fiscal	 austerity	 and	 structural	 reforms	 and	 pursuing	 expansionary	 monetary	
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policies	 in	 the	 face	of	 at	 times	entrenched	German	opposition.	 Explaining	 the	
expansion	 of	 central	 banks’	 de	 facto	 authority	 requires	 attention	 to	 the	 less	
visible	 aspects	 of	 central	 bank	 power.	 In	 particular,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 explore	
changes	 in	 the	 interdependencies	 between	 central	 banks,	market	 participants	
and	 incumbent	 politicians	 that	 shape	 their	 interactions	 with	 one	 another.	 In	
short,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 examine	 how	 central	 banks’	 ‘structural	 power’	 has	
changed	since	the	onset	of	the	financial	crisis.	
5.4 THE	ROOTS	OF	CENTRAL	BANKS’	AUTHORITY:	STRUCTURAL	POWER	
The	 concept	 of	 ‘structural	 power'	 has	 been	 discussed	 extensively	 in	
international	relations	and	international	political	economy	scholarship	(Strange	
1988;	Gill	and	Law	1989;	Barnett	and	Duval	2005).	One	insight	common	to	these	
discussions	 is	 the	notion	 that	 actors’	 ability	 to	 influence	others	 does	not	 only	
stem	from	their	ability	to	marshal	material	resources	–	such	as	wealth,	military	
might,	or	hierarchical	authority	–	 in	their	direct	 interactions	with	one	another.	
Rather,	power	also	stems	from	what	Barnett	and	Duval	 (2005:	43)	describe	as	
‘the	 constitution	 of	 subjects’	 capacities	 in	 direct	 structural	 relation	 to	 one	
another’.	 In	 other	 words,	 these	 scholars	 suggest	 that	 the	 source	 of	 actors’	
power	is	their	differential	endowment	of	capabilities	and	how	dependent	other	
actors	 are	 upon	 them.	 As	Woll	 (2014a:	 46)	 suggests,	 structural	 power	 is	 not	
about	‘influence	peddling’	or	persuasion,	but	rather	the	degree	to	which	actors	
need	each	other.	 Cohen	 (2013:	 6)	 captures	 the	 spirit	 of	 this	understanding	of	
structural	 power	 succinctly	 when	 he	 writes:	 ‘the	 basic	 question,	 in	 simplest	
terms…	[is]:	‘Who	needs	whom	more?’		
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Such	 an	 understanding	 of	 power	 underpinned	Marxist	 and	 radical	 pluralist	
discussions	 of	 the	 ‘structural	 power	 of	 business’	 (Block	 1978;	 Lindblom	 1978;	
Gill	 and	 Law	 1989).	 It	 has	 also	 underpinned	 more	 recent	 scholarship	 on	 the	
structural	 power	 of	 finance	 after	 the	 financial	 crisis	 (Bell	 2012;	 Bell	 and	
Hindmoor	2014,	2015).	According	to	this	view,	incumbent	political	elites	rely	on	
businesses	 to	 create	 growth	 and	 provide	 employment.	 In	 turn,	 businesses’	
ability	 to	 ‘exit’	 –	 or	 to	 threaten	 to	 exit	 –	 any	 jurisdiction	 imposing	 policies	
distasteful	 to	 their	 preferences	 gives	 them	 bargaining	 power	 to	 extract	
concessions	from	policymakers.	More	broadly,	the	dependence	of	politicians	on	
the	private	investment	decisions	of	businesses	is	said	to	engender	a	generalised	
bias	 towards	business-friendly	policies,	even	where	 firms	and	 lobby	groups	do	
not	actively	engage	in	policy	debates	(Hall,	P.	1986).		
If	 structural	 power	 derives	 from	 the	 stratification	 of	 interdependencies	
between	actors,	then	the	power	of	central	banks	should	have	reached	its	zenith	
in	recent	years.	 Just	as	societies	need	businesses,	so	too	do	they	need	central	
banks.	Commercial	banks	and	other	 financial	 institutions	rely	on	central	banks	
to	supply	them	with	cash	and	other	highly	liquid	securities	when	they	need	it.	In	
normal	times,	the	knowledge	that	firms	have	recourse	to	central	bank	liquidity	
enhances	 their	 creditworthiness	 and	 lowers	 their	 costs	 of	 doing	 business.	 In	
crisis	 periods,	 access	 to	 central	 bank	 liquidity	 becomes	 an	 essential	 lifeline	
keeping	markets	 open	 and	 firms	 afloat.	 Politicians	 rely	 upon	 central	 banks	 to	
help	 stimulate	 economic	 growth	 and	 employment,	 and	 to	 keep	 inflation	 in	
check.	 In	 times	 of	 war	 or	 economic	 crisis,	 governments	 may	 rely	 on	 central	
banks	to	help	finance	public	deficits	(even	if	‘monetary	financing’	of	public	debt	
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is	a	taboo	subject	in	many	countries;	see	Tognato	2012).	Politicians	also	rely	on	
central	 banks	 to	 act	 as	 what	 (Dyson	 2009:	 10)	 describes	 as	 'gate	 keepers'	 to	
complex,	volatile,	interconnected,	and	opaque	markets’.	By	acting	as	LOLR,	and	
by	 controlling	 risk	 taking	 through	 prudential	 policies,	 central	 banks	 can	 help	
maintain	financial	stability.		
The	 dependency	 of	 both	market	 participants	 and	 incumbent	 politicians	 on	
central	banks	derives	from	central	banks’	particular	endowment	of	capabilities,	
the	most	important	of	which	is	the	unique	ability	to	create	and	destroy	money	
at	 the	 stroke	of	 a	 pen	 (or	 keyboard).3		 In	 order	 to	understand	why	politicians	
have	 been	 so	 acquiescent	 to	 central	 bankers’	 policy	 entrepreneurship	 during	
the	post-crisis	reforms,	and	why	central	banks	have	been	able	to	exert	greater	
authority	 over	 both	 financial	 market	 participants	 and,	 in	 some	 instances,	
national	executives	since	the	financial	crisis,	it	is	necessary	to	examine	how	the	
dependency	of	these	actors	on	central	banks	has	changed	in	recent	years.		
5.4.1 DEPENDENCY	OF	MARKET	PARTICIPANTS	ON	CENTRAL	BANKS	
Central	 banks	 have	 long	 played	 a	 role	 in	 stabilising	 the	 inherently	 unstable	
business	of	banking	(see	Chapter	3).	One	of	the	key	functions	commercial	banks	
perform	is	so-called	‘maturity	transformation’:	they	fund	long-term	assets,	such	
as	mortgage	 contracts	 to	 be	 repaid	 over	 30	 years,	 with	 short-term	 liabilities,	
such	 as	 customer	 deposits	 that	 can	 be	 redeemed	 a	 moment’s	 notice.	 Banks	
maintain	only	 a	 small	 fraction	of	 their	 liabilities	 in	 the	 form	of	 liquid	 reserves	
(such	 as	 cash).	 This	 means	 they	 are	 susceptible	 to	 runs.	 If	 for	 any	 reason	
depositors	lose	confidence	in	a	bank,	they	will	scramble	to	withdraw	their	funds	
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before	 the	 bank	 runs	 out	 of	 cash.	 The	 susceptibility	 of	 banks	 to	 runs	 is	 well	
understood.	One	 of	 the	 principal	mechanisms	 by	which	 governments	 prevent	
runs	from	occurring	is	by	establishing	central	banks	to	act	as	LOLR	to	banks	that	
find	 themselves	 in	 need	 of	 liquidity.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 the	 need	 to	
equip	 the	 chronically	 crisis-prone	 US	 banking	 system	 with	 a	 LOLR	 was	 the	
primary	motivation	behind	the	creation	of	the	Federal	Reserve	in	1913.		
THE	ILLUSION	OF	LIQUIDITY	
Transformations	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 banking	 and	 in	 wider	 processes	 of	 credit	
intermediation	 in	 the	 three	 decades	 preceding	 the	 financial	 crisis	 heightened	
the	dependency	of	financial	market	participants	on	the	liquidity	insurance	that	
central	banks	provide	through	their	LOLR	functionality.	The	banking	sectors	of	
the	United	States,	 the	United	Kingdom	and	most	euro	area	countries	came	to	
be	 dominated	 by	 large	 international	 banks.	 Few	 such	 banks	 rely	 mainly	 on	
customer	 deposits	 as	 their	 main	 source	 of	 funding.	 Rather,	 most	 funded	
themselves	mainly	by	issuing	various	short-	and	long-term	debt	instruments	in	
wholesale	funding	markets.4	These	forms	of	funding	are	generally	more	‘flighty’	
than	 customer	 deposits,	 because	 unlike	 the	 latter,	 they	 are	 not	 covered	 by	
public	 deposit	 insurance	 schemes	 (Feldman	 and	 Schmidt	 2001).	 Institutional	
investors	 in	 wholesale	 funding	 markets	 also	 have	 greater	 expertise	 and	
knowledge	about	the	financial	condition	of	the	banks	to	which	they	are	lending,	
meaning	 that	 they	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 withdraw	 their	 funding	 (or	 refuse	 to	
rollover	short-term	loans)	if	adverse	news	about	a	bank	comes	to	light.		
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The	increasing	reliance	on	more	unstable	sources	of	funding	was	part	of	the	
wider	rise	of	so-called	‘market	based’	banking	in	Europe	and	the	United	States	
(Hardie	and	Howarth	2013).	The	characteristics	of	 this	 transformation	differed	
in	different	 jurisdictions.	On	 the	whole,	banks	 incorporated	 in	 the	UK	and	 the	
euro	area	became	relatively	more	dependent	on	wholesale	funding	than	banks	
in	other	regions	(Le	Leslé	2012).	One	simple	measure	for	assessing	the	stability	
of	bank	 funding	 is	 the	 loan-to-deposit	 ratio:	 if	a	bank	has	 fewer	deposits	 than	
loans,	 it	must	 fill	 the	 gap	with	wholesale	 funding.	On	 the	 eve	 of	 the	 banking	
crisis,	the	loan-to-deposit	ratios	for	the	UK	and	the	euro	area	were	132	and	130	
per	 cent	 respectively	 (ECB	 2012;	 Bank	 of	 England	 2014e).	 By	 contrast,	 the	
United	States	entered	the	crisis	with	a	loan-to-deposit	ratio	of	little	over	100%.	
Large	 UK	 and	 euro	 area	 banks	 also	 tended	 (and	 tend)	 to	 be	 relatively	 more	
reliant	 on	 shorter-term	 forms	 of	 wholesale	 funding	 than	 other	 globally	
significant	banks	 (see	ECB	2014a:	S14).	Thus,	on	 the	whole,	UK	and	euro	area	
banks	 were	 particularly	 dependent	 on	 central	 bank	 liquidity	 insurance	 on	
entering	the	crisis.5	
The	United	 States’	 low	 loan-to-deposit	 ratio	 flatters	 the	 stability	 of	 the	US	
financial	system,	suggesting	it	was	less	dependent	on	central	bank	liquidity	than	
it	actually	was.	A	large	proportion	of	credit	intermediation	in	the	United	States	
takes	 place	 through	 non-bank	 intermediaries,	 or	 ‘shadow	 banks’	 (see	 Adrian	
and	 Shin	 2010;	 Adrian	 and	 Ashcraft	 2012).	 Such	 entities	 are	 involved	 in	
securitisation,	 the	 practice	 of	 packaging	 individual	 loans	 into	 investment	
products	bearing	different	levels	of	risk.	Shadow	banks	are	generally	reliant	on	
very	short-term	wholesale	funding,	such	as	overnight	 ‘repurchase	agreements’	
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(repos).	 Like	 traditional	 banks,	 shadow	 banks	 are	 involved	 in	 maturity	
transformation	 –	 borrowing	 short	 and	 lending	 long	 –	 meaning	 that	 they	 are	
susceptible	to	runs.	Unlike	traditional	banks,	shadow	banks	do	not	have	official	
recourse	to	public	backstops	 in	the	form	of	central	bank	 liquidity	 insurance	or	
public	deposit	 insurance.	However,	this	 is	not	to	say,	that	the	shadow	banking	
sector	was	completely	outside	the	government	safety	net	prior	to	the	financial	
crisis	(Pozsar	et	al.	2012).	Many	shadow	banks	were	in	fact	merely	off-balance	
sheet	 vehicles	 of	 regulated	 banks.	 These	 entities	 often	 benefited	 from	
contractual	credit	and	liquidity	guarantees	from	their	regulated	‘parent’	banks,	
meaning	they	were	indirect	beneficiaries	of	the	central	bank	liquidity	insurance	
available	 to	 the	 banks	 that	 sponsored	 them.	 Other	 shadow	 banks	 had	 no	
contractual	guarantees,	but	were	nevertheless	bailed	out	by	their	parent	banks	
during	the	financial	crisis	for	reputational	or	other	reasons.	These	entities	also	
benefited	 from	 (implicit)	 central	 bank	 support.	 Still	 others	 were	 established	
outside	 of	 the	 regulated	 industry	 altogether.	 This	 ‘external’	 shadow-banking	
sector	had	neither	indirect	nor	implicit	recourse	to	government	backstops	prior	
to	the	crisis.	However,	in	the	event,	even	many	of	these	entities	benefited	from	
the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 largesse,	 as	 they	 were	 able	 to	 participate	 directly	 in	
special	liquidity	operations	established	by	the	central	bank	(Pozsar	et	al.	2012).		
As	 financial	 systems	 became	 increasingly	 reliant	 on	 less	 stable	 sources	 of	
funding,	 the	 private	 dependence	 on	 public	 liquidity	 insurance	 increased.	
Paradoxically,	however,	the	great	abundance	of	cheap	wholesale	funding	in	the	
period	 immediately	 prior	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis	 gave	 precisely	 the	 opposite	
impression.	 Between	 2002	 and	 2007,	 a	 boom	 in	 wholesale	 funding	 markets	
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produced	 the	 illusion	of	 infinite	private	 liquidity	 (Nesvetailova	2010:	4).	While	
commercial	 banks	 could	 access	 central	 bank	 funds	 through	 various	 ‘standing	
facilities’,	they	very	rarely	chose	to	do	so	because	it	was	cheaper	to	raise	funds	
in	private	markets.	Indeed,	accessing	central	bank	liquidity	became	so	rare	that	
any	 firm	 doing	 so	 risked	 signalling	 to	 the	market	 that	 it	 was	 in	 dire	 financial	
distress.	 During	 this	 period,	 central	 banks’	 transactions	 in	 financial	 markets	
were	 confined	 to	 setting	 short-term	 interest	 rates	 through	 ‘open	 market	
operations’,	 trading	 relatively	 small	 quantities	 of	 high-quality	 assets	 (mainly	
government	bonds)	with	select	groups	of	counterparties	in	regular	weekly	and	
monthly	 liquidity	auctions.	Lending	as	a	 last	resort	to	financial	 institutions	was	
exceptionally	rare.	All	this	began	to	change	from	the	summer	of	2007	as	private	
sources	of	funding	suddenly	became	unavailable.		
THE	ILLUSION	DISPELLED	
The	US	securitisation	markets	ceased	operating	in	the	summer	of	2007	as	grave	
doubts	emerged	about	the	true	value	of	sub-prime	mortgage-backed	securities	
that	banks	and	shadow	banks	used	as	collateral	in	short-term	funding	markets.	
The	providers	of	 that	 funding	–	 institutional	 investors	 such	as	asset	managers	
and	money	market	funds	–	suddenly	became	unwilling	to	continue	rolling	over	
their	 loans.	 Unable	 to	 attract	 new	 funding,	 banks	 and	 shadow	 banks	 were	
forced	to	sell	 their	 illiquid	assets	at	 fire	sale	prices,	causing	the	value	of	 those	
assets	to	plummet.	As	asset	prices	fell,	other	institutions	were	sucked	into	the	
quagmire.	The	evaporation	of	wholesale	liquidity	and	the	sudden	breakdown	of	
the	 securitisation	 industry	 claimed	 some	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis’s	 most	 high-
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profile	 early	 victims.	 This	 included	 two	 hedge	 funds	 owned	 by	 the	 US	
investment	 bank	 Bear	 Stearns,	 IKB	 Bank	 in	 Germany	 and	 the	 UK	 mortgage	
lender	Northern	Rock.	Notoriously,	 the	 failure	of	Northern	Rock	 involved	 long	
queues	of	retail	depositors	forming	outside	its	branches.	It	was	the	first	run	on	a	
UK	bank	in	over	a	century.		
In	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 spiral	 of	 self-destruction	 continued	 for	 another	
year,	reaching	a	crescendo	in	September	2008	with	the	bankruptcy	of	Lehman	
Brothers,	a	seismic	event	for	global	markets.	The	Federal	Reserve	responded	to	
the	unfolding	crisis	with	increasingly	large	liquidity	operations.	In	August	2007,	
it	 lowered	the	rate	at	which	 it	 lent	to	banks	at	 its	 ‘discount	window’	and	later	
that	year	it	launched	the	‘Term	Auction	Facility’,	whereby	it	auctioned	loans	to	
banks	 to	 encourage	 them	 to	 borrow	 without	 being	 stigmatised	 as	 financially	
weak.	Relying	on	a	little	known	provision	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Act	–	‘Section	
13(3)’	 –	 that	 allowed	 it	 to	 lend	 to	 non-banks	 in	 ‘unusual	 and	 exigent	
circumstances’,	 the	 Fed	 enabled	 Wall	 Street	 investment	 banks	 to	 access	 its	
‘discount	 window’	 for	 the	 first	 time	 since	 the	 Great	 Depression.	 When	 Bear	
Stearns	reached	the	point	of	failure	in	March	2008,	it	used	the	same	legal	basis	
to	 provide	 a	 $30	 billion	 loan	 to	 help	 JP	Morgan	 acquire	 the	moribund	 bank.	
Exposing	 the	Federal	Reserve	 to	 significant	 credit	 risk,	 this	 loan	demonstrated	
that	 the	 central	 bank	 was	 willing	 to	 gamble	 it	 could	 warehouse	 the	 financial	
industry’s	dubious	assets	on	its	own	balance	sheet	for	the	duration	of	the	crisis	
without	suffering	catastrophic	losses.	In	late	September	2008,	the	Fed	provided	
an	even	larger	loan	-	$85	billion	-	to	the	insurance	giant	AIG,	saving	it	from	the	
consequences	of	its	disastrous	investments	in	sub-prime	credit	default	swaps.	It	
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also	 established	 a	 suite	 of	 other	 liquidity	 facilities,	 massively	 expanding	 its	
balance	 sheet	 and	 accepting	 collateral	 of	 increasingly	 dubious	 quality	 (see	
Wessels	2010;	Blinder	2013).	Altogether,	 the	 total	 stock	of	 credit	extended	 to	
the	 financial	 system	 through	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 various	 liquidity	 facilities	
peaked	at	$1.5	trillion	in	December	2008.		
The	Bank	of	England	was	initially	more	hesitant.	In	autumn	2007,	it	launched	
additional	liquidity	auctions,	but	following	longstanding	convention,	it	chose	to	
charge	 a	 penalty	 rate	 of	 interest.	 Banks	 refused	 the	 offer,	 fearing	 that	 they	
would	 be	 stigmatised	 as	 financially	 weak.	 Later	 in	 2007	 the	 Bank	 more	 fully	
embraced	the	need	to	pump	 liquidity	 into	 the	system.	Amongst	 the	 largest	of	
the	Bank’s	emergency	liquidity	measures	was	its	‘extended	collateral	long-term	
repos’,	which	involved	lending	for	three-month	durations	against	a	broad	range	
of	assets	including	mortgage-backed	securities	and	corporate	debt.	The	stock	of	
loans	 outstanding	 under	 this	 scheme	 peaked	 in	 January	 2009	 at	 £180	 billion	
(Fisher	 2009).	 Another	 important	 emergency	measure	was	 the	 Bank’s	 Special	
Liquidity	 Scheme.	 Launched	 in	 April	 2008,	 this	 enabled	 banks	 to	 swap	 their	
temporarily	illiquid	but	ostensibly	high-quality	asset-backed	securities	for	highly	
liquid	Treasury	bills,	which	could	be	swapped	for	cash	in	private	markets.	Use	of	
the	Special	Liquidity	Scheme	peaked	at	£185	billion.	In	October	2008,	the	Bank	
also	made	secret	 loans	to	two	of	the	United	Kingdom’s	largest	banks,	RBS	and	
HBOS.	Assistance	to	these	two	institutions	peaked	at	£61.5	billion	(Plenderleith	
2012).	 Like	 the	Federal	Reserve,	 the	Bank	of	England	effectively	absorbed	 the	
credit	risks	of	the	financial	system,	storing	them	on	its	own	balance	sheet	until	
more	normal	conditions	resumed.		
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The	ECB	likewise	expanded	its	liquidity	provision	during	the	financial	crisis.	In	
the	 summer	 of	 2007,	 the	 ECB	 stole	 a	 march	 on	 other	 central	 banks	 when	 it	
offered	an	unlimited	quantity	of	euros	 to	European	banks	 in	 reaction	 to	news	
that	the	French	bank	BNP	Paribas	had	suspended	withdrawals	from	three	of	its	
investment	 funds.	Offered	at	a	 fixed	 rate	of	 four	per	 cent,	banks	 immediately	
borrowed	€95	billion.	Under	 the	banner	 of	 ‘enhanced	 credit	 support’	 (Trichet	
2009),	other	liquidity	schemes	included	the	provision	of	Long	Term	Refinancing	
Operations	consisting	of	loans	to	banks	with	six-month	durations,	the	provision	
of	 US	 dollars	 through	 a	 currency	 swap	 line	 with	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 and,	 in	
2009,	purchases	of	longer-term	‘covered	bonds’	(a	common	form	of	debt	issued	
by	 euro-area	 banks).	With	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 sovereign	 debt	 and	 banking	
crisis	 in	 2010,	 the	 ECB	 undertook	 a	 series	 of	 further	 initiatives	 to	 ease	 the	
pressure	on	European	banks.	The	largest	of	these	was	the	2011	extended	Long-
Term	 Refinancing	 Operations,	 under	 which	 the	 ECB	 lent	 approximately	 €1	
trillion	 to	 banks	 at	 a	 fixed	 rate	 for	 up	 to	 three-years.	 As	 this	 programme	
involved	 lending	 to	 banks	 with	 questionable	 solvency,	 it	 involved	 the	 ECB	
assuming	 large-scale	 credit	 risk	 (Gros	 et	 al.	 2012).	 Ultimately,	 much	 of	 this	
funding	 remained	 on	 the	 ECB’s	 balance	 sheet:	 Southern	 European	 banks	
borrowed	large	sums	from	the	ECB,	while	northern	European	banks	deposited	
equally	 large	sums	 in	 their	ECB	accounts.	As	Gros	et	al.	 (2012)	argue,	 through	
these	programmes,	the	ECB	effectively	became	the	central	counterparty	for	the	
entire	euro	area-banking	sector.	
As	 central	 banks	 replaced	 wholesale	 funding	 markets	 with	 a	 public	
alternative,	 their	 authority	 over	 financial	 market	 participants	 in	 respect	 of	
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prudential	 regulation	 and	 supervision	 was	 enhanced.	 Although	 liquidity	
operations	did	not	 involve	explicit	 conditionality,	 they	nevertheless	weakened	
the	 bargaining	 position	 of	 market	 participants	 in	 their	 relations	 with	 central	
banks.	Systemically	 important	 financial	 institutions	were	 revealed	 to	be	highly	
reliant	 on	official	 liquidity	 insurance	 and	other	 forms	of	 public	 sector	 support	
(see	 below).	 Moreover,	 the	 three	 central	 banks	 were	 revealed	 to	 have	
enormous	 financial	 strength.	 Prior	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 central	 bank	balance	
sheets	were	small	relative	to	the	largest	commercial	banks.	During	the	financial	
crisis,	 the	 three	 central	 banks	 transformed	 themselves	 into	 major	 players	 in	
their	own	right.	 Indeed,	measured	by	assets,	 the	Federal	Reserve	had	become	
the	world’s	largest	bank	by	2014.		
It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 such	 a	 remarkable	 transformation	would	 not	 have	
been	 possible	 for	 the	 central	 banks	 of	 smaller	 economies.	 The	 ability	 of	 the	
Federal	Reserve,	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	ECB	to	mutate	 into	truly	central	
banks	 rested	 on	 the	 implicit	 (and	 occasionally	 explicit)	 backing	 of	 their	
respective	 governments.	 In	 extremis,	 the	 fiscal	 authorities	 of	 their	 respective	
jurisdictions	 could	 recapitalise	 their	 central	 banks,	 should	 they	 suffer	 large	
losses	on	the	assets	they	purchased	(see	Stella	2005;	Archer	and	Moser-Boehm	
2013).6	Central	banks	could	ride	to	the	rescue	only	because	of	the	deep	pockets	
of	 the	 taxpayers	 standing	 behind	 them.	 As	 these	 central	 banks	 intervened	
aggressively	 in	 financial	 markets	 in	 late	 2008	 and	 2009,	 the	 prospect	 of	
teetering	global	banks	relocating	to	Luxembourg,	Singapore	or	Switzerland	was	
exposed	as	an	empty	threat.		
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At	the	same	time,	the	power	of	the	financial	industry	was	being	assailed	on	
other	 fronts.	 In	 all	 three	 cases,	 central	 banks’	 liquidity	 support	 took	 place	
alongside	 taxpayer	 bailouts	 that	 often	 involved	 explicit	 conditionality.	 In	 the	
United	States,	the	fiscal	bailout	of	the	US	financial	system	took	the	form	of	the	
‘Troubled	Asset	Relief	Programme’	(TARP),	under	which	the	federal	government	
forcibly	 injected	 $250	 billion	 of	 new	 capital	 into	 the	 nation’s	 largest	 banks.	
While	 the	 conditions	 attached	 to	 this	 support	 were	 arguably	 quite	 lax	 (Bair	
2012:	 313;	Woll	 2014a),	 banks	were	 highly	 reluctant	 to	 accept	 the	 funds	 and	
repaid	them	as	soon	as	possible,	fearing	government	intervention	in	their	day-
to-day	operations.	In	the	United	Kingdom,	the	Labour	government	announced	a	
£50	 billion	 ‘Recapitalisation	 Fund’	 in	 October	 2008,	 alongside	 a	 £250	 billion	
guarantee	scheme,	under	which	new	debts	issued	by	eligible	UK	banks	would	be	
guaranteed	for	a	limited	period	(see	HM	Treasury	2008).	The	largest	banks,	RBS,	
HBOS	 and	 Lloyds	 TSB,	 were	 nationalised.	 Senior	 managers	 of	 RBS	 and	 HBOS	
were	 fired	 while	 the	 banks’	 shareholders	 lost	 most	 of	 the	 value	 of	 their	
investments.	 In	 the	 EU,	 fiscal	 bailouts	were	provided	on	 a	 country-by-country	
basis	 before	 member	 states	 began	 to	 agree	 burden-sharing	 arrangements	 in	
2012.	 In	 France,	 government	 support	 for	 the	 financial	 industry	 came	 with	
explicit	requirements	for	banks	to	reach	domestic	lending	targets;	in	Germany,	
support	 from	 the	 Federal	 Agency	 for	 Financial	 Market	 Stabilisation	 Fund,	
established	 in	 2008,	 entailed	 restrictions	 on	 executive	 pay	 and	 dividend	
payments	among	other	conditions	(Woll	2014b).	
Both	 taxpayer	 bailouts	 and	 central	 bank	 liquidity	 assistance	 were	 highly	
unpopular	with	the	general	public	and	they	helped	raise	the	salience	of	financial	
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regulation	in	the	media	and	political	discourse.	 In	both	Europe	and	the	United	
States,	these	actions	provided	the	motivation	for	the	major	legislative	initiatives	
to	strengthen	financial	regulation.	Moreover,	as	Johal	et	al.	(2014)	suggest,	the	
crash	 of	 2008	 helped	 discredit	 elite	 and	 popular	 cultures	 that	 had	 sustained	
untrammelled	 financial	 innovation	 and	 light-touch	 supervision	 prior	 to	 the	
crisis.	In	this	climate,	it	became	more	difficult	for	financial	industry	lobbyists	to	
speak	 out	 against	 prescriptive	 regulations	 (cf.	 Young	 2013).	 The	 post-crisis	
climate	was	also	one	 in	which	 central	bankers’	 incentives	 to	act	 stringently	 in	
their	 implementation	 of	 new	 regulations	 were	 magnified,	 lest	 they	 be	 held	
accountable	for	further	failures	‘on	their	watch’.	
A	 note	 of	 caution	 is	 in	 order.	 Central	 bank	 liquidity	 support	 and	 taxpayer-
funded	bailout	schemes	may	have	strengthened	the	hand	of	public	authorities	
vis-à-vis	 market	 participants	 in	 subsequent	 regulatory	 and	 supervisory	
processes.	 However,	 the	 very	 fact	 that	 these	 interventions	 became	necessary	
may	 also	 be	 taken	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 continuing	 structural	 power	 of	 the	
financial	industry	itself.	Central	banks	and	governments	found	themselves	with	
little	 choice	 but	 to	 intervene	 to	 alleviate	 the	 acute	 liquidity	 and	 solvency	
problems	 facing	banks	and	wider	 financial	markets.	 Failure	 to	prevent	a	more	
widespread	 collapse	 would	 have	 had	 calamitous	 consequences	 for	 the	 real	
economy.	It	would	almost	certainly	also	have	prompted	governments	to	revoke	
or	 otherwise	 curtail	 central	 banks’	 hallowed	 independence.	 While	 the	 senior	
managers	 of	many	 bailed	 out	 firms	were	 fired,	 and	 some	 firms’	 shareholders	
were	 wiped	 out,	 public	 interventions	 did	 spare	 the	 rescued	 firms’	 unsecured	
creditors	 (bondholders)	 from	the	consequences	of	 their	bad	 investments.	This	
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suggests	that	although	the	structural	power	of	the	financial	 industry	may	have	
been	diminished	during	the	financial	crisis,	it	was	certainly	not	eliminated.		
5.4.2 DEPENDENCY	OF	INCUMBENT	POLITICIANS	ON	CENTRAL	BANKS	
Incumbent	 politicians	 in	 the	 executive	 branches	 of	 national	 governments	 also	
became	more	dependent	on	their	central	banks’	during	the	financial	crisis.	In	all	
three	 jurisdictions,	executive	politicians	have	been	either	unwilling,	or	unable,	
to	use	the	main	macroeconomic	stabilisation	tool	over	which	they	have	direct	
control	–	 fiscal	policy	–	 to	 stimulate	demand	and	boost	growth.	 In	 the	United	
States,	the	Obama	administration	introduced	tax	cuts	and	spending	increases	in	
2009,	 but	 the	 measures	 were	 short-lived	 and	 began	 to	 unwind	 in	 2010	 (see	
Stiglitz	 2010).	 Subsequently,	 gridlock	 in	 Congress	 prevented	 further	
discretionary	 fiscal	 stimulus.	 Moreover,	 recurrent	 episodes	 of	 high-stakes	
brinkmanship	between	Republicans	and	Democrats	over	budgetary	negotiations	
have	occasionally	threatened	to	drastically	curtail	US	government	spending.	 In	
the	United	 Kingdom,	 the	 Conservative-Liberal	Democrat	 coalition	 government	
shifted	 the	country	 from	stimulus	 to	austerity	 in	2010,	promising	 to	eliminate	
the	 budget	 deficit	 over	 the	 course	 of	 its	 five-year	 term	 in	 office.	 This	 helped	
shut-off	 the	 recovery	 in	 the	 UK	 economy,	 which	 slipped	 into	 a	 ‘double	 dip’	
recession	in	early	2012.	
In	the	euro	area,	debt	sustainability	posed	a	major	constraint	on	fiscal	policy.	
Deep	 recessions	 in	 Greece,	 Ireland,	 Portugal,	 Italy,	 Spain	 and	 Cyprus	 led	 to	
declining	 tax	 revenues	and	greater	expenditure	 in	 the	 form	of	unemployment	
benefits	 and	other	 so-called	 ‘automatic	 stabilisers’.	 As	 interest	 rates	 on	 these	
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countries’	debt	ballooned,	four	of	them	-	Greece,	Ireland,	Portugal	and	Cyprus	-	
were	forced	to	seek	international	assistance	in	the	form	of	bailouts	from	the	so-
called	 ‘Troika’	 (comprising	 the	 IMF,	 the	 European	 Commission	 and	 the	 ECB).	
Thus,	 in	 these	 countries	 a	 combination	 of	 bond-market	 pressure	 and	
international	 creditor	 constraint	precluded	 the	adoption	of	discretionary	 fiscal	
stimulus	 measures.	 Even	 in	 the	 euro	 area’s	 relatively	 prosperous	 northern	
creditor	 countries,	 politicians	 have	 been	 reluctant	 to	 use	 fiscal	 policy	 to	
stimulate	demand.	For	example,	after	implementing	a	small	stimulus	package	in	
2009,	Germany	had	achieved	a	fiscal	surplus	by	2013.	
The	 unwillingness	 and	 inability	 of	 politicians	 to	 use	 fiscal	 policy	 as	 a	
countercyclical	 stabilisation	 instrument	 has	 left	 monetary	 policy	 as	 ‘the	 only	
game	 in	 town’	 (Bini	 Smaghi	 2014).	 Governments	 have	 relied	 on	 their	 central	
banks	to	creatively	reinterpret	their	mandates	in	order	to	give	greater	emphasis	
to	 stimulating	 aggregate	 demand	 as	 opposed	 to	 focusing	 predominantly	 on	
price	 stability.	Unconventional	monetary	policies	 in	 the	United	States	and	 the	
United	 Kingdom	 followed	 similar	 paths.	 The	 Fed	 cut	 interest	 rates	 early	 and	
aggressively,	reducing	the	target	for	the	Federal	Funds	Rate	from	5.25	per	cent	
in	mid	 2007	 to	 less	 than	 0.5	 per	 cent	 –	 effectively	 the	 so-called	 ‘Zero	 Lower	
Bound’	–	in	September	2008.	It	then	looked	for	additional	means	of	stimulating	
the	economy.	In	November	2008,	it	announced	the	first	of	three	programmes	of	
‘Large-Scale	 Asset	 Purchases’,	 otherwise	 known	 as	 ‘quantitative	 easing’	 (QE).	
This	 involved	using	newly	created	central	bank	money	to	purchase	 long-dated	
Treasury	bills	as	well	as	bonds	and	mortgage-backed	securities	issued	by	Fannie	
Mae	 and	 Freddy	 Mac,	 the	 giant	 government-sponsored	 mortgage	 finance	
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companies.	As	a	result	of	QE,	the	assets	on	the	Federal	Reserve’s	balance	sheet	
swelled	from	$800	billion	in	2008	to	more	than	$4.3	trillion	in	2014.	In	the	UK,	
the	Bank	of	England	cut	its	main	policy	interest	rate	to	the	Zero	Lower	Bound	in	
March	2009.	Like	the	Federal	Reserve	 it	then	undertook	three	episodes	of	QE.	
By	 November	 2012,	 the	 Bank’s	 purchases	 reached	 £375	 billion,	 composed	
almost	exclusively	of	government	bonds	(or	‘gilts’).	In	both	the	US	and	the	UK,	
the	main	intention	of	QE	was	the	equivalent	of	 lowering	interest	rates.	That	 is	
to	 say,	 central	 banks	 aimed	 to	 stimulate	 spending	 by	 raising	 asset	 prices	 and	
lowering	the	cost	of	borrowing	throughout	the	economy.		
Although	 it	was	not	 the	primary	motivation,	one	consequence	of	QE	 in	 the	
United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom	has	been	to	lower	the	cost	of	borrowing	
for	 their	 respective	 governments.	 The	 Federal	 Reserve	 transformed	 itself	 into	
the	 largest	 single	 holder	 of	US	 government	 securities	 anywhere	 in	 the	world,	
surpassing	even	the	Chinese	government	(as	of	January	2015,	the	Fed	held	$2.5	
trillion	while	 the	Chinese	government	held	$1.3	 trillion).	Likewise,	 the	Bank	of	
England	 came	 to	 own	 more	 than	 a	 third	 of	 the	 stock	 of	 outstanding	 UK	
government	 bonds.	 Central	 banks	 purchased	 government	 securities	 in	
secondary	markets	–	i.e.	from	banks	and	other	private	institutions	–	rather	than	
from	their	respective	national	treasuries.	They	could	therefore	justifiably	claim	
not	to	have	been	engaged	in	the	dreaded	‘monetary	financing’	of	government	
deficits	 (printing	 money	 to	 finance	 public	 deficits).	 Even	 so,	 their	 purchases	
brought	 the	 cost	 of	 borrowing	 down	 for	 their	 governments,	which	 needed	 to	
pay	less	to	issue	new	debts.		
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Estimating	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 QE	 on	 government	 bond	 prices	 and	 yields	 is	
complicated	because	prices	reflect	market	participants’	expectations	regarding	
future	monetary	policy.	 Thus,	 a	 simple	 comparison	of	 asset	prices	before	and	
after	central	banks’	various	announcements	of	new	purchases	do	not	reveal	the	
full	 impact	of	QE	(see	McLaren	et	al.	2014).	Notwithstanding	these	difficulties,	
several	 studies	of	 the	 impact	of	 the	 first	 rounds	of	QE	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	
and	the	United	States	suggest	that	the	average	yields	on	long-dated	US	and	UK	
government	 securities	 (such	 as	 10	 year	 bonds	 and	 longer)	 were	 reduced	 by	
around	20	 to	 40	basis	 points	 (see	 Joyce	et	 al.	 2011	 for	 the	UK;	Gagnon	et	 al.	
2011	for	the	US;	Meaning	and	Zhu	2011;	Williams	2011).	
Some	commentators	fret	that	these	actions	have	diminished	the	pressure	on	
politicians	 to	 agree	measures	 to	 reduce	 their	 fiscal	 deficits	 (see,	 for	 example,	
Shultz	et	al.	2012).	Yet	it	is	important	not	to	overstate	the	influence	of	US	and	
UK	 government	 bond	 purchases	 on	 politicians’	 spending	 decisions.	 Many	
factors,	 other	 than	 central	 bank	 policies,	 affect	 the	 yields	 on	 US	 and	 UK	
government	debt.	Notably,	US	government	debt	enjoys	special	status	as	a	‘risk-
free’	asset	for	financial	markets.	As	a	safe	haven,	demand	for	US	debt	increases	
at	 times	 of	 crisis.	 Thus,	 in	 2008	 and	 again	 in	 2011,	 yields	 on	 longer-dated	US	
debt	plummeted	as	investors	scrambled	to	invest	in	safe	US	Treasury	bills.	After	
each	of	these	episodes,	the	yield	on	US	government	bonds	gradually	recovered	
as	global	 risk	appetite	returned.	These	recoveries	were	only	partially	offset	by	
the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 purchases.	 Similar	 dynamics	 were	 at	 play	 in	 the	 UK	
government	debt	market,	where	some	announcements	of	QE	were	followed	by	
rising	prices	and	declining	yields	(as	the	central	bank	intended),	but	others	had	
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little	 effect	 and	 still	 others	 saw	 government	 securities’	 prices	 move	 in	 the	
opposite	direction	(Meaning	and	Zhu	2011).		
More	importantly,	neither	the	Federal	Reserve	nor	the	Bank	of	England	have	
deliberately	 used	 their	 ability	 to	 influence	 government	 borrowing	 costs	 as	 a	
means	 of	 forcing	 politicians	 to	 take	 particular	 decisions	 in	 respect	 of	 fiscal	
policy.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	 governors	 of	 these	 central	 banks	 have	
refrained	from	expressing	their	views	in	relation	to	fiscal	policy.	Ben	Bernanke,	
Chairman	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 from	 2006-2012,	 frequently	 exhorted	
policymakers	 to	 take	 action	 to	 improve	 long-term	 debt	 sustainability	 (see	
Bernanke	2009	for	one	of	many	examples).	While	he	supported	the	need	for	a	
fiscal	 stimulus	 package	 in	 2008,	 he	 argued	 that	 such	 measures	 should	 be	
temporary	 and	 consistent	with	 long-term	 fiscal	 consolidation	 (Bernanke	2008;	
cf.	Buiter	2014).	In	the	UK,	the	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	England,	Mervyn	King,	
went	 even	 further.	 During	 the	 election	 campaign	 of	 2010,	 King	 caused	 great	
consternation	in	the	Labour	administration	when	he	gave	his	apparent	backing	
to	the	fiscal	austerity	programme	being	offered	by	the	Conservative	opposition.	
These	examples	demonstrate	that	neither	the	Bank	of	England	nor	the	Federal	
Reserve	 have	 been	 afraid	 to	 step	 beyond	 their	 mandates.	 However,	 neither	
central	 bank	 actively	 sought	 to	 deliberately	 force	 politicians’	 hands	 by	
threatening	 to	 hold	 back	 on	 purchases	 of	 government	 securities.	 In	 any	 case,	
such	a	move	would	likely	have	been	ineffectual.	As	discussed,	central	bank	asset	
purchases	are	by	no	means	the	only	 factor	weighing	on	US	or	UK	government	
borrowing	costs.	Furthermore,	any	such	action	would	risk	collateral	damage	in	
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the	form	of	lower	consumption	and	investment,	which	could	ultimately	damage	
the	central	banks’	credibility	and	independence.	
The	 path	 of	 monetary	 policy	 in	 the	 euro	 area	 has	 been	 different.	 In	 May	
2010,	the	ECB	launched	an	initial	set	of	large-scale	asset	purchases	under	its	so-
called	 ‘Securities	Markets	Programme’	 (SMP).	Officially	 justified	as	a	means	of	
restoring	 the	 normal	 functioning	 of	 the	 monetary	 policy	 transmission	
mechanism	 (ECB	2010),	 the	 SMP	was	mainly	 a	means	of	 lowering	 the	 cost	 of	
borrowing	for	countries	facing	sovereign	debt	crises.	Initially,	it	involved	the	ECB	
intervening	 in	 the	 secondary	 markets	 for	 Greek,	 Irish	 and	 Portuguese	 bonds	
although	from	August	2011	it	was	extended	to	Italian	and	Spanish	government	
bond	markets	as	well	 (Ghysels	et	 al.	 2014).	 The	 implications	of	 this	 action	 for	
the	 ECB’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 governments	 of	 these	 countries	 were	
considerable.	Unlike	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom,	each	of	these	
countries	 was	 facing	 ballooning	 borrowing	 costs	 as	 markets	 rapidly	 lost	
confidence	 in	 their	 ability	 to	 repay	 their	 debts.	 This	 threatened	 to	 create	 a	
vicious	 circle	 –	 with	 rising	 sovereign	 borrowing	 costs	 heaping	 pressure	 on	
already	 strained	 public	 finances	 –	 leading	 towards	 default.	 Under	 these	
circumstances,	 the	 governments	 of	 these	 countries	 became	highly	 dependent	
on	 the	 ECB’s	 ability	 to	 intervene.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 and	 the	
Bank	 of	 England,	 the	 ECB’s	 structural	 power	 was	 magnified.	 Its	 ability	 to	
effectively	 determine	 whether	 or	 not	 these	 countries	 would	 default	 on	 their	
debts	 gave	 it	 leverage	 in	 policy	 debates	 beyond	 its	 immediate	 mandate.	 As	
discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 ECB	 made	 its	 purchases	 of	 these	
countries’	debt	 conditional	on	 swingeing	 fiscal	 austerity	and	 sweeping	 supply-
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side	 reforms,	 including	 large-scale	 privatisations	 and	 changes	 to	 employment	
laws	to	make	it	easier	to	hire	and	fire	workers.		
The	 ECB’s	 conditionality	 was	 initially	 kept	 secret,	 although	 a	 leaked	 2012	
letter	from	ECB	President	Mario	Draghi	to	the	then	Italian	Prime	Minister	Silvio	
Berlusconi	revealed	how	the	ECB	had	demanded	stringent	austerity,	structural	
reforms	 and	 constitutional	 change	 to	 lock-in	 a	 balanced	 budget	 rule	 (Corriere	
della	Sera	2011).	Subsequently,	 the	ECB	has	made	 its	conditionality	explicit.	 In	
2012,	 it	announced	a	successor	programme	to	the	SMP,	the	so-called	Outright	
Monetary	Transactions.	This	constituted	a	promise	to	buy	potentially	unlimited	
quantities	 of	 euro	 area	 countries’	 sovereign	 debt.	 However,	 any	 purchases	
would	be	conditional	on	the	country	in	question	seeking	loans	from	the	recently	
created	 EU-level	 bailout	 funds,	 the	 European	 Financial	 Stability	 Facility	 (EFSF)	
and	its	permanent	successor	the	European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM).	Any	such	
loans	 would	 require	 governments	 to	 adhere	 to	 strict	 conditionality	 involving	
macroeconomic	 adjustment	 programmes	 based	 on	 fiscal	 austerity	 and	
neoliberal	 supply	 side	 reforms.	 Such	 reforms	 have	 large	 and	 highly	 visible	
distributional	consequences	for	the	citizenry	of	the	countries	in	which	they	are	
implemented	 and	 they	 have	 been	 the	 source	 of	 deep	 political	 ructions	 in	
Southern	 Europe.	 Their	 effective	 imposition	 by	 a	 supranational	 organisation	
acting	at	–	and	arguably	beyond	–	 the	outer	 reaches	of	 its	mandate	 is	 clearly	
problematic	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 democratic	 legitimacy	 and	 political	
accountability.		
	 250	
5.5 CONCLUSION	
The	 previous	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 demonstrated	 how	 the	 authority	 of	 each	
central	 bank	 had	 increased	 after	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Politicians	 in	 each	 of	 the	
three	 jurisdictions	 under	 consideration	 had	 delegated	 new	 formal	 powers	 to	
their	 central	 banks.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 central	 banks	 have	 demonstrated	
heightened	ability	to	induce	deference	on	the	part	of	their	key	interlocutors	in	
financial	markets	and	in	the	case	of	the	ECB	in	particular,	in	respect	of	national	
executive	politicians.		
This	chapter	sought	to	identify	the	mechanisms	through	which	these	changes	
were	effected.	 It	argued	 that	 the	proximate	explanation	 for	politicians’	 choice	
to	delegate	new	powers	to	their	central	banks	was	the	policy	entrepreneurship	
of	 central	 bankers’	 themselves.	 The	 transnationally	 networked	 community	 of	
central	 bankers	 provided	 policymakers	 with	 diagnoses	 of	 the	 pre-crisis	
regulatory	 failures	 and	 blueprints	 for	 how	 to	 respond.	 In	 making	 their	 case,	
central	bankers’	 seized	upon	previously	marginalised	and	somewhat	disparate	
ideas	 about	 the	operation	of	 financial	markets.	Bundling	 these	 ideas	 together	
under	 the	 heading	 of	 ‘macroprudential’	 policy,	 some	 central	 bankers	 and	
academic	 commentators	 have	 proclaimed	 a	 transformational	 shift	 has	 taken	
place	 in	 the	 ideas	 and	 assumptions	 underpinning	 financial	 regulation	 and	
supervision.	 However,	 as	 the	 next	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 demonstrates,	 the	
disparate	nature	of	these	 ideas,	their	differing	acceptance	 in	different	parts	of	
the	transgovernmental	central	banking	community	and	their	cohabitation	with	
older,	more	 orthodox,	 theories	 and	 assumptions	 about	 how	markets	 operate	
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has	influenced	the	types	of	regulatory	policies	that	central	banks	are	pursuing	in	
each	jurisdiction.		
The	differentiated	 ‘bricolage’	of	new	and	old	thinking	within	different	parts	
of	the	central	banking	community	also	provides	part	of	the	explanation	for	the	
differential	delegation	of	formal	powers	to	central	banks	after	the	crisis.	In	the	
United	 States,	 key	 officials’	 limited	 embrace	 of	 macroprudential	 ideas	 helps	
explain	why	they	never	gave	serious	consideration	to	abolishing	the	institution-
focused	 and	 fragmented	 regulatory	 architecture,	 which	 is	 inherently	 geared	
towards	 a	 more	 microprudential	 approach.	 By	 contrast,	 the	 more	 wholesale	
reorganisations	in	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	European	Union	were	in	part	a	
reflection	 of	 European	 central	 bankers’	 desire	 to	 place	 (countercyclical)	
macroprudential	 policy	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 an	 expanded	 conception	 of	 central	
banking.			
Though	significant,	the	differentiated	embrace	of	new	macroprudential	ideas	
was	 less	 important	 for	 determining	 the	outcome	of	 reforms	 than	 the	 existing	
political	 and	 institutional	 terrains	 that	 central	 bankers	 and	 their	 allies	 had	 to	
navigate.	 In	 the	 United	 States,	 opposition	 to	 an	 expanded	 Federal	 Reserve	
mandate	was	strong	because	existing	regulatory	agencies,	which	were	eager	to	
protect	 their	 bureaucratic	 turf,	 formed	 coalitions	 with	 financial	 market	
participants	bent	on	avoiding	stricter	regulation	by	the	Fed.	The	Federal	Reserve	
and	its	allies	also	had	to	reckon	with	the	historic	current	of	anti-federal	Reserve	
sentiment	 in	 Congress,	 which	 flared	 up	 during	 the	 financial	 crisis	 as	 centrist	
politicians	found	political	advantage	in	criticising	the	Federal	Reserve	for	its	role	
in	 bailing	 out	 Wall	 Street.	 In	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 core	
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executive	 in	 the	UK	parliamentary	 system	of	 government	meant	 that	once	an	
administration	 convinced	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 expanding	 central	 bank	 authority	
had	been	elected	to	office,	there	were	few	hurdles	to	expanding	the	power	of	
the	central	bank.	In	the	EU,	the	modest	De	Larosière	reforms	of	2010-11	were	
the	 product	 of	 two	 factors:	 first,	 the	 absence	 of	 expert	 consensus	 over	 the	
wisdom	and	desirability	of	assigning	supervisory	 functions	to	the	ECB;	second,	
the	 persistent	 reluctance	 of	member	 states	 to	 cede	 sovereignty	 over	 banking	
supervision	to	supranational	policymakers.	Both	calculations	changed	following	
the	severe	deterioration	of	financial	conditions	that	took	place	in	late	2011.	The	
weight	of	opinion	within	the	central	banking	community	shifted	such	that	those	
who	 favoured	 an	 expansion	 of	 the	 ECB’s	 supervisory	 functions	 outnumbered	
those	who	feared	conflicts	between	monetary	and	prudential	objectives.	At	the	
same	 time,	 governments’	 resistance	 to	 ceding	 greater	 authority	 over	
supervision	was	eroded	as	crisis-struck	Southern	European	countries	pushed	for	
burden-sharing	 arrangements	 for	 future	 bank	 bailouts	 and	 accepted	
supranational	banking	supervision	as	the	quid	pro	quo.		
The	 second	part	of	 this	 chapter	 sought	 to	explain	 the	differential	power	of	
the	three	central	banks	in	their	post-delegation	relations	with	financial	market	
participants	 and	 national	 executive	 politicians	 (or	 their	 de	 facto	 authority).	 It	
suggested	 that	 changes	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 banking	 and	 credit	 intermediation	 in	
the	 three	 decades	 preceding	 the	 financial	 crisis	 had	 increased	 the	 reliance	 of	
banks	 and	other	 financial	 firms	on	 central	 banks’	 unique	ability	 to	 create	 and	
destroy	 money	 by	 fiat.	 This	 dependency	 grew	 as	 banks	 came	 to	 rely	 on	
increasingly	 unstable	 forms	 of	 wholesale	 funding	 rather	 than	 customer	
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deposits.	 In	 the	United	States,	 complex	chains	of	 shadow	banks	–	which	were	
highly	 dependent	 on	 wholesale	 funding	 –	 displaced	 traditional	 banks	 as	 the	
principal	mechanism	for	intermediating	between	borrowers	and	savers,	thereby	
disguising	the	extent	to	which	the	US	financial	system	was	likewise	centred	on	
unstable	 wholesale	 funding.	 During	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 this	 dependency	 was	
revealed	as	central	banks	transformed	themselves	from	bit-part	players	in	their	
respective	financial	markets	into	major	players	with	balance	sheets	to	rival	even	
the	 largest	 global	 banks.	 They	warehoused	 commercial	 banks’	 risky	 assets	 on	
their	 balance	 sheets	 and	 made	 markets	 for	 securities	 that	 private	 investors	
were	 unwilling	 to	 purchase.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 structural	 power	 of	 financial	
market	 participants	was	diminished.	On	 the	one	hand,	 systemically	 important	
financial	 institutions	 could	 no	 longer	 credibly	 threaten	 to	 relocate	 their	
businesses	 to	more	 favourable	 territories,	 as	 they	were	 revealed	 to	 be	 highly	
dependent	on	access	to	the	liquidity	insurance	of	central	banks	backed	by	fiscal	
authorities	with	deep	pockets.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	very	 fact	 that	 financial	
firms	 were	 in	 receipt	 of	 public	 support	 –	 in	 the	 form	 of	 both	 central	 bank	
liquidity	and	public	bailouts	–	altered	the	wider	political	climate	in	which	bank	
lobbyists	 operate,	 such	 that	 opposing	 more	 stringent	 financial	 regulations	
became	more	difficult	than	it	was	prior	to	the	financial	crisis.	
Structural	power	also	helps	explain	the	differential	relations	between	central	
banks	and	their	respective	political	authorities	after	the	financial	crisis.	Notably,	
the	 ECB	 has	 been	 particularly	 capable	 of	 shaping	 policy	 debates	 beyond	 its	
immediate	 monetary	 policy	 and	 financial	 stability	 remit	 because	 of	 the	
heightened	dependency	of	debt-laden	national	executives	on	its	sovereign	bond	
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purchase	 programmes.	 The	 ECB	 was	 able	 to	 cajole	 Southern	 European	
governments	 into	accepting	deep	 structural	 reforms	and	 spending	 restrictions	
because	it	had	the	ability	to	determine	whether	those	countries	would	default	
on	 their	 debts.7	The	 weakness	 of	 these	 countries’	 sovereign	 finances	 helps	
reveal	 why	 the	 ECB	 has	 been	 able	 to	 induce	 deference	 on	 the	 part	 of	 their	
national	governments.	This	marks	a	clear	difference	between	the	ECB	and	the	
other	 two	 central	 banks	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis.	 While	 both	 the	 Federal	
Reserve	 and	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 have	 had	 some	 influence	 in	 fiscal	 policy	
debates,	neither	has	had	the	leverage	to	compel	politicians	to	act	in	line	with	its	
preferences.	
In	explaining	why	the	de	facto	authority	of	central	banks	has	increased	after	
the	 financial	 crisis,	 this	 chapter	 has	 explored	 central	 banks’	 structural	 power,	
which	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 interdependencies	 between	 actors	 that	 govern	 their	
interactions	with	one	another.	Structural	power	 is	a	more	 indirect	and	hidden	
form	 of	 power	 than	 authority,	 which	 involves	 direct	 interactions	 with	 actors	
inducing	 deference	 others.	 However,	 both	 structural	 power	 and	 authority	
employ	a	conception	of	power	that	is	negative:	power	is	conceived	in	terms	of	
actors’	ability	 to	 influence	the	behaviour	of	others.	Both	structural	power	and	
authority	are	‘power	over’	concepts.	 In	the	next	chapter,	the	focus	shifts	from	
explaining	 how	 central	 banks’	 relationships	 with	 their	 key	 interlocutors	 have	
changed	to	a	consideration	of	how	these	changes	have	affected	the	capacity	of	
central	banks	to	achieve	the	objectives	that	politicians	have	assigned	to	them.	
In	examining	 this	more	 forward	 looking	question,	 the	next	 chapter	employs	 a	
different	conception	of	central	bank	power:	one	in	which	power	is	understood	
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positively,	 as	an	ability	 to	achieve	ones’	goals,	 rather	 than	as	an	ability	 to	get	
others	to	do	what	they	would	not	otherwise	do.	
	
																																																						
1	Those	who	invoke	MM	in	the	current	debate	over	bank	capital	adequacy	freely	
admit	that	the	mix	between	capital	and	debt	in	a	banks’	funding	structure	is	not	
irrelevant	 in	 practice	 (see	 for	 instance	 Pfleiderer	 2010;	 Admati	 and	 Hellwig	
2013,	2014).	Most	notably,	 interest	payments	on	debt	are	 tax	deductible,	but	
dividends	 to	 shareholders	 are	 not,	 meaning	 that	 the	 tax	 code	 effectively	
encourages	banks	to	fund	themselves	with	debt	rather	than	equity.	Modigliani	
and	Miller	themselves	readily	accepted	that	their	irrelevancy	result	would	only	
hold	under	highly	restrictive	assumptions	and	they	spent	much	of	their	careers	
refining	their	theory	in	light	of	real	world	‘frictions’	(See	MacKenzie	2006).	Still,	
for	 these	 authors,	 the	 supposed	 absence	 of	 a	 direct	 link	 between	 capital	 and	
bank	lending	augurs	against	using	capital	as	the	main	instrument	for	controlling	
the	supply	of	credit.		
2	The	name	was	eventually	changed	to	Financial	Stability	Oversight	Council.	
3 	Hall,	 R.	 (2008)	 makes	 a	 similar	 case.	 He	 refers	 to	 central	 banks’	 unique	
capabilities	 as	 ‘deontic	 powers’	 in	 order	 to	 emphasise	 how	 they	 arise	 from	
intersubjectively	shared	understandings.	
4	Short-term	debt	instruments	include	commercial	paper,	certificates	of	deposit,	
and	repurchase	agreements	(‘repos’);	long-term	instruments	include	senior	and	
subordinated	‘term	debt’	and	covered	bonds	(Le	Leslé	2012)	
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5	This	 is	 not	 to	 deny	 the	 great	 heterogeneity	 of	 funding	 structures	within	 the	
euro	area.	Notably,	German	banks	have	tended	to	rely	on	longer-term	sources	
of	wholesale	funding,	while	French	banks	have	been	the	most	heavily	reliant	on	
short-term	debt	instruments	(Hardie	and	Howarth	2013;	Howarth	2013).	In	the	
UK,	 the	 funding	 gap	 underestimates	 how	 dependent	 UK	 banks	 became	 on	
central	 bank	 liquidity	 insurance	 because	 customer	 loans	 accounted	 for	 only	
about	50%	of	UK	banks’	assets	(Bush	et	al.	2014).	
6	Since	 central	 banks	 can	 always	 print	more	money	 to	meet	 their	 obligations,	
they	 cannot	 go	 bankrupt	 like	 commercial	 banks	 (Archer	 and	 Moser-Bohem	
2013).	However,	because	central	banks	pay	their	profits	to	national	treasuries,	
any	 losses	they	suffer	will	ultimately	be	passed	on	to	taxpayers	 in	the	form	of	
lower	 redemptions.	 Were	 a	 central	 bank	 to	 enter	 negative	 equity,	 market	
participants	and	politicians	may	conclude	that	there	was	a	need	to	recapitalise	
the	central	bank,	even	 if	 there	 is	nothing	 inherently	preventing	a	central	bank	
from	 operating	with	 negative	 equity.	 Under	 such	 circumstances,	 central	 bank	
policy	 credibility	 and	 independence	 would	 be	 in	 doubt.	 For	 these	 reasons,	
central	banks	generally	strive	to	operate	with	positive	equity	and	to	avoid	losses	
at	all	costs	(see	Caruana	2013;	Stella	2005).	
7	The	ECB	has	also	employed	a	strategy	of	behind-the-scenes	conditionality	in	its	
provision	of	emergency	 liquidity	assistance	 to	 the	 troubled	banking	 sectors	of	
Ireland	and	later	Greece	(see,	for	example,	ECB	2014f).	
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6 CONTEMPORARY	DYNAMICS	OF	CENTRAL	BANKING	
6.1 INTRODUCTION		
So	far,	this	thesis	has	examined	the	power	of	central	banks	in	relational	terms.	
Our	 concern	 has	 been	 the	 ability	 of	 central	 banks	 to	 exert	 ‘power	 over’	
politicians	and	financial	market	participants,	including	their	ability	to	win	policy	
debates	and	set	the	parameters	within	which	other	actors	perceive	and	frame	
their	 preferences.	 This	 chapter	 examines	 central	 bank	 power	 in	 terms	 of	
empowerment,	 focusing	 specifically	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘capacity’.	 Central	 bank	
capacity	is	a	more	positive	understanding	of	central	bank	power	that	concerns	
their	‘power	to’	do	things.	For	the	purposes	of	this	thesis,	capacity	is	defined	as	
the	 ability	 to	 attain	 specified	 outcomes	 (Morriss	 2002:	 33).	 The	 rationale	 for	
discussing	 central	 bank	 capacity	 derives	 from	 the	 intuition	 that	 while	 central	
banks’	 actions	 necessarily	 affect	 other	 actors,	 an	 array	 of	 factors,	 other	 than	
their	‘power	over’	those	actors,	shape	how	successful	they	are	in	achieving	their	
objectives.	Put	another	way,	central	banks’	authority	and	their	structural	power	
are	 important	 factors	 determining	 central	 banks’	 ability	 to	 attain	 their	
objectives,	but	they	are	not	the	only	factors.	This	chapter	evaluates	the	merits	
and	 drawbacks	 of	 the	 different	 policy	 objectives	 and	 tools	 that	 each	 central	
bank	 is	 developing,	 their	 particular	 ‘styles’	 of	 policy	 implementation	 and	 the	
coordinative	 challenges	 they	 face	 with	 respect	 to	 making	 and	 implementing	
policy	 in	 their	 particular	 jurisdictions.	 The	 purpose	 is	 to	 assess	 how	 these	
different	 aspects	 of	 central	 banks’	 activities	 and	environments	 condition	 their	
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chances	for	‘success’	in	terms	of	protecting	consumers	of	financial	services	and	
maintaining	financial	stability.	
	The	 chapter	 identifies	 three	 sets	 of	 conditions	 –	 other	 than	 authority	 and	
structural	 power	 –	 that	 affect	 central	 banks’	 capacity	 in	 the	 financial	 stability	
domain.	 First,	 it	 examines	 the	 ‘fitness	 for	 purpose’	 (Dyson	 2009)	 of	 the	
particular	 policy	 instruments	 that	 each	 central	 bank	 is	 adopting	 in	 order	 to	
further	 its	 objectives.	 There	 is	 a	 significant	 divergence	 between	 the	 three	
central	banks	in	terms	of	their	‘intermediate	objectives’,	that	is,	the	objectives	
they	have	set	for	themselves	in	pursuit	of	their	higher-level	(statutory)	financial	
stability	 objectives.	 In	 particular,	 the	 central	 banks	 differ	 in	 respect	 of	 the	
degrees	of	emphasis	that	each	places	on	time-invariant	‘structural’	reforms	that	
aim	 to	 increase	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 financial	 system	 and	 time-varying	
‘countercyclical’	 policies	 that	 aim	 to	 dampen	 cyclical	 fluctuations	 in	 credit	
conditions	 and	 asset	 prices.	 As	 discussed	 below,	 resilience-focused	 policies	
exhibit	important	continuities	with	pre-crisis	forms	of	financial	regulation,	both	
in	 theory	 and	 in	 practice.	 Countercyclical	 policies	 recall	 modes	 of	 financial	
regulation	that	have	been	out	of	 favour	 in	most	Western	economies	since	the	
1970s.	As	 such,	 they	 represent	more	of	 a	 fundamental	discontinuity	 from	 the	
pre-crisis	status	quo	ante.		
The	second	set	of	conditions	shaping	central	banks’	capacity	 is	their	 ‘styles’	
of	policy	implementation,	in	particular	a	preference	for	rules	over	discretion,	or	
vice	 versa.	 Prior	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 central	 banks	 and	 financial	 supervisory	
authorities	 were	 often	 categorised	 as	 adopting	 either	 ‘principles-based’	 or	
‘rules-based’	regimes.	This	distinction	was	sometimes	overdrawn,	obscuring	the	
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convergence	 on	 more	 formalised	 and	 programmatic	 approaches	 to	 financial	
regulation	 that	 took	 place	 in	 many	 countries	 from	 the	 1970s	 onwards	 (see	
Chapter	 3).	 Yet	 the	 distinction	 did	 highlight	 certain	 enduring	 differences	 in	
respect	of	national	 styles	of	policy	 implementation,	 in	particular	 the	extent	of	
discretion	exercised	by	policymakers	in	different	jurisdictions	in	executing	their	
mandates.	 Such	 differences	 persist	 after	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Preferences	 for	
rules-versus-discretion	 are	 embedded	 within	 the	 organisational	 cultures	 of	
central	 banks	 and	 financial	 authorities	 and	 the	 wider	 national	 (or	 regional)	
institutional	 contexts	 within	 which	 they	 operate.	 The	 rules-versus-discretion	
dichotomy	 is	 apparent	 in	 central	 banks’	 implementation	 of	 both	
macroprudential	and	microprudential	policies.	The	chapter	argues	 in	 favour	of	
more	 discretionary	 approaches	 to	 implementing	 financial	 stability	 policy.	 It	
suggests	 policymakers	 should	 be	 willing	 to	 intervene	 even	 in	 conditions	 of	
fundamental	 uncertainty,	 where	 they	 do	 not	 have	 the	 luxury	 of	 perfectly	
reliable	 measures	 of	 systemic	 risk	 or	 policy	 effectiveness.	 By	 extension,	 it	
suggests	 central	 banks	 need	 to	 accept	 higher	 levels	 of	 reputational	 risk,	
recognising	 that	 their	 broadened	 mandates	 bring	 with	 them	 a	 greater	
probability	of	making	mistakes.		
The	 third	 set	 of	 conditions	 relevant	 to	 central	 bank	 capacity	 concerns	 the	
extent	to	which	policy	is	coordinated	with	other	authorities	involved	in	financial	
regulation	 and	 wider	 macroeconomic	 policymaking.	 Central	 banks	 do	 not	
operate	 in	 a	 vacuum.	 In	 all	 three	 cases,	 central	 banks	 coexist	with	 regulatory	
authorities	 that	have	an	 impact	on	 financial	 stability	both	domestically	and	at	
the	 international	 level.	 At	 the	 international	 level,	 forums	 such	 as	 the	 Basel	
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Committee	 on	 Banking	 Supervision	 (BCBS)	 and	 the	 Financial	 Stability	 Board	
(FSB)	 are	 the	 ultimate	 source	 of	 most	 of	 the	 financial	 stability	 policies	 that	
central	 banks	 implement.	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 international	 standards	 limit	
central	banks’	ability	to	tailor	rules	or	supervisory	approaches	to	their	national	
financial	systems,	they	may	diminish	the	capacity	of	central	banks	to	maintain	
financial	stability	within	their	borders.	At	the	national	level,	central	banks	must	
also	share	power	with	non-central	bank	financial	supervisors,	which	can	lead	to	
bureaucratic	infighting	and	other	operational	challenges.		
Central	banks’	capacity	in	regards	to	financial	stability	also	depends	on	wider	
macroeconomic	 conditions.	While	 central	 banks	 are	 generally	 responsible	 for	
setting	monetary	policy,	 as	discussed	 in	 the	previous	 two	chapters,	 they	have	
limited	(albeit	varying)	influence	over	fiscal	policy.	The	overall	mix	of	fiscal	and	
monetary	 policies	 at	 any	 given	 moment	 will	 profoundly	 influence	 financial	
conditions	and	the	capacity	of	central	banks	 to	achieve	their	 financial	 stability	
objectives.	The	chapter	evaluates	how	 interconnections	and	conflicts	between	
fiscal	 policy,	 monetary	 policy	 and	 financial	 stability	 policy	 have	 influenced	
central	banks’	policy	choices	and	their	overall	capacities	in	relation	to	financial	
stability.		
Before	 proceeding,	 one	 qualifier	 is	 in	 order.	 The	 analysis	 that	 follows	
confines	itself	to	discussing	central	bank	capacity	in	relation	to	financial	stability	
policy.	It	is	not	the	intention	to	discuss	capacity	in	relation	to	monetary	policy,	
although	 aspects	 of	monetary	 policy	 are	 discussed	where	 relevant	 (for	 useful	
discussions	of	post-crisis	developments	in	monetary	policy	see	Bean	et	al.	2010;	
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Eichengreen	et	al.	2011;	Blinder	2013;	 Issing	2013;	Reichlin	and	Baldwin	et	al.	
2013;	Fernández-Albertos	2015).	
6.2 INTERMEDIATE	OBJECTIVES	AND	POLICY	CHOICES	
6.2.1 RESILIENCE	VERSUS	COUNTERCYCLICALITY?			
As	noted,	 the	 three	 central	 banks	place	different	degrees	of	 emphasis	 on	 the	
objective	of	enhancing	the	resilience	of	the	financial	system	to	shocks	and	the	
objective	 of	 containing	 systemic	 risks	 by	 dampening	 cyclical	 fluctuations	 in	
credit	conditions	and	asset	prices.	The	primary	objectives	of	‘resilience-focused’	
approaches	 are	 twofold:	 diminishing	 the	 likelihood	 that	 a	 systemically	
important	firm	will	fail	and	reducing	the	impact	that	such	a	failure	would	have	
on	 the	 financial	 system	 were	 it	 to	 occur.	 The	 resilience	 approach	 involves	
imposing	 time-invariant	measures	 that	alter	 the	distribution	of	 risk	within	 the	
financial	 system	 at	 a	 given	moment	 in	 time,	making	 financial	 institutions	 less	
likely	 to	 fail.	 It	 also	 requires	banks	 to	 fund	 themselves	 in	 such	a	way	 that	 the	
costs	 of	 their	 potential	 failure	 would	 fall	 on	 shareholders	 and	 unsecured	
creditors,	rather	than	taxpayers.		
The	 calibration	 of	 time-invariant	 prudential	 standards	 has	 been	 greatly	
strengthened	 since	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 The	 Basel	 Committee	 on	 Banking	
Supervision	 (BCBS)	 has	 agreed	 measures	 to	 increase	 banks’	 ability	 to	 absorb	
losses	by	requiring	them	to	fund	themselves	with	greater	quantities	of	capital,	
especially	the	purest	form	of	capital,	so-called	Common	Equity	Tier	1	(see	BCBS	
2011).	 Furthermore,	 several	 new	 prudential	 metrics	 have	 been	 added	 to	 the	
pre-crisis	 framework,	which	relied	only	on	the	ratio	of	capital	 to	risk-weighted	
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assets.	 This	 includes	 the	 ‘leverage	 ratio’,	 which	 sets	 minimum	 capital	
requirements	 against	 banks’	 total,	 non-risk-weighted,	 assets;	 and	 two	 new	
liquidity	 regimes,	 the	 liquidity	coverage	 ratio	and	 the	net	stable	 funding	 ratio.	
Alongside	these	innovations,	the	Financial	Stability	Board	(FSB)	has	put	in	place	
new	standards	 for	bank	 resolution,	which	aim	to	end	 the	phenomena	of	 ‘too-
big-to-fail’	 by	 requiring	 systemically	 important	 banks	 to	 fund	 themselves	with	
more	 capital	 and	 loss-absorbing	 forms	 of	 debt,	 and	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
distribution	 of	 financial	 resources	 within	 their	 group	 structures	 facilitates	
orderly	resolution	(FSB	2011;	2014).	Financial	regulators	are	also	implementing	
‘structural’	 reforms	 which	 prohibit	 certain	 types	 of	 financial	 entity	 from	
performing	 specified	 activities	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 insulating	 so-called	 ‘utility’	
banking	 –	 such	 as	 taking	 deposits	 and	making	 loans	 to	 individuals	 and	 small	
businesses	 –	 from	 ostensibly	 riskier	 ‘casino’	 banking,	 such	 as	 proprietary	
trading.		
It	 is	 fair	 to	 say	 there	have	been	 significant	 advancements	 in	 central	 banks’	
thinking	 around	 the	 concept	 of	 financial	 resilience	 since	 the	 financial	 crisis.	
Regulators	no	longer	 look	upon	complexity	and	interconnectedness	as	signs	of	
risk	 being	 dispersed	 to	 those	 best	 able	 to	 bear	 it,	 but	 rather	 as	 sources	 of	
uncertainty	 and	 vulnerability	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Haldane	 2009).	 Furthermore,	
regulators	have	identified	the	problem	of	‘too-big-to-fail’	to	be	both	iniquitous,	
since	systemically-important	banks	benefit	from	implicit	public	guarantees,	and	
a	 source	of	moral	 hazard,	driving	 irresponsible	 risk-taking	 in	 financial	markets	
(see	Dudley	2013).		
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However,	resilience-focused	approaches	also	exhibit	strong	continuities	with	
pre-crisis	 microprudential	 financial	 regulation	 (cf.	 Mügge	 2013).	 Much	
resilience-focused	policy	was	present	prior	 to	the	 financial	crisis.	For	example,	
regulatory	 limits	 on	 banks’	 large	 exposures	 to	 individual	 counterparties	 or	 to	
groups	 of	 connected	 counterparties	 have	 long	 been	 a	 feature	 of	 the	
microprudential	toolkit.	Such	tools	have	the	effect	of	limiting	risks	arising	from	
interconnectedness	in	the	financial	system,	which	is	now	a	key	priority	for	post-
crisis	regulation.	Indeed,	prior	to	the	financial	crisis,	regulators	already	imposed	
capital	and	liquidity	requirements	and	complex	standards	for	risk	management	
and	 corporate	 governance.	 While	 the	 calibration	 of	 these	 policies	 was,	 with	
hindsight,	 wholly	 too	 liberal,	 they	 shared	 the	 same	 intermediate	 objective	 as	
post-crisis	 resilience-focused	 policies,	 namely	 that	 of	 requiring	 more	 prudent	
risk	 management	 of	 individual	 institutions.	 This	 is	 a	 broadly	 market-oriented	
objective;	 it	 takes	 systemic	 financial	 instability	 to	be	an	exogenous	constraint,	
which	financial	institutions	must	adapt	to.		
Countercyclical	 approaches	 involve	 time-varying	 measures,	 which	 aim	 to	
‘lean	against’	emerging	imbalances	in	the	supply	of	credit,	fluctuations	in	asset	
prices	or	excessive	growth	of	private	 sector	 indebtedness.	 The	 countercyclical	
toolkit	 includes	 measures	 such	 as	 limits	 on	 the	 maximum	 loan-to-income	 or	
loan-to-value	ratios	for	residential	mortgages;	time-varying	adjustments	to	the	
provisions	 banks	 make	 against	 losses;	 and	 variations	 in	 the	 level	 of	 required	
reserves	banks	hold	at	 the	 central	bank	 (see	 IMF	2013,	Claessens	et	 al.	 2014;	
and	 Claessens	 2014	 for	 overviews).	 Countercyclical	 policies	 were	 common	 in	
Europe	and	the	United	States	in	the	three	decades	after	the	Second	World	War,	
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when	central	banks	were	largely	subordinate	to	government	control	(see	Elliot	
et	 al.	 2013	 for	 the	 United	 States;	 Watson,	 C.M.	 and	 Herzberg	 2014	 for	 the	
United	 Kingdom;	 and	 Perez	 1998	 for	 France	 and	 Spain).	 While	 such	 policies	
were	used	extensively	in	East	Asia	and	Central	Eastern	and	Southeastern	Europe	
in	the	1990s	and	early	2000s	(Zhang	and	Zoli	2014;	Vandenbussche	et	al.	2013),	
they	fell	out	of	use	in	the	Western	countries	in	the	period	of	market	orthodoxy	
that	 immediately	 preceded	 the	 financial	 crisis	 (see	 Chapter	 3).	 To	 the	 extent	
that	 they	 have	 re-emerged	 after	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 they	 are	 indicative	 of	 a	
more	 fundamental	 discontinuity	 in	 the	 trajectory	 of	 change	 in	 financial	
regulation	 than	 the	 evolution	 and	 reinforcement	 of	 resilience-focused	
approaches.		
6.2.2 OBSERVED	APPROACHES	
In	the	United	States,	the	Federal	Reserve’s	on-going	regulatory	agenda	focuses	
overwhelmingly	 on	 ensuring	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 largest	 firms	 (Tarullo	 2013).	
The	Fed	has	issued	new	capital	standards	for	banks,	implementing	and	in	some	
areas	going	beyond	the	‘Basel	III’	international	capital	framework	(see	FRS,	OCC	
and	FDIC	2013a,	2014).	 It	has	also	issued	a	raft	of	more	stringent	rules	for	the	
large	 banks	 and	 systemically	 important	 non-bank	 firms	 under	 its	 supervision.	
Key	 milestones	 include	 requirements	 for	 banks	 to	 submit	 ‘resolution	 plans’,	
which	detail	how	they	could	be	wound	down	safely	 (FRS	and	FDIC	2011),	and	
rules	in	relation	to	various	stress	tests	(FRS	2011,	2012a,	2012b).	More	recently,	
the	Fed	 issued	a	set	of	rules	to	 implement	Sections	165	and	166	of	the	Dodd-
Frank	 Act,	 which	 require	 it	 to	 set	 out	 prudential	 standards	 for	 large	 banking	
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firms	 that	are	more	 stringent	 than	 for	 smaller	 firms	 (FRS	2014).	An	additional	
milestone	was	the	joint	agreement	between	the	Fed	and	other	US	regulators	on	
the	 implementation	 of	 the	 so-called	 ‘Volcker	 Rule’	 (FRS	 2013;	 FRS,	OCC,	 FDIC	
and	SEC	2013).	This	restricts	banks’	ability	to	trade	‘on	their	own	account’	and	
limits	 their	 relationships	 with	 hedge	 funds	 and	 other	 investment	 companies.	
The	 Volcker	 Rule	 is	 a	 resilience-focused	 measure	 since	 it	 focuses	 on	 the	
structure	 of	 the	 financial	 system	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 risk	 amongst	market	
participants	at	any	given	moment.		
The	Federal	Reserve’s	use	of	countercyclical	policies	has	been	more	limited.	
Regulators	interviewed	for	this	thesis	identified	only	one	such	initiative:	in	2013,	
the	 Fed	 and	 other	 Federal	 banking	 regulators	 issued	 supervisory	 guidance	 on	
‘leveraged	lending’,	which	may	have	some	effect	in	constraining	the	build-up	of	
debt	in	the	commercial	sector	(FRS,	OCC	and	FDIC	2013b;	author	interviews,	11	
and	 16	 July	 2014,	 Washington	 DC).1	Arguably,	 the	 Fed’s	 approach	 to	 stress	
testing	 (see	below)	also	allows	 it	 to	 respond	dynamically	 to	 the	emergence	of	
systemic	 risks,	 although	 here	 the	 main	 emphasis	 is	 on	 ensuring	 financial	
institutions	are	resilient	 in	the	face	of	cyclical	 fluctuations	 in	credit	conditions,	
rather	than	dampening	those	fluctuations	in	the	first	place.		
Both	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 and	 the	 ECB	 are	 pursuing	 a	 more	 balanced	
approach.	On	the	resilience	side,	both	have	enhanced	the	rigour	and	stringency	
of	microprudential	 supervision,	 including	 through	 stress-testing	 exercises	 (see	
below)	and,	 in	the	case	of	the	Bank	of	England,	by	establishing	rules	that	hold	
firms	 to	more	stringent	capital	 standards	 than	 the	minimums	 laid	down	 in	EU	
legislation	(see	Bank	of	England	2013b).	Both	are	also	working	to	 increase	the	
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resolvability	of	banks.	As	the	UK	resolution	authority,	the	Bank	of	England	has	
developed	proposals	 for	 ensuring	operational	 continuity	 of	 failing	 banks’	 core	
business	 services	 and	 for	 apportioning	 losses	 amongst	 shareholders	 and	
creditors	 (see	 Bank	 of	 England	 2014a).	 The	 ECB’s	 role	 in	 resolution	 is	 more	
limited,	 but	 it	 recently	 established	 a	 Crisis	 Management	 Division	 to	 provide	
expertise	in	reviewing	banks’	resolution	plans	and	to	participate	in	international	
Crisis	 Management	 Groups2 ,	 which	 have	 been	 established	 to	 manage	 the	
potential	 failure	 of	 globally	 significant	 banks	 (ECB	 2014b).	 Like	 the	 Federal	
Reserve,	both	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	ECB	are	also	helping	to	 implement	
structural	 banking	 reforms.	 The	 Bank	 of	 England	 is	 implementing	 the	 ‘ring	
fencing’	of	banks’	retail	activities	from	the	activities	of	their	wider	groups.	This	
was	first	proposed	by	the	UK	‘Independent	Commission	on	Banking’,	Chaired	by	
Sir	John	Vickers,	which	was	established	in	2010	to	provide	recommendations	of	
a	 structural	 and	 non-structural	 nature	 (see,	 for	 instance,	 Bank	 of	 England	
2014f).	Legislation	on	structural	reforms	in	the	EU	is	yet	to	be	agreed,	but	will	
follow	 the	 recommendations	 of	 a	 High	 Level	 Expert	 Group	 chaired	 by	 Erkki	
Liikanen,	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	Finland.	The	ECB	has	expressed	its	support	for	
the	recommendations,	which	would	 impose	a	ban	on	proprietary	trading	 (ECB	
2014c).		
On	 the	 countercyclical	 side,	 both	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 and	 the	 ECB	 have	
demonstrated	 commitment	 to	 pursuing	 macroprudential	 policies	 of	 a	 time-
varying	nature.	 In	mid-2012,	 the	Bank	of	England’s	Financial	Policy	Committee	
(FPC)	 recommended	 that	 liquidity	 requirements	 for	 banks	 should	 be	 lowered	
and	 that	 risk	 weights	 on	 certain	 new	 lending	 to	 small	 and	 medium	 sized	
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enterprises	 should	be	 set	 to	 zero	 (Bank	of	 England	2012).	 These	were	overtly	
countercyclical	macroprudential	 policies	designed	 to	boost	 lending	 to	 the	 real	
economy	during	a	slump.	The	Bank	of	England	was	also	early	to	operationalise	
the	 so-called	 ‘Countercyclical	 Capital	 Buffer’	 (CCB).	 This	 instrument,	 which	 is	
part	 of	 the	 ‘Basel	 III’	 international	 framework	 of	 capital	 standards,	 requires	
banks	to	raise	additional	capital	during	periods	of	credit	growth.	Its	primary	aim	
is	 to	 improve	 banks’	 ability	 to	 continue	 lending	 in	 a	 downturn	 (i.e.	 banking	
sector	resilience),	but	it	may	also	dampen	the	magnitude	of	credit	cycles	in	the	
first	 place	 (BCBS	 2010).	 So	 far,	 the	 FPC	 has	 maintained	 the	 CCB	 at	 zero,	
reflecting	the	subdued	volume	of	lending	to	the	real	economy	after	the	financial	
crisis.	 Nevertheless,	 by	 actively	 deliberating	 its	 calibration	 each	 quarter,	 the	
Bank	 has	 demonstrated	 its	 readiness	 to	 intervene	 to	 contain	 excess	 credit	
growth.	Furthermore,	the	Bank	of	England	has	signalled	its	desire	to	adjust	the	
new	 leverage	 ratio	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 financial	 cycle,	 in	 tandem	 with	
adjustments	in	the	countercyclical	capital	buffer;	by	the	Bank’s	own	analysis,	it	
is	 the	 only	major	 jurisdiction	 proposing	 to	 vary	 the	 leverage	 ratio	 in	 this	way	
(Bank	of	England	2014g:	21).	
The	ECB’s	support	for	the	use	of	containment-focused	policies	is	manifest	in	
the	 outputs	 of	 the	 European	 Systemic	 Risk	 Board	 (ESRB),	 which	 it	 dominates	
(see	 Chapter	 4).	 In	 2013,	 the	 ESRB	 issued	 a	 recommendation	 to	 the	
macroprudential	 authorities	 of	 member	 states	 setting	 out	 five	 intermediate	
objectives	of	macroprudential	policy.	The	first	of	 these	objectives,	 ‘to	mitigate	
and	 prevent	 excessive	 credit	 growth	 and	 leverage’,	 is	 overtly	 focused	 on	
countercyclicality	 (ESRB	2013).	The	recommendation	also	set	out	an	 indicative	
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list	 of	 countercyclical	 tools	 that	member	 states	 should	 have	 at	 their	 disposal.	
This	 included	 the	 CCB;	 time-varying	 adjustments	 to	 sector-specific	 capital	
requirements;	 countercyclical	 use	 of	 leverage	 ratios;	 and	 loan-to-income	 or	
loan-to-value	limits	(ESRB	2013).		
With	 the	creation	of	 the	Single	Supervisory	Mechanism	 in	November	2014,	
the	 ECB	 became	 jointly	 responsible	 with	 the	 national	 competent	 authorities	
(NCAs)	of	member	states	for	some	aspects	of	macroprudential	policy.	While	the	
ECB	 had	 not	 taken	 any	 macroprudential	 actions	 by	 the	 endpoint	 of	 the	
timeframe	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis,	 early	 indications	 suggest	 it	 will	 retain	 an	
approach	 focused	 on	 countercyclicality.	 For	 instance,	 in	 2014,	 ECB	 Vice-
President	 Vítor	 Constâncio,	 who	 generally	 leads	 the	 ECB’s	 work	 on	
macroprudential	policy	stated:	
	
It	is	crucial	to	recognise	that	the	financial	cycle	has	an	important	endogenous	
component	which	arises	because	banks	take	too	much	solvency	and	liquidity	
risk.	 The	 aim	 of	macro-prudential	 policy	 should	 be	 to	 temper	 the	 financial	
cycle	 rather	 than	 to	 merely	 enhance	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 financial	 sector	
ahead	of	crises	(Constâncio	2014).	
	
These	remarks	contrast	sharply	with	those	of	Constâncio’s	counterparts	at	the	
Federal	Reserve.	 Senior	 Fed	officials	 –	 including	Governor	Daniel	 Tarullo,	who	
represents	 the	 Fed	 on	most	 regulatory	 issues	 –	 express	 scepticism	 as	 to	 the	
reliability	 of	 measures	 of	 time-varying	 systemic	 risk,	 the	 possibilities	 of	
calibrating	 countercyclical	 tools	 effectively	 and	 the	 efficacy	 of	 measures	 that	
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may	be	easily	circumvented	through	regulatory	arbitrage	(Tarullo	2013;	author	
interview,	11	July	2013,	Washington	DC).	
6.2.3 FIT	FOR	PURPOSE?	
Prior	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 most	 efforts	 to	 improve	 financial	 governance	
focused	 on	 increasing	 the	 quantity	 and	 quality	 of	 information	 available	 to	
market	 participants	 (transparency),	 improving	 market-sensitive	 risk-
management	 and	 strengthening	 prudential	 standards	 for	 (individual)	 financial	
institutions	 (Persaud	2000,	2015;	Best	2010;	Walter	2008).	These	efforts	were	
criticised	 as	 a	 manifestation	 of	 a	 ‘neo-liberal’	 economic	 worldview	 that	 had	
come	 to	 dominate	 policymaking,	 professional	 and	 academic	 circles	 (Hall,	 P.	
1993;	 Best	 2005,	 Chapter	 6;	 Baker	 2006).	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 during	 this	
period,	 financial	 regulation	 came	 to	 be	 based	 on	 ‘simplified	 versions	 of	 the	
dominant	beliefs	of	economists’	(Turner	2011).	In	particular,	officials	took	it	as	
axiomatic	that	markets	were	‘efficient’,	both	in	the	sense	that	the	price	of	any	
given	 asset	 would	 accurately	 reflect	 all	 publicly	 available	 information	 (Fama	
1970)	 and	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 ‘self-interests	 of	 organizations,	 specifically	
banks	and	others,	were	such	as	that	they	were	best	capable	of	protecting	their	
own	shareholders	and	their	equity	in	the	firms’	(Greenspan	2008).		
Scholars	 are	 divided	 as	 to	whether	 the	 post-crisis	 shift	 to	macroprudential	
policy	represents	a	potential	(but	as	yet	unrealised)	‘paradigm	shift’	in	financial	
regulation	 (Baker	 2013b)	 or	 incremental	 tweaking	 of	 existing	market	 friendly	
approaches	 (Moschella	 and	 Tsingou	 2013;	 Porter	 2014;	 Helleiner	 2014;	
Underhill	2014).	Whichever	side	of	this	debate	one	comes	down	on,	 it	 is	clear	
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that	the	Federal	Reserve’s	resilience-focused	approach	adheres	more	closely	to	
the	 pre-crisis	 orthodoxy	 than	 the	 more	 mixed	 approaches	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	
England	and	the	ECB.	The	Federal	Reserve’s	approach	can	be	characterised	as	
microprudential	policy	with	a	‘macroprudential	overlay’	(cf.	Haldane	2013).	The	
stringency	of	its	microprudential	regulations	is	tailored	to	the	systemic	risks	that	
firms	 pose,	 while	 stress	 tests	 provide	 a	 mechanism	 for	 requiring	 banks	 to	
provision	against	 emerging	 risks.	 The	overriding	purpose	of	 such	policies	 is	 to	
ensure	 that	 the	 financial	 system	 can	withstand	 a	major	 recession	 or	 financial	
shock,	rather	than	to	contain	the	likelihood	of	such	shocks	occurring	in	the	first	
place.	In	contrast,	the	countercyclical	policies	being	implemented	or	considered	
in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 the	 euro	 area	 are	 based	 on	 ideas	 that	 are	
ontologically	 incompatible	 with	 the	 pre-crisis	 efficient	 markets	 orthodoxy	
(Baker	 and	Widmaier	 2014).	 Such	 ideas	 include	 notions	 such	 as	 endogenous	
financial	 instability	 and	 the	 procyclicality	 of	 credit	 (Minsky	 1986),	 herd-like	
investment	 behaviour	 (Persaud	 2000)	 and	 neglected	 risks	 due	 to	 investor	
irrationality	and	collective	myopia	(Gennaioli	et	al.	2011).		
One	 need	 not	 view	 countercyclical	 policy	 as	 the	 ‘saviour	 of	 neoliberalism’	
(see	 Casey	 2014)	 to	 believe	 that	 an	 approach	 that	 is	 balanced	 between	
resilience	and	countercyclicality	 is	 likely	 to	prove	superior	 to	one	 that	 focuses	
almost	solely	on	resilience.	The	experience	of	the	financial	crisis	demonstrated	
that	 the	 scale	 of	 losses	 that	 emerge	 after	 a	 finance-led	 boom	 can	 greatly	
outweigh	 the	 loss-absorbing	 capacity	 of	 banks,	 even	 where	 additional	
provisions	have	been	built	up	through	the	cycle.	For	example,	the	Bank	of	Spain	
required	 Spanish	 banks	 to	 make	 increasingly	 large	 provisions	 against	 losses	
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during	 the	 decade	 preceding	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 When	 the	 Spanish	 property	
bubble	 burst,	 Spanish	 banks	 quickly	 burnt	 through	 these	 additional	 buffers.	
Absent	 time-varying	 containment	policies	 to	dampen	 the	 financial	 cycle,	 bank	
capital	 requirements	need	 to	do	 all	 the	heavy	 lifting.	 In	 such	 a	 scenario,	 they	
would	probably	need	to	be	an	order	of	magnitude	greater	than	they	currently	
are.	 Indeed,	 advocates	 of	 resilience-focused	 approaches	 have	 argued	 that	
capital	 requirements	 should	 be	 in	 the	 region	 of	 20	 per	 cent	 of	 risk-weighted	
assets	(Miles	et	al.	2011;	ICB	2011;	Admati	and	Hellwig	2013).	This	is	double	the	
amount	agreed	 in	 the	Basel	 III	 international	capital	 framework	and	more	 than	
any	central	bank	currently	requires.	
6.3 STYLES	OF	POLICY	IMPLEMENTATION	
6.3.1 RULES	VERSUS	DISCRETION	
A	 second	 area	of	 divergence	between	 the	 three	 central	 banks	 centres	 on	 the	
respective	 preferences	 for	 ‘rules’	 and	 ‘discretion’	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	
financial	 stability	 policies.	 The	 rules-versus	 discretion	 dichotomy	 has	 a	 long	
pedigree	in	discussions	of	central	bank	governance	and	policy	implementation.	
For	 example,	 prior	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 there	 was	 a	 longstanding	 debate	
amongst	banking	supervisors	as	to	the	merits	of	‘rules-based’	versus	‘principles-
based’	approaches	to	banking	supervision	(Black	et	al.	2007).	Likewise,	there	is	a	
long-running	 debate	 in	 relation	 to	 monetary	 policy	 as	 regards	 the	 impact	 of	
rules-based	 and	 discretion-based	 decision-making	 on	 price	 stability	 outcomes	
(see	Kydland	and	Prescott	1977;	Fischer	1990,	among	others).			
	 272	
The	 rules-versus-discretion	 dichotomy	 is	 much	 discussed	 amongst	
economists	and	financial	technocrats	in	relation	to	the	implementation	of	both	
macroprudential	 and	microprudential	 policies.	 To	 their	 proponents,	 the	main	
advantages	 of	 rules-based	 approaches	 is	 that	 they	 tie	 the	 hands	 of	
policymakers,	reducing	the	likelihood	that	they	will	act	arbitrary	ways,	whether	
in	 respect	 of	 decision-making	 around	 distressed	 financial	 institutions	 or	 in	
relation	 to	measures	 to	mitigate	 systemic	 risks	 to	 financial	 stability	 (Cecchetti	
and	 Schoenholtz	 2014).	 For	 example,	 in	 the	microprudential	 policy	 domain,	 a	
rule-based	 regime	 may	 prevent	 supervisors	 from	 engaging	 in	 so-called	
‘supervisory	forbearance’;	that	is,	turning	a	blind	eye	to	emerging	problems	at	a	
supervised	firm	in	the	hope	that	the	institution	will	recover	of	its	own	accord.	In	
this	 example,	 a	 rules-based	 approach	 is	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 alleged	 ‘time-
inconsistency’	 problem	 in	 microprudential	 supervision,	 whereby	 supervisors	
promise	 to	 adopt	 a	prudent	 stance	 in	 the	 long-run,	 but	 face	 incentives	 to	 act	
leniently	 in	 the	 short	 run	 (see	Masciandaro	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Cihak	 2010;	 on	 ‘time	
inconsistency’	 in	monetary	policy	 see	Kydland	and	Prescott	 1977;	Barrow	and	
Gordon	1983;	Rogoff	1985).	 In	 relation	 to	macroprudential-policy,	proponents	
of	 rules-based	 approaches	 claim	 that	 rules	 increase	 transparency,	 providing	
greater	predictability	to	the	regulatory	environment	(Lim	et	al.	2011).	This	could	
ultimately	 cause	 banks	 to	 hold	 lower	 reserves	 of	 capital	 and	 liquidity	 as	 a	
precaution	 against	 regulatory	 uncertainty,	 ostensibly	 resulting	 in	 a	 more	
efficient	allocation	of	financial	resources	(Bank	of	England	2009).	
Discretion	 comes	 in	 a	 number	 of	 guises	 in	 central	 banking	 and	 financial	
stability	 policy.	 For	 example,	 ‘principles-based	 regulation’	 involves	 requiring	
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financial	market	participants	to	adhere,	first	and	foremost,	to	the	spirit	of	high-
level	 principles	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 letter	 of	 detailed	 rules.	 Principles-based	
regulation	 is	 said	 to	 afford	 supervisory	 authorities	 the	 flexibility	 necessary	 to	
maintain	 prudential	 standards	 even	 amid	 rapid	 financial	 innovation,	 wherein	
new	 products	 and	 activities	 emerge	 more	 quickly	 than	 rulebooks	 can	 be	
updated	 (Toniolo	and	White	2015).	Discretion	 is	also	central	 to	so-called	 ‘risk-
based	 regulation’.	 Risk-based	 approaches	 involve	 implementing	 systematised	
mechanisms	for	prioritising	risks	and	deploying	supervisory	time	and	resources	
to	 firms	 accordingly	 (Black	 and	 Baldwin	 2010).	 Such	 approaches	 are	
discretionary	 since	 in	 practice	 they	 require	 supervisors	 to	make	 a	 judgement	
about	which	firms	and	activities	to	concentrate	on,	and	which	elements	of	the	
rulebook	will	 be	actively	monitored	and	enforced.	Central	banks	and	 financial	
supervisory	 authorities	 often	 also	 refer	 to	 themselves	 as	 ‘judgement-based’	
(see,	 for	 example,	 Bank	 of	 England	 2014b).	 This	 is	 shorthand	 for	 describing	
situations	 in	 which	 decisions	 are	 not	 tied	 to	 particular	 indicators	 or	 trigger	
points,	 but	 instead	 are	 based	 on	 a	 holistic	 appraisal	 of	 multiple	 sources	 of	
information.	 In	 regards	 to	 microprudential	 supervision,	 a	 judgement-based	
approach	would	involve	supervisors	drawing	on	a	wide	range	of	indicators,	both	
quantitative	 and	 qualitative,	 about	 the	 financial	 soundness	 of	 a	 firm	 and	 the	
nature	 of	 its	 risk	management.	 Such	 an	 approach	 is	 said	 to	 guard	 against	 so-
called	 ‘model	 risk’,	wherein	decisions	are	susceptible	 to	 the	errors	 inherent	 in	
supervisors’	own	risk-models	and	frameworks.		
Balancing	 rules	 and	 discretion	 in	 financial	 policy	 involves	 trade-offs.	 Risk-
based	 approaches	 are	 inherently	 less	 costly	 than	 rules-based	 approaches.	
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However,	since	policymakers	do	not	have	perfect	foresight,	they	may	decide	to	
deprioritise	particular	firms	or	activities	that	subsequently	turn	out	to	be	major	
sources	of	 risk.	Principles-based	 regulation	 theoretically	provides	 flexibility	 for	
supervisors	to	keep-up	with	financial	innovation.	Yet	prior	to	the	financial	crisis,	
principles-based	 regulation	 became	 a	 veil	 for	 excessively	 detached,	 ‘light-
touch’,	supervision	(see	McPhilemy	2013).	Likewise,	judgement-based	decisions	
provide	a	means	of	acting	even	where	firms	are	in	compliance	with	the	letter	of	
detailed	 rules.	 However,	 critics	 suggest	 that	 suggest,	 ‘excessive	 reliance	 on	
supervisory	discretion	cannot	replace	a	poor	regulatory	regime	and	often	leads	
to	inappropriate	forbearance’	(Toniolo	and	White	2015).		
6.3.2 OBSERVED	APPROACHES	
In	 light	 of	 these	 apparent	 trade-offs,	 it	 is	 unsurprising	 that	 the	 three	 central	
banks	discussed	in	this	thesis	have	exhibited	a	certain	degree	of	convergence	in	
their	 preferences	 for	 rules	 and	 discretion.	 Prior	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 the	 US	
regulatory	agencies	and	the	Federal	Reserve	were	widely	regarded	as	exemplars	
for	 the	rule-based	approach.	After	 the	 financial	crisis,	US	regulators	now	refer	
to	 themselves	 as	 adopting	 a	 principles-based	 approach	 (see	 IMF	 2015).	
Furthermore,	as	a	consequence	of	the	Dodd	Frank	Act,	the	regulatory	regime	in	
the	 United	 States	 has	 become	 more	 risk-based,	 since	 the	 most	 systemically	
important	 financial	 institutions	 have	 been	 singled	 out	 for	 more	 stringent	
regulation	 and	 more	 intensive	 supervision.	 In	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 the	
reputation	 of	 principles-based	 regulation	 was	 dealt	 a	 severe	 blow,	 becoming	
associated	 with	 the	 ‘light	 touch’	 epithet.	 However,	 while	 both	 the	 Financial	
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Services	 Authority	 and	 subsequently	 the	 Prudential	 Regulation	 Authority	
dropped	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 principles-based	 regulation,	 in	 practice	 the	 UK	
authorities	continue	to	follow	a	principles-based	approach.	Moreover,	the	Bank	
of	 England	 routinely	 refers	 to	 itself	 as	 a	 ‘judgement	 based’	 regulator	 (see	
below).	 The	 ECB	 Single	 Supervisory	 Mechanism	 (SSM)	 has	 stated	 that	 its	
processes	 for	 microprudential	 supervision	 will	 be	 ‘built	 on	 a	 “constrained	
judgement”	 approach,	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 consistency	 across	 the	 SSM,	 while	
allowing	 for	 expert	 judgement	 to	 consider	 the	 complexity	 and	 variety	 of	
situations	within	a	clear	and	transparent	framework’	(ECB	2014b).			
Notwithstanding	this	apparent	convergence,	the	institutional	legacies	of	pre-
crisis	styles	of	policy	 implementation	have	 influenced	how	the	central	banks	–	
particularly	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 and	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 –	 have	 set	 about	
implementing	 financial	 stability	policies	after	 the	 financial	 crisis.	A	key	area	of	
divergence	 in	 relation	 to	 rules	 and	 discretion	 concerns	 stress	 testing.	 The	
Federal	Reserve	has	pioneered	the	use	of	 rule-based	stress	 tests.	 In	2011,	 the	
Federal	 Reserve	 issued	 a	 ‘Capital	 Plan	 Rule’	 requiring	 large	 banks	 and	
designated	 systemically	 important	 financial	 institutions	 to	 submit	 detailed	
capital	 plans	 on	 an	 annual	 basis	 (FRS	 2011).	 Capital	 plans	 set	 out	 banks’	
proposed	capital	actions	(such	as	paying	dividends,	issuing	shares	or	conducting	
share	buybacks),	and	their	projections	for	capital	adequacy	under	various	stress	
scenarios	 (FRS	 2011).	 The	 Federal	 Reserve	 evaluates	 these	 plans	 qualitatively	
against	a	detailed	set	of	criteria	and	it	compares	the	firm-run	stress	tests	against	
its	 own	 calculations.	 If	 a	 bank	 cannot	 demonstrate	 that	 its	 capital	 adequacy	
would	 remain	above	minimum	required	 levels	 in	 stressed	conditions,	or	 if	 the	
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Federal	 Reserve	 is	 otherwise	 dissatisfied	 with	 its	 capital	 planning	 process,	 it	
‘objects’	 to	 the	 capital	 plan.	 Following	 such	 an	 objection,	 banks	 are	 generally	
prohibited	 from	paying	dividends	or	 conducting	 share	buybacks.	As	Hirtle	and	
Lehnert	 (2014)	 argue,	 this	 ‘pass-or-fail’	 characteristic	 of	 the	 US	 stress	 tests,	
combined	with	automaticity	of	 the	prohibitions	on	distributions	 for	 firms	 that	
fail	 the	 test,	 represents	 a	 shift	 from	 discretion	 to	 rules	 in	 the	 supervision	 of	
large	banks.		
By	contrast,	the	Bank	of	England’s	approach	to	stress	testing	emphasises	the	
importance	of	judgement	(Bank	of	England	2013c).	The	Bank	has	indicated	that	
its	 staff	 will	 synthesise	 the	 results	 of	 supervisor-led	 and	 company-led	 stress	
tests	that	use	different	models	for	projecting	the	various	parameters	that	feed	
into	 the	 tests,	 such	 as	 net	 interest	 income	or	 future	 operating	 costs	 (Bank	 of	
England	2013c).	Moreover,	 it	has	 stated	 that	 there	will	be	no	simple	 ‘pass-or-
fail’	mechanism	and	 that	 policy	 responses	will	 not	 be	 ‘mechanically’	 linked	 to	
test	results.	Whereas	 in	the	United	States	a	bank	that	fails	a	stress	test	would	
face	automatic	restrictions	on	its	ability	to	pay	dividends	or	conduct	share	buy	
backs,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 reserves	 to	 itself	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 powers,	
including	raising	capital	requirements	for	the	firm	or	requiring	senior	managers	
to	 address	 specific	 issues	 relating	 to	 capital	 planning	 and	 bank	 governance	
(Bank	of	England	2013c:	30).	Of	course,	the	Bank	of	England,	like	other	financial	
supervisory	authorities,	implements	a	vast	rulebook	of	highly	complex	rules.	In	
this	regard,	it	would	be	fallacious	to	describe	it	as	operating	a	purely	discretion-
based	 regime.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Bank’s	 emphasis	 on	 judgement	 can	 be	
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regarded	 as	 merely	 the	 latest	 incarnation	 of	 a	 characteristically	 British	
preference	for	discretion	(see	Clift	and	Tomlinson	2010).	
As	a	new	supervisory	authority,	the	ECB	Single	Supervisory	Mechanism	is	less	
constrained	by	the	 legacies	of	earlier	supervisory	approaches.	While	the	ECB’s	
stress	 testing	 capabilities	 remain	 at	 a	 nascent	 stage,	 early	 indications	 suggest	
that	it	will	fall	between	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	Federal	Reserve	in	respect	
of	 its	use	of	 rules	and	discretion.	 In	2014,	 the	ECB	coordinated	a	set	of	 stress	
tests	 as	 part	 of	 its	 ‘Comprehensive	Assessment’	 of	 the	 130	 ‘significant’	 banks	
that	it	supervises	directly	within	the	SSM.	The	Comprehensive	Assessment	also	
comprised	an	Asset	Quality	Review	(AQR),	involving	a	detailed	exposition	of	the	
risks	on	banks’	balance	sheets.	The	ECB	placed	great	emphasis	on	ensuring	the	
quality	 and	 consistency	 of	 the	 results	 across	 banks	 and	 jurisdictions.	 To	 that	
end,	 it	 cooperated	 closely	 with	 the	 European	 Banking	 Authority	 and	 national	
authorities	 to	ensure	 standardised	 reporting	and	methodologies	were	used.	 It	
also	devoted	large	numbers	of	its	staff	to	a	quality	assurance	process	(see	ECB	
2014d).	 The	 ECB’s	 methodology	 for	 conducting	 stress	 tests,	 and	 its	
interpretation	of	 results	appears	 closer	 to	a	 rules-based	approach,	with	banks	
publicly	 declared	 to	 have	 either	 passed	 or	 failed.	 As	 one	 of	 the	 ECB’s	 main	
objectives	 is	 to	 ensure	 consistent	 supervision	 for	 all	 SSM-supervised	 banks,	 a	
relatively	 prescriptive	 rules-based	 approach	 is	 likely	 to	 persist.	 At	 the	 same	
time,	the	ECB	has	reserved	to	itself	some	discretion	in	how	it	deals	with	banks	
with	insufficient	capital.	It	has	stated	that	it	will	use	a	range	of	quantitative	and	
qualitative	 measures	 to	 address	 any	 shortcomings,	 with	 interventions	 not	
automatically	tied	to	the	results	of	its	assessments	(ECB	2014b:	25-26).		
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Central	 banks’	 preferences	 as	 regard	 rules-based	 versus	 discretion-based	
styles	 of	 policy	 implementation	 influence	 their	 intermediate	 objectives	 and	
their	 choice	 of	 macroprudential	 policy	 instruments.	 In	 theory,	 countercyclical	
macroprudential	 policy	 could	 be	 based	 on	 adherence	 to	 a	 set	 of	 strict	 rules,	
with	measures	 ‘triggered’	whenever	 certain	 conditions	 arise.	 In	 practice,	 such	
policies	 require	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 judgement	 and	 discretion.	 Research	 into	 the	
identification	 of	 systemic	 risks	 and	 the	 calibration	 of	 macroprudential	 tools	
remains	 at	 an	early	 stage.	 There	 is	 currently	no	 single	 indicator,	 analogous	 to	
the	 rate	 of	 inflation,	 which	 can	 act	 as	 a	 target	 for	 countercyclical	
macroprudential	 policies,	 despite	 the	 efforts	 of	 policymakers	 to	 establish	
‘composite	indicators	of	systemic	stress’	(see,	for	example,	ESRB	2012a).	In	the	
United	 States,	 a	 preference	 for	 rules	 over	 discretion,	 combined	 with	
dissatisfaction	 regarding	 the	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 the	 current	 means	 of	
identifying	 asset	 price	 bubbles,	 has	 been	 an	 important	 factor	 shaping	 the	
Federal	 Reserve’s	 preference	 for	 resilience-focused	 policies	 to	 date	 (author	
interview,	 11	 July	 2014,	 Washington	 DC).	 Indeed,	 the	 preference	 for	
measurability	 and	 automaticity	may	 explain	why	 the	United	 States	 has	 so	 far	
failed	 to	 elaborate	 how	 it	 intends	 to	 implement	 the	 countercyclical	 capital	
buffer,	 which	 is	 part	 of	 the	 internationally	 agreed	 Basel	 III	 framework	 (BCBS	
2011).	 By	 contrast,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	 FPC	 has	 published	 its	 intention	 to	
draw	 on	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 potential	 inputs	 in	 reaching	 judgements	 about	 the	
setting	 of	macroprudential	 policies.	While	 it	 currently	 publishes	 a	 set	 of	 core	
indicators	that	it	will	consider	in	reaching	judgements	about	the	countercyclical	
capital	 buffer	 (Bank	 of	 England	 2014e),	 it	 has	 stated	 that	 ‘no	 single	 set	 of	
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indicators	can	ever	provide	a	perfect	guide	to	systemic	risks’	and	that	‘policy	will	
not	 be	 mechanically	 tied	 to	 any	 specific	 set	 of	 indicators’	 (Bank	 of	 England	
2014h).	 Likewise,	 while	 the	 ESRB	 issued	 guidance	 to	 the	 EU	 member	 states	
regarding	 the	quantitative	 indicators	 that	 should	be	 taken	 into	account	 in	 the	
implementation	of	the	countercyclical	capital	buffer,	it	stressed	the	importance	
of	judgement,	particularly	when	it	comes	to	releasing	the	buffer	at	the	onset	of	
a	downturn	or	in	a	financial	crisis	(ESRB	2014a).		
6.3.3 RULES,	DISCRETION	AND	TRANSPARENCY	
As	discussed	above,	 increasing	 transparency	 is	often	 cited	as	 a	motivation	 for	
adopting	a	more	rules-based	approach	to	financial	stability	policy.	The	demand	
for	 transparency	 stems	 from	 the	 notion	 that	 increasing	 the	 amount	 of	
information	 available	 to	 financial	 markets	 about	 the	 likely	 path	 for	 financial	
regulations	 leads	 to	 improved	 efficiency	 and	 stability	 of	 financial	 market	
outcomes.	This	notion	was	a	guiding	principle	behind	much	financial	regulation	
and	 supervision	 prior	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis	 and	 it	 remains	 a	 highly	 influential	
factor	in	the	design	of	new	regulations	even	after	the	crisis.	Under	a	rule-based	
approach,	 so	 the	 argument	 goes,	 financial	 market	 participants	 have	 greater	
certainty	about	future	policy	actions,	so	they	will	allocate	their	scarce	resources	
more	efficiently.		
The	 rhetoric	 of	 transparency	 is	 intuitively	 appealing,	 evoking	 positive	
connotations	 with	 notions	 such	 as	 democratisation	 and	 open	 government.	
However,	 there	 are	 reasons	 to	 doubt	 that	 eliminating	 discretion	 in	 order	 to	
improve	 transparency	 truly	 reduces	 uncertainty	 or	 improves	 economic	
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outcomes	 (cf.	 Best	 2005).	 The	 experience	 of	 the	 recent	 financial	 crisis	 –	 and,	
indeed,	 countless	 financial	 crises	 before	 it	 –	 is	 that	 neither	 individual	market	
participants	 nor	markets	 as	 a	whole	 are	 capable	 of	 assimilating	 or	 processing	
information	in	the	efficient	manner	assumed	in	orthodox	economic	theories	(cf.	
Keynes	2036;	Kindleberger	2011[1978];	Minsky	1986;	Akerlof	and	Shiller	2009,	
among	many	others).	Indeed,	notwithstanding	consistent	and	continuing	efforts	
to	improve	the	transparency	of	financial	markets	and	market	regulation,	global	
markets	have	become	increasingly	unstable	in	recent	decades.		
If	 heightened	 transparency	 is	 unlikely	 to	 lead	 to	 more	 efficient	 market	
outcomes,	 the	 case	 for	 rules-based	 financial	 stability	 policy	 loses	much	 of	 its	
force.	 By	 extension,	 central	 banks	 such	 as	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 which	 have	
striven	 to	 maintain	 a	 more	 rules-based	 approach	 to	 their	 implementation	 of	
microprudential	 and	 macroprudential	 policy,	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 having	
inadvertently	 weakened	 their	 capacity	 to	 attain	 their	 financial	 stability	
objectives	 because	 they	 have	 constrained	 their	 own	 ability	 to	 respond	 to	
financial	 innovation	and	‘creative	compliance’	 (whereby	firms	comply	with	the	
letter	 but	 not	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	 rules),	 which	 can	 render	 existing	 rulebooks	
obsolete.	 Conversely,	 the	 more	 discretion-based	 approach	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	
England,	and	to	a	 lesser	extent	the	ECB,	provides	greater	agility	to	respond	to	
new	 market	 developments.	 It	 is,	 however,	 important	 not	 to	 overstate	 the	
differences	 between	 the	 three	 central	 banks	 on	 this	 point.	 All	 claim	 to	 value	
transparency	 and	 both	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 and	 the	 ECB	 have	 taken	 steps	 to	
enhance	the	level	of	transparency	around	monetary	policy	in	recent	years	(see	
ECB	2014e;	Bank	of	England	2014c).	This	suggests	that	the	Bank’s	adoption	of	a	
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more	discretion-based	approach	to	its	financial	regulation	and	supervision	owes	
more	to	the	institutional	legacies	of	earlier	discretionary	approaches	than	to	an	
ideational	 schism	 between	 British	 and	 American	 supervisors	 regarding	 the	
merits	 of	 transparency	 or	 the	 ability	 of	 financial	 markets	 to	 process	 and	
assimilate	information	rationally.		
6.4 POLICY	COORDINATION	
So	far	this	chapter	has	focused	on	factors	largely	internal	to	central	banks:	their	
self-defined	 intermediate	 objectives	 and	 their	 particular	 styles	 of	 policy	
implementation.	Yet	the	capacity	of	a	central	bank	to	attain	its	objectives	is	also	
dependent	on	the	wider	macroeconomic	and	regulatory	environments	in	which	
it	operates.	None	of	the	central	banks	considered	in	this	thesis	has	control	over	
all	 aspects	 of	 macroeconomic	 policy	 or	 financial	 regulation.	 The	 policies	 and	
decisions	of	other	public	authorities	may	be	supportive	of	central	banks’	actions	
and	objectives,	or	 they	may	make	 the	central	banks’	 tasks	more	difficult.	 This	
section	focuses	on	three	sets	of	policy	coordination	challenges	(summarised	in	
Table	6).	First,	it	examines	challenges	arising	from	the	domestic	(or,	in	the	case	
of	the	EU,	regional)	regulatory	environments	in	which	central	banks	are	located.	
Second,	 it	 evaluates	 a	 number	 of	 salient	 challenges	 arising	 from	 the	
international	 regulatory	 environment.	 Finally,	 it	 examines	 issues	 arising	 from	
the	absence	of	coordination	between	central	banks	and	fiscal	authorities.		
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6.4.1 DOMESTIC	(AND	REGIONAL)	REGULATORY	ENVIRONMENTS	
Challenges	 associated	 with	 regulatory	 cooperation	 and	 coordination	 are	
particularly	 pronounced	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 Prior	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 US	
financial	conglomerates	(such	as	bank	holding	companies	and	financial	holding	
companies)	had	considerable	 latitude	to	choose	which	 federal	or	state	agency	
would	 be	 responsible	 for	 supervising	 them.	 ‘Cross-regulator	 regulatory	
arbitrage’,	 as	 Rethel	 (2014)	 terms	 it,	 led	 to	 some	 highly	 irregular	 supervisor-
supervisee	 pairings.	 Notoriously,	 American	 Insurance	 Group	 (AIG)	 –	 the	
insurance	giant	 that	 sold	 vast	quantities	of	 credit	default	 swaps	on	 sub-prime	
mortgage	backed	securities	–	owned	a	 small	 savings	and	 loans	association	 (or	
‘thrift’).	This	meant	that	the	group	as	a	whole	was	classified	as	a	Thrift	Holding	
Company	and	supervised	by	the	Office	for	Thrift	Supervision	(OTS).3		
The	 Dodd	 Frank	 Act	 partially	 addressed	 the	 problem	 of	 cross-regulator	
regulatory	arbitrage	by	ensuring	that	the	Federal	Reserve	will	supervise	the	vast	
majority	 of	 financial	 conglomerates	 (see	 Chapter	 4).	 However,	 it	 remains	 the	
case	 that	most	 such	 conglomerates	 have	multiple	 regulators.	Under	 the	 1999	
Gramm	Leach	Bliley	Act,	the	Federal	Reserve	acts	as	an	‘umbrella’	supervisor	of	
bank	 holding	 companies	 and	 financial	 holding	 companies	 at	 the	 consolidated	
level.	The	operational	subsidiaries	within	each	conglomerate	are	supervised	by	
an	 array	 of	 ‘primary	 regulators’,	 such	 as	 the	Office	 of	 the	 Comptroller	 of	 the	
Currency	(OCC)	or	state-level	agencies.	The	Federal	Reserve	 is	required	to	rely	
‘to	 the	 fullest	 extent	 possible’	 on	 the	 examination	 reports	 that	 primary	
regulators	make	in	the	course	of	supervising	individual	operational	subsidiaries.	
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This	limits	the	capacity	of	the	Federal	Reserve	to	understand	or	control	the	risks	
being	taken	within	those	subsidiaries.		
The	 challenges	 posed	 by	 the	 multi-regulator	 system	 were	 exemplified	 in	
2012,	when	the	London	branch	of	JPMorgan	Chase	Bank	lost	approximately	six	
billion	dollars	trading	in	complex	derivatives.	JPMorgan	Chase	Bank	is	a	national	
bank	 supervised	 by	 the	Office	 of	 the	 Comptroller	 of	 the	 Currency	 (OCC).	 This	
entity	 is	a	subsidiary	of	JPMorgan	Chase	&	Company,	a	bank	holding	company	
supervised	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 Bank	 of	 New	 York	 (FRBNY).	 A	 subsequent	
internal	 investigation	 into	 the	 FRBNY’s	 supervision	 of	 JPMorgan	 Chase	 &	
Company	 found	 that	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 and	 the	 OCC	 lacked	 a	 common	
understanding	of	certain	aspects	of	the	Federal	Reserve’s	expectations	of	firms,	
resulting	in	gaps	in	coverage	and	duplication	of	effort	(OIG	2014).	
A	further	difficulty	for	the	Federal	Reserve	is	 its	 limited	authority	to	control	
risk	 taking	 in	 the	 non-bank	 (or	 ‘shadow	 bank’)	 financial	 sector.	 This	 makes	
certain	forms	of	macro-prudential	policy	more	difficult.	For	example,	one	much	
discussed	 tool	 for	 addressing	 risks	 in	 wholesale	 funding	 markets	 is	 the	
imposition	of	minimum	 ‘haircuts’	on	 the	collateral	used	 in	 securities	 financing	
transactions	such	as	securities	lending	and	repurchase	agreements	(‘repos’).4	To	
address	 risks	 in	 these	markets,	 the	Federal	Reserve	would	need	 to	coordinate	
with	 the	 federal	 agencies	 primarily	 responsible	 for	 institutional	 investors,	
notably	the	SEC	and	the	CFTC,	to	impose	such	rules.	Relative	to	the	UK	and	the	
euro	area,	the	size	of	the	non-bank	financial	sector	in	the	United	States	is	large.	
In	 2012,	 the	 assets	 of	 non-bank	 financial	 intermediaries	 in	 the	 United	 States	
were	 equivalent	 to	 174	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 assets	 of	 US	 domiciled	 banks;	 the	
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equivalent	 figures	 for	 the	United	Kingdom	and	 the	 Euro	 area	 are	 42	per	 cent	
and	61	per	 cent,	 respectively	 (FSB	2013).	 This	makes	 interagency	 cooperation	
and	 coordination	particularly	 important.	 Yet	 the	 body	 established	 to	 facilitate	
this,	 the	 FSOC,	 has	 been	 beset	 by	 ‘turf	 wars’	 amongst	 its	 various	 member	
agencies	(see	Stein,	K.	2014;	Dayen	2014).	The	clearest	example	of	this	occurred	
in	 2012	when	 the	 FSOC	 proposed	 to	make	 a	 recommendation	 to	 the	 SEC	 on	
measures	 to	mitigate	risks	associated	with	money	market	 funds.	The	proposal	
engendered	fierce	resistance	 from	the	affected	 industry,	which	allied	with	the	
SEC	 in	 arguing	 that	 only	 the	 latter	 had	 the	 necessary	 expertise	 to	 evaluate	
money	market	reforms	(see,	for	example,	ICI	2012).5	The	FSOC	has	also	found	it	
difficult	 to	designate	 ‘systemically	 important’	non-bank	 firms	 to	be	supervised	
by	the	Federal	Reserve.	At	the	end	of	2014,	 it	had	designated	only	three	such	
companies:	AIG,	Prudential	Financial,	and	GE	Capital	Corp.		
Relative	 to	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 challenges	 of	 domestic	 regulatory	
coordination	 in	 the	United	 Kingdom	 are	 few.	With	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 FSA	 in	
1998,	 responsibility	 for	 banking,	 insurance	 and	 securities	 supervision	 was	
consolidated	 into	a	 single	entity	 (see	Chapter	3).	 The	FSA	was	 responsible	 for	
both	 prudential	 regulation	 and	 ‘conduct-of-business’	 regulation	 (such	 as	
consumer	 protection,	 fraud	 prevention	 and	 promoting	 competition).	 While	
supporters	of	the	FSA	model	highlighted	its	efficiencies	(Briault	1999,	2002),	the	
financial	 crisis	 gave	 credence	 to	 the	 view	 that	 prudential	 regulation	 and	
conduct-of-business	 regulation	 entail	 different	 organisational	 cultures	 and	 do	
not	 sit	 well	 in	 a	 single	 agency	 (FSA	 2009a,	 2009b;	 House	 of	 Lords	 2009:	 33,	
Taylor	2014).	This	view	was	reflected	 in	the	Financial	Services	Act	2012,	which	
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split	 the	 FSA	 into	 two	 separate	 agencies:	 the	 FCA	 to	 carry	 out	 conduct-of-
business	regulation	and	the	PRA	to	focus	on	financial	stability	(see	Chapter	4).		
This	so-called	 ‘twin	peaks’	model	has	benefits	and	drawbacks.	The	PRA	and	
the	 FCA	 dually	 supervise	 banks,	 building	 societies,	 insurance	 companies	 and	
large	investment	firms,	with	each	agency	pursuing	distinct	statutory	objectives.	
The	FCA	also	has	responsibility	for	prudential	supervision	of	smaller	investment	
firms.	 This	means	 that	 the	 FCA	 supervises	 some	 firms	 that	 are	 subsidiaries	 of	
PRA-supervised	financial	groups.	As	the	principal	securities	regulator	in	the	UK,	
the	FCA	is	also	central	to	any	efforts	to	mitigate	risks	from	shadow	banking.	An	
obvious	drawback	of	 these	 arrangements	 is	 that	 it	 increases	 the	potential	 for	
duplicated	work,	neglected	risks	and	contradictory	decision-making	 (cf.	Briault	
1999).	 Indeed,	 the	distinctions	between	 the	 two	bodies’	 respective	objectives	
are	 not	 always	 clear	 (Georgosouli	 2012).	 For	 example,	 one	 of	 the	 FCA’s	
objectives	is	to	maintain	‘market	integrity’,	including	its	soundness	stability	and	
resilience’	 (Financial	 Services	 Act	 2012	 Schedule	 6	 (1)(1D),	 emphasis	 added).	
While	 cooperation	arrangements	between	 the	 two	authorities	are	established	
in	 a	 series	 of	memoranda	of	 understanding,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 inevitable	 that	 over	
time	the	organisations	will	grow	apart.		
In	the	euro	area,	the	creation	of	the	SSM	was	partly	a	response	to	regional	
coordination	 failures	 in	 respect	 of	microprudential	 policy	 (Enria	 2013;	 Council	
Regulation	 1024/2013	 Recital	 12;	McPhilemy	 2014).	 In	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s,	
European	 financial	 markets	 became	 increasingly	 integrated,	 but	 inconsistent	
regulation	 and	 supervision	 created	 opportunities	 for	 cross-border	 regulatory	
arbitrage	and	inhibited	risk	management	(De	Larosière	et	al.	2009).	Moreover,	
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with	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 trust	 and	 cohesion	 between	 NCAs	
evaporated	as	officials	became	increasingly	reluctant	to	talk	frankly	and	openly	
with	one	another	(De	Larosière	et	al.	2009;	author	interviews,	2	October	2012,	
Madrid;	23	March	2013,	London).	The	SSM	resolves	some	of	these	problems	by	
greatly	enhancing	the	authority	of	the	ECB	(see	Chapter	4).	As	the	SSM	develops	
operationally,	 a	 key	 factor	 determining	 ECB	 capacity	 will	 be	 the	 nature	 of	
intergovernmental	 cooperation	 between	 NCAs	 and	 the	 ECB	 within	 the	 SSM.	
Since	NCA	supervisors’	 first	 responsibility	 is	a	national	one	 (cf.	EC	2007b),	 it	 is	
possible	 that	 their	 incentives	 could	 diverge	 from	 those	 of	 their	 colleagues	 in	
Frankfurt.	In	turn,	this	raises	the	possibility	of	polarisation	between	national	and	
supranational	officials	working	in	joint	ECB-NCA	supervisory	teams.	It	also	raises	
the	possibility	of	delays	and	disagreements	at	the	level	of	the	new	Supervisory	
Board,	which	is	composed	of	NCA	and	ECB	senior	managers.		
In	 the	 macroprudential	 policy	 domain,	 the	 challenges	 of	 cooperation	 and	
coordination	 are	 also	 considerable.	 Within	 the	 SSM,	 the	 ECB	 shares	 the	
authority	 to	 set	 certain	 macroprudential	 capital	 buffers	 for	 banks	 with	 the	
national	macroprudential	authorities	of	euro	area	member	states,	including	the	
CCB	 and	 sectoral	 capital	 requirements.	 Financial	 intermediation	 in	 Europe	 is	
heavily	 bank	 based,	 compared	 to	 the	 United	 States,	 meaning	 that	 the	 ECB’s	
(partial)	control	over	these	tools	gives	it	an	important	handle	on	systemic	risk	in	
the	 region	 (see	 ESRB	 2014b).	 However,	 beyond	 the	 regulated	 banking	 sector,	
the	 ECB’s	 scope	 for	 action	 is	 limited.	 To	 address	 systemic	 risks	 arising	 in	 the	
securities	 and	 insurance	 sectors,	 or	 risks	 of	 a	 cross-sectoral	 nature,	 the	 ECB	
must	work	with	a	broad	array	of	national	and	supranational	authorities	through	
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the	 ESRB.	 This	 includes	 national	 central	 banks	 and	 financial	 supervisory	
authorities,	the	ESAs,	the	European	Commission	and,	indirectly,	national	finance	
ministries,	which	are	represented	in	the	ESRB	by	the	President	of	the	Economic	
and	Financial	Committee.		The	ESRB,	in	turn,	has	tended	to	focus	on	risks	in	the	
banking	sector.	Of	the	seven	recommendations	 issued	by	the	ESRB	since	2011	
only	 one	 –	 the	2012	 recommendation	on	money	market	 funds	 –	 addressed	 a	
non-banking	sector	risk	(ESRB	2012b).		
6.4.2 INTERNATIONAL	REGULATORY	ENVIRONMENT	
Central	banks’	ability	to	attain	their	financial	stability	objectives	depends	on	the	
content	of	the	rules	they	are	enforcing	(see	Section	6.2	above).	In	the	context	of	
highly	globalised	financial	markets	(Helleiner	1994;	Cohen	1996),	it	is	important	
to	recognise	that	such	rules	are	very	frequently	agreed	at	the	international	level	
and	are,	 therefore,	 the	product	of	 transnational	negotiations	between	central	
banks	 and	 finance	 ministry	 officials.	 Regulators	 enter	 into	 international	
agreements	 because	 they	 cannot	 unilaterally	 ensure	 financial	 stability	 whilst	
maintaining	 open	 and	 internationally	 competitive	 financial	 markets	 (Singer	
2004,	 2007).	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 international	 regulatory	 harmonisation	
constrains	 the	 flexibility	 of	 central	 banks	 to	 define	 regulations	 or	 supervisory	
approaches	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 well	 suited	 to	 their	 particular	 national	 financial	
systems,	 they	 can	 diminish	 the	 capacity	 of	 those	 organisations	 to	 maintain	
financial	 stability.	 Indeed,	 the	 worldwide	 convergence	 on	 Anglo-American	
financial	standards,	calibrated	in	a	manner	that	was	excessively	accommodative	
of	 the	preferences	 large	 financial	 institutions,	was	arguably	 the	primary	policy	
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failing	 contributing	 to	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis.	 In	 view	 of	 the	 comparative	
focus	of	this	research,	a	detailed	examination	of	international	coordination	and	
cooperation	 is	not	provided	here.	However,	 it	 is	worth	considering	how	some	
aspects	 of	 the	 international	 regulatory	 environment	 affect	 central	 banks’	
capacity	to	attain	their	intermediate	financial	stability	objectives.	
THE	INTERNATIONAL	REGULATORY	FRAMEWORK	FOR	BANKS		
Since	the	late	1980s,	the	basic	structure	for	bank	capital	regulation	around	the	
world	has	been	agreed	internationally	through	the	Basel	Committee	on	Banking	
Supervision	 (BCBS)	 (see	 Kapstein	 1992,	 1994;	 Tsingou	 2008,	 Lall	 2012	 among	
others).	The	latest	iteration	of	these	standards,	Basel	III,	increases	the	minimum	
proportion	of	banks’	risk-weighted	assets	(RWAs)	that	must	be	funded	through	
capital,	as	opposed	to	debt.	It	also	requires	banks	to	have	higher	quality	capital	
by,	for	example,	excluding	certain	forms	of	debt-equity	hybrid	instruments	from	
the	definition	of	 ‘Tier	1’	 capital	 and	eliminating	 the	 concept	of	 ‘Tier	3’	 capital	
(see	Table	6).		
Other	aspects	of	the	Basel	III	framework	include	the	introduction	of	two	new	
liquidity	 standards,	 the	 Liquidity	 Coverage	 Ratio	 and	 the	 Net	 Stable	 Funding	
Ratio.	The	former	requires	banks	to	have	a	sufficient	stock	of	High	Quality	Liquid	
Assets	on	hand	 in	order	 to	be	able	 to	 survive	 for	a	period	of	30	days	without	
access	 to	 wholesale	 funding	 markets.	 The	 latter	 requires	 banks	 to	 fund	
themselves	 on	 an	 on-going	 basis	 with	 more	 stable	 forms	 of	 debt	 and	 equity	
funding.		
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Outside	of	the	Basel	III	framework,	in	2014	the	FSB	issued	for	consultation	a	
set	of	proposals	for	the	resolution	of	global	systemically	important	banks.	Bank	
holding	companies	will	be	required	to	have	‘Total	Loss	Absorbing	Capital’	(TLAC)	
of	 equivalent	 to	 16-20	 per	 cent	 of	 their	 RWAs	 (FSB	 2014).	 TLAC	 is	 to	 be	
composed	of	capital	–	as	defined	in	the	Basel	III	framework	–	and	a	layer	of	debt	
that	 can	 be	 converted	 into	 equity	 (or	 ‘bailed-in’)	 should	 the	 bank	 enter	
resolution.	 The	 idea	 is	 that	 resolution	 will	 normally	 involve	 a	 ‘single	 point	 of	
entry’:	 losses	 suffered	 in	 an	operating	 company	will	 be	passed	up	 to	 the	 top-
level	holding	company.	Authorities	will	resolve	that	top-level	holding	company,	
bailing-in	 its	 creditors.	 Theoretically,	 this	 will	 allow	 the	 group’s	 operational	
subsidiaries	to	remain	solvent	and	free	to	continue	providing	essential	banking	
services.		
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TABLE	6:	BASEL	II	AND	BASEL	III	CAPITAL	REQUIREMENTS	(%	OF	RWAS)	
Basel	II	 Basel	III	
Tier	1	=	4%		
§ Innovative	capital	<	50%	Tier	1	
capital	
§ Debt-equity	 hybrid	
instruments	 	 <	 15%	 Tier	 1	
Capital		
Total	Tier	1	=	6%		
§ Core	Equity	Tier	1	=	4.5%		
§ Additional	Tier	1	=	1.5%		
Tier	2	<	100%	Tier	1	 Total	Tier	1	and	Tier	2	=	8%		
Tier	3	(vs.	market	risk	only)	<	250%	of	
Tier	1	Capital	used	for	market	risk.		
Capital	Conversion	Buffer	(Core	Equity	
Tier	1)	=	2.5%		
	 Countercyclical	 capital	 buffer	 (Core	
Equity	Tier	1)	=	up	to	2.5%	
Total	minimum	capital	=	8%		 Total	minimum	 capital	 =	 10.5%	 (13%	
with	maximum	CCB)	
Source:	BCBS	2011	
Critics	of	the	Basel	III	framework	argue	that	like	its	predecessor,	it	is	based	on	a	
flawed	 methodology	 that	 involves	 calculating	 capital	 charges	 using	 banks’	
proprietary	 ‘Value-At-Risk’	 models,	 which	 estimate	 future	 performance	 of	
banks’	assets	according	to	their	performance	in	the	recent	past	(Lall	2012;	Blyth	
2013a;	Haldane	and	Madouros	2012;	Taleb	2007).	Moreover,	while	the	leverage	
ratio	 provides	 some	 degree	 of	 protection	 against	 the	 ‘model	 risk’	 inherent	 in	
banks’	 VAR	models	 (BCBS	 2014),	 its	 critics	 contend	 that	 this	 ratio	 is	 woefully	
inadequate	at	just	3%	of	total	assets	(Lall	2012;	Admati	and	Hellwig	2013).	Both	
Basel	III	and	the	FSB	TLAC	proposals	have	also	been	criticised	for	providing	long	
transitional	periods	before	the	full	extent	of	the	requirements	come	into	effect	
(see	Figure	1).	
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FIGURE	2:	RISK	WEIGHTED	CAPITAL	REQUIREMENTS	AND	TRANSITIONAL	PERIODS	(%	RWAS)	
	
Source:	BCBS	2011,	Bank	of	England	2013b.	
These	 criticisms	 aside,	 the	 central	 banks	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis	 are	 only	
loosely	constrained	by	these	 international	standards.	 In	 the	United	States,	 the	
minimum	 risk-weighted	 capital	 requirements	 of	 Basel	 III	 have	 become	 largely	
irrelevant	 (cf.	 KPMG	 2013).	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 has	
implemented	 its	 own	 standards	 –	 including	 capital	 requirements	 for	
systemically	important	firms	and	the	leverage	ratio	–	that	exceed	the	minimum	
levels	 agreed	 in	 the	BCBS.	On	 the	other	hand,	 it	 has	 adopted	 an	 approach	 to	
stress	testing	that	requires	banks	to	meet	minimum	capital	thresholds	even	 in	
the	event	of	a	severe	shock.	This	means	that	minimum	capital	in	‘normal’	times	
must	be	significantly	higher	than	the	Basel	III	framework	suggests.		
Even	 in	 the	 EU,	 where	 the	 Basel	 III	 framework	 is	 written	 into	 the	 legally	
binding	 Capital	 Requirements	 Regulation	 (CRR)	 and	 the	 Capital	 Requirements	
Directive	 (CRD	 IV),	 central	 banks	 have	 room	 for	 manoeuvre.	 This	 legislation	
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purports	to	cut	down	on	the	scope	for	national	authorities	to	‘gold	plate’	or	‘tin	
plate’	 European	 rules	 at	 the	 domestic	 level.	 Areas	 such	 as	 the	 definition	 of	
capital,	 capital	 requirements,	 large	exposure	 limits,	 liquidity	 requirements	and	
leverage	are	subject	to	the	principle	of	‘maximum	harmonisation’	meaning	that	
they	 apply	 directly	 to	 firms	 without	 the	 need	 for	 transposition	 into	 national	
rulebooks.	 Yet	 the	 detail	 of	 European	 regulations	 reveals	 a	wealth	 of	 options	
and	discretions	that	often	enable	national	authorities	(especially	those	of	larger	
member	 states)	 to	 continue	 applying	 whichever	 techniques	 they	 have	
historically	favoured.	To	take	one	example,	under	Articles	6	and	11	of	the	CRR,	
banks	are	required	to	comply	with	prudential	regulations	on	both	an	individual	
basis	and	at	the	level	of	their	consolidated	banking	group.	In	other	words,	both	
the	 individual	 operating	 companies	 within	 a	 banking	 group	 and	 the	 banking	
group	as	a	whole	must	meet	all	prudential	requirements.	Yet	under	Article	7	of	
the	 CRR,	 national	 authorities	 have	 the	 option	 to	 ‘switch	 off’	 prudential	
requirements	 for	 individual	 institutions,	meaning	 that	 only	 the	wider	 banking	
group	need	comply.	The	former	approach	has	traditionally	been	adopted	in	the	
United	Kingdom,	while	the	latter	has	traditionally	been	adopted	in	France.		
Another	major	deviation	from	the	principle	of	maximum	harmonisation	was	
the	decision	to	allow	national	authorities	–	and,	since	the	creation	of	the	SSM,	
the	ECB	–	to	determine	the	calibration	of	macroprudential	requirements	for	the	
banks	within	their	jurisdictions.	This	includes	the	CCB	(CRD	Article	130),	various	
buffers	 relating	 to	 systemically	 important	 institutions	 (CRD	 Articles	 131,	 133-
134),	 and	 discretionary	 use	 of	 capital	 and	 liquidity	 requirements	 tailored	 to	
individual	 firms	 (CRD	 Articles	 103,	 105).	 The	 European	 Commission	 and	 the	
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ESRB	have	some	ability	 to	constrain	member	 states’	discretion	 in	 these	areas,	
but	 initial	 experience	 demonstrates	 that	 in	 practice	 national	 authorities	 have	
ample	 flexibility	 to	 determine	 the	 level	 of	 capital	 applying	 to	 banks	 in	 their	
jurisdictions	(see	ESRB	2015).	In	short,	national	authorities	in	the	EU	have	ample	
discretion	to	set	macroprudential	policies	in	order	to	mitigate	localised	systemic	
risks	should	they	arise.		
INTERNATIONAL	MACROPRUDENTIAL	POLICY	COORDINATION	
One	 area	 where	 deficiencies	 in	 the	 international	 regulatory	 framework	 could	
impinge	 on	 the	 financial	 stability	 capacity	 of	 central	 banks	 is	 international	
macroprudential	 policy	 coordination.	 For	 nationally	 determined	
macroprudential	 policies	 to	 be	 effective,	 they	 need	 to	 be	 coordinated	 with	
those	 of	 other	 countries.	 Absent	 international	 coordination,	 macroprudential	
policies	are	susceptible	to	both	‘leakages’	and	‘spill-overs’.	Leakages	occur	when	
the	desired	effects	of	a	policy	are	diminished	due	to	international	competition	
(Watson,	C.M.	and	Kincaid	2013).	For	example,	a	central	bank	may	determine	to	
‘lean	against’	 a	 localised	property	boom	by	 imposing	 limits	 on	 the	number	of	
high	loan-to-income	or	loan-to-value	mortgages	banks	under	its	supervision	can	
issue.	The	effect	of	 this	policy	would	be	 reduced	 if	 foreign	banks	moved	 in	 to	
meet	the	demand	for	such	 loans.	 ‘Spill-overs’	 refer	to	the	situation	that	arises	
when	policies	taken	in	one	jurisdiction	have	adverse	consequences	for	another	
jurisdiction.	 For	 example,	 an	 increase	 in	 capital	 requirements	 in	 banks’	 home	
jurisdictions	 may	 cause	 them	 to	 repatriate	 capital	 from	 their	 branches	 and	
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subsidiaries	 in	host	 jurisdictions,	which	could	 lead	to	financial	 instability	 in	the	
host	jurisdiction.		
The	Basel	III	framework	includes	a	requirement	for	national	(‘home’	country)	
authorities	 to	 reciprocate	when	overseas	 (‘host’	 country)	authorities	 impose	a	
CCB	 (BCBS	 2010).	 This	 involves	 a	 home	 regulator	 requiring	 its	 banks	 to	 fund	
their	 operations	 in	 host	 countries	 in	 line	with	whatever	 capital	 standards	 the	
host	 jurisdiction	 has	 chosen	 to	 apply.	 This	 is	 the	 only	 example	 of	 such	
coordination	 at	 the	 international	 level.	 The	 central	 banks	 and	 financial	
regulatory	 authorities	 of	 G20	 countries	 cooperate	 with	 one	 another	 in	 the	
Financial	 Stability	 Board	 (FSB).	 However,	 while	 the	 FSB	 provides	 a	 venue	 for	
defining	 new	 standards	 and	 conducting	 mutual	 monitoring	 through	 peer	
reviews,	it	has	not	yet	developed	mechanisms	for	coordinating	the	actual	use	of	
macroprudential	policies	across	borders.	
Macroprudential	 policy	 coordination	within	 the	 EU	 is	 better	 developed.	 As	
discussed,	the	ECB	shares	with	NCAs	the	ability	to	set	macroprudential	policies	
for	banks	within	the	SSM.	In	practice,	it	is	likely	that	the	ECB	will	coordinate	the	
use	of	CCBs	across	 the	Banking	Union.	The	ESRB	meanwhile	provides	a	venue	
for	cooperation	and	coordination	across	 the	EU	as	a	whole,	and	 in	 relation	 to	
policies	 affecting	 non-bank	 financial	 sectors	 and	 matters	 of	 a	 cross-sectoral	
nature.	 The	 ESRB	has	 already	 established	 a	 ‘hub’	 for	 information	 exchange	 in	
relation	to	national	usages	of	macroprudential	policies	and	under	the	CRD-IV	it	
has	a	formal	obligation	to	issue	opinions	on	the	use	of	certain	macro-prudential	
tools.	 Such	opinions	are	 intended	 to	 focus	 in	particular	on	questions	of	 cross-
border	spill-over	and	leakage	(author	interview,	7	February	2014,	Brussels).	
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6.4.3 MACROECONOMIC	ENVIRONMENT	
Ultimately	 financial	 systems	 are	 interdependent	 with	 the	 real	 economies	 in	
which	 they	 are	 embedded,	 even	 if	 financial	market	 conditions	 do	 not	 always	
reflect	 underlying	macroeconomic	 fundamentals.	 A	 central	 bank’s	 capacity	 to	
achieve	financial	stability	will	be	diminished	in	the	absence	of	economic	growth	
or	 amid	 high	 levels	 of	 unemployment.	 While	 central	 banks	 have	 operational	
control	over	monetary	policy,	other	aspects	of	macroeconomic	policy	lie	beyond	
their	remit,	including	fiscal	policy,	public	debt	management,	and	tax	policies.	To	
the	 extent	 that	 macroeconomic	 performance	 is	 affected	 by	 such	 policies,	
central	banks’	capacity	 in	relation	to	financial	stability	 is	also	a	function	of	the	
supportiveness,	or	otherwise,	of	decisions	taken	in	those	domains.		
FISCAL	POLICY,	MONETARY	POLICY	AND	FINANCIAL	STABILITY	
Like	 ‘a	 car	 with	 two	 drivers’,	 monetary	 policy	 and	 fiscal	 policy	 can	 steer	 in	
different	 directions,	 each	 tending	 to	 overcompensate	 for	 the	 other	 (Greider	
1987).	 This	 often	 dysfunctional	 interaction	 has	 profound	 implications	 for	
financial	 stability.	 Since	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 fiscal	 policy	 and	
monetary	policy	have	followed	roughly	similar	paths	in	each	of	the	jurisdictions	
under	discussion.	Fiscal	deficits	increased	markedly	between	2008-10	as	a	result	
of	 automatic	 stabilisers	 (such	 as	 unemployment	 benefits)	 and	 discretionary	
fiscal	 stimulus	 measures.	 Discretionary	 stimulus	 measures	 were	 larger	 in	 the	
United	 States	while	 automatic	 stabilisers	were	 larger	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 euro	
area	(Schelkle	2012).	Then	in	2010,	fiscal	authorities	in	each	jurisdiction	pivoted	
from	stimulus	to	austerity.	The	pace	of	consolidation	was	faster	in	the	UK	than	
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in	the	United	States	or	the	euro	area	as	a	whole,	although	some	peripheral	euro	
area	governments	were	 forced	 into	harsh	austerity	measures	as	 the	condition	
of	 their	bailouts	by	 the	 IMF,	 the	European	Commission	and	ECB	(the	 ‘Troika’).	
The	 contractionary	pressures	 created	by	 these	policies	 left	 central	 banks	with	
little	 choice	 but	 to	maintain	 interest	 rates	 at,	 or	 close	 to,	 zero	 and	 to	 pursue	
unconventional	monetary	 policies	 to	 kick-start	 lending	 and	 stimulate	 demand	
(Stiglitz	2010;	Koo	2011;	Krugman	2013;	Blyth	2013b;	Wolf	2014	among	others).		
This	mix	of	 fiscal	and	monetary	policies	has	produced	a	cocktail	of	 financial	
stability	risks,	which	central	banks	have,	so	far,	been	unable	to	address.	The	low	
interest	 rate	 environment,	 coupled	 with	 the	 availability	 of	 cheap	 funding	 for	
banks	 caused	 equity	 markets	 to	 soar,	 credit	 spreads	 to	 narrow	 and	 market	
volatility	 to	 reach	 historic	 lows,	 even	 as	 real	 macroeconomic	 performance	
remained	 depressed	 (BIS	 2014).	 Some	 influential	 officials	 have	 argued	 that	
central	banks	should	have	responded	by	raising	interest	rates	(see	BIS	2014).	In	
the	United	States,	Jeremy	Stein	(2013,	2014),	a	member	of	the	Federal	Reserve	
Board	until	2014,	argued	forcefully	 that	monetary	policy	would	be	superior	 to	
macroprudential	policy	as	a	means	of	combating	such	risks	because	it	‘gets	in	all	
the	 cracks’.	 That	 is,	 whereas	 the	 efficacy	 of	 macroprudential	 policies	 can	 be	
undermined	by	the	migration	of	financial	activity	into	unregulated	products	and	
markets	 (regulatory	arbitrage),	monetary	policy	affects	 the	 incentives	 for	 risk-
taking	by	all	market	participants.	This	consideration	is	especially	pertinent	in	the	
United	States,	which	has	an	outsized	non-bank	financial	sector.		
The	course	of	 interest	 rates	 in	 recent	years	demonstrates	 that	none	of	 the	
central	banks	under	consideration	have	been	willing	to	use	monetary	policy	 in	
	 297	
this	 way	 (Carney	 2014,	 Draghi	 2013,	 Yellen	 2014).	 These	 central	 banks’	
reluctance	 to	 raise	 rates	was	 reinforced	by	 the	unfortunate	experience	of	 the	
Swedish	Riksbank,	 which	 began	 raising	 interest	 rates	 in	 June	 2010,	 in	 part	 to	
counteract	 perceived	 threats	 to	 financial	 stability.	 This	 episode	 was	 widely	
perceived	to	have	been	a	dramatic	failure,	driving	the	Swedish	economy	into	a	
period	of	deflation	and	undermining	the	central	bank’s	credibility	(Milne	2014).	
Indeed,	 it	 is	 precisely	 these	 adverse	 side	 effects	 of	 using	monetary	 policy	 for	
financial	 stability	 purposes	 that	 provide	 the	 rationale	 for	 central	 banks	 to	
implement	 targeted	 macroprudential	 policies	 to	 ‘lean	 against’	 imbalances	 in	
particular	 asset	 classes	 or	 economic	 sectors	 (Borio	 and	 Shim	 2007;	 N’Diaye	
2009).	 Having	 said	 that,	 it	 is	 far	 from	 clear	 that	 either	 resilience-focused	 or	
countercyclical	macroprudential	policies	have	the	capacity	to	overcome	the	wild	
gyrations	 on	 global	 stock	 exchanges	 and	 massive	 international	 capital	 flows	
induced	by	the	period	of	cheap	money	that	has	prevailed	since	early	2009.	
PUBLIC	DEBT	MANAGEMENT	
Another	 aspect	 of	 macroeconomic	 policy	 affecting	 the	 efficacy	 of	 monetary	
policy	–	and,	in	turn,	central	bank	capacity	in	the	financial	stability	domain	–	is	
public	debt	management.	For	many	years,	managing	the	volume	and	maturity	
of	public	sector	debt	was	a	central	component	of	monetary	policy	(C.	Goodhart	
2012).	From	the	late	1980s,	as	monetary	policy	came	to	focus	solely	on	varying	
short-term	interest	rates	and	public	debt	management	came	to	be	regarded	as	
separate	 from	monetary	 policy.	 Public	 debt	managers	 have	 tended	 to	 pursue	
	 298	
objectives	 similar	 to	 corporate	 treasurers:	 they	 focus	 on	 lowering	 overall	
borrowing	costs	and	diminishing	rollover	and	interest	rate	risk.		
The	advent	of	quantitative	easing	has	brought	public	debt	management	and	
monetary	 policy	 back	 together	 (Chadha	 et	 al.	 2013).	 Quantitative	 easing	
involves	 central	 bank	 purchases	 of	 longer-dated	 government	 securities	 in	
secondary	 bond	 markets.	 One	 of	 the	 main	 channels	 by	 which	 this	 policy	
provides	stimulus	to	the	economy	is	through	the	so-called	‘portfolio	rebalancing	
effect’	 (see	 Joyce	 et	 al.	 2011).	 Central	 banks	 buy	 long-dated	 government	
securities	from	commercial	banks,	which	causes	the	price	of	those	securities	to	
rise	and	their	yields	to	fall.	Banks,	 in	turn,	rebalance	their	portfolios	by	buying	
other	 assets	 to	 substitute	 for	 those	 they	 have	 sold.	 With	 the	 supply	 of	
government	 securities	 newly	 reduced,	 banks	 buy	 substitutes,	 such	 as	 assets	
linked	to	real	estate.	This	raises	prices	and	lowers	yields	in	those	asset	classes	as	
well.	This	is	positive	for	firms	and	households	because	it	raises	the	value	of	their	
assets	 and	 lowers	 the	 costs	 of	 servicing	 their	 debts.	 It	 is	 also	 positive	 from	 a	
financial	 stability	perspective	because	wealthier	 firms	and	households	are	 less	
likely	 to	default	 (although,	as	discussed,	cheap	money	can	create	destabilising	
imbalances	in	global	financial	markets).		
The	conflict	between	quantitative	easing	and	public	debt	management	arises	
because	 fiscal	 authorities	 may	 simultaneously	 sell	 new	 securities	 into	 the	
market,	 thereby	directly	offsetting	the	effects	of	 the	central	bank’s	purchases.	
As	a	recent	study	by	Greenwood	et	al.	 (2014)	highlights,	 this	 is	precisely	what	
has	 happened	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 The	 Treasury	 Department	 has	 a	
longstanding	policy	of	extending	the	maturity	of	US	public	debt,	which	involves	
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issuing	 greater	 quantities	 of	 long-dated	 government	 bonds.	Greenwood	 et	 al.	
(2014:	 12)	 estimate	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 Treasury’s	 maturity	 extension	
programme	has	been	to	offset	the	yield-lowering	effects	of	quantitative	easing	
by	approximately	one	third.	6	To	the	extent	that	public	debt	managers	offset	the	
effects	 of	 quantitative	 easing,	 they	 may	 have	 indirectly	 made	 the	 job	 of	
maintaining	financial	stability	more	difficult.	
OTHER	ECONOMIC	POLICIES	
Several	 other	 areas	 of	 government	 policy	 affect	 central	 banks’	 ability	 to	
maintain	 financial	 stability.	 Two,	 in	 particular,	 are	 worthy	 of	 comment.	 First,	
most	national	taxation	regimes	offer	a	tax	advantage	for	corporations	to	finance	
themselves	with	debt,	rather	than	equity	(see	De	Mooij	2011;	Fleischer	2011).	
This	 is	 because	 companies	 are	 generally	 permitted	 to	 deduct	 debt	 interest	
payments	when	determining	taxable	profits,	but	not	returns	on	equity	(such	as	
dividends	to	shareholders).	The	tax	bias	to	debt	therefore	encourages	firms	to	
become	more	 leveraged,	making	 them	 less	 resilient.	 This	bias	 is	present	 in	all	
three	 of	 the	 jurisdictions	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis.	 However,	 its	magnitude	 is	
greater	in	the	United	States,	mainly	because	the	United	States	has	a	higher	rate	
of	corporate	income	tax	than	most	European	countries	(De	Mooij	2011).	
Second,	 policies	 affecting	 housing	 finance	 also	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 central	
banks’	financial	stability	capacity.	Government	support	for	housing	finance	has	
been	linked	with	amplified	swings	 in	house	prices	and	mortgage	credit	growth	
in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis	 (IMF	 2011).	 Of	 the	 three	 jurisdictions	
considered	in	this	thesis,	government	support	for	housing	finance	is	by	far	the	
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most	pronounced	 in	 the	United	States.	 Just	as	banks	can	deduct	debt	 interest	
from	 corporation	 tax,	 so	 US	 households	 may	 deduct	 mortgage	 interest	
payments	from	their	income	tax.	US	households	also	benefit	from	tax	breaks	on	
property	and	capital	gains	at	the	state	and	 local	 levels,	all	of	which	encourage	
higher	levels	of	household	leverage	(IMF	2011).	Uniquely,	the	United	States	also	
provides	 extensive	 public	 support	 to	 the	 mortgage	 market	 through	 the	
‘government	 sponsored	 enterprises’	 (GSEs),	 Fannie	 Mae	 and	 Freddie	 Mac.	
Nationalised	 in	 2008,	 these	 agencies	 purchase	 and	 securitise	 mortgages	 that	
have	been	 issued	by	banks	 and	other	 finance	 companies.	 They	 are	 statutorily	
required	to	pursue	‘affordable	housing	goals’	which	in	practice	involves	buying	
mortgages	 that	 have	 been	 extended	 to	 lower	 income	 households.	 There	 is	
much	 disagreement	 over	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 GSEs	 –	 and	 government	
participation	in	housing	finance	more	generally	–	contributed	to	the	sub-prime	
mortgage	bubble	 in	 the	United	States	 (see	Financial	Crisis	 Inquiry	Commission	
2011;	Pinto	2010	for	opposing	views;	see	also	Seabrooke	2010).	However,	 the	
GSEs	clearly	contribute	to	household	leverage,	which	other	things	being	equal,	
makes	the	task	of	maintaining	financial	stability	more	difficult.		
In	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 public	 support	 for	 housing	 finance	 is	 much	 less	
significant.	There	is	no	equivalent	in	the	UK	of	GSE’s	and	mortgage	interest	tax	
relief	was	abolished	under	the	Labour	Government	 in	2000.	The	most	notable	
programme	to	support	homeownership	in	recent	years	was	the	so-called	‘Help	
to	 Buy’	 scheme,	 launched	 in	 2013	 (see	 Chapter	 4).	 This	 scheme	 helps	
prospective	 homeowners	 access	 larger	 mortgages.	 Announced	 at	 a	 time	 of	
rapid	 house	 price	 inflation	 in	 the	 Southeast	 of	 the	 country,	 the	 Help-to-Buy	
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scheme	 coincided	 with	 deliberations	 in	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	 FPC	 over	
measures	to	cool	the	housing	market.	While	the	quantity	of	loans	made	under	
the	 Help-to-Buy	 scheme	 was	 small	 and	 FPC	 did	 not	 judge	 it	 to	 constitute	 a	
systemic	 risk	 (Bank	 of	 England	 2014i;	 author	 interview,	 17	 July	 2014,	
Washington	 DC),	 such	 schemes	 clearly	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 undermine	 the	
central	 banks’	 efforts	 to	 contain	 unstable	 housing	 price	 inflation,	 which	 is	
perhaps	 the	 preeminent	 financial	 stability	 risk	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (see	
Turner	2014).	
Within	the	euro	area,	government	support	for	housing	is	also	smaller	than	in	
the	 United	 States.	 However,	 the	 institutional	 features	 of	 housing	 finance	
regimes	 differ	 significantly	 reflecting	 different	 political	 calculations	 around	
spending,	 taxation	 and	 interest	 rates	 (cf.	 Schwartz	 and	 Seabrooke	2008).	One	
feature	 common	 to	 many	 continental	 European	 housing	 finance	 systems	 is	
government	 subsidies	 via	 direct	 contributions	 into	 prospective	 homeowners’	
savings	 accounts.	Many	 European	 governments	 also	 retain	mortgage	 interest	
tax	 relief	 and	 other	 tax	 incentives	 for	 homeownership.	While	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
generalise	across	18	countries,	the	level	of	public	support	for	homeownership	in	
the	euro	area	as	a	whole	exceeds	 the	 level	 in	 the	UK,	at	 least	 in	 terms	of	 the	
range	of	policies	that	support	housing	finance	(see	IMF	2011:	128).		
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TABLE	7:	POLICY	COORDINATION	COMPARED	
	 United	States	 United	Kingdom	 EU	
Domestic	
(regional)	
regulatory	
environment	
• Fragmented	
architecture	and	
dysfunctional	FSOC	
diminishes	capacity	
for	effective	non-
bank	
macroprudential	
policymaking.		
• Largely	centralised	
but	shift	to	‘twin	
peaks’	creates	
potential	overlaps,	
tensions	and	
inefficiencies.		
• SSM	designed	to	
diminish	regional	
coordination	failures.	
• Potential	for	
divergent	national	
supranational	
incentives	remains.		
	
International	
regulatory	
environment	
• Minimally	
constrained	by	Basel	
III	
	
• Minimally	
constrained	by	Basel	
III	
• Absence	of	
international	
coordination	of	
macroprudential	
policy	mitigated	at	
EU	level.	
	
• Minimally	
constrained	by	Basel	
III	
• Absence	of	
international	
coordination	of	
macroprudential	
policy	mitigated	at	
EU	level.	
	
Economic	
policy	
coordination	
• Fiscal	consolidation	+	
monetary	expansion	
à	financial	stability	
risks.	
• Public	debt	
management	at	
cross-purposes	to	
monetary	policy.	
• Adverse	tax	and	
housing	finance	
policies.		
• Fiscal	consolidation	+	
monetary	expansion	
à	financial	stability	
risks.	
• Fiscal	consolidation	+	
monetary	expansion	
à	financial	stability	
risks.	
	
6.5 CONCLUSION	
This	chapter	has	examined	capacity	of	the	Federal	Reserve,	the	Bank	of	England	
and	the	European	Central	Bank	to	maintain	financial	stability	by	evaluating	their	
intermediate	 objectives	 and	 policy	 instruments;	 their	 styles	 of	 policy	
implementation;	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 their	 policies	 are	 coordinated	 with	
other	 authorities	 involved	 in	 economic	 policymaking.	 It	 has	 demonstrated	
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divergences	in	the	intermediate	objectives	and	styles	of	policy	that	each	central	
bank	 has	 been	 pursuing.	 It	 was	 argued	 that	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 predominantly	
resilience-focused	 and	 rules-based	 approach	 is	 likely	 to	 prove	 inferior	 to	 the	
more	 containment-focused	 approaches	 being	 pursued	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	
and	the	euro-area.	The	resilience	approach	places	a	heavy	emphasis	on	banks’	
ex	ante	capital	and	liquidity	buffers	as	the	main	guarantor	of	financial	stability.	
Were	 central	 banks	 willing	 to	 use	 monetary	 policy	 to	 address	 excess	 credit	
growth	 and	 asset	 price	 fluctuations,	 such	 an	 approach	 would	 stand	 a	 better	
chance	of	success.	However,	the	experience	of	recent	years	has	demonstrated	
that	central	bank	interest	rates	are	unlikely	to	be	used	in	this	way.	Indeed,	the	
difficulty	 of	 adjusting	 monetary	 policy	 to	 meet	 financial	 stability	 concerns	
provides	 the	 basic	 rational	 for	 central	 banks	 to	 adopt	 discretionary	
countercyclical	macroprudential	 policies	 to	 address	 localised	or	 sector-specific	
systemic	risks	as	they	arise.		
In	 examining	 policy	 coordination,	 the	 chapter	 highlighted	 the	 particular	
challenges	faced	by	the	Federal	Reserve	as	a	result	of	the	fragmented	nature	of	
the	 US	 regulatory	 landscape.	 The	 size	 of	 the	 non-bank	 financial	 sector	 in	 the	
United	States	and	the	Federal	Reserve’s	institution-focused	regulatory	authority	
makes	 interagency	 policy	 coordination	 particularly	 important.	 Yet	 the	 FSOC,	
which	was	established	to	help	facilitate	interagency	coordination,	has	struggled	
to	 rise	 above	 turf	 battles	 between	 its	 various	members.	 In	 the	 UK,	 domestic	
regulatory	 coordination	poses	 fewer	problems,	although	 the	new	 ‘twin	peaks’	
model	inevitably	risks	leading	to	duplicated	work	and	neglected	risks.	In	the	EU,	
the	 significant	 centralisation	of	 power	within	 the	 ECB	 is	 designed	precisely	 to	
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overcome	 the	 coordination	 challenges	 of	 the	 past.	However,	 it	 remains	 to	 be	
seen	 how	 cooperative	 and	 integrated	 the	working	 relationships	 between	 ECB	
and	NCA	officials	will	prove	to	be	within	the	SSM.	
In	all	three	jurisdictions,	government	fiscal	policy	and	wider	macroeconomic	
conditions	have	exerted	a	strong	 influence	over	 financial	conditions.	Against	a	
backdrop	 of	 fiscal	 consolidation,	 interest	 rates	 have	 been	 stuck	 at	 the	 Zero	
Lower	 Bound	 since	 early	 2009.	 Combined	 with	 unconventional	 central	 bank	
liquidity	 schemes	and	asset	purchases,	 this	has	been	a	major	 source	of	 risk	 in	
financial	markets,	driving	global	asset	prices	higher	and	risk	spreads	narrower,	
even	as	underlying	economic	performance	remained	subdued.	The	fiscal	policy	
stance	 in	 the	United	States	has	been	marginally	more	accommodative	 than	 in	
the	United	Kingdom	or	the	euro	area	and	relatively	strong	US	growth	suggests	
that	the	‘normalisation’	of	monetary	policy	is	likely	to	happen	first	in	the	United	
States.	However,	other	areas	of	US	economic	policy	present	 relatively	 greater	
challenges	to	financial	stability.		In	particular	challenges	from	tax	biases	towards	
debt	 and	 government	 participation	 in	 housing	 finance	 are	 particularly	
pronounced	in	the	United	States.	
Looking	across	the	three	sets	of	conditions,	the	Federal	Reserve	emerges	as	
the	 central	 bank	 with	 the	 least	 capacity	 in	 the	 financial	 stability	 arena,	
notwithstanding	 its	 ample	 human	 and	 analytical	 resources.	 Its	 ability	 to	
maintain	 financial	 stability	 is	 undermined	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 regulatory	
architecture	it	operates	in	and	the	types	of	policy	instruments	it	is	choosing	to	
develop.	 Those	 policies	 are,	 in	 turn,	 partly	 a	 consequence	 of	 its	 narrow	
institution-based	formal	authority	discussed	in	Chapter	4.	The	Bank	of	England	
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emerges	as	the	central	bank	with	the	greatest	financial	stability	capacity.	This	is	
on	account	of	its	balanced	set	of	intermediate	objectives,	the	strong	emphasis	it	
places	on	judgement	and	discretion,	and	the	absence	of	major	domestic	policy	
coordination	 challenges.	 As	 for	 the	 ECB,	 its	 financial	 stability	 capacity	 is	 only	
now	 emerging.	 Its	 strengths	 include	 its	 high	 level	 of	 formal	 autonomy	 (see	
Chapter	4),	which	ensures	that	it	has	the	political	insulation	necessary	to	adopt	
discretionary	 countercyclical	 macroprudential	 policies	 and	 to	 implement	 its	
‘constrained	 discretion’	 approach	 to	 microprudential	 supervision.	 As	 noted,	
however,	 financial	 stability	 and	 macroeconomic	 performance	 are	
interdependent	in	the	long	run.	On	this	account,	the	ECB’s	capacity	to	maintain	
financial	 stability	 in	 future	 is	 clearly	 threatened	by	absence	of	 recovery	 in	 the	
euro	area	and,	no	 less	 importantly,	 the	 continued	 risk	 that	one	or	more	euro	
area	countries	could	leave,	or	be	forced	out	of,	the	single	currency	altogether.		
	
																																																						
1	Leveraged	lending	refers	to	loans	made	to	borrowers	already	heavily	indebted.	
2	One	 of	 the	 key	 developments	 in	 cross-border	 banking	 supervision	 since	 the	
financial	crisis	is	the	establishment	of	Crisis	Management	Groups.	This	emerged	
from	 the	 Financial	 Stability	 Board’s	 ‘Key	 attributes	 of	 effective	 resolution	
regimes	for	financial	institutions’,	published	in	October	2011.	
3	The	 OTS	 was	 roundly	 criticised	 as	 a	 ‘light	 touch’	 regulator	 leading	 to	 its	
abolition	in	the	DFA.	There	is	some	empirical	research	to	suggest	that	it	was	not	
significantly	 more	 light	 touch	 than	 other	 agencies	 (see	 Donelson	 and	 Zaring	
2011).		
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4	In	 securities	 financing	 transactions	 shadow-bank	 entities	 borrow	 funds	 from	
institutional	 investors	 such	 as	 money	 market	 funds,	 lending	 or	 temporarily	
transferring	ownership	of	securities	as	collateral.	A	system	of	minimum	haircuts	
could	limit	the	extent	to	which	banks	and	non-bank	entities	could	use	securities	
financing	transactions	to	boost	their	leverage	(FSB	2013).	
5	Eventually	the	SEC	did	implement	reforms,	although	this	took	more	than	two	
years	 and	 was	 on	 terms	 defined	 by	 the	 SEC	 rather	 than	 the	 FSOC	 (see	 SEC	
2014).	
6	This	 conflict	between	debt	management	operations	and	monetary	policy	did	
not	 arise	 in	 the	 same	 way	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 because	 the	 UK	 Debt	
Management	Office	 had	 no	 equivalent	maturity	 extension	 programme.	 In	 the	
EU,	the	ECB	had	not	launched	a	full-scale	programme	of	quantitative	easing	by	
the	end	of	the	timeframe	considered	in	this	thesis	(December	2014).	
	 307	
7 CONCLUSION	
How	 has	 the	 power	 of	 the	 major	 Western	 central	 banks	 changed	 since	 the	
global	 financial	 crisis?	 The	 central	 argument	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 the	
reorientation	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 and	 the	 European	
Central	Bank	(ECB)	towards	financial	stability	since	the	global	financial	crisis	has	
left	 these	 central	 banks	more	 powerful,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 relations	with	
politicians	 and	 financial	market	 participants	 and	 in	 their	 capacity	 to	maintain	
financial	stability	over	the	medium	term.	However,	the	extent	of	the	change	in	
each	case	has	varied	reflecting	different	local	political,	cultural	and	institutional	
constraints	and	the	differential	dependence	of	societal	actors	–	politicians	and	
financial	 market	 participants	 –	 on	 the	 functions	 that	 these	 central	 banks	
perform.		
To	 substantiate	 these	 claims,	 the	 thesis	 developed	 and	 applied	 a	 threefold	
typology	of	central	bank	power.	This	encompassed:	(1)	authority,	defined	as	the	
ability	 of	 central	 banks	 to	move	policy	 in	 line	with	 their	 own	preferences;	 (2)	
structural	 power,	 defined	 as	 the	 ability	 to	 shape	 the	 contexts	 in	 which	 other	
actors	 perceive	 and	 frame	 their	 preferences;	 and	 (3)	 capacity,	 defined	 as	 the	
ability	 to	attain	 specified	objectives,	whether	 statutorily	defined	or	 set	by	 the	
central	 bank	 itself.	 This	 concluding	 chapter	 highlights	 the	 implications	 of	 the	
research	 for	 understanding	mechanisms	 of	 change	 in	 central	 banking.	 It	 also	
discusses	how	the	power	of	central	banks	can	be	expected	to	develop	in	coming	
years.	Before	turning	to	this	final,	more	future	oriented,	question,	 it	begins	by	
summarising	the	key	findings	of	the	empirical	analysis.	
	 308	
7.1 SUMMARY	OF	FINDINGS	
The	thesis	set	out	 to	answer	the	three	specific	 research	questions	specified	 in	
the	introduction.	These	were:		
1. How	 has	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 major	 advanced	 economy	 central	 banks	 to	
determine	policies	 in	 line	with	 their	own	preferences	changed	since	 the	
onset	of	the	financial	crisis?	
2. What	 has	 enabled	 these	 central	 banks	 to	 exert	 greater	 authority	 over	
their	key	interlocutors	since	the	financial	crisis?		
3. How	 capable	 are	 these	 central	 banks	 of	 achieving	 their	 objectives,	
particularly	those	relating	to	financial	stability?	
These	 questions	 were	 considered	 sequentially	 in	 Chapters	 4-6	 of	 the	 thesis.	
Chapter	4	argued	that	all	three	central	banks	have	emerged	from	the	crisis	with	
an	 enhanced	 ability	 to	 determine	 policies	 in	 line	with	 their	 own	 preferences,	
without	 yielding	 to	 the	 preferences	 of	 executive	 or	 legislative	 politicians	 or	
financial	market	participants.	It	explored	the	changing	authority	of	each	central	
bank,	distinguishing	 in	particular	between	the	formal	(or	de	jure)	and	 informal	
(or	de	facto)	elements	of	authority.	However,	it	revealed	that	the	extent	of	the	
disjuncture	with	 the	 pre-crisis	 status-quo	 ante	has	 varied	 considerably	 across	
the	three	cases.	
Chapter	 5	 identified	 the	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 this	 variegated	
expansion	 of	 central	 bank	 authority	 had	 taken	 place.	 A	 two-step	 explanation	
was	 offered.	 First,	 transgovernmentally	 networked	 central	 bankers	 acted	 as	
policy	 entrepreneurs	 (Kingdon	 2011	 [1984])	 in	 their	 respective	 jurisdictions,	
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making	 the	 case	 for	 reform	 and	 drawing	 for	 support	 on	 the	 rapidly	 formed	
technocratic	consensus	around	macroprudential	policy	that	emerged	in	2008-09	
(Baker	2013a).	The	variegated	delegation	of	 financial	 stability	policy	 to	central	
banks	after	the	financial	crisis	was	the	product	of	policy	differences	within	the	
epistemic	 community	 of	 central	 bankers	 and	 the	 differential	 ‘translation’	
(Campbell	 2004)	 of	 new	 macroprudential	 policy	 ideas	 into	 local	 institutional	
terrains.	The	second	step	in	the	explanation	involved	examining	the	underlying	
structural	 relations	between	these	central	banks	and	their	key	 interlocutors	 in	
financial	markets	and	governments.	It	was	argued	that	central	banks’	structural	
power	 peaked	 as	 both	 market	 participants	 and	 politicians	 became	 highly	
dependent	on	the	unique	money-creating	function	that	central	banks	perform.	
In	Chapter	6	the	analysis	turned	away	from	central	banks’	‘power	over’	other	
actors	 (the	 relational	view),	 towards	 their	 ‘power	 to’	 achieve	 their	 objectives,	
especially	as	regards	 financial	stability	 (the	empowerment	view).	 It	highlighted	
three	 key	 categories	 of	 factors	 that	 have	 impacted	 central	 banks’	 capacity	 in	
relation	to	financial	stability:	their	‘intermediate’	policy	objectives;	their	‘styles’	
of	policy	implementation;	and	their	particular	challenges	with	respect	to	policy	
coordination.	 It	was	argued	that	all	 three	central	banks	have	more	capacity	to	
maintain	 financial	 stability	 than	 they	 did	 prior	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Again,	
however,	marked	differences	between	the	three	central	banks	were	identified.	
The	remainder	of	this	section	summarises	the	key	findings	for	each	central	bank	
and	the	differences	between	them.		
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7.1.1 THE	FEDERAL	RESERVE	
The	 Federal	 Reserve	 emerged	 from	 the	 financial	 crisis	 having	 undergone	 the	
least	 overall	 change	 from	 the	 pre-crisis	 status	 quo	 ante.	 As	 the	 longstanding	
supervisor	of	bank	holding	companies	and	certain	other	state-chartered	banks,	
the	Federal	Reserve	was	 the	only	one	of	 the	 three	central	banks	 to	enter	 the	
crisis	already	playing	a	substantive	role	in	prudential	regulation	and	supervision.	
The	scope	of	the	Federal	Reserve’s	supervisory	umbrella	was	extended,	in	part	
because	 of	 the	 conversion	 of	Wall	 Street	 investment	 banks	 into	 bank	 holding	
companies,	and	in	part	by	provisions	in	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	(DFA)	to	place	other	
systemically	important	firms	under	its	supervision.	Yet	the	Fed	gained	few	new	
formal	 powers	 in	 respect	 of	macroprudential	 policy.	 Overall	 responsibility	 for	
this	 policy	 domain	 was	 delegated	 to	 the	 multi-agency	 Financial	 Stability	
Oversight	 Council,	 which	 is	 chaired	 by	 the	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Treasury.	 What	
formal	authority	 the	Fed	does	possess	 in	 the	macroprudential	domain	derives	
from	 its	 responsibility	 for	 supervising	 systemically	 important	 firms.	As	 regards	
crisis	management,	the	Federal	Reserve’s	formal	authority	was,	in	fact,	slightly	
diminished.	 The	 DFA	 introduced	 new	 prohibitions	 on	 the	 Fed’s	 liquidity	
provision	to	non-bank	financial	institutions	and	an	unprecedented	requirement	
for	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	to	approve	new	emergency	lending	from	the	
Fed	to	non-bank	financial	 institutions.	The	Federal	Reserve	was	also	subject	to	
new	transparency	requirements	regarding	its	emergency	lending	facilities.		
Notwithstanding	the	limited	nature	of	the	changes	to	its	formal	authority,	it	
was	revealed	that	the	Federal	Reserve	has	adopted	a	more	authoritative	stance	
in	 its	 relationships	 with	 financial	 market	 participants	 since	 the	 onset	 of	 the	
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financial	 crisis.	 Although	 it	 has	 faced	 public	 criticism	 for	 alleged	 supervisory	
failings	 and	 for	 the	 generosity	 of	 its	 emergency	 lending	 programmes,	 the	
Federal	 Reserve	 has	 adopted	 a	 tough	 stance	 in	 the	 negotiation	 and	
implementation	 of	 prudential	 policies,	 relative	 both	 to	 other	 US	 regulatory	
agencies	and	some	European	jurisdictions	(Bair	2012).	This	suggests	the	Federal	
Reserve	 is	 not	 ‘captured’	 by	 financial	 sector	 interests,	 as	 some	 have	 alleged	
(Bernstein	2014).	
In	other	areas,	the	Federal	Reserve’s	de	facto	authority	appeared	unchanged.	
For	example,	it	has	exhibited	no	special	influence	over	the	course	of	fiscal	policy	
since	 the	 crisis.	 The	 thesis	 noted	 that	 Federal	 Reserve	 and	 the	 Executive	 had	
worked	hand	in	glove	during	and	after	the	financial	crisis	with	little	evidence	of	
policy	divergences.	 In	 light	of	 the	prolonged	period	of	ultra-low	 interest	 rates,	
this	 closeness	has	 spurred	 some	 commentators	 to	decry	 the	end	of	 the	 Fed’s	
independence	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Meltzer	 2013).	 However,	 the	 thesis	 argued	
that	 the	 real	 test	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 de	 facto	 authority	 remains	
prospective.	 Should	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 begin	 to	 raise	 interest	 rates	 and	 exit	
from	 quantitative	 easing	 before	 any	 significant	 uplift	 in	 inflation	materialises,	
such	claims	will	have	proven	unfounded.	
The	reforms	in	the	United	States	were	driven	by	an	alliance	between	central	
bankers	 and	 the	 recently	 installed	 Obama	 administration.	 This	 coalition	 of	
actors	 sought	 to	 defend	 and	 promote	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 interests	 in	 a	
political	 and	 institutional	 environment	 that	 was	 not	 propitious	 for	 radical	
reform.	 Populist	 suspicion	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 –	 a	 hardy	 perennial	 of	 US	
political	culture	–	was	in	full	bloom	at	the	time	of	the	negotiations	over	the	DFA.	
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The	fragmented	and	complex	architecture	of	financial	supervision	in	the	United	
States	also	guaranteed	ample	bureaucratic	opposition	to	a	major	expansion	of	
Federal	 Reserve	 power.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 key	 policymakers	 in	 the	 Federal	
Reserve	 and	 the	 administration	 played	 down	 the	 importance	 and	 viability	 of	
countercyclical	policies	–	a	stance	reflective	of	the	broad	scepticism	of	 ‘statist’	
financial	 policies	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 The	 reluctance	 to	 break	 with	 the	
traditional	 institution-focused	 and	 rules-based	 approach	 to	 financial	 stability	
helped	 to	 ensure	 the	 relative	 continuity	 of	 regulatory	 and	 supervisory	
arrangements	in	the	United	States	as	compared	to	the	changes	implemented	in	
the	United	Kingdom	and	the	euro	area.	
This	 relative	 continuity	 should	 not	 overshadow	 the	 enhancement	 of	 the	
Federal	Reserve’s	authority	in	absolute	terms.	As	discussed,	the	Federal	Reserve	
adopted	a	considerably	more	prudent	stance	in	its	relations	with	firms	after	the	
crisis.	 The	 Fed’s	 heightened	de	 facto	authority	was	 a	 product	 of	 its	 amplified	
structural	power	vis-à-vis	financial	markets.	Long-term	structural	changes	in	the	
nature	 of	 financial	 intermediation	 in	 the	 United	 States	 led	 to	 increased	
dependence	 of	 banks	 and	 non-bank	 financial	 institutions	 on	 flighty	wholesale	
sources	of	 funding.	While	 these	 transformations	 created	an	 illusion	of	 infinite	
liquidity	(Nesvetailova	2010:	4),	 in	fact	they	had	increased	the	extent	to	which	
banks	 and	 connected	 shadow-bank	 entities	 relied	 implicitly	 on	 public	 safety	
nets,	 including	 the	 liquidity	 insurance	provided	by	 the	 Fed.	 The	extent	of	 this	
reliance	became	apparent	during	 the	 financial	 crisis,	when	wholesale	 liquidity	
evaporated	and	the	Federal	Reserve	extended	vast	loans	to	banks	and	non-bank	
financial	institutions,	warehousing	their	‘toxic’	assets	on	its	own	balance	sheet.		
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The	Fed	was	able	to	do	so	mainly	because	it	has	the	monopoly	right	to	create	
new	 base	 money	 ‘out	 of	 thin	 air’.	 Yet	 such	 an	 action	 was	 not	 within	 the	
capability	of	just	any	central	bank.	The	Federal	Reserve	took	on	the	liabilities	of	
the	financial	sector	only	after	the	Federal	government	agreed	to	indemnify	it	for	
losses.	 Central	 banks	 cannot	 become	 bankrupt,	 since	 they	 can	 always	 print	
more	money	to	meet	their	liabilities	as	they	fall	due	(see	Stella	2005;	Archer	and	
Moser-Boehm	 2013;	 Caruana	 2013).	 However,	 the	 pervasive	 misconception	
that	they	can	meant	that	only	a	central	bank	backed	by	the	deep	pockets	of	a	
large	advanced	economy	taxpayer	base	could	perform	this	function	without	its	
credibility	as	a	defender	of	‘sound	money’	principles	being	called	into	question.		
Notwithstanding	 the	 absolute	 increase	 in	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 authority,	
the	 thesis	 cast	 doubt	 on	 its	 capacity	 to	 maintain	 financial	 stability	 in	 the	
medium	term.	The	Federal	Reserve	has	focused	on	enhancing	the	resilience	of	
banks	and	other	systemically	important	financial	institutions.	To	this	end,	it	has	
strengthened	 the	 quantity	 and	 quality	 of	 capital	 in	 the	 banking	 sector,	 taken	
steps	to	decrease	banks’	reliance	on	wholesale	sources	of	funding	and	adopted	
measures	to	end	the	phenomena	of	too-big-to-fail.	While	these	changes	are	an	
obvious	 improvement	 on	 the	 pre-crisis	 regulatory	 framework,	 the	 Federal	
Reserve	 has	 so	 far	 refrained	 from	 taking	 actions	 to	 mitigate	 time-varying	
systemic	 risks	 to	 financial	 stability.	 As	 such,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 resilience-
focused	approach	stands	at	odds	with	arguably	the	key	regulatory	lesson	of	the	
financial	 crisis,	 namely,	 that	 institution-specific	 policies	 need	 to	 be	
supplemented	with	systemic	measures	that	curb	the	build-up	of	risk	across	the	
financial	cycle.		
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In	 line	 with	 its	 longstanding	 preference,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 has	 also	
adopted	 a	 mainly	 ‘rules-based’	 approach	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 financial	
stability	policy.	The	preference	for	rules	over	discretion	is	predicated	on	a	belief	
that	 tying	 regulators	 to	 explicit	 rules	 leads	 to	 improved	 transparency,	 more	
efficient	 allocation	 of	 capital	 in	 financial	 markets	 and	 improved	 financial	
stability.	 This	 set	 of	 beliefs,	 which	was	 characteristic	 of	 pre-crisis	 thinking	 on	
financial	 regulation,	 augurs	 against	 the	 adoption	 of	 countercyclical	measures,	
which	are	inherently	more	discretionary.		
The	thesis	suggested	that	the	capacity	of	 the	Federal	Reserve	 in	relation	to	
financial	 stability	 is	 also	 constrained	 by	 aspects	 of	 the	macroeconomic	 policy	
environment	in	which	it	is	embedded.	Fiscal	policy	in	the	United	States	has	been	
generally	 contractionary	 since	 2010,	 albeit	 less	 so	 than	 in	 many	 European	
countries.	 In	 such	 circumstances,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 has	 been	 effectively	
forced	 to	 maintain	 interest	 rates	 at	 rock-bottom	 levels	 whilst	 aggressively	
pursuing	other	options	–	such	as	quantitative	easing	–	aimed	at	stimulating	the	
economy	 by	 increasing	 asset	 prices	 and	 making	 credit	 cheaper.	 Quite	 apart	
from	 its	 iniquitous	 distributional	 consequences,	 there	 are	 reasons	 to	 believe	
that	this	monetary	policy	stance	has	resulted	 in	considerable	financial	stability	
risks,	 as	 investors	 have	 shifted	 into	 riskier	 assets	 in	 a	 ‘search	 for	 yield’	 (BIS	
2014).	With	some	justification,	the	Federal	Reserve	has	been	unwilling	to	raise	
interest	rates	to	tackle	financial	stability	risks,	given	the	potential	for	collateral	
damage	to	the	wider	US	economy.	However,	this	monetary	policy	stance	makes	
the	absence	of	countercyclical	macroprudential	policies	in	the	United	States	all	
the	more	of	an	omission.	
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7.1.2 THE	BANK	OF	ENGLAND	
The	Bank	of	England	has	been	through	a	more	transformative	change	than	the	
Federal	Reserve,	gaining	many	new	formal	competencies.	With	the	dissolution	
of	 the	 Financial	 Services	 Authority	 (FSA),	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 became	 solely	
responsible	for	the	microprudential	supervision	of	banks,	 insurance	companies	
and	large	investment	firms	headquartered	in	the	United	Kingdom.	The	Bank	of	
England	 also	 gained	 sole	 responsibility	 for	 conducting	macroprudential	 policy.	
Its	 new	 Financial	 Policy	 Committee	 was	 entrusted	 with	 making	
recommendations	and	binding	directions	 to	 the	FSA’s	successor	organisations,	
one	 of	 which,	 the	 Prudential	 Regulation	 Authority	 (PRA),	 is	 in	 any	 case	 a	
subsidiary	 of	 the	 Bank.1	As	 regards	 crisis	 management,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	
faced	no	new	restrictions	on	its	ability	to	act	as	lender	of	last	resort	and	it	was	
delegated	the	authority	to	act	as	the	UK	resolution	authority.		
Partially	offsetting	this	expansion	of	the	Bank	of	England’s	authority	were	a	
number	 of	 governance	 reforms	 that	 aimed	 to	 increase	 its	 accountability.	 This	
included	 the	 innovation	 of	 annual	 letters	 from	 HM	 Treasury	 to	 the	 Bank,	
whereby	the	former	provides	guidance	as	to	how	the	latter	should	interpret	its	
financial	stability	mandate.	The	government	also	introduced	a	new	mechanism	
whereby	HM	Treasury	will	be	able	to	suspend	the	independence	of	the	Bank	of	
England	 in	 a	 future	emergency	 situation.	However,	 it	 is	 questionable	whether	
this	mechanism	will	prove	to	be	a	meaningful	ex	post	constraint	on	the	Bank	of	
England’s	 autonomy.	As	discussed	 in	Chapter	3,	 existing	 legal	mechanisms	 for	
intervening	 in	 the	 Bank’s	 operations	 have	 tended	 to	 be	 used	 so	 rarely	 as	 to	
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become	 inoperable	 (since	 doing	 so	 would	 risk	 sending	 highly	 destabilising	
signals	to	the	markets).		
Like	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 has	 adopted	 a	 ‘hawkish’	
approach	 in	 international	and	EU-level	negotiations	over	prudential	 regulation	
and	 in	 its	 domestic	 implementation	 of	 international	 and	 European	 standards.	
This	 provides	 evidence	 of	 the	 Bank’s	 heightened	 relational	 power	 vis-à-vis	
financial	 market	 participants.	 Also	 in	 common	 with	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 the	
Bank	 has	 not	 exhibited	 greatly	 enhanced	 influence	 over	 domestic	
macroeconomic	debates	or	other	areas	of	government	economic	policy,	such	as	
housing.	While	 there	 have	 been	 occasional	 skirmishes	 between	 the	 Bank	 and	
the	government	–	with	the	disagreements	between	Governor	Mervyn	King	and	
Chancellor	Alastair	Darling	in	2007-2010	being	the	most	obvious	examples	–	the	
Bank’s	ability	to	shape	macroeconomic	policies	outside	its	immediate	monetary	
policy	and	financial	stability	remit	does	not	appear	markedly	greater	than	it	did	
prior	to	the	financial	crisis.	
The	factors	underlying	the	expansion	of	the	Bank	of	England’s	authority	were	
similar	to	those	underlying	the	changes	affecting	the	Federal	Reserve.	As	in	the	
United	States,	the	Bank	of	England	allied	with	a	recently	installed	administration	
to	 promote	 its	 own	 role	 in	 financial	 stability.	 However,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 US	
case,	the	political	and	institutional	terrain	provided	this	coalition	more	space	to	
exert	 its	agency.	The	less	fragmented	nature	of	the	UK	regulatory	architecture	
meant	that	the	bureaucratic	opponents	to	a	major	organisational	overhaul	were	
few.	 Moreover,	 the	 one	 agency	 that	 might	 have	 been	 expected	 to	 mount	 a	
vigorous	 defence	 of	 the	 organisational	 status	 quo,	 the	 FSA,	 declared	 itself	
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ambivalent	 to	 its	 fate	 (Turner	 2009b:	 18).	 Central	 bankers	 in	 the	 United	
Kingdom	were	able	to	point	to	the	emerging	technocratic	consensus	within	the	
transgovernmental	network	of	central	bankers	and	related	policy	experts	on	the	
merits	 and	 necessity	 of	 operationalising	macroprudential	 policy.	 At	 the	 same	
time,	the	recently	 installed	Conservative-Liberal	Democrat	coalition,	convinced	
of	 the	 case	 for	 reform,	 faced	 few	 substantive	 obstacles	 to	 the	 execution	 of	 a	
major	organisational	overhaul.		
As	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 de	 facto	 authority	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 in	
relation	 to	 banks	 and	 financial	 market	 participants	 was	 bolstered	 by	 the	
heightened	 dependence	 of	 those	 actors	 on	 its	 liquidity	 support.	 Credit	
intermediation	in	the	United	Kingdom	is	dominated	by	a	small	number	of	global	
banks,	 which	 were	 especially	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 disruptions	 in	 global	 financial	
markets.	 As	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 stepped	 in	 to	 support	 these	 banks,	 their	
bargaining	 power	 was	 reduced;	 any	 notion	 that	 they	 would	 relocate	 their	
activities	to	more	favourable	jurisdictions	was	at	least	temporarily	dispelled.		
The	 thesis	 presented	 a	 cautiously	 optimistic	 view	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	
potential	 to	maintain	 financial	 stability	 in	 the	medium	 term.	 The	 Bank	 stands	
out	 from	 its	US	counterpart	as	having	 implemented	a	 range	of	countercyclical	
macroprudential	policies.	This	includes	the	early	implementation	of	the	Basel	III	
countercyclical	 capital	 buffer,	 measures	 to	 dampen	 excessive	 leverage	 in	 the	
housing	 sector	 and	 efforts	 to	 boost	 lending	 during	 the	 recession	 by	 lowering	
banks’	 reserve	 requirements.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 relatively	 low	 credit	 growth	
overall,	most	of	 these	measures	have	been	calibrated	 to	have	 little	 impact	 so	
far.	Still,	putting	the	requisite	analytical	and	governance	frameworks	in	place	for	
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the	use	of	such	tools	makes	it	more	likely	that	the	Bank	will	use	them	when	the	
cycle	turns.	The	Bank	of	England’s	financial	stability	capacity	is	also	enhanced	by	
its	 preference	 for	 discretion-based	 policy	 implementation;	 this	 ensures	 it	 has	
the	 latitude	 to	 act	 on	 less	 than	 perfect	 information	 and	 where	 firms	 comply	
with	the	letter	but	not	the	spirit	of	regulations.		
As	 regards	 policy	 coordination,	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 faces	 the	 same	 key	
constraint	 as	 its	 US	 counterpart.	 The	 commitment	 of	 the	 UK	 government	 to	
fiscal	austerity	has	left	the	Bank’s	Monetary	Policy	Committee	with	little	option	
but	to	maintain	rates	at	the	Zero	Lower	Bound	for	an	extended	period	of	time.	
This	 is	 a	 source	 of	 systemic	 risk	 and	 increases	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 Bank’s	
systemic	countercyclical	policies.	Other	aspects	of	policy	coordination	are	more	
favourable.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 the	 Bank	 is	 situated	 in	 a	
relatively	 benign	 domestic	 regulatory	 environment.	 Whereas	 the	 Federal	
Reserve	 must	 coordinate	 its	 efforts	 with	 more	 than	 100	 federal	 and	 state	
regulatory	agencies,	the	Bank	of	England	shares	the	domestic	regulatory	space	
with	only	one	other	major	player,	namely	the	Financial	Conduct	Authority	(FCA).		
While	there	are	some	overlaps	between	the	Bank’s	prudential	mandate	and	the	
role	 of	 the	 FCA	 in	 protecting	 consumers,	 ensuring	 market	 integrity	 and	
promoting	 competition,	major	 policy	 divergences	 between	 the	 regulators	 are	
yet	to	emerge.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	Bank	has	a	completely	free	hand	when	
it	 comes	 to	 prudential	 regulation.	 Its	 freedom	 to	 create	 new	 financial	
regulations	is	constrained	by	the	requirement	to	comply	with	a	detailed	body	of	
increasingly	 harmonised	 European	 financial	 legislation.	 Elements	 of	 this	
regulation	 clash	 with	 the	 Bank’s	 preferences,	 but	 within	 the	 Single	 European	
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Market	 it	 has	 limited	mechanisms	 to	mitigate	 any	 adverse	 effects	 this	 might	
have	on	financial	stability.	
7.1.3 THE	EUROPEAN	CENTRAL	BANK	
Like	 the	 Bank	 of	 England,	 the	 ECB	 has	 also	 been	 through	 rapid,	
transformational,	change	in	recent	years.	In	the	microprudential	policy	domain,	
the	ECB	has	become	the	central	hub	in	the	new	Single	Supervisory	Mechanism	
(SSM),	 which	 also	 comprises	 the	 national	 microprudential	 supervisors	 of	
participating	member	states.	Within	the	SSM,	approximately	130	of	the	largest	
or	 most	 systemically	 ‘significant’	 banks	 are	 supervised	 from	 the	 ECB’s	 newly	
created	 supervisory	 arm	 in	 Frankfurt.	 This	 represents	 a	 giant	 leap	 towards	
supranationalised	financial	services	governance	in	the	euro	area.	For	the	ECB,	it	
is	a	transformation	every	bit	as	significant	as	the	creation	of	the	PRA	was	for	the	
Bank	of	England.		
However,	the	ECB	enjoys	less	formal	authority	in	the	macroprudential	domain	
than	 the	 Bank	 of	 England.	 The	 ECB	 plays	 a	 dominant	 role	 in	 the	 European	
Systemic	 Risk	 Board	 (ESRB),	 which	 is	 an	 EU-wide	 intergovernmental	 body	
composed	 of	 national	 central	 banks	 and	 an	 array	 of	 officials	 of	 EU	 level	
organisations.	Yet	 the	ESRB	has	 limited	 formal	authority	of	 its	own.	The	ECB’s	
macroprudential	authority	within	 the	SSM	 is	also	constrained.	 It	 shares	power	
with	 the	 new	 national	 macroprudential	 authorities	 of	 participating	 member	
states	 in	 a	 complex	 institutional	 arrangement	 also	 involving	 the	 European	
Commission	and	the	European	Council.	 Like	 the	Federal	Reserve,	 the	ECB	also	
gained	little	new	formal	authority	in	respect	of	crisis	management.	While	it	will	
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be	 responsible	 for	 determining	 when	 a	 bank	 has	 reached	 the	 point	 of	
resolution,	 responsibility	 for	 actually	 carrying	 out	 a	 resolution	 rests	 with	 the	
new	Single	Resolution	Mechanism	(SRM).		
The	 ECB	had	only	 recently	 begun	 its	 banking	 supervision	operations	 at	 the	
end-point	of	the	timeframe	considered	in	this	thesis	(early	2015).	This	made	a	
full	 assessment	 of	 its	de	 facto	 authority	 relative	 to	 banks	 and	 other	 financial	
market	 institutions	more	difficult.	However,	 it	was	not	 too	early	 to	assess	 the	
ECB’s	 de	 facto	 authority	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 executive	 politicians	 of	 euro	 area	
governments.	 Following	 the	 eruption	 of	 the	 European	 sovereign	 debt	 and	
banking	 crisis	 in	 2011,	 the	 ECB	 has	 clearly	 demonstrated	 its	 strength.	 On	 the	
one	 hand,	 it	 has	 pursued	 expansionary	 monetary	 policies	 such	 as	 Outright	
Monetary	 Transactions	 and,	 latterly,	 quantitative	 easing,	 which	 have	 been	
opposed	in	Germany,	the	euro	area’s	largest	and	most	powerful	member	state.	
On	the	other	hand,	it	has	taken	the	unprecedented	step	of	making	its	assistance	
to	 crisis-struck	 Southern	 European	 debtor	 countries	 explicitly	 conditional	 on	
those	 countries’	 governments	 agreeing	 to	 stringent	 fiscal	 austerity	 and	
neoliberal	structural	reforms.	This	is	an	unparalleled	expansion	of	the	power	of	
a	central	bank	over	democratically	elected	politicians.	
In	 the	 EU,	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 SSM	 followed	 years	 of	 incremental	
reform	in	banking	regulation	and	supervision.	It	was	led	and	promoted	first	and	
foremost	by	the	leadership	of	supranational	policymakers,	including	the	ECB	(De	
Rynck	2015).	However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	SSM	was	made	possible	only	
by	a	 ‘series	of	 structural	 realignments’	 in	 the	positions	of	key	member	 states,	
above	 all	 France,	 Germany	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 which	 for	 their	 own	
	 321	
reasons	ceased	their	opposition	to	greater	supranational	integration	of	banking	
regulation	and	supervision	(cf.	Veron	2014).		
As	in	the	other	two	cases,	the	ECB’s	de	facto	authority	in	relation	to	financial	
market	 actors	 has	 been	 underpinned	 by	 the	 structural	 dependence	 of	 those	
actors	on	its	liquidity	provision.	The	ECB	became	an	essential	component	in	the	
European	 intermediation	 system;	 as	 Northern	 European	 financial	 institutions	
drew	back	from	Southern	European	peripheral	countries,	the	ECB	stepped	up	its	
support	 to	 those	 countries’	banks.	A	key	difference	between	 the	ECB	and	 the	
other	 two	central	banks	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 the	ECB	also	enjoyed	
greatly	 enhanced	 structural	 power	 in	 relation	 to	 executive	 politicians.	 While	
national	executive	politicians	in	all	three	jurisdictions	became	more	dependent	
on	 their	 central	banks	during	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 certain	 crisis-struck	Southern	
European	governments	have	at	 times	been	wholly	 reliant	on	 the	ECB	 to	 keep	
their	sovereign	borrowing	costs	from	driving	them	into	default.	Likewise,	the	so-
called	 ‘doom-loop’	 that	 emerged	 between	 the	 creditworthiness	 of	 European	
governments	and	 the	 solvency	of	 their	 respective	banks	 further	 increased	 the	
structural	 power	 of	 the	 ECB,	 which	 could	 effectively	 dictate	 whether	 or	 not	
certain	countries’	banks	would	be	able	to	open	for	business	from	one	day	to	the	
next.	 In	making	 its	 assistance	 to	 Southern	 European	 countries	 conditional	 on	
swingeing	austerity	and	supply-side	reforms,	the	ECB	converted	this	structurally	
advantageous	position	into	direct,	coercive,	overt	power.		
Given	the	timing	of	the	SSM	reforms,	it	is	too	early	to	make	a	full	assessment	
of	the	ECB’s	capacity	in	relation	to	financial	stability.	Like	the	Bank	of	England,	
the	 ECB	 appears	 set	 to	 balance	 the	 intermediate	 objectives	 of	 resilience	 and	
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countercyclicality.	 The	 ESRB	 –	 in	 which	 the	 ECB	 is	 dominant	 –	 has	 pushed	
member	 states	 to	 develop	 countercyclical	 policy	 frameworks.	 Furthermore,	
leading	 officials	 within	 the	 ECB	 have	 been	 voluble	 in	 their	 support	 for	
countercyclical	policies.	The	ECB	also	looks	set	to	balance	rules	and	discretion	in	
its	 implementation	of	 its	microprudential	and	macroprudential	responsibilities.	
As	 a	 new	 organisation,	 the	 supervisory	 arm	 of	 the	 ECB	 is	 less	 constrained	 by	
legacies	of	past	modes	of	policy	 implementation.	 It	has	 stated	 its	 intention	 to	
adopt	a	‘constrained	judgment’	approach.	However,	much	will	depend	on	how	
its	supervisory	approach	develops	in	light	of	its	intergovernmental	structure	and	
the	 pressures	 of	 ensuring	 consistent	 implementation	 across	 different	
jurisdictions.	Like	the	other	two	central	banks,	the	ECB	must	adapt	to	legislation	
and	regulations	that	are	largely	defined	by	other	actors.	The	ECB’s	supervisory	
arm	implements	the	same	body	of	European	legislation	as	the	Bank	of	England.	
However,	 where	 that	 legislation	 provides	 for	 national	 discretion,	 the	 ECB	 is	
committed	 to	 implementing	 whatever	 options	 have	 been	 exercised	 at	 the	
national	level	by	the	member	states.	Over	time	it	is	to	be	expected	that	the	ECB	
will	 develop	 greater	 regulatory	 capacity	 of	 its	 own,	which,	 other	 things	 being	
equal,	should	benefit	financial	stability.		
As	discussed,	the	ECB	has	enjoyed	a	high	degree	of	authority	and	structural	
power	 vis-à-vis	 executive	 politicians.	 Yet	 its	 ‘power	 over’	 politicians	 has	 not	
translated	into	a	significantly	increased	‘power	to’	maintain	financial	stability.	In	
part,	 this	 is	 because	 the	 ECB	 has	 itself	 been	 a	 major	 proponent	 of	 fiscal	
austerity,	which	–	as	 in	the	US	and	UK	cases	–	has	contributed	to	the	need	to	
maintain	 interest	 rates	 at	 rock-bottom	 levels.	 Indeed,	 the	 ECB	 has	 arguably	
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exercised	 its	 structural	 power	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 undermine	 its	 chances	 of	
maintaining	financial	stability	in	the	medium	term.	In	supporting	contractionary	
fiscal	 policies,	 it	 has	 effectively	 tied	 itself	 to	 an	 ultra-loose	 monetary	 policy	
stance.	In	turn,	this	monetary	policy	is	a	source	of	financial	stability	risks	in	the	
form	of	a	widespread	search	for	yield	amongst	 investors	and	the	continuation	
of	excessive	levels	of	private	sector	indebtedness	across	the	continent.	
7.2 IMPLICATIONS	OF	THE	STUDY	
7.2.1 UNDERSTANDING	CHANGE	IN	CENTRAL	BANKING	
One	 implication	of	the	foregoing	analysis	 is	 the	 importance	of	 focusing	on	the	
mechanisms	by	which	 creative	 and	 reflexive	 agents	 are	 able	 to	 construct	 and	
reconstruct	 the	 institutional	 environments	 in	 which	 they	 operate.	 Consistent	
with	 the	 agent-centred	 historical	 institutionalist	 analytical	 framework	
introduced	 in	Chapter	2,	 the	thesis	 identified	the	agency	of	central	bankers	as	
the	 crucial	 factor	driving	 change	 in	each	case.	Central	bankers	acted	as	policy	
entrepreneurs	 (Kingdon	 2011[1984]),	 advocating	 change	 in	 line	 with	 their	
economic	 beliefs,	 in	 particular	 the	 notion	 that	 central	 banks	 should	 play	 a	
leading	 role	 in	 any	 post-crisis	 strengthening	 and	 reorientation	 of	 financial	
services	 regulation.	 The	 embrace	 of	 macroprudential	 ideas	 was	 partly	 a	
reflection	of	the	changed	political	climate	around	financial	regulation	after	the	
crisis.	 Just	 as	 the	 pre-crisis	 dominant	 interpretive	 frame	 of	 ‘efficient	markets’	
reflected	the	ascendance	of	an	ideology	of	finance	(cf.	Johnson	and	Kwak	2009;	
Baker	2010),	so	central	bankers’	more	prudent	policy	stance	after	the	financial	
crisis	 reflected	the	more	hostile	political	climate	surrounding	 financial	services	
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in	 recent	 years	 (Young	 2013).	 Central	 bankers	 acted	 much	 as	 a	
transgovernmental	 epistemic	 community	 in	 driving	 reforms.	 However,	 the	
specific	 diagnoses	 of	 pre-crisis	 regulatory	 failures	 and	 prescriptions	 for	 policy	
change	 varied	 across	 jurisdictions.	 The	 economic	 ideas	 and	 policy	 proposals	
central	 bankers’	 espoused	 respected	 local	 political,	 cultural	 and	 institutional	
logics.	They	were	a	product	of	ideational	‘bricolage’	(Campbell	2004;	Carstensen	
2011)	 wherein	 ‘new’	 ideas	 came	 to	 rest	 alongside	 ‘old’	 ones,	 even	 at	 the	
expense	of	ontological	coherence.2		
The	 analysis	 also	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 focusing	 on	 the	 distinctive	
national	variations	that	arise	when	new	ideas	and	practices	are	enacted	in	local	
institutional	 environments.	 Borrowing	 from	 Campbell	 (2004:	 79),	 the	 thesis	
employed	the	notion	of	‘translation’	to	describe	the	mechanisms	by	which	new	
ideas,	 principles	 and	 practices	 are	 enacted	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 The	 existing	
institutional	terrains	in	which	central	bankers	operated	ensured	the	outcome	of	
reforms	in	each	jurisdiction	exhibited	distinctive	national	(or	regional)	hues.	The	
relatively	 incremental	nature	of	 the	 reforms	 in	 the	United	States	owed	 to	 the	
fragmented	nature	of	power	within	the	US	political	and	regulatory	architecture,	
which	 all	 but	 ruled	 out	 a	 fundamental	 reorganisation	 of	 the	 architecture	 of	
financial	 supervision.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 regulation	 continued	 to	 focus	 on	
individual	 institutions	 with	 a	 preference	 for	 rules-based	 implementation	 over	
discretion.	 Change	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 was	 more	 discontinuous,	 but	 it	
followed	a	characteristically	British	pattern.	The	top	down	reorganisation	of	the	
architecture	 for	 financial	 supervision	 –	 a	 second	 in	 just	 15	 years	 –	was	made	
possible	because	of	the	exceptionally	powerful	position	of	the	British	executive.	
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At	 the	 same	 time,	UK	 regulators	 –	 relocated	en	masse	 from	 the	 FSA’s	 Canary	
Wharf	headquarters	to	a	new	Bank	of	England	building	in	the	City	of	London	–	
have	 retained	 their	 preference	 for	 discretion-based	 policy	 implementation.	 In	
the	euro	area,	the	ECB’s	supervisory	arm	is	a	new	organisation.	Yet	even	here	
change	 has	 also	 followed	 a	 familiar	 pattern.	 While	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 SSM	
represented	 a	 giant	 leap	 towards	 more	 supranational	 European	 banking	
supervision,	new	organisational	structures	–	including	the	European	Supervisory	
Authorities,	 the	 ESRB,	 the	 ECB’s	 supervisory	 arm	 and	 the	 Single	 Resolution	
Mechanism	–	each	have	 intergovernmental	governance	structures,	 comprising	
officials	from	national	central	banks	and	other	national	‘competent	authorities’.	
In	 this	 regard,	 they	 follow	 the	 increasingly	 prevalent	 ‘new	
intergovernmentalism’	(Bickerton	et	al.	2015;	Howarth	and	Quaglia	2015)	in	EU	
integration,	 in	 which	 member	 states	 delegate	 authority	 not	 to	 traditional	
supranational	organisations	such	as	the	European	Commission,	but	to	de	novo	
bodies	composed	of	national	officials.			
While	change	has	exhibited	distinctive	local	hues,	it	would	be	wrong	to	infer	
that	 institutional	 arrangements	 in	 any	 given	 locality	 are	 fated	 to	 evolve	 along	
pre-determined	 historical	 paths.	 Local	 institutional	 factors	 have	 at	 times	
constrained	 the	 possibilities	 for	 reform,	 but	 the	 policy	 entrepreneurs	
considered	 in	 this	 thesis	 have	 by	 no	 means	 been	 locked	 in	 ‘an	 iron	 cage	 of	
institutions’	 (Crouch	2005:	3).	On	the	contrary,	central	bankers	have	exploited	
existing	institutions	as	resources	from	which	new	institutions	can	be	fashioned.	
An	example	of	this	creativity	is	the	way	in	which	US	central	bankers	–	who	have	
been	more	 constrained	 than	 their	 European	 counterparts	 –	 have	 repurposed	
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their	 existing	 institution-focused	 and	 broadly	 microprudential	 regulatory	
framework	 towards	 ensuring	 systemic	 financial	 resilience.	 Whereas	 pre-crisis	
institution-specific	 policies	were	 focused	mainly	 on	 protecting	 consumers	 and	
taxpayers	from	losses	associated	with	the	failure	of	individual	firms,	post-crisis	
regulation	in	the	United	States	has	concentrated	on	ending	the	phenomenon	of	
too-big-to-fail	 and	 reducing	 the	 complex	 interconnectedness	 between	market	
participants,	which	can	propagate	 instability	 from	one	 firm	 to	 the	next.	While	
this	 thesis	 is	 sceptical	 of	 the	 ability	 of	 resilience-focused	 policies	 to	maintain	
financial	stability	in	the	absence	of	complementary	countercyclical	measures,	it	
is	 important	 to	 recognise	 that	US	regulators	have	 innovated	 to	a	considerable	
extent	within	the	constraints	of	their	existing	regulatory	framework.		
Another	example	of	reflexive	policy	entrepreneurs	using	existing	institutions	
as	 resources	 is	 the	emergence	of	 ‘judgement	based’	supervision	 in	 the	United	
Kingdom.	 As	 discussed,	 the	 institutional	 genealogy	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	
judgement-based	approach	can	be	traced	to	the	‘moral	suasion’	(or	‘governors’	
eyebrows’)	approach	 to	maintaining	standards	of	behaviour	 in	 the	City,	which	
prevailed	during	 the	era	of	 ‘club	 governance’	 lasting	 from	 the	19th	 century	 to	
the	 ‘Big	 Bang’	 in	 the	 1980s	 (Moran	 2003).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 Bank’s	
judgement-based	approach	 is	also	a	 response	to	new	 imperatives	of	 the	post-
crisis	 era,	 in	 particular,	 the	 need	 to	 make	 regulation	 more	 responsive	 to	
innovations	in	financial	markets	and	more	robust	to	errors	arising	from	financial	
risk	modelling.	 Judgement-based	 supervision	 can,	 therefore,	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	
pragmatic	policy	solution	in	which	existing	institutional	and	ideational	resources	
are	recycled	and	put	to	new	uses	(see	McPhilemy	2013:	761).		
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7.1.1 WILL	THE	ENHANCED	POWER	OF	CENTRAL	BANKS	ENDURE?	
The	reforms	of	the	Federal	Reserve,	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	ECB	were	a	set	
of	rapid	–	and	in	many	instances	transformational	–	 institutional	changes,	that	
were	arguably	a	once	 in	a	generation	event.	Each	central	bank	was	delegated	
new	 formal	 powers	 and	 obligations,	 which	 they	 are	 only	 now	 beginning	 to	
implement.	 It	 is	probable	 that	 change	 in	 the	 functions	and	governance	of	 the	
major	 Western	 central	 banks	 will	 follow	 a	 more	 incremental	 dynamic	 in	 the	
coming	 years.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 principal	 agents	 for	 change	 in	 central	
banking	 in	 these	 jurisdictions	 –	 central	 bankers	 themselves	 –	 are	 largely	
satisfied	with	 the	outcome	of	 the	 reforms,	with	 the	partial	exception	of	 some	
senior	officials	at	the	Federal	Reserve,	who	would	have	preferred	to	have	been	
afforded	 a	 leading	 role	 in	 macroprudential	 policy	 (see	 Kohn	 2014b;	 Fischer	
2014).	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	window	of	 opportunity	 opened	 by	 the	 crisis	 –	
including	the	high	level	of	public	salience	of	financial	regulation	and	the	interest	
of	politicians	in	pursuing	major	regulatory	changes	–	is	now	closed.		
To	be	sure,	each	of	the	central	banks	considered	in	this	thesis	faces	a	degree	
of	political	opposition.	In	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	euro	area,	this	opposition	
comes	mainly	from	the	left;	in	the	United	States	it	comes	mainly	from	the	right.	
Political	opposition	to	central	banks	is	manifested	in	each	jurisdiction	in	calls	for	
the	central	bank	to	become	more	accountable	to	politicians	and	the	public.	The	
central	 banks	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis	 have	 a	 tried	 and	 tested	 formula	 for	
responding	 to	 these	 calls:	 namely,	 to	 increase	 transparency,	 in	 particular	 by	
communicating	 decisions	 more	 promptly	 and	 by	 giving	 greater	 information	
about	 the	 analytical	 judgements	 underlying	 their	 actions.	 Still,	 there	 is	 little	
	 328	
indication	 that	 new	 legislative	 changes	 will	 be	 brought	 to	 bear	 to	 curtail	 or	
fundamentally	 readjust	 these	 central	 banks’	 mandates	 in	 the	 medium	 term.	
Importantly,	support	for	the	institution	of	central	bank	independence	–	and	for	
the	 notion	 of	 central	 banks	 as	 depoliticised	 arbiters	 of	 the	 public	 interest	 –	
remains	 exceptionally	 widespread	 within	 mainstream	 political	 parties,	 the	
economics	 profession	 and	 the	 financial	 press.	 In	 all,	 this	 suggests	 that	 the	
formal	 aspects	 of	 these	 central	 banks’	 authority	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 4,	
including	 their	 statutory	 mandates	 and	 the	 formal	 mechanisms	 establishing	
their	autonomy	from	executive	politicians,	are	unlikely	to	be	watered	down	any	
time	soon.			
However,	other	aspects	of	the	augmentation	of	central	bank	power	are	likely	
to	prove	 fleeting.	The	structural	advantages	of	central	banks	vis-à-vis	 financial	
market	participants	peaked	during	 the	 financial	 crisis.	As	banks	have	 repaired	
their	 balance	 sheets,	 they	 have	 become	 less	 dependent	 on	 public	 support	 to	
keep	 them	 in	 business.	 In	 the	 longer-term,	 new	 prudential	 regulations	 have	
been	agreed	 that	 are	 steadily	 (if	 not	 absolutely)	 reducing	 the	 implicit	 support	
that	 banks	 and	 other	 financial	 institutions	 draw	 from	 their	 access	 to	 central	
bank	liquidity	insurance.	New	liquidity	standards	–	the	Net	Stable	Funding	Ratio	
and	the	Liquidity	Coverage	Ratio	–	have	required	banks	to	become	less	reliant	
on	unstable	sources	of	wholesale	funding	and	to	maintain	greater	stocks	of	high	
quality	liquid	assets,	such	as	government	bonds,	which	they	can	easily	exchange	
for	cash	in	a	future	financial	crisis.	Likewise,	changes	in	the	US	Generally	Agreed	
Accounting	Principles	and	the	International	Financial	Reporting	Standards	have	
diminished	 the	 extent	 to	which	 unregulated	 shadow	bank	 entities	 involved	 in	
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securitization	and	other	forms	of	credit	intermediation	can	benefit	from	implicit	
government	 support	 (see	 FSAB	 2009).	 Where	 banks	 ‘sponsor’	 such	 entities,	
either	because	they	established	them	in	the	first	place	or	because	they	provide	
them	with	lines	of	credit	or	liquidity	facilities	on	an	ongoing	basis,	they	are	now	
generally	 required	 to	 account	 for	 those	 entities	 within	 their	 consolidated	
financial	accounts.	Such	entities	are,	therefore,	effectively	subject	to	the	same	
prudential	 requirements	 as	 the	 banks	 themselves	 (see	 FRS	 2010).	 These	
changes	decrease	 the	dependence	of	banks	and	other	 financial	 companies	on	
(implicit	or	explicit)	 central	bank	 support.	 It	 also	means	 that	 such	entities	 can	
more	 credibly	 threaten	 to	 ‘exit’	 jurisdictions	 that	 impose	 regulations	
unfavourable	to	their	preferences.		
Analyses	 of	 structural	 power	 suggest	 that	 stratifications	 of	
interdependencies	between	actors	 tend	 to	have	a	 greater	bearing	on	political	
processes	than	‘influence	peddling’	(cf.	Woll	2014a).	Having	said	that,	the	ability	
of	financial	market	participants	to	influence	central	banks	through	lobbying	and	
persuasion	 is	 likely	 to	 increase	 in	coming	years.	As	memories	of	 the	events	of	
2008	begin	to	fade,	the	high	level	of	public	salience	of	financial	regulation	and	
the	general	hostility	of	Western	publics	towards	financial	institutions	is	likely	to	
subside.	 Public	 attention	 is	 a	 finite	 resource	 and	 other	 issues	 will	 inevitably	
occupy	greater	prominence.	Under	 such	circumstances,	 the	de	 facto	 authority	
of	 central	 banks	 vis-à-vis	 financial	 market	 participants	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 reduced	
further.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 regulatory	 developments	 will	 receive	 less	 scrutiny	
from	the	press	and	public	interest	pressure	groups	than	in	the	immediate	post-
crisis	period.	On	the	other	hand,	the	 lobbying	activity	of	the	financial	sector	 is	
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likely	 to	 be	maintained	 or	 even	 to	 increase	 as	 profits	 recover	 and	 post-crisis	
regulations	take	effect.	
In	 the	 short	 term,	 a	 return	 to	 boom-time	 politicians	 goading	 financial	
regulators	 into	 an	 ever	 lighter	 touch	 is	 perhaps	 unlikely.	 Central	 banks	 are	
generally	 more	 insulated	 from	 political	 pressures	 than	 other	 regulatory	
agencies.	The	strong	societal	support	 for	central	bank	 independence,	 together	
with	the	formal	mechanisms	by	which	autonomy	is	maintained,	such	as	secure	
terms	 of	 office	 for	 central	 bank	 governors,	 provide	 central	 banks	 with	 some	
freedom	 to	 persist	 with	 a	 more	 prudent	 stance	 for	 some	 time	 to	 come.	 Yet	
central	 bankers	 are	by	no	means	 immune	 from	criticism.	 Should	a	major	 firm	
threaten	 to	withdraw	 from	 a	 given	 jurisdiction	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 excessively	
burdensome	 regulation,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 politicians	 will	 refrain	 from	 placing	
pressure	on	their	central	banks	to	change	course,	either	publicly	or	behind	the	
scenes.		
7.1.2 TOWARDS	A	CENTRAL	BANK	LEGITIMACY	CRISIS?	
In	 a	 series	 of	 insightful	 contributions	 on	 the	 emergence	 of	 macroprudential	
policy	frameworks	after	the	financial	crisis,	Baker	(2013a,	2015b;	see	also	Baker	
and	 Widmaier	 2013)	 has	 argued	 that	 countercyclical	 variants	 of	
macroprudential	 policy	 could	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 undermining	 central	 banks’	
popular	 legitimacy.	 His	 argument	 is	 that	 central	 bankers	 will	 become	
overconfident	in	their	ability	to	act	as	a	‘benign	enlightened	regulatory	planner’	
(see	 Baker	 and	 Widmaier	 2013,	 quoting	 Haldane	 2011),	 intervening	 to	 curb	
financial	excesses	wherever	they	find	them.	Baker	(2015b)	describes	this	as	the	
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ultimate	‘central	bankers’	paradox’.	Curbing	the	credit	cycle,	he	argues,	requires	
delegating	 more	 power	 to	 central	 banks,	 which	 in	 turn	 must	 take	 politically	
unpopular	decisions	that	restrict	access	to	credit.	Implementing	such	decisions,	
he	 suggests,	 will	 lead	 the	 public	 and	 politicians	 to	 question	 central	 banks’	
carefully	nurtured	reputations	as	‘apolitical’	technocratic	organisations,	thereby	
undermining	the	viability	of	the	macroprudential	exercise,	which	 is	dependent	
on	the	central	bank	being	seen	as	above	the	political	fray.	
In	focusing	on	the	possibility	of	declining	public	support	for	policies	that	will	
restrict	 borrowers’	 access	 to	 credit,	 Baker’s	 account	 concentrates	 mainly	 on	
central	banks’	‘input’	legitimacy	(Scharpf	1999).	However,	there	is	a	potentially	
more	pressing	and	immediate	concern	for	central	banks:	namely	that	they	will	
face	 a	 crisis	 of	 output	 legitimacy	 if	 they	 fail	 to	 fulfil	 their	 mandates	 of	
maintaining	 financial	 stability.	 As	 the	 financial	 crisis	 recedes	 in	 the	 public	
memory,	and	the	structural	power	of	central	banks	relative	to	financial	market	
actors	 begins	 to	 ebb,	 excessive	 timidity,	 insufficient	 radicalism	 and	 a	 bias	
towards	 inaction	are	arguably	greater	dangers	 to	central	bank	 legitimacy	 than	
hubristic	interventionism.	
As	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 central	 banking	 has	 not	 been	 through	 a	 paradigm	
shift.	Rather,	a	process	of	ideational	and	institutional	bricolage	has	taken	place,	
wherein	 central	 bankers	 have	 pragmatically	 combined	 ontologically	
incompatible	policy	analyses	and	disparate	policy	frameworks.	Central	bankers	
tailored	 their	 particular	messages	 to	 the	 institutional	 and	 political	 climates	 in	
which	they	were	operating.	The	result	is	that	much	pre-crisis	thinking	–	whether	
in	 regards	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 capital	 requirements	 on	 bank	 lending,	 the	
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desirability	of	‘risk-sensitive’	regulation	or	the	ostensible	benefits	of	heightened	
transparency	 on	 economic	 efficiency	 –	 continues	 to	 shape	 the	 design	 and	
implementation	of	post-crisis	financial	regulations.		
The	prevalence	of	pre-crisis	 thinking	 is	most	apparent	 in	resilience-focused,	
rules-based,	approaches	 to	 financial	 regulation.	Resilience-focused	approaches	
are	more	measurable	than	countercyclical	policies,	where	reliable	indicators	of	
systemic	risk	are	scarce.	Likewise,	rules-based	policies	expose	central	banks	to	
fewer	 reputational	 risks	 and	 threats	 of	 legal	 challenge.	 While	 post-crisis	
resilience-focused	 policies	 are	 certainly	 an	 improvement	 on	 pre-crisis	
microprudential	 regulations,	 the	argument	made	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 focusing	
predominantly	or	exclusively	on	 resilience	at	 the	expense	of	 countercyclicality	
adheres	 too	 closely	 to	 the	 failed	 pre-crisis	 orthodoxy,	 in	 which	 ensuring	 the	
safety	 and	 soundness	 of	 individual	 financial	 institutions	 was	 considered	 a	
sufficient	means	of	maintaining	systemic	financial	stability.		
As	 this	 thesis	 has	 documented,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 has	 focused	 almost	
exclusively	 on	 enhancing	 resilience,	 and	 has	 downplayed	 the	 viability	 or	
desirability	 of	 policies	 to	mitigate	 cyclical	 risks	 to	 financial	 stability.	 However,	
neither	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 nor	 the	 ECB	 are	 exclusively	 committed	 to	 the	
countercyclical	 approach.	 As	 Western	 economies	 recover	 and	 the	 political	
climate	 around	 financial	 regulation	 becomes	more	 liberal,	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	
central	 banks	will	 succumb	 to	 the	 risk-aversion	 characteristic	 of	 the	 resilience	
focused	 approach.	 In	 particular,	 there	 is	 a	 danger	 that	 scepticism	 over	 the	
ability	of	policymakers	to	spot	financial	bubbles	(a	view	already	prevalent	within	
the	 Federal	 Reserve)	 and	 a	 fixation	 on	 the	 need	 for	 rigorous	 econometric	
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modelling	 of	 systemic	 risks	 will	 come	 to	 dominate	 thinking	 in	 the	
transgovernmental	 network	 of	 central	 bankers.	 This	 could	 dissuade	 central	
banks	 from	 intervening	 to	mitigate	cyclical	 financial	 stability	 risks,	even	where	
anecdotal	evidence	suggests	action	would	be	warranted	(cf.	Tucker	2014:	5).		
The	 need	 for	 discretion	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 countercyclical	 macroprudential	
policy	suggests	central	banks	will	need	to	give	careful	consideration	to	how	they	
communicate	 their	 actions	 to	 politicians	 and	 the	 wider	 public	 if	 they	 are	 to	
retain	 their	 popular	 legitimacy.	 Yet	 they	 must	 also	 take	 care	 to	 ensure	 that	
anticipating	and	avoiding	adverse	public	reactions	does	not	spill	over	into	a	lack	
of	action	in	the	face	of	emerging	threats.	Having	been	delegated	extensive	new	
competencies,	 central	 banks	 would	 find	 themselves	 with	 few	 excuses	 were	
another	financial	crisis	to	erupt.	In	such	a	scenario,	further	fundamental	reforms	
of	Western	 central	 banks	 and	 a	 return	 to	more	 explicitly	 politicised	 forms	 of	
financial	regulation	cannot	be	discounted.	
	
																																																						
1	The	PRA	is	set	to	become	a	wholly	 incorporated	division	of	the	Bank	 in	2015	
(see	Bank	of	England	2014c).	
2 	Baker	 (2015a)	 highlights	 the	 intellectual	 incoherence	 between	 prevailing	
thinking	on	macroeconomic	policy	and	financial	regulation.	The	argument	made	
here	 is	 that	 even	within	 financial	 regulation	 there	 is	 a	 considerable	degree	of	
intellectual	incoherence,	with	many	pre-crisis	beliefs	continuing	unchallenged.	
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ANNEX	1:	LIST	OF	INTERVIEWS	
Interviews	were	conducted	on	a	non-attributable	basis.	Further	details	available	
on	request.	
		
Title/Role	 Sector	 Date	 Place	
Senior	official	/	
consultant	 Financial	Services	Authority	 06	September	2011	 London	
Policy	officer	
Directorate	General	Internal	
Market	and	Services,	European	
Commission		 30	May	2012	 Brussels	
Policy	officer	
Directorate	General	Internal	
Market	and	Services,	European	
Commission		 31	May	2012	 Brussels	
Policy	officer	
United	Kingdom	
Representative	to	the	
European	Union	(UKREP)	 31	May	2012	 Brussels	
Senior	official	 Bank	of	Spain	 31	October	2012	 Madrid	
Policy	officer	 Bank	of	Spain	 31	October	2012	 Madrid	
Senior	official	
(retired)	/	
academic	
Bank	of	England	(MPC)	/	
Academia	 29	November	2012	 London	
Senior	official	
Bundesanstalt	für	
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht	
(BaFin)	 14	March	2013	 By	phone	
Senior	official	
Economic	and	Financial	
Committee,	European	Council	 19	March	2013	 Brussels	
Senior	official		 ECB,	DG	Research	 22	March	2013	 Frankfurt	
Senior	official	 ECB,	DG	Data	and	Statistics	 23	March	2013	 Frankfurt	
Senior	official	 European	Systemic	Risk	Board	 25	March	2013	 Frankfurt	
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Senior	official	 European	Banking	Authority	 26	March	2013	 London	
Senior	official	
(retired)	 Banque	de	France/IMF	 31	May	2013	 By	phone	
MEP	 European	Parliament	 26	June	2013	 By	phone	
Senior	official	
(deceased)	 International	Monetary	Fund	 15	October	2013	 Oxford	
Senior	official	 Bank	of	England	 07	February	2014	 Brussels	
Policy	officer	
Directorate	General	for	
Economic	and	Monetary	
Affairs,	European	Commission	 07	February	2014	 Brussels	
Private	sector	
economist	
Centre	for	European	Policy	
Studies	 07	February	2014	 Brussels	
Journalist	 Financial	Times	 12	May	2014	 By	phone	
Senior	official	 International	Monetary	Fund	 11	June	2014	 By	phone	
Journalist	 Financial	Times	 10	July	2014	
Washington	
D.C.	
Senior	official	
Board	of	Governors	of	the	
Federal	Reserve		 11	July	2014	
Washington	
D.C.	
Senior	official	 International	Monetary	Fund	 11	July	2014	
Washington	
D.C.	
Senior	official	
Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	New	
York	 15	July	2014	 New	York	
Senior	official	 Office	of	Financial	Research	 16	July	2014	
Washington	
D.C.	
Senior	official	 Office	of	Financial	Research	 16	July	2014	
Washington	
D.C.	
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Consultant/Lobb
yist	 American	Enterprise	Institute	 16	July	2014	
Washington	
D.C.	
Senior	official	
(retired)	
Board	of	Governors	of	the	
Federal	Reserve		 17	July	2014	
Washington	
D.C.	
Private	sector	
economist	 Bruegel	 18	July	2014	
Washington	
D.C.	
Private	sector	
economist	 Group	of	Thirty	 24	July	2014	 By	Skype	
Private	sector	
economist		 Senior	official,	Citigroup	 24	October	2014	 London	
Senior	official	
(retired)	 Former	Bank	of	England	 06	December	2014	 London	
Policy	officer	
Prudential	Regulation	
Authority	 12	December	2014	 London	
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